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
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**THE NEW
ITALIAN ARMY**

**THE EUROPE
OF SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT
INTERVIEW WITH
PROFESSOR
ROMANO PRODI**

**THE ITALIAN CORPS
FOR NATO**



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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS, PARTICULARLY WITH NATO AND EU

**Lecture by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army at the Institute
for High Defence Studies
(Rome, October 12, 2001)**

The purpose of my presentation is to clarify the reasons that led to the organization of the Italian Army in connection with the international commitments. Never before considering the events involving – side by side with the US – such a large part of the international community, has this subject been so crucial, also in the light of the recent developments, whose particular aspects will be fully analyzed. In particular, after a short account of the reasons supporting our decisions in this sector, I shall describe the organization realized by the Service in order to meet the requirements connected with the multinational nature of the land instrument and point out the major international engagements of the Italian Army: NATO, Europe and the minor organizations, in that order.

THE REASONS OF OUR PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL FORMATIONS

About the reasons of our participation in multinational formations, I want to say right away that we now play an active role on the politico-military scene of our continent, at a level at long-last comparable to that deriving from other sectors which characterize our Country. It is therefore inevitable to illustrate in short the new international

scenario, in which Italy is a leading actor, both within NATO and in the European Union. Also owing to the crisis in Kosovo, the picture has undergone a sharp conceptual change. As a matter of fact, there was a transition from a generic participation in missions of peace support (PSO), usually under UN aegis, to the planning and conduct of operations for crisis management (CRO). The latter envisage the development of plans based on employment options related to possible risks, have a faster and more active development than PSOs, and can be deployed much more rapidly.

In short, the organizational decisions were based on the directives issued by the Minister of Defence and the Defence Chief of Staff, consistently with the development of the new strategic concept of the Alliance and with the evolution of an autonomous capability in crisis management in a European framework, following two principles:

- **“active prevention”**, meant as participation of the military instrument in the national security policy, both in the various phases of prevention/control/management of crises, developed through a “remote control of conflicts”, and in the national interests, independence and sovereignty;
- **“defensive sufficiency”**, i.e. the upkeep of the minimum quantity of force for deterrence or, failing this, for defence. This principle is obviously applied with reference to the Alliance system to which Italy belongs, and not from a purely national viewpoint.

These are well-rooted principles, which were confirmed also by the deep crisis experienced by the international community following the attack launched against the economic, political and military heart of the United States on September 11. If anything, this new situation has further enlarged the already wide horizons of the possible military interventions in support of the institutional decisions. In short, far are the years when Italy's security policy consisted only in the convinced and loyal adherence to the Atlantic Alliance, but it is equally true that, together with Europe, NATO obviously continues to be the Pole star of our defence policy.

Our Country is bound to the Alliance through its constitutive Charter, which envisages the well-known obligations in case of attack against one of the participants, leading to operations usually identified as “Article 5”. These operations were inexorably evoked precisely by the suicidal attack against the US, an event which entails not only the revision of the typical mechanism of the cold war, but, above all, a new elaboration of the very concept of “common defence”. In practice, the end of the bipolar confrontation and the impact caused by the conflict of the early '90s have clearly shown the limits of the world's security systems, starting from the supranational one, managed by the UN, and have stimulated synergies and distribution of functions and responsibilities with regional organizations or coalitions capable of carrying out more complex missions and of tackling risky and highly operational situations.

As a matter of fact, the regional organizations and coalitions can rely on appropriate military instruments, and are urged and supported in their efforts by the necessity to act against any threat to the interests of their members.

This is the scenario in which both the evolution of the strategic concept and the definition of the new tasks of NATO have taken place. Tasks which were formalized with the strategic concept, approved in 1999, but already implemented in practice during the operations in the Balkans, and very topical today. At the Washington summit of 1999, at the height of the Balkan crisis, some very important decisions were made,

which, in the coming years, will greatly influence:

- **the new strategic concept**, with the possibility of operating preventively in order to manage the crises at their onset, without waiting for the interests of the members of the Alliance to be affected;
- the creation of a European capability of crisis management, through diplomatic means and the support of a military instrument;
- **the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI)**, i.e. the

coordinate development of the military capabilities of the European NATO members aiming at force goals and equipment on the basis of what is realized by the United States.



In particular, as regards the crisis management capability, the question is to be able to cope with two major PSO operations (of the Balkan type) in separate Theatres, together with a minor "Article 5" crisis.

All this has involved a deep revision of the Alliance's organizational criteria, emphasizing the projection capabilities and Command-and-Control structures, with the additional burden deriving from the considerable duration of the operations and the necessary continuous rotation of Units and Headquarters.

The second pillar of the "multinational" reorganization of the land instrument is the implementation of the concept of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) which, in stages, led to the creation of the "European Forces".

ESDI is also an instrument which strengthens the cohesion, the efficiency and flexibility of NATO, through a better sharing of responsibilities and burdens among the European and North American allies. The formal act of the EU members' contributions to the European military instrument, which took place in November 2000, is a fundamental step along the process aimed at establishing an autonomous capability of crisis management, i.e. the goal fixed in Helsinki. The objective is to create adequate European military capabilities, avoiding the duplication of command structures, planning staffs, organizations and military capabilities already existing within NATO.

But, beyond these decisions, which by now could be defined as "historical", owing to the rapid evolution of events, the best reference element for defining the organization of the land instrument best suited to compete in the international arena, is an assessment of the future scenario, constantly updated on the basis of the numerous inputs deriving from the interaction with the main politico-military national and international organizations.

The three characterizing elements are:

- the geostrategic aspects and the consequent alliances within which we are going to operate;
- the causes of instability, which allow us to define the types of intervention;

- last, the foreseeable nature of the battlefield, for what concerns the purely technical-military aspects.

Let's examine, therefore, the geostrategic scenario, in order to see how it could influence the requirements of the military instrument. In the medium/long term, the possibilities that an international "actor" could threaten national or allied vital interests employing traditional methods are very low. Nevertheless, today's events show that future scenarios are marked by a great variety of risks, different as regards type, dimension and target.

The first consequence of today's instability will be the growing fluidity of the political situations and, therefore, of the framework of alliances and coalitions within which a military instrument will have to operate. Thus, from a technical and military point of view, and considering the land military instrument, we must underline that, very probably, our potential enemies will profit by the lesson learned from recent conflicts, perfecting a number of strategies capable of preventing modern Armed Forces to exert their technological and professional preponderance. Their action will very likely consist in the asymmetric application of a number of strategies and tactics, both conventional and unconventional, capable of minimizing the technological and organizational gap, of hampering the access and the effectiveness of the instrument in the operational theatre, exploiting our, or our Allies', political, social or military vulnerabilities.

The main causes of instability that could produce critical situations are well known. The end of the confrontation and the expansion of free markets have marked a time of epochal transformations. The most important consequences, at macrosystemic level, are a considerable political fragmentation and a growing globalization, which are going to be the main elements of instability in a multipolar system.

From the viewpoint of the instrument's general planning, these risky situations give shape to a complex technical/military scenario. In very general terms, we can say that the operational environment where the Italian Army might have to operate will be characterized by four elements:

- intricate information-architecture, including civilian, private and military systems, destined to influence the conduct of the operation more and more;
- a complex morphology of the operations area, a greater urbanization, high compartmentalization and the presence of civilians are among the conditions that will be exploited by the potential enemies in order to overcome our technologic advantage;
- coexistence within the same operation of highly conflictive situations comprised within more widespread minor tensions;
- a new role for the land instrument, called to carry out a wide range of missions, according to the evolution of the crises: prevention and deterrence in the initial phases, coercion and restraint in the successive ones.

This said, we can affirm that the technological progress enables us to express greater strategic and tactical mobility. This will give a practical foundation to some emerging concepts such as "active prevention" through the deployment of forces from the very beginning of a crisis. Somehow, these are concepts already included in NATO's Strategic Concept.

The implementation of the concept of active prevention and the effectiveness of the instrument within the abovementioned operational context, require military forces capable of meeting several criteria: **projectability, interoperability, mobility, versatility, survivability, lethality, precision and integration of the command, control and communications**

systems with the sensors spread all over the conflict area. In short, as concerns the land forces, these are the convergency criteria upon which the DCI is founded with the intent of providing Europe with military capabilities comparable with the US ones, as a prerequisite for a more autonomous role of the European forces within ESDI. At the origin of this initiative there is the awareness – well known to the experts and pitilessly shown to public opinion by the Kosovo operations – that it is impossible for the European Nations to

autonomously manage peace enforcing operations, as envisaged by the new strategic concept of the Alliance. It is a simple truth, but it will affect the future decisions of all the European Nations, cutting down to size the hegemonic aspirations of some nuclear-capable Countries, raising the expenses for modernization and renewal of materials, and increasingly promoting the integration of the military instruments, through the manifold forms of collaboration that I shall describe later on.

On the other hand even the US, whose resources are greater than the whole of Europe's, is pursuing multinationality, both at organic level and – above all – during the operations, owing to the great advantages, in terms of lawfulness and impartiality before public opinion and, last but not least, in view of a possible approval by the UN.



OUR ORGANIZATION FOR PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL FORCES

Let us see now how our land instrument is organized for these tasks. The absence of a well-defined and quantifiable threat requires a flexible operational instrument, capable of adapting the Command-and-Control structures and the composition of the forces to the various possible requirements. Therefore, the Army has taken the form of a producer of forces, ready and constantly capable of meeting, in terms of efficiency/effectiveness, different requirements, less envisageable than in the past, in distinctly joint and mainly multinational contexts.

The restructuring process has been developed according to these considerations and to the criterion of sustainability, upon which we shall dwell later on, during our examination of CROs. The conceptual synthesis of this process is represented by the principle of modularity, which could also be defined as "task oriented". The reference bases of the concept are the main missions assigned to the Armed Forces.

Active prevention, the reference concept I mentioned before, consists of a qualified, active and reassuring presence on the national territory in order to conduct a constant vigilance and contribute with continuity to the collective security and well-being, of the participation in the common defence within the Atlantic Alliance and the projections of forces to crisis areas in order to contribute, in multinational contexts, to the prevention of conflicts (crisis-management operations and humanitarian missions in a broad sense).

These activities can be developed inside a wide spectrum of scenarios deriving from the combination of several parameters among which we can list: the type of operations that range from the traditional to the humanitarian ones; the operational theatre, which could be outside the normal NATO area; the operational context, which increasingly envisages joint and multinational arrangements; intensity of the engagements, which in crisis management will be very likely essentially asymmetric, but with possible local higher-intensity areas. This high degree of indeterminacy requires of the manoeuvring forces great flexibility, in order to face a possible rise in the intensity of the operation.

The instrument that can guarantee this flexibility is precisely the new structure of our Service, which separates the command responsibilities (aimed at preparing the instrument for the operational employment and managed by the chain of command going back to the Army Staff) from the truly operational ones, directed by the CHOD through the Joint Operational Command. In practice, the operational Commands and forces have been conceptually grouped in "basins" corresponding to the operational functions that must be carried out: C4, Manoeuvre, Fire, RSTA. Similarly, some Commands are (or will be very soon) assigned only operational activities, freeing them from the responsibility for the forces preparation. As the need arises, and according to the mission they have to carry out, the Commands are assigned the forces required for the performance of the operational tasks, taking from the various basins the necessary modules and aggregating them into appropriate "task forces".


The reference picture described above is at the basis of the Army's operational Concept which fixes: the operational activities and relevant forces required; the force categories and priorities for their preparation and, finally the maximum endurable effort for each envisaged task. The rationale for this configuration is explained in the "Ministerial Directive" (1999) and in the "CHOD Strategic Concept" (2000).

In particular, the Armed Forces are called to:

- strengthen and increase their presence within the military structures of the Atlantic Alliance and participate in the construction of the European pillar of defence and security;
- acquire technical and organizational capabilities enabling them to face the entire spectrum of possible conflict situations.

This latter aspect could entail:

- situations of low/medium intensity. They fall within the category of CROs (humanitarian aid, peacekeeping);
- high-intensity situations. They concern both CROs (peace enforcing) and declared conflicts (collective defence – Art.5).




In short the reference operational problem, which is at the basis of the definition of the bulk of forces necessary to reconfigure the Armed Forces into a professional instrument, is centred on the capability of participating in joint missions, ensuring the availability of C2 structures permitting to assume the direction of a CRO (LCC) and the responsibility of an AoR, both in case of a CRO and of an "Art.5" (Corps and Division).

As regards the requirement of forces, we shall need Brigades and supports (CS and CSS) enabling us to participate, in case of CROs, in two long operations (one Brigade in each Theatre) and in a third operation, either limited or within the framework of multinational agreements. These forces will have to be able to contribute significantly to two of the new projectable HQs of the Alliance, which were established in accordance with the new strategic concept. This body of forces, when not engaged in other missions, could be employed in activities of public interest on the national territory.

Summing up, the operational concept fixes the following levels of engagement for our forces:

- the Service as a whole in activities for the defence of our territory and the national external interests;
- in activities for the participation in the collective defence of the Alliance, the forces will be divided into packages, based on the plans for the performance of the agreed-upon tasks within NATO;
- in case of long operations in response to crises (CROs), the Army has decided to subdivide the operational cycle into 4 four-month periods, in order to have, once achieved the full availability of projectable professional units, a period of twelve months between two successive engagements to be spent for reconditioning, training, evaluations within the preparations for the usual operational activities and, just before the employment, for special training cycles in view of the specific mission.

To define the bulk of forces necessary for the tasks requires a remarkable effort. In fact, in order to keep in the Theatre the levels of forces and the number of Commands envisaged by the operational concept, we must have a sizable reserve, without which we shall not be able to carry out the mandate assigned by the political authorities.



THE CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

Let us examine more in detail the relations between the multinational commitments and the national land instrument. The most historically important commitment is obviously the one with the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, I shall examine it first.

With the adoption of the "contingency" planning for employment, which has taken root

along with the progressive reduction of the threat from the East and the simultaneous focalization of areas more risky for the security of the borders of the Alliance, in the last few years the NATO forces have been “categorized” into three main groups, according to the time necessary for their preparation and their modalities of employment.

- Reaction Forces, already assigned to NATO Commands since the early phases of the operations. In their turn, they are divided into Immediate Reaction Forces, such as the airborne multinational force (AMF(L), and Rapid Reaction, i.e. the Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC);
- Main Defence Forces: national units, in different stages of readiness, with different levels of commitment, based on the priorities agreed upon within the Alliance;
- Mobilization Forces, present in different sizes in the various Nations.

One of the measures established following the approval of the new NATO strategic concept is the revision of the system of NATO Headquarters, mostly static and still oriented towards the management of defensive operations typical of the Cold War. The static HQs are now flanked by nine projectable land HQs, capable of managing Corps-level operations or, when appropriately completed, of directing the land component of the Theatre HQ (Land Component Command), and even assuming the responsibility for the entire Theatre in case of minor operations.


Italy, which was already present in the Reaction Forces with the “Cuneense” contingent of the AMF(L) and, above all, with a Division HQ, 5 Brigades and tactical/logistic supports, for a total of about 30,000 men in the ARRC, has decided to contribute to NFSR by offering a HRF(L) HQ and a complex of Forces and supports (approx 30,000 men).

The offer, made in July 2000, envisaged the reconfiguration, no later than November 2002, of the Milan's Projection Forces HQ into a Rapid Reaction Corps HQ for NATO, which can play leading roles at tactical (Corps), operational (Land Component Command) and operational/strategic (Operational Theatre Command – JHQ Land Heavy) level.

The project's essential features are:

- multinationality of the HQ, for which important contacts are being established with several NATO Nations (*US in primis*);
- construction of new installations for HQs, support units and dependents;
- full operativeness by the end of 2002.

The establishment of the HQ is now proceeding at full speed. It is a matter of reorganizing Milan's Operational Projection Forces Command at the new base of Solbiate Olona, providing it with all the material, human and organizational resources necessary to plan and conduct



operations of the level mentioned before. We should not forget that the pre-existent Command's capabilities could have met only a small percentage of the new requirements. To this we must add that the multinationality of the new HQ, in which dozens of Officers from other NATO Nations will serve, opens new horizons in terms of personnel preparation (suffice it to think of languages and procedures) and validation of organizational structures. Furthermore, the new HQ must be capable of operating aboard ships, with the consequent activation of joint studies and analyses conducted with the Navy General Staff.


We are determined protagonists in the projects of revision of the NATO structure and forces, also taking into account our geostrategic position and the need to revitalize the Southern Region, which must be enabled to effectively project stability to the Balkans and the Mediterranean at large.

With a view to this, our commitment towards NATO consists of:

- two Regiment-level task forces for the two immediate reaction land forces now in existence, i.e. AMF(L), capable of operating wherever necessary, and the NATO Composite Force, earmarked for operations in Norway;
- one HRF(L) Command, with a force package centred on a Division HQ and four Brigades, plus tactical and logistic supports;
- one force package for the ARRC HQ, also reconfigured into an HRF(L), consisting of a Division HQ and four Brigades, plus tactical and logistic supports.

It is a considerable effort, which in some cases be sustained through the time, while in others – as for the Corps HQ – rotations are impossible, because of the lack of resources.

This concerns also the airborne Brigades, highly valued but very expensive assets, of which no European Nation has more than one.



OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

More recent, but no less important, is our commitment for the Reaction Forces of the European Union.

The member Nations have clearly shown their determination to acquire an autonomous military capability in support of the European Policy of Security and Defence (PECSO) as a development of the concept of European Identity of Security and Defence, with the aim of enabling the European Union to play in full its role on the international scene.

With a view to this, the EU plans to acquire, by 2003, the resources needed for setting up a force of 60,000 men, with a sustainability of at least one year in any operations Theatre. Unfortunately the Union at present is unable to deploy this force within 60 days, as envisaged

in Helsinki and neither, as was proved in the Balkans, does it have the operational instruments capable of meeting critical situations involving not only peacekeeping missions, but peace enforcing as well. I refer, in particular, to Command and Control, strategic transport, intelligence and precision weapons, which are necessary elements for the full effectiveness of the forces's actions and operations.

The 2003 development target, imposed by the political authorities of the Union, will put at the EU disposal a well tested mechanism that can support its military-policy and security decisions. We must continue along this road, keeping in mind that the US continues to be an indispensable partner both for regional and global security.


Europe must increase its defence capabilities, in order to better integrate with the American ally, also considering that the bonds between the two shores of the Atlantic are not based on transitory interests, but on common values of freedom and democracy.

The formal act signed by the Ministers of Defence of the fifteen Nations of the Union is a fundamental step in the process of constituting an autonomous capability for crisis management, which was the target fixed in Helsinki. This process, commonly called "Helsinki Headline Goal" has developed, starting in January, through the planning of the forces necessary to conduct operations in international crises. The result (approx 115,000 men) is much higher than 60,000, which is the maximum number that can be simultaneously employed, according to the political decisions made in Helsinki. It is easy to understand that the possible operations could be very different from each other, and therefore require different "instruments".

The whole contribution of the Army to the pool of EU forces consists of a package which includes:

- one Corps HQ or, as an alternative, a Division HQ;
- the necessary tactical and logistic supports represented by Regiment-level units (signal, engineers, artillery, logistics, medical service);
- manoeuvre forces including four Brigades, two of which mechanized, one Alpine and one airborne. Two of these Brigades can be employed simultaneously in long operations.

These forces, which amount to approx **20,000 men**, from which the necessary assets must be drawn in order to carry any "Petersberg" mission, **would not be employed simultaneously**, but would give the Army the necessary flexibility for gauging its engagement which, as a whole, could reach the maximum sustainable number of **13,000**. In other words, according to the type of operation and the characteristics of the environment, its composition will vary, both as concerns quantity and type of the tactical and logistic supports and as regards the manoeuvre forces. The latter, in particular, could include two mechanized Brigades or, as an alternative,



one mechanized and one Alpine (light). Furthermore, in the initial phases of the operation, the employment of different forces, airborne in particular, could be required, in the capacity of "Entry Force". In this case, the effort could reach a peak of **14,000 men**, for a variable period of time which, in any case, will not be longer than four months.

The Corps HQ, being a NATO asset, can be employed, as any other resource of the Alliance, exclusively after its release by the Atlantic Council (NAC).

THE OTHER MULTINATIONAL COMMITMENTS

Finally, let us go into the **commitments which are often defined as "minor"**, from the viewpoint of the forces engaged, but which are equal to the others if we consider their politico-military characteristics and the accords on which they are based.

The Army participates in four formations with "on-call" units, either for operations or for training events, giving a permanent contribution of personnel to the Headquarters. In short, they are:

- **EUROFOR**. A Major Unit at Division/Brigade level, oriented towards "Petersberg missions". It was installed in Florence in 1996, with the participation of Italy, France, Spain and Portugal. The HQ is outright multinational, and the main jobs are assumed by a rotation of nationalities. It might develop into an immediate-reaction force for the EU;
- **Multinational Land Force (MLF)**. A Brigade-level Major Unit established within the PfP and oriented towards "Petersberg missions". Its members are Italy, Hungary and Slovenia. The Headquarters is "Italian framework", based on the "Julia" Brigade HQ, where Magyar and Slovenian representatives are permanently posted. The trilateral agreement on the organization of the MLF was signed on July 12, 2001;
- **South East Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG)**. A Brigade-level Major Unit, born of a Turkish initiative in 1996, established within the PfP, is constituted by seven Nations (Italy, Greece, Turkey, Albania, Rumania, Bulgaria and FYROM) and oriented towards interventions in the Balkan area for "peacekeeping only" missions. The US and Slovenia participate as observers;
- **Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)**. A Brigade-level Major Unit earmarked for peacekeeping operations under the UN aegis, with the participation of numerous Countries. It stems from a Danish initiative of 1996, and at present is engaged in the UNMEE operation in Eritrea.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

Owing to the high variability of the operational situations and the need to prepare a basic instrument in any possible way, (since it is impossible to envisage different packages of Commands and forces for each requirement), we have to consider different operational subordinations.

Therefore, the administrative subordination of the units follows the principle of maximum simplification by the adoption of a geographic criterion. Besides, in order to make the Division HQs fully projectable, freeing them from administrative responsibilities, the Brigades are normally placed under the authority of permanent Commands, directed towards activities of preparation and management (1st and 2nd Defence Forces Commands, Alpine Troops Command).

The Command-and-Control structure of the Service takes on different configurations according to the reference situations (I shall be more precise later on).

The administrative structure envisages three Intermediate Operational Commands, subordinate to the Land Forces Operational Command. Each of them is:

- responsible for the preparation of a variable number of Brigades;
- “parent” of a Division-level projectable command structure, associated, in two different cases, to the Rapid Reaction Corps Command (soon to be established at Solbiate Olona) (1st FOD) and to the British Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) (2nd FOD).

The units assigned to the NATO Immediate Reaction Forces are:

- the “Taurinense” alpine Brigade, responsible for the projection of the “Cuneense” contingent for the AMF(L), consisting of an infantry Regiment reinforced by “combat support” and “combat service support” units. This formation can be transported by air, since the AMF(L) must be capable of operating from the very early phases of the operations planned by NATO;
- the “Julia” alpine Brigade, which detaches a similar unit to the “NATO Composite Force” (NCF), destined for operations in Norway.

The units assigned to the Rapid Reaction Corps Command of Solbiate Olona, are:


- one Division HQ (resulting from the present 1st Operational Defence Forces Command);
- four Brigades (“Aosta”, “Sassari”, “Julia” and “Friuli”). The latter conducts operations from and in the 3rd dimension;
- specialistic, tactical and logistic supports.

The elements assigned to the ARRC HQ are:

- one Division HQ (centred on the present 2nd Operational Defence Forces Command);
- four Brigades (“Garibaldi”, “Pinerolo”, “Ariete” and “Pozzuolo del Friuli”);
- specialistic, tactical and logistic supports.

Finally the pool of forces available to the European Union includes:

- one Army Corps HQ or, as an alternative, a Division HQ;
- manoeuvre forces including four Brigades (“Aosta”, “Sassari”, “Julia” and “Friuli” airmobile Brigade as “Entry Force”). Two of them can be employed simultaneously in long-term operations;
- the necessary tactical and logistic supports, represented by Regiment-level units (signal, engineers, artillery, logistics and medical units).



In addition, we have the “Folgore” paratroop Brigade, which has always been the Army reserve capable of facing sudden, unforeseeable and unplanned situations.

It must be noted that this organization is not yet complete. The transformation activities are proceeding, and the entire Service is engaged in expressing the force levels employed in unprecedented operations abroad.

The analysis conducted so far allows us to express some conclusive remarks. The evolution of the geostrategic picture, and the progressive reduction of the resources available to the military instrument, not only in purely financial terms but also in connection with personnel – better in quality, but reduced in quantity – have forced Italy and the other most important Nations to proceed in a distinctly international sense. This implies the need to organize multinational formations, which allow each Nation to face the problems of defence and security in a direct manner while taking into due consideration the rationalization of the expenses, thanks to the scalar economy intrinsic in the multinational dimension of the actually operational contingents. Let us not forget, on the other hand, that this type of economy implies a reduced decision-making autonomy, since nowadays all decisions must be mediated and agreed upon, in order not to conflict with the politico-military decisions of the individual participating Nations, which are often less integrated than the operational instruments subordinate to them.

Thus, we see a new role of mediation and agglomeration of the politico-military intents, which today is assigned to the multinational units, now destined to assume the complex role of a policy instrument concerning both the Country and the coalitions with which they interact. One could ask whether, in the future, once the validity of this approach is ascertained, it would not be useful and profitable to participate in multinational formations with all the forces available, entrusting them with our security.

This question can be answered through a close analysis of the politico-military aspects which characterize the multinational forces. As we said, they were established in order to meet the requirements related to the following problems:

- collective security and defence;
- rationalization/reduction of military instruments and expenses.

Their employment, therefore, must answer the need to reduce the risks deriving from:

- the possible redundancy of the instruments, out of place in the present context of reduction of resources; on the other hand the reduction was recently reviewed, in the light of the events in the US;
- the dispersion of efforts, which imposes a constant analysis of the opportunities offered by the “market” of international formations, with the intent of participating exclusively in those which directly meet the politico-military requirements of the Nation avoiding, as much as possible, the commitments that cannot be met when the operational requirement occurs;
- the rapid obsolescence of the instrument’s rules of employment, which imposes a continuous regeneration of procedures, operational concepts and – at the same time – weapon systems, in a growing spiral incompatible, in terms of costs and efforts, with the restraints mentioned above.

The efficiency and the effectiveness of these formations, furthermore, depend on:

- **unity of intents** of the participating Nations, to ensure that they will hold on as the events progress. This must go together with the clarity of the mandate assigned to the Force, as well as of the level of authority entrusted to each element of the chain of command;

- **consent** of the participating Nations to the mission, in order to avoid reshufflings within the coalition during the operation, as happened in several cases;
- **determination** in pursuing definite objectives, to be defined in the form of indisputable “end states” within a joint planning process at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical);
- **sustainability** in terms of resources, in particular as regards long-term missions and possible sudden changes in pace, not always foreseeable when planning.


In substance, the efficiency and effectiveness of the forces derive from the:

- **rationalization of available resources;**
- **standardization of employment procedures and modalities;**
- **interoperability of the components.**

Finally, we must list the determining factors of a multinational formation, in terms of organization, assets and personnel. These are obviously macrofactors, and each of them imposes – in relation to the objectives fixed thanks to multinational processes of convergence, such as the NATO planning cycle and the “Defence Capabilities Initiative” – a variety of decisions covering the entire range of the training and qualification activities of the units.

In conclusion, the Army is well on its way on the road imposed by the multinationalization of the instrument. Much has been done, but the final objective, albeit defined in all details, is still far away, since the available resources demand extremely long times. The achievement of the objectives, fundamental for the functionality of a land instrument in line with the defence objectives and the aspirations of the whole Nation, is closely connected with the allocation of material, human and budgetary resources that the latest events on the international stage have contributed to highlight.

□
Lieutenant General Roberto Speciale



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Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

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

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The Italian Armed Forces Are striving, together with the Allies, to contrast international terrorism, in protection of peace and international security.

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
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Interview with Prof. Romano Prodi

by Ornella Rota *



The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States have changed the politico-strategic international scene. Could the new world-situation, made worse by the conflict in Afghanistan and by the aggravation of the conflict in the Near and Middle East, affect – and how – the process of enlargement and extension of the European Union?

I don't see any reason why the commitment to fight against terrorism should have negative or slowing effects on the process of enlargement of the Union. If anything, but I don't see any proof or connection with this, there could have been an accelerating effect.

The enlargement is the first occasion in history that unites the Continent and, for the very first time, this takes place

with peaceful means. Such an important opportunity must be absolutely seized and accompanied by a parallel and simultaneous process of reforms, so that the enlargement should not entail a dilution of the Union's operational capabilities, with the risk of a paralysis. In consideration of the evolution of the present international crisis, Europe should have the capability

The enlargement of the European Union is a great occasion to make the dream of unification of the Old Continent real and concrete.


The earnest will of the member Nations to realize solid forms of integration in the field of foreign and security policy and to give a vigorous impulse to scientific and technological research is an essential prerequisite for Europe to adequately stand up to international competition.


In the following interview, Romano Prodi discusses with us these and other subjects.

of conducting effective and timely actions. We must respect this obligation, and the results of the Laeken European Council go in that direction.

Do you think that all this could strengthen, or weaken, the project for a European military instrument?

Naturally, it strengthens our project. It was evident to everybody that the Union reacted timely and effectively within the sectors where the Commission is responsible and can act (money laundering, intelligence cooperation, European warrant of arrest), while it has to rely on the collaboration among the member Nations when the Commission is





Left.
Italian paratrooper during the mission in East Timor.

Facing page.
Paratroop patrol on a VCC-1.

“Pax europea” in the Balkans depends on the success of the “Pact of Stability”. It is necessary to Europeanize the Balkans without “balkanizing” Europe. The role of the EU is very weighty both in the various sectors of intervention (from diplomacy to economic policy and security) and in developing economic and politic relations among the Nations of the region. Could you tell us what are the measures under study to favour the democratic evolution and the economic and social development of the Nations of the Former Yugoslavia?

I don't think that the Balkans could produce a force of attraction so powerful as to “balkanize” Europe. On the contrary, in those Countries there is a strong demand for association with Europe.

The measures being studied now are well known: respect of human rights and civil liberties; political and economic assistance; support to the modernization process and to infrastructural investments; support to the strengthening of democracy; scrutiny of the requests for association; opening of partnership, negotiations, as was done in the case of Albania.

To put it more specifically: the multisector programme of the EU for the reconstruction and development of the Balkan region, better known as “Pact of Stability for Southeastern Europe”, concerns three sectors: democratization and human rights; economic

not qualified to act directly, as is the case with PESC.

But I am sure that you know better than I do that the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force, already decided and now under way, needs a period of time which cannot be reduced in any way. But, as I said, the decision has been made and there are no second thoughts.

The beginning of the negotiations for opening to other nations and, above all, the actual start of a military policy can, once the risks of fragmentation of the national policies are overcome, could give rise to a new Europe, very different from that of commerce and common

currency. Is the time ripe for the EU to actually play its role, which has been virtual up to now, as a regional power?

The euro was not born in a day; the debates on a common currency lasted over 40 years. Once the decision was taken, things went on quickly.

I am not saying that another half century will be necessary to achieve forms of better integration in the sector of foreign policy and security but it is evident that this kind of steps forward can be made only when the public opinion of the member Countries are mature and willing to proceed. To force things too soon would only be over-ambitions.



reconstruction; cooperation security and defence. What are your expectations about the development of these three sectors in this rather difficult moment?

I see that the process is proceeding according to schedule without the delays or the difficulties caused by the consequences of the fight against terror or by the worsening of the Middle East crisis.

I am optimistic on the rapid process of normalization of the Balkan area. On the other hand, times will not be very short.

Along the way to a not-only economic and monetary Europe, an agreement which characterizes it also in a military sense has at last been reached. Based on the experience you have made, also in the industrial world, in what way do you think it will be possible to start the promotion

of a highly technological and research-oriented Europe?

This is the effort we are making within our global action plan of reforms. One of the key points, as was already underlined at the European Council in Stockholm, is the promotion of a strong commitment to research, both scientific and technological. This is a sector which, as long as a continental dimension is not adopted, will greatly suffer from the international, and particularly American, competition.

If we don't want to miss the train of the development of the so-called new-frontier technologies, we must assemble the efforts of all member Nations in order to provide the scientific and technological research with the necessary strength, in order to obtain a real and competitive successes.

□

**Journalist,
Contributor to "La Stampa"*

Romano Prodi was born in Scandiano, near Reggio Emilia, in 1939. He graduated in Law at Milan "Università Cattolica", specialized at the London School of Economics and was a professor of political and industrial economy at several Italian and foreign Universities, among which Trento Free University.

Professor Prodi is considered a precursor in the field of research on the development of small and medium enterprises, industrial districts and antitrust policy. He is the author of various publications which have become classics in the study of industrial economy, relations between State and market, denationalization policies and the essential role played by the school system for the promotion of economic development and social cohesion, the process of European integration and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dynamics of the different models of capitalism. From 1974 to 1978 he was president of "Il Mulino" publishing firm and in 1981 founded "Nomisma", an institute for economic studies. From 1978 to 1979, Professor Prodi has been Minister of Industry and, from 1982 to 1989, President of the Institute for the Reconstruction of Industry (IRI). In 1993 he was appointed again to the same office.

In 1995 he was one of the founders of the "Olive Tree" political coalition, leading it to success in the general election of 1996. Prime Minister until 1998, he has led Italy into the head group of the Nations which adopted the Euro.

Professor Romano Prodi is now the President of the European Commission.





NEW THREATS NEW STRATEGIES

Faced with unpredictable and indiscriminate attacks, like those against the US and world democracy, a mobilisation of the available security resources is now under way, also through a careful monitoring and interpretation of the events, in order to find prudent strategic choices, farsighted and adherent to the new scenarios.

From here the interest to appraise the substance of the new threat taking shape, in order to verify what are the possibilities of success against a challenge to civilisation and civil progress.



by Maurizio Coccia *

Terrorism in general, diversified as a whole, is grown up to become the most serious threat the values, the liberty, to the territory and to life. Terrorism isn't referable to a single Country, to a government, to a single leader, but to a tenacious opposition, that in the post-bipolar scenery is reinvigorated.

It's a wide opposition, because the contradictions of a very defective world are many, so it is possible and it can be imagined that in case of not satisfactory development of the effected countermeasures, the activists, already numerous, can be destined to grow, as the mandators.

In this perspective, the realised series of terrorist events constitutes the point - visible at the moment - of an iceberg of much greater dimensions and on which it is necessary to intervene in a wide field of actions, if we want to exorcise the collective fear and reconstruct a climate of trust and liberty.

The suffered aggression fades the terrorism of the past, also recent, into the background because, in comparison to that, it is characterised by the ideological and religious optimal combination of the components with the application, without hesitations, of the most sophisticated technologies; for the search of effects of global scope, without pre-set limits, to maximum relapse in every sector of internal and international relations, according to a direction that has already shown to know how to draw the maximum profit from the least effort, resulting in an initial shock without precedents, to the limit of the imaginable. Instigating so a chain reaction whose effects are diffused and are made to be felt in time.

What is the model of relations wanted by terrorists and by their mandators it is still to be determined, but the range of possible motivations and claims allows to glimpse the ghost of the amplest and destructive anarchy.

As the American President has specified since the first reactions to the treacherous attacks, the exploitation by terrorism of the vulnerabilities of democracy could

make mankind regress to levels judged unacceptable. The answer is war. War on terrorism, beyond measure obsolete, difficult up to graze the impossible, but also always made of actions and reactions, of forces comparison, means and strategies in which the most innovative, the most lasting, the more felt and sustained wins.

It preliminarily owes to us to intend as war, more than to terrorism is a form of fight, is turned and with every mean to the social, political and economic presuppositions that favour it, to the craftsmen and to the mandators.

It's clear that every human being, everywhere and despite own merits, is the principal objective of the present terrorism. His individual safety is openly jeopardised, such as the freedom which he has enjoyed in past or he would have liked to enjoy in the future, because of the control established by every Country and that seems destined to increase.

The involvement is made total. Each feels in first line and has good motives to speak out. Taken by anguish and by fear, they have the tendency to react by instinct radicalising divergences, incongruities and contradictions. Facilitating the plan of terrorists, that great trust attach to every decomposed reaction and on its negative effects.

It would be a serious error. The lessons learned from the long cohabitation with this sore of modern times put us in watch from a series of dangers of formulation. The first direct danger that an institution, national or international, runs in facing the terroristic phenomenon is implicit in an uneven struggle that instigates the terrorist to apply violence where there is not predictable



Above and facing page.
Italian soldiers on patrol in East Timor.

contrast revolving the measures of defence and safety applied. Against such a danger every classical defence is revealed till now insufficient, while the analysis of the facts, the ability of forecast and the intuition of the employees can make miracles. It follows the danger of the recognition as the parties to the case, that coincides with his legitimisation and it allows his promoters the ethical jump from criminal to fighter. Starting a real career of the operators that, in case of positive result of the action, anticipates raising to hero of liberty. Finally, the danger to regress to the same level to reduce the operational discrepancy or for reaction in case of serious loss of image, feeding a spiral of violence without end.

Terrorism is always also the symptom of an illness that cannot be taken care of only with a moral sentence and of

principle, a symptom that can be taken to champion of the level of confrontation of the system, as it represents the most radical demonstration.

In such sense, it is necessary to consider that the future reserves us every other type of struggle already experimented, unless we reduce the levels of confrontation and injustice in the world through a mobilisation even more arduous and longer of that declared against terrorism.

To introduce terrorism is not easy. In the common meaning, under such generic expression, it is intended a strategy that resorts to forms of struggle and activity characterized by violence and by illegality, finalized to shoot down a regime or a Government or in any case finalized to create tension, mistrust and insecurity.

The fundamental parameters of the action are the conceptual opposition and the consequent recourse to violence in deceitful

and hidden form, the application of sporadic violence (selective or indiscriminate), the maintenance of the liberty of action, the appeal to the amplest illegality, the choice of tall representative content objectives, with particular respect to those that are magnified by the surprise effect and from the reaction with the conscience and the culture of the involved people or peoples.

Modern terrorism has accompanied the inside relationships among States beginning from the industrial revolution of the XIX century and has had a meaningful role in the wars of liberation and in the movements of independence. Since then the social classes

evolved in an aware society, legitimist, that doesn't accept anymore the Machiavellian concept of the goal that justifies the means that has served as conductor thread to all the modern demonstrations of terrorism and the consequent repression. Seeing that, in time, the results have never been equal to the expectations, today there is the tendency to preliminarily appraise the goal and the means to reach it. The public opinions and the single citizens demand guarantees so that, at the end of the run, the individual can improve himself, rather than sacrifice himself for a vague and uncertain ideal, however situated in a future all to be defined.

Consequently, the myths collapse, the awareness grows while the possibilities for terrorism to realise the "ethical" goal native to lift the masses with the example become inconsistent.

At the same time, to the reduction of the material poverty in the world corresponds the increase of the moral poverty of the motivations, and this can originate an equal individual rebellion.

Democracy and its choices overcome for amplitude of involvement and consent every logic of terrorism. They are set as the best medicine against every type of violence. The process is in progress and far from finished; this is so true that when politics is not able, to make itself adequately understood, appreciate, also in the most emancipated Countries again violence reappears.


It is necessary, therefore, to involve in the democratic process the whole world and the individuals, but in the meantime it is necessary to protect both. The globalization seemed a good answer, in that it is potentially able to level the comfort, reducing the injustice on which terrorism grows and flourishes;

but also this is globalized, choosing forms of struggle typical of an open and communicating society.

NEW THREATS

The threats to the collective security changed at the change of the equilibrium related to the relationships among States. We passed, in fact, from the cold war of bipolarism to a kind of planetary regency of the USA, still managed in a national key. Consequently, the compromise is grown in every part to trying to involve the rest of the world and

collective recognition and help to the development. On the other hand, episodes of rebellion are occurred by States that have tried to oppose the rules of the general development in the intent to preserve and, if possible, to expand their own relative power: the Gulf war and Irak, the inside struggle in Somalia, the despotism of Milosevic in the Balkans, up to the recrudescence of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians, visibly gone out of the schemes of compromise and tolerance that in the last years had succeeded in containing violence in the sad cohabitation between the two peoples.



to cohabit with the American values.

The lack of alternatives has made the tension grow. Also because the European and American way are progressively approaching, until they almost coincide. The radicalisation of the refusal is accented. This way, while on one side the progress of the democratisation and the international co-operation has occurred under the aegis of US, Europe, UN, OSCE, NATO and every other international organization devoted to the

The opposition of the past, an unusual liberty at every level and above all the opening of communications and information, have amplified the terrorism of period and have originated another, making to meet the different matrixes in a communicating system.

The native roots generally recognized are at least seven:

- dynamics of the cold war. Plan of destabilisation of the world order fomented by the URSS to put in crisis the model of the capitalist society, making its



Italian checkpoint in East Timor.

contradictions explode. Realised through the financing and support of the anti-imperialists movements in every part of the world (Latin America, Middle East, Africa, Spain, Italy, Germany, Ireland, etc.);

- imitative process by groups and individuals attracted by the spectacular effect of the action of protest and rebellion;
- ambiguity between official positions of the States and their contrary behaviours in surreptitious form, in the picture of the hidden opposition to the American leadership and the western values or, simply, to reach contingent objectives in national or faction key;
- conspiracy among States sponsor of terrorism (according to the American National Commission on terrorism of the year 2000: Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Cuba and Sudan,

but the reading of the newspapers allows to widen the spectrum in much ampler form) and organised crime for conquering world power and realize immense earnings;

- international isolation of charismatic leaders (Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, etc.);
- support to the Palestine's cause and to the destruction of the Jewish State by Arabic Islamic Countries and movements present nearly anywhere in the world;
- expansion of the Islamic fundamentalism, in form of popular movement (Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, others).

The worst case is the coalition of manifold forces united by the anti-American and anti-Western ideology.

A predictable behaviour may be founded upon breaking attacks distributed in time, whose effects would be strengthened by the more and more radical recriminations within the coalition and from reactions,

also radical and violent, that would reduce the consent, also increasing the fronts of struggle and contrast up to the exhaustion of the notable abilities of answer. Where the answer of the coalition was, instead, calibrated in time and proportional to the attack, the tension could be prolonged endlessly, with identical repercussions on the vulnerabilities of the democracy, with particular reference to the fall of economy and liberty.

To many people it can seem that this threat, wide and breaking, appeared from nothing and succeeded in avoiding the safety measures erected from single States and from the international community as a whole. It is not this way. In the last ten years world strategic analysis has not remained with its hands in hand. Aggressive initiatives had been planned also on a wide scale, by Countries endowed with values different from the western ones and of significant military ability as well as by transnational groups. Under the heading

"indeterminateness of the threat", it was understood that the lack of suitable control in the diffusion of information, once reserved, and of advanced technology, could increase the number and the typology of critical situations and potential actors: nuclear, biological and chemical armaments, offence (computer science or conventional) invisible to the means of identification, employment of space against our security, wide terrorism, expansion of organised crime and, particularly, of that devoted to the commerce of drug trafficking and the clandestine migratory flows.

All this had been examined case by case, even if it had not been contemplated as feasible the realisation of such events in system and the probability of their happening had not been considered. Besides, we kept on counting, perhaps over measure, on the ability of the single States to individualise, monitor and oppose the destruction in all its aspects.

Finally, and on the base of the past experiences, an ability of discernment was attributed to terrorists in the application of the violence. This resulted restrictive and represents, perhaps, the aspect of the greatest strategic surprise.

After the first terrorist initiatives it seems reasonable to believe that the ethical, cultural and religious opposition between Israel and the Palestine's people, international since the origins, is now globalised, pushing the opponents of democracy toward a violent radicalism that meets in terrorism. In the national frame, where the opposition of values is

stronger or where stronger is the authoritarianism of the regime. In the international frame, when a flag subsists, a common element of recognition among populations, public opinions or single individuals. The appeal to the Holy war tends really to this preventive recognition, turning to the Islamic world and specifically to the Arab people.

Elsewhere, poverty, marginalization and alienation make the individual rebellion meet the organised crime. Also this has become global and with much more incisive effects than those reached by the States, up to become a planetary network. An invisible State of remarkable economic weight, wich intercommunicates with terrorism of whatever matrix, because of the similarities and of the mutual demands tied to the invisibility, conspiracy of silence and illegality, able to exert remarkable multidirectional pressures on the single Countries and on the international context.

The reason for the effervescence of period and the actual amplification in the formalities and in the tools, can be connected to the most negative effects of the global economic interaction, but also to an action of conceitedness of the enemy. Crime has already

tried to underline itself at the level of State ("narconation") and perhaps feels enough or it judges us weak enough for a further jump of visibility.

The fall of the collective security is also attributable to the discrepancy of attention among the reached economic and social development and the quantitative and qualitative modesty of the strategies of defence, that should have protected the yet and, instead, they have not succeeded in changing to safety strategies, really for the low our action level of interest and involvement of the people.

This vulnerability has immediately been individualised and stricken.

An assertion is constantly dramatically repeated by the security operators and that is to say that a primary good of such magnitude cannot be delegated to a minority.

The safety of which it is spoken must not be confused with the militarist attitude. For security we mean the growth of awareness, participation and integrated co-operation of every community, toward the predictable or unexpected threats, knowing the enemy up to knowing how to recognise its activity and intentions, acting with every means for the



Italian paratrooper in activity of vigilance in Bosnia.



Italian paratroopers during an exercise.

maintenance of the collective good of security. The example of heroic citizenship, realised by the passengers of the aeroplane fallen in Pittsburgh, on the tragic day of 11 September of last year, points out the values that we intend to defend and delineates the level of the commitment to which we could be called.

News strategies

The security, that is compulsory to build, must be constructed by integration and co-operation between the Countries and the peoples, without being conditioned by fear and egoism, but in the belief that only with the magnitude of the commitment the reached development can be consolidated and the premises for further finishes established.

It is a question of giving depth to every aspect of the evolution and not to return to the dawn of coexistence, to the Middle Ages, to the towers and the strengthened walls.

The reaction to terrorism has always existed. The most common errors are the undervaluation of

the amplitude fact, of the phenomenon and the reduction of the reaction to a single fact limiting the attention to the visible part of the iceberg. Also common is the excess of reaction, repression, seeking an equal or superior result to that achieved by the terrorists. Very similar is, without doubt, the error to bask in the demoralisation that the missed attainment of such an objective involves.

To adequately react, one can depart from the verification that the surprise tactic is inevitable, because it is realised with the attack, while the strategic surprise can be opposed up to make it decay.

And how?

Analysing the parameters of reference of the terrorist strategy and through fitting and timely countermeasures.

The enemy is shaped with a certain number of connotations:

- in this scenery of war, the terrorist organisations become transnational, part of a global net, even if they historically vindicate motives and national objectives. The bond is made consistent with organised crime;

- the first objective is the capitulation of the will because of fear and intimidation. One tends, therefore, to the employment of weapons of mass destruction of every type, to seek epochal slaughters. The hypothesis to arrive to an apocalyptic future is not excluded;
- grows the number of terrorist organisations that individualise in the US the objective to strike. Of these, Al Qaeda, created by Bin Laden, is only the more sadly known;
- the fall of the ideological motive and the revolution of the masses as last aim, doesn't make a behavioural logic necessary because it could be individualised, monitored and stricken, and not even a hierarchical organisation that acts as the embryo of the new institutions, once taken power and that grant a minimum of visibility to the investigators;
- to the invisibility of the violence serves as contrast a good visibility of the financing and the resources.

The parameters of the strategy of Osama Bin Laden are drawn from the objectives listed in his proclamations and from the perpetrated actions:

- America, crusaders that then become the Jewish-Christian alliance, the Saudi real family, oil and the Palestinian cause;
- the strategy of the terror applied turns around oil;
- the formula of the spectacularity is adopted, lifting the sought level of destruction and resorting to the kamikaze technique and to advanced technology;
- the declared wish to raise a Holy war is not original. It has already been proposed many times and has punctually failed.

From Nasser in the 50s to Gaddafi in the 70s, to Khomeini in the 80s, to Saddam in the 90s, the appeal to the "Islamic nation" has never gotten more than a bland consent of principle. The motives for so much tepidity find their origin both in National interest and in global involvement and, therefore, they seem destined to last in time;

- the nuclear weapon is certainly accessible and surely the methods have been found for bringing it up to the objective in hidden form. And it is not even the case to discuss the pros and cons of such a choice, in the sense that has been done already and its employment is foreseen. As much can be affirmed for possible biological and chemical attacks of great dimensions;
- since it is believed that so much terrorist engagement can meet only in marginal, local tactical successes, we can prefigure the

conceptual limit of the movement, that is destined to regress for lack of support in time.

In the meantime, what can be opposed to these connotations of the threat, to reduce its value and to facilitate its decline?

Preliminarily, the awareness that terrorism is as an epidemic illness, that first of all must be isolated and then needs an intensive therapy, because the roots are ample and surprisingly branched.

The conceptual aspect of base is given really from the opening of the confrontation. The reaction, institutional and of the democratic collectivities, must be ample, clear and involved respect to the paraded claim, reducing it without truce in the mediatic confrontation and in the operational strategy of reaction.

The ambiguous, transversal and fleeing threat must be opposed directly and in its perverse effects with a

progressive approach and within a convinced operational reciprocity. Only an aware co-operation, founded on the determination and on the exaltation of global interests of security and development, can make the collective strength of the opposition grow. In this case it will be more probable that to the new risks and fears can correspond, as in the past, new possibilities and opportunities, new successes for the progress of humanity.

Between distrust and barriers (West and Islam, them and us, etc..) it is better to isolate the facts. If we want a better world, we must not doubt and mortgage what we have already reached together. It's better to valorise,

Italian paratroopers at a checkpoint in Somalia during operation "Restore Hope".





American unit patrolling a roadway in Kosovo.

why not to rediscover the common affiliation to human kind, the monotheist religious communion among Islam, Judaism and Catholicism, the recognition of an integrated culture that has on European and Mediterranean matrix, the improvement of the concept of justice going back to universal principles. This way the damage is limited, non necessary clashes are avoided, however dramatic, folly is kept to whom wants even in good faith a better world, when the whole history points out that terrorism makes to regress the development and the collective recognition. For whoever has to heart peace and development, "not to regress" should be the word of order.

In a scenery as the one delineated, the most meaningful result to be reached is the world awareness of every individual to have overcome, toward terrorism, the limits of every acceptable compromise. An epoch is ended and another starts, also it is an epoch of war, in which all human beings are called to the first line, otherwise we recede.

The first objective of this war will have to be the demolition or, at least, the ample and visible regress of compromise, followed by analogous action towards the ambiguity, of the political contemporary custom, to hold the feet in two or more stirrups, at every level, to safeguard particular interests. Terrorism strikes by now everybody, inside and out of its own circle of National affairs.

The victory, arduous and at present very distant, will be given by a new type of relationships among people freed from the false problems of coexistence, originated from the National perspectives.

The realisation of these objectives entails manifold choices and activities:

- to overcome the passive phase of absorption of the damages brought by so many parts, assuming the initiative of a global campaign for the use of the available tools, drawing up all the National and international security resources. In such sense, the element of great meaning is given by the answer of the Islamic communities in

the world. Their definite position towards the methods and the objectives applied by terrorism would make to decay the intensity and amplitude of the potential ideological, cultural and ethical confrontation.

- to seek maximum effectiveness without denaturalising the democratic characteristics and without losing sight of the objective of the wanted development and the consent that can gather. Farsighted, in such sense, is the strategy solicited by the President of the European Commission: support to America, integration no to the war of civilisations, affinities prevail on differences, reciprocity and solidarity;
- to solve inside the US and inside the coalition Countries, the problems of the resources assigned to the security organisms, of co-ordination and of operational co-operation between the different branches and components;
- to extend the operational co-operation at global level checking the devotion, ability and reliability of every other Country in the common struggle;
- to extend in capillary form the activities of control – today they are limited essentially to the frontiers and to objectives considered sensitive in the institutional optics – without paralysing activities; on the contrary, stimulating them to progress in how much feasible in a scenery of greater security than in the past;
- to rigorously isolate sponsor States;
- to neutralise with accords or if necessary with force the weapons of mass destruction within a planetary campaign of awareness, co-operation and rigour;



Raider in training.

- don't make concessions and don't go down to compromises with terrorists. When captured, bring them to the democratic justice;
- to remember that also terrorism has its heel of Achilles, a structural vulnerability that can be activated by adherent and intelligent countermeasures. It is the stimulant chain that borns from the demoralisation, to become dissociation, repentance and collaboration;
- to strike Bin Laden as negative symbol for excellence.

As you can see, the threat is serious for how it is realised and for the future risk. It requires an answer just as serious that could redraw the map of the international relationships and behaviours.

Globalisation was associated to peace and now is seen under conditions of war. This shows the lack of territoriality and the demand to compensate new

vulnerabilities with mutual trust, fixing new rules, avoiding and overcoming nationalistic closures, inside wich it is possible to make ideas and terrorist activities grow.

The evolutionary lines, allow to think about a new diffused interventionism from many Countries and the convergence toward behaviours judged positive in this type of global commitment, like: the control of the production and sale of weapons of mass destruction; the widened informative collaboration; the redefinition of the vulnerabilities and the extension of security; the operational collaboration between military forces of defence and police forces; institutions; society and economy.

The Schemes of the alliances have jumped and this means a new potentiality of globalization.

In the picture of word common effort for security, Russia, China and Islamic community in the world can say their word and do a good job, regaining positions of credibility and connection in the international field, first temporally blocked in name of a

recent past, but conceptually far. The same is true for their "near abroad", for their alliances and proximities.

A new international osmosis is around the corner with an America amalgamated in a more multipolar context. America rediscovers America and its needs, and the world rediscovers the humanity of it. This increases the relative proximity and the desire to collaborate. The Europe of the nations follows, even if the terrorist events of the last period have not exalted it or accented the push to integration.

In the US as in the European Countries and elsewhere, good and bad news cross in this first phase of adaptation. There is an increasing series of initiatives to raise security. Their brake to the free operation is already bringing to new behaviours that don't facilitate the development programmed. In the process of general revision, the finality of survival and security has the tendency to take upper hand on every other need.

International co-operation in the field of information and



Italian paratroopers rake up an inhabited centre in East Timor.

security is still in good measure to be experimented, with its potential risks and with its potentialities to reduce attritions and preconceived hostility. The fervour and good will are extended and visible and the particular period pushes to take initiatives that up to yesterday were judged unscrupulous.

To isolate terrorism it is necessary to make democracy grow in the depressed Countries and integration in those with different ethnic groups and

religions. For these goals new strategies and tools in the international field are needed.

Within the coalition of the wishes that refers to the emancipated west, the tools at our disposal to contrast the threat are only a part of those judged necessary by the Nations more developed and by the international Organisations. The whole diplomatic and military Commitment is so intense to fear for the consumption without return of these two essential tools of politics. The economy in recessive phase underlines the onerousness and the modesty of the strategic choices till now operated. It is necessary to quickly move toward a compatible form of global solidarity, before the

human and material resources spent with so much prodigality and with so modest returns are dried up.

In this perspective, for example, among the construction of new systems of spatial defence all to be experimented "a posteriori" and the reduction of the strategic and tactical nuclear armament, in the austerity and above all in the unusual convergence of the moment, the second solution seems the only practicable one.

To realise so radical changes, the unity of intents must be maintained firm in time. This is quite difficult, because around terrorism an induced consent that can produce other violence grows and it finds origin in the emulation, in the tendency to aggregation and in misinformation, in easy beliefs of, in the lack of a historical culture and in the exponential growth of the people directly involved in politics and in the management of power without having a complete and correct informative picture.

The institutional opposition has to remove strategic space from terrorism, with an informative offensive able to re-establish and extend the grip of our point of view. Toward the Islamic communities to which Bin Laden turns, but also toward those, much more careless, in our own house.

Not only declaring and testifying that a war of civilisation is not in progress, but revising the mechanisms and the contents of the communications again, so that the information is given in a way to be understood by the recipients and doesn't serve only to capture the attention dictated by selling fear, a great number of copies. It is a question of progressing, overcoming the logic of the scoop and the effect title not supported by the contents that have originated it, with which a large part of the

communication is developed in the US and in our Countries.

The service must be delivered at home, therefore opportunely diversified, as it is proper in a real mediate war. Where for media war we intend much more than the propaganda of war, of informative war and intelligence. Its operational purpose tends to isolate the terrorists because public opinions judge them non-believable actors not entitled to raise objections, to vindicate justice, to seek attention.

A war of these proportions has not even been imagined before, and the times seem mature to give a deadly hit to the declared enemy that, more wrongly than nightly, after '68 and after the terrorism of European-American matrix, is broadly spread in the fabrics of modern societies, and continues to flourish in the developing ones.

The resistance of a wide coalition of wills is already clear. In this situation it is predictable to see a hysteric future of tears for the terrorism of the XXI century. But not less dangerous and hard to fight and to destroy. But at least, we can objectively think that its interests are on this earth, so the destiny of the modern world is not stake.

The state of siege of these days and of the predictable future, even if it does not continue, authorises to think that is being developed a new sensibility and will of intervention toward the critical areas where terrorism is fed. We can imagine that, from every part, there will be he tendency to reduce the economic discrepancy, the social injustice and the authoritarianism on a National basis. Also because we are really involved and the appeal to definite and onerous choices in name of a common interest that is first of all of survival, of mutual support, therefore of continuity.

The run won't be virtuous only.



Reduction of the growth, wide controls and revaluation of the frontiers, stiffening of the security measures, probable protectionism to make revert abroad the costs of the new security, reduction of the exchanges and anaemia of certain types of products and services, reciprocity of the commercial accords. Yet problems and themes as agriculture, the environment and the amplitude of the subject realted to commerce demand global approaches. To avoid a heap of negative effects would be necessary to relaunch the open markets and the liberalisation of products, continuing in the reform of the rules that are applied to global commerce. The economic resumption there will be, but it won't bring everything as it was before. New technologies will haul because so wants the law of it evolution and progress. Already telematics have filled the void of the aerial land and naval communication, dug by fear. We will go toward a phase of new risks and great costs in which the public investment will prevail on the private one, everything in the circle of comppatible areas and

Russian soldiers on patrol in Chechnya.

regions therefore less global.

Economy, politics and strategy will become even more united and synergetic. The economic globalisation has paved the way but, as for the historical courses and recurrences, we start a new commitment in which the integrated opening, politic, economic and of security begins among a group of similar Countries, creating protected areas of reference that will progressively be widened, resulting in a new globalisation, much more complex and complete than before.


However it is precisely in the impossibility to proceed straight toward the collective recognition of the whole human society and in this spiral trace left in history that our destiny is written.

□

**Major General (ret.)*

STRATEGIC ASYMMETRIES

by Ferruccio Botti *



At the beginning of the new millennium, a doctrinal ambivalence is gaining ground in the military environment: on the one hand, there is a tendency to safeguard the individual and his rights as much as possible, asking him moderate efforts and little risks and taking advantage of every technological resource; on the other, almost as if one wished to annul or reduce the technological gap existing vis-à-vis the most advanced societies and armies, a few well equipped men are opposed to an armed mass whose life is not greatly considered, to the point of asking the individual to sacrifice his life in the name of hate and celestial happiness.

This enormous ambiguity plays against the West and on September 11 enabled 18 *Kamikaze* armed with primordial weapons to achieve the optimum of classic strategy: the maximum result with minimum effort, applying the ancient principles of surprise, concentration and economy of forces.

What can be done, and how can we get out of this quagmire? Strategy, especially today, does not have sure recipes. This is true, but we cannot deny that the fateful date of September 11 rings out not so much as the beginning of a new era but rather as a commanding call to the awareness that national and international security must keep, or take back, its all-important place.

Once, the saying went that granaries must be defended also with arsenals. Is this still true? It really seems so, since granaries do not represent only the material welfare reached by man but , above all, they embody values of progress and civilization laboriously pursued along the path of history. The following article urges us to think rationally and helps to understand the complex problems that will affect the future of the world.



Before September 11, 2001 (it is no use to repeat here what happened on that day, tragic for all us and not for the US only), if one asked what changes had taken place in the military world after the Cold War, the “politically and militarily correct” answer, particularly in Italy, would have been as follows: before 1989 the armed forces were preparing for war and defence of the borders

whereas today their task is mainly to carry out “peace missions” overseas and/or abroad.

This was a new (or supposedly so) role for the military force, which was very suggestive for public opinion and could be summed up in the well-known “peacekeeping” and “peace enforcing” missions.

Having observed that this type of missions implies, in practice, the

recourse to arms, albeit on a reduced scale, and that also in peacekeeping missions unfortunately a price in human lives has been paid by our military, a question comes to our mind: what has really changed after 1989? And in what measure does the recent bloody terrorist attack on the economic and military sanctuaries of the Superpower contribute to make us understand, or change the strategic parameters?

It must be said right away that the strategic problem that we have to face, not only today, but which existed already in the last decade of the 20th Century, is extremely complex, since it contains such a number of threats and risks, lights and shades and contradictory signals, to put to a severe test any politico-military leadership, discouraging any attempt of summing up the issues in a few formulas and concepts, or in more or less pleasing, rhetoric and approximate phrases for the benefit of the media. Strategy has never accepted sure recipes, and this is even more true today. It cannot let itself be too influenced by the past (as happened only too often) and neither can it refuse

the whole historical experience and refer only to the increased performance of the new technologies, even by attributing them thaumaturgic virtues they don't have and never had.

The least that can be said today is that the "peace missions" have behind them a long history going back to the 19th Century (1). Even terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Two of the facts that occurred on September 11, on the contrary, are new: the capability of striking in a massive way, for the

1. In a book always ignored by historians, a certain Mr. Vincenzo Molinari, in 1871, represented the still chivalrous conduct of the wars of his time thus: *vile treacheries must be dispensed with, all military actions must be fair and generous. Prisoners must be respected, if they behave according to their state: officers can keep their sword, as a token of honour, they can even be set free on their word. Generals must be kind to each other. If they are found on reconnaissance, it is a*

nations would be less and less numerous, with a return to local disputes and internal conflicts, so much so that Nations will find within themselves the reasons for war which they cannot find anymore with others.

And even if solutions through force were to become exceptions, it is impossible to envisage the complete disappearance of morbid passions. Therefore, peace would never be perpetual. On the other hand, an excessive attenuation of the destructive character of war would deny its essence and at the same time would increase the hardships of society, since it would prevent crises from being resolutory (3).

3. In 1898, Col. Enrico Barone, a distinguished sociologist, historian and economist, maintained that, *considering things in broad outline, certain salient politico-social characteristics correspond to some prominent military qualities; that is to say that the reasons for which war is waged, the manner in which the instrument, i.e. the Army, is forged and employed, i.e. the conduct of war, are nothing but simple superstructures of the political and social conditions, and follow their variations. Thus, in order to understand the succession of military events, it is necessary to refer to the succession of the social phenomena.*

Dealing with the characteristics of the "cabinet wars" of the 18th Century, Col. Barone added: *at that time, the constitution of the Armies and the conduct of wars were so closely related to the politico-social conditions prevailing at the time that only "that" constitution and "that" conduct of war were possible.* According to Barone, therefore, one should not be misled by very conspicuous changes, such as those concerning weapons: the art of war is mainly influenced by politico-social factors, because if



A "Bersaglieri" checkpoint with a "Camillino" VCC-1.

first time, the territory of the Superpower, and the psychological significance of the targets, unprecedented also thanks to the unconsciously self-injuring amplifications of the mass-media. We are not inclined to see military revolutions everywhere, and also for this reason we believe that, to approach in a correct way the present reality, some theoretical examples of 19th Century classic strategy would be useful. Therefore, we summarize them here as terms of comparison and/or interpretative keys for today's events.

good custom to shoot into the air to warn them. And their lost luggage or field glass will be returned to them (2).

2. In 1875, Gen. Nicola Marselli foresaw that the often violent revolts for the formation of nationalities and the frequent international conflicts which had characterized the 19th Century would be followed by a period in which the great wars among

weapons and materials change, the nature of man, with his instincts and his passions does not change and, even less, does the psychology of the masses (4).

4. The classic strategic thought – starting from Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Marselli, Bonamico, etc. – refers essentially to wars between regular armed forces of highly developed Nations, and is mostly influenced by the Napoleonic wars, both on land (Napoleon's offensive, rapid and decisive war) and on the sea (Nelson at Trafalgar). Nevertheless, already during the first part of the 19th Century, the idea of waging war also against the civilian population started to gain ground, considering that it would lower the morale and deprive the fighting armies of moral and material support. During the American Civil War, General Sherman, commander of the Federal forces, did something of that kind. In 1880 the French *Jeune Ecole Navale* maintained that the Italian coastal cities should be bombed from the sea, counting on the psychological fragility and scarce national spirit of our people, who would then rise against the Government, forcing it to seek peace (5). In the twenties, our Giulio Douhet, like the *Jeune Ecole*, theorized on the usefulness of striking the inhabited centres from the air, since he considered them the most vulnerable and defenceless part of the enemy Nation. Their destruction would take the fighting will and the sources of support away from the armed forces. From 1943 to 1945, the heavy Anglo-American air raids hit very hard the German and Japanese cities. After 1945, the "Mutual Destruction" assured by the intercontinental nuclear missiles subjected the entire territory of the opposing blocs to a deadly threat; it must be added

that the nuclear, biological and missile technologies have been available, for quite a time, even to the less developed countries. The barbarization of war in the 20th Century and the direct involvement of civilian populations have long been facts that, albeit deprecable, must be taken into account. What is even more disquieting today, is the vulnerability of the computerized systems and the growing availability of the technologies related to nuclear and chemical

surprise: the commander should always know what to do in case of a sudden enemy attack; *if he is doubtful, then he is in a bad position and outside the rules, and must find a remedy very quickly.*

In the light of these historical references, it becomes easier to say what has actually changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and what has changed again after the fateful date of 11 September 2001, which was defined by the media as an epochal change, the



An Italian checkpoint with a "Leopard" 1-A5 tank.

warfare, that could be exploited precisely by the terrorists.

5. Napoleon used to say that one should never do what the enemy want or expect for the very reason that they want or expect it; nor one should go into battle, for the same reason, on a terrain or at a moment that suit the enemy. Furthermore, one should never be taken by

beginning of a new era, the third world war etc.etc. Some also wondered whether it was a clash of religions or civilizations, i.e. a new war threatening to continue for a long time. This debate bewilders and alarms the man in the street, without letting him understand anything, and without adding anything actually new to the strategic reality. Everybody talks about war, if anything to deny or exorcise it: but one should be very clear about today's concept of war, from which that of strategy is derived (6). Certainly war is not

declared anymore; certainly it is no more a conflict between Nations – as was the case at least up to 1945 – which, incapable of solving a serious dispute in a peaceful way, had recourse to arms, conforming to the rules of international law. Certainly there is no more a dichotomy – as was proved in the cold war – or a clear fracture between war and peace. Beside the continuous tension between the two blocs from 1945 to 1989, during this period of – at least European – “peace”, many Nations (mainly France and the US, but also the UK, Belgium, Holland...) have been fighting exacting oversea

degree of organization on both fronts, another scholar (Luard) believes that war must be characterized by a significant number of actions for a significant length of time, and this is also true. Finally, one should remember that, according to Clausewitz *in war, actions are never conducted against matter alone but also, simultaneously, against the moral forces that animate it; and it is impossible to differentiate them.* Marshal

Army rangers armed with “Heckler und Koch” MP5 during an exercise.



wars, often with traumatic outcomes, as was the case in Indochina, Algeria and Vietnam. And what should we say about the Gulf war and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia? No doubt, today war is *an armed and bloody struggle between organized groups* (Bouthoul); but it must also be kept in mind that for a long time, since the American Civil War (1861-1865) it has not been conducted only with weapons, but enters more and more the economic, industrial and social internal tissue of the Nations. Besides implying a certain

Montgomery (1968) gives us a definition which is still interesting today. He does not consider only the employment of military means or the leading role of the States: *war is the continuation with weapons of any conflict between rival political groups. It includes insurrections and civil wars, and excludes riots and individual acts of violence* (7).

These scattered elements are undoubtedly valuable, but we would like to add that a definition of war, particularly

today, must have a dual character, i.e. it must refer not only to those who formulate it, but to the probable or possible enemy, to their methods and their weapons. In a word, it should not be “Europocentric” or, to put it better, it should not be valid for the developed West only. So, even after September 11, we believe that, on the whole, our definition of 1998 is still realistic: *war is a state of hostility and struggle deriving from a conflict of great interests or from a crisis (between States or coalitions of States, between States or organized internal or external groups, or between States and organized groups) reaching such a level that for both opponents it becomes necessary and inevitable to have recourse to the potential or actual use of armed force (not of “the Armed Forces”) on a considerable scale, in order to achieve their political objectives* (8).

Today, we must only observe that in this definition there is no reference to the *time* parameter: as Luard says, in order to be considered a war, a struggle must last for a significant period of time (but how long? Up to, and including, the very recent war in Kosovo, short wars have always been the primary objective of politico-military leaders). However a war must have an end: if it is “infinite”, it cannot be a war in the full sense of the term. By applying these theoretical principles to the reality of today, we note that on September 11 there was certainly a recourse to force on a considerable scale by an organized criminal group, against which a legitimate reaction was directed – on a remarkable scale as well, and not only by military means – by the US and the West: but what will the sequel of the fight against terrorism be? Will it be, also in the future, studded with actions of violence organized on a

remarkable scale by both sides, or will terrorism become a chronic disease with which we shall have to live, fighting it when it strikes, with the means required by the situation? In other words, will there be such an escalation that the word "war" could be justified?

Only history will give a final and irrefutable answer, proved by facts. Meanwhile, it is important to find the best way not only to fight terrorism, but also to counter the numerous threats to the well-being and security of the western societies; threats that must not be forgotten, as a consequence of the enormous resonance of the terrorist attack against the United States (this would be indeed a remarkable result for the terrorists). Certainly terrorism is not the only challenge for the West. If anything, it is closely connected with success in other and perhaps more important challenges. After all, if the fight against terrorism can be called war is a secondary and debatable question. Before Bin Laden, the "holy war" was proclaimed also by Saddam Hussein. We must beware of the propaganda's and the media's exasperations. In this respect, at least for the European mentality and sensitivity, the less we talk about war, the better it is.

For the moment, suffice it to note that there is a developed Western world with its own culture, history and mentality and a religious inspiration which is more Christian-Calvinistic than Catholic-Orthodox. But there is also an anti-West and extremist culture, a tradition, a religious philosophy which, referring to Islamic traditions, conducts an all-out struggle against the West. In the Islamic world there is also a group of moderate Countries which do not consider the West an enemy to fight without quarter, but rather a partner with which it is convenient to cooperate, albeit without

accepting *in toto* its economic, social and political patterns, which often remain divergent. Another fact is that those who live in indigence and underdevelopment consider the consumer's society a provocation and is thus relatively easy to convince them that the West is the den of all evils, etcetera.

As Col. Barone wrote, the purely military and strategic dimensions of the present reality are closely connected with the politico-social situation where old

"Bersaglieri" controlling a vehicle near a checkpoint.



and new emerging confrontations directly influence the different military modalities of the recourse to organized violence. From this point of view, terrorism is a phenomenon with a clear and growing strategic value, and this confirms what we wrote in 1998: *"it tends to strike the enemy vulnerabilities and, as shown by the events of the recent years, is a very effective antiWestern and antiAmerican weapon, probably even superior to guerrilla warfare, since it requires less men, less equipment and not very protracted and intense efforts(9).*

To fight terrorism, the experience of the two great wars of the 20th Century is useless. After all, they were won by those who were better armed, better equipped and richer, even prescindendo from the quality of the strategic conduct and other factors that we do not wish to consider here. On the contrary, this heritage could even be misleading, if its results were to be the overestimation of the role and quality of weapons and materials and the underrating of the human factor in general. Leaving aside, for the moment, the purely military considerations,

we can say right away that the Western way of life makes the recourse to terrorism very attractive for its enemies, as much as the Superpower's force and technological superiority – in the armaments' sector, but not only – induce the West's adversaries to avoid challenges on the plane of the classic art of war and of war technologies, because they would certainly lose: the last to make this mistake was Saddam Hussein in 1990-1991, and he was also at a disadvantage on account of the desert land, which offered



Crew members of a self-propelled gun.

excellent targets to the Western air forces.

The soundness of Barone's teachings is also proved by the almost compulsive military repercussions of the Western socio-political system. Its advantages are evident: a welfare level, never achieved before, for large masses of citizens and democratic liberties. But, in order to achieve and keep these excellent objectives, the system must be based on the individual,

on his initiative that must be left as free as possible, and on the cult of results, efficiency, profit and growth, even to the detriment of other needs. The negative implications are also evident: a dangerous tendency to set aside the moral values, which can produce dangerous even if reduced sectors of social discomfort that can breed internal violence and even international terrorism; the creation in the rest of the world of hostilities, tensions, envies, accusations of injustice and economic exploitation. In particular, the system, precisely

because it is based on technologies directed only to profit, presents growing vulnerabilities, which can be reduced but not easily eliminated. Therefore, for the enemy, they are a practically unlimited number of "paying targets" which can be hit with not very sophisticated weapons, or even without arms. Suffice it to think of skilled acts of sabotage against thermonuclear centrals, aqueducts, pipelines, etc.). In short, it is an efficient and organized system, but with several delicate mechanisms which make it insecure, also in the minds of its citizens.

The evident consequence is that this system *must* necessarily produce highly technological military instruments which, in turn – and this is also a limitation – give the utmost importance to performance, i.e. destructive power, to the detriment of other requirements. In military organizations, as in industries, the number of machines increases, and personnel diminishes. A few men can express a terrifying power: but also in this case, an exaggerated cult of power can open important "windows" to vulnerability. Still vulnerable, despite everything, are the armies' rear lines, airports, logistic infrastructure, etc. Relatively vulnerable are also ultrapowerful, very expensive and very sophisticated weapon systems, such as tanks, airplanes and helicopters, that can be destroyed by not highly sophisticated and very common arms, such as surface/air or antitank portable missiles, whose main requisite is the fighter's guts.

To all this, we must add that the modern weapon systems were designed, constructed and optimized for the war of armies and fleets, which finished in 1989. Secondly, *they have an absolute need of paying and well-determined targets* which, in the present reality, only a very

clumsy enemy would offer them (also in the Kosovo war, the Serbian Army suffered very modest losses). Let us not delude ourselves: these limitations cannot be easily removed, also because *the West is practically condemned to conduct a war of machines*, which not only tend to replace men, but also to avoid losses. During the recent limited wars, the Superpower was the first to impose extremely severe restrictions to its military strategy: first of all to avoid losses of personnel or aircraft, because public opinion would not tolerate them. But this is not a new strategic position: it emerged already in the conduct of the Anglo-American war in 1939-1945, especially in North Africa and Italy.

Land borders appropriately defended by fortifications and mobilization mechanism ready to spring up are anachronisms. It is a fact that after 1989 they still exist, particularly in the sea and air sectors, even if they are not always drawn on maps. Their existence is proved by the preparation of a space shield, that the US has been considering for twenty years and sooner or later will be made: the question is only *when* it will start to operate. Another proof of their existence is, above all, the deep fracture across the Mediterranean, invisible on the maps, but very visible every day, when hundreds of desperate people land on our coasts. We refer to the border between welfare-society and the large – too large – underdeveloped world where, for various reasons, Islamic extremism enjoys the sympathy of many, and the anti-West propaganda, as well as the call to the strictest Islamic traditions, find fertile ground. Together with the enormous uncontrolled mass of dirty money moving around the world (thanks to the financial instruments typical of the advanced societies) and the

profitable trafficking in drugs and illegal immigrants, this is a good culture medium, not only, or not so much, for terroristic undertakings, but for any activity aimed at endangering in different ways the well-being and the stability of Western societies. Unfortunately, therefore, granaries must be defended also by arsenals.

For all these reasons the underdeveloped societies, and particularly those of the Middle East and the northern coast of Africa, permit terrorism and

2000s, symbolized by the fact that, also in the military field, one side tends to safeguard the individual and his rights to the utmost, to the point of asking him to fight as little as possible and to sacrifice himself for the common cause only by exploiting every resource of technology; the other side, on the contrary, continues to oppose armed masses – whose life is not greatly valued and the individual is asked the supreme sacrifice in the name of hatred and celestial joy, to a small number of



other forms of illegal activities to recruit large numbers of "labourers" ready for anything, to the point of sacrificing their lives for the cause. At the same time, particularly tanks to the oil profits – which did not translate into what, at least for the Western mind, is an economic, social and cultural development – those societies also provide large amounts of money to whomever wants to fight the loathed American enemy and the Western model in general.

In the final analysis, this creates a strategic asymmetry, which is the main characteristic of the early

A radio operator of the Army Rangers during the INTERFET mission in East Timor.

superequipped, superfed and superprotected men. Thus the *Kamikaze* has become a primary strategic resource that can annul the technological gap that separates the most advanced armies. But we can say even more: in the present reality, the *Kamikaze* has become the best weapon of our enemies, for the simple reason the he can exploit the West's niches of vulnerability" while against this threat, terrible

and indeed inconceivable for our mentality, there is not a really valid defence. It is therefore an asymmetry which plays against the US and the West for two essential reasons: it would be very difficult to remove it with further refinements of the military, informative and social/territorial control-technologies; at the same time, the asymmetry increases precisely with the well-known faults of the advanced industrial societies. The latter, in their turn, are not easily disposed of, for the simple reason that their removal could impose changes in living standards, and even more in mentality and customs, which the Western peoples are not prepared for, and cannot accept.

Nevertheless, this asymmetry can and must be reduced. It might seem like a paradox, but it can be done using criteria and means we do not hesitate to define as traditional and, as such, are rather easy to state but very difficult to apply. Reasoning coldly, we must note that after all, the 18 *Kamikaze* armed only with millenarian weapons such as knives, on September 11 achieved the *optimum* of classic strategy: maximum result with minimum effort, obtained by

applying the well-known ancient principles: concentration of forces on the weakest and most profitable point of the enemy front, surprise and economy of forces. Secondly, today, in order to counter the schemes against our society – not only terrorism – one should use a perfect mix of ingredients, involving the economic, financial, social diplomatic, informative, psychological and military sectors. Also this, after all, is an old practice followed for centuries by yesterday's Superpower, Great Britain, which managed to defeat its powerful enemies, and develop its well-being through a highly technological instrument (the Royal Navy) and a small volunteer army, accompanied by a foreign policy, a diplomacy and a proverbially efficient intelligence which were capable of combining the employment of the military instrument with all the other possible extramilitary and paramilitary means, multiplying their effectiveness. In this way the great powers of the continent (France first, then Germany), which counted mainly on the many divisions of their armies, were defeated. This does not alter the fact that in the wake

of Sorel and Blanqui's theories, violence, be it more or less organized, continues to be, as always, the protagonist and the mould of history, even if it is limited to small minorities. In this situation, the sterile appeals of the self-styled pacifist movements are pathetic in face of facts which, as Spinoza used to say, are not touched by our wrath.

In concrete, the question today is to continue and perfect the old British way, making the military instrument not *the only means* but rather *one of the means* to be employed very selectively, and only when targets and possible results are very clear. Terror and its supporters must be hit with different means, *taking into account – and this is the difficult part – the repercussions of our actions, first of all in the Arab world, where it is necessary to reduce – and not to increase – the area of assent around terrorism.* Secondly – and we underline it, *only* secondly – our vulnerabilities must be reduced, starting with the psychological ones, which have already heavily affected the economic and financial activities, touching upon the interests and living standard of the average American and European citizen, without distinction. Those who want peace should know that war has already been declared on them, and act accordingly. The asymmetry starts precisely from the way events are perceived. In Italy and in the West in general, unfortunately this is an advantage for the subversive forces. Everyone thinks as he pleases and there are, without too much of a scandal, different recipes and different sensitivities, even among European nations and between Europe and the US. Nothing of the kind exists within



Italian emplacement for territorial control in Kosovo.



Tank leader and radio operator aboard a "Leopard" 1A5 of the Garibaldi Brigade.

the area consenting to terrorism, where the religious authorities, who hate the West, give political teachings, which are listened to by many and which incite to holy war, thinking on behalf of all. The only advantage we have at present is that the justified horror caused by September 11 objectively reunited the Western lineup, taking space and consent away from the pseudopacifists.

But this horror should not turn into a pure and simple yearning for revenge (this is a fault of democracy) or into short-lived and irrational impulses of public opinion, which governments could be tempted to second, in order to achieve consent. It is relatively easy to unleash the destructive power of armaments, but it could be counterproductive; on the contrary it is extremely difficult,

for the reasons mentioned before – to strike at the right time what must be struck.

The information on the enemy is essential in the present context, and must still rely mainly on man rather than on mythical technological devices for global listening. The Air Force, providing that good targets are found, can hit the Countries which support the terrorists, but not the terrorists themselves, who can easily escape an offence from the sky. We should only ask of technologies what they can give; on the internal plane it would be good to follow the example, rightly recalled in these days, of the Englishman who in 1940 or 1941 affixed on the debris caused by the *Luftwaffe* a "business as usual" sign. This is an effective way of defending ourselves against terror fighting it, first of all, by learning to live with it, exactly as we do with the many evils of our time, which also cause victims.

Public opinion should become aware of the fact that security measures are necessary but not always sufficient, and that terrorism is just a very impressive expression of the manifold threats to the welfare society. They can be faced only by recovering our moral values and with a policy which must not confuse the demands of economic development (and the deriving globalization) with an anachronistic homogenization which does not consider enough the many diverse histories, cultures, religions, characters, traditions and economic situations of the various peoples, be they developed or not.

Within this framework it must be strongly stressed that the fundamental mission of the Armed Forces is still the same: to safeguard national security and territorial integrity, on the basis of the directives issued by the legitimate political authorities and in the ways and forms – very



Engineer NCOs in a mine-clearing operation.

the threats of tomorrow using arms conceived against yesterday's enemies, we must rethink our security (Lord George Robertson, NATO Secretary General – September 14);

- *once the aircraft have taken wing we must decide what to do, the specific threat which we have to attack must be identified. We are very efficient in countering external attacks, less so against the internal ones.* (Gen. Richard Myers, USAF, future Chief of Staff – September 15, 2001).

If this is the situation, what are we going to do? In order to meet the very hard challenges of the future, it would be wrong to tailor the security instrument only for the fight against terrorism. Technologies and military instruments must instead be oriented to the best development of two primary objectives: capability of carrying out comprehensive, rapid and selective interventions (against any threat and naturally, where necessary, also in peace missions), and reduced vulnerability which must be pursued through changes in the organization and particularly in the weapon systems, which so far have given the highest priority to power (in the maritime sector, the attack to the *USS Cole* can teach us many things). Great attention must be given also to the precision of the weapons and of the target-acquisition equipment; it goes without saying that the *collateral damages*, even when limited, are as many psychological weapons offered to the enemy propaganda. Finally, the most difficult challenge: we must establish a mainly humanistic cultural and professional training for the

different from the past ones – required by the present and by the foreseeable future situation. In this sense, the fateful date of September 11 does not sound so much as the beginning of a new era but rather as a strong spur not to indulge in illusions or fashions, demanding of the military and of the government what, beyond appearances, has always been their primary mission, particularly after the Cold War. To be even clearer: as we have been saying since 1998 (10), defence, security and national integrity must keep, or

retake, the first place.

In the preparation of the military instrument, some radical changes are nevertheless necessary. This is acknowledged, for example, by three acceptable authoritative statements, which should be carefully considered:

- *our classic armies are obsolete vis-à-vis faceless enemies who do not wear uniforms, have no name and fly easily across the most fortified borders* (Shimon Peres, Israel's Foreign Minister – September 12, 2001);
- *we crossed the Rubicon, we cannot defend ourselves from*



"Mangusta" A 129 combat helicopter armed with A/T missiles.

Cadres, teaching them to give due importance to man, giving technology only the role it deserves, without excessive enthusiasm. Everybody – and not only the military – should understand that the war between regular armed forces did not finish on September 11 but rather, as we said, with the fall of the Berlin Wall. This causes a sharp change in the concept of security which, besides putting to the test the politico-military leaders, requires the harmonious coordination of all efforts and components to achieve the common objectives. Non-affiliation, corporativism, separation and exclusivism, so common in our military history, are not admitted anymore. From

the global, industrial, technological, massive war to the *invisible war* of today, the leap is long and difficult, but necessary.

To have success, the transition must be made with unity of intents and objectives, not only by the entire security system of the Country, but by all citizens. And soon. Only in this way we shall be able to concentrate all our forces on the enemy's decisive and weakest point. The real *revolution in military affairs* starts precisely from this.

(October 2001)



*Colonel (ret.)

NOTES

(1) See, for example: Various Authors, "The missions abroad of the Italian Army" (edited by Enrico Magnani). Rome, Army Staff Ed. 1992.

(2) Vincenzo Molinari, "The art of

war" – six volumes, Parma, Grazioli Ed. 1871, p.234.

(3) Nicola Marselli, "War and its history", Rome, Voghera 1875, Vol. I, p. 104 and 136-139.

(4) Enrico Barone, "Military institutions and politico-social conditions", Turin, Roux & Frassati 1898, pp.VII, XVIII and XIX.

(5) See "The war against Italy", Rome, Quadrivio Ed. 1940 (abstract from "Les Guerres navales de demain" – 1891, by Commandant Z. & H. Montechant; foreword by Maj. Antonino Trizzino, ITN.

(6) On the changed nature of the war in our time see "Encyclopedia of Social Sciences", Rome, Istituto Enciclopedia Italiana 1894, Vol. IV pp 465-467 and Ferruccio Botti, "The art of war in 2000 – men and strategies between the 19th and the 20th Century", Rome, Rivista Militare Ed. 1998, chapter IV.

(7) Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, "History of wars", Milan, Rizzoli Ed. 1970, p.10.

(8) F. Botti, "The art of war in 2000 – men and strategies", p.305.

(9) Ibid, p.358.

(10) Ibid, pp.630-632.

SOUTH EAST ASIA LOOKS TO EUROPE

by Francesco Semprini *



Most ASEAN countries, after the devastating crisis of 1997, start to show the intention to open themselves to the free market and to international cooperation.

This explains the interest of the Western operators towards this area and in particular towards Thailand. A Country that stands out for its economic dynamism, its efficient military instrument, employed in a wide range of UN peace missions, and for its manifest preference for the culture, art and products made in Italy.

The Asian continent, outstanding for its territorial and demographic dimensions (about 3 billion people) is characterized by noticeable economic, commercial and sociopolitic diversities, despite the development, for decades, of a multilateral process of regional accords among its sovereign States.

ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) is the first organization derived from this process. It was born in 1967, from



a pact among Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and enlarged with the joining of Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Cambodia. Papua New Guinea and South Korea are admitted as observers. ASEAN's decision-making centre resides in the Conference of the foreign ministers, but the important decisions are made during the rare occasions of the summits of the Heads of State and Government. The current business is handled by a permanent ad hoc committee of specialists and officials and by a coordination committee in Jakarta.

In the past, in ASEAN has prevailed the **principle of non interference in the internal affairs of the partner countries** and pursuit of consent devoid of

unpleasant deep examinations. As a matter of fact, it seems unapt to give adequate answers to the multilateral political and social crises occurred in the area and even less to the financial crises. It has only been able to overcome the problem of Marcos' succession in the Philippines, to freeze Cambodia's participation, after the bloody events occurred in the Country, and to stimulate Vietnam's transition from state-centred Communism to a free-market economy. In face of the financial crisis of the late nineties, ASEAN should express some decision-making capability, proving itself willing to rise the levels of cooperation among the partner Countries and create the conditions that can set in motion a cycle of commercial integration.

Only at the end of 1998 did the Partners decide to: institute a special area of investment aimed at reducing the barriers against the flow of direct investments and to achieve, by 2010, the optimal objective of liberalizing trade and investments by doing away with duties and customs barriers; promote a further regional cooperation for industrial development and implementing a plan of coordination among the central banks and of regional surveillance with reciprocal information on the economic data.

Having set aside the principle of multilateral non-interference, ASEAN opts for a par control of the reciprocal behaviours so as to **exert pressures on the Countries that adopt risky policies**. In substance, it wants to

create a system of macrostability, possibly supported by a kind of Asian monetary fund, up to now favoured only by Japan.

A second phenomenon of advanced Asian regionalism appears in 1989, with the institution of **APEC**, following a proposal made by Australia. The organization, which has its seat in Singapore, includes the ASEAN Countries washed by the Pacific Ocean: China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, United States, Canada, Russia, Papua New Guinea, Taiwan, Chile, Mexico and Peru.

APEC, albeit it includes many non-Asian countries, has a particular significance within the Asian region washed by the Pacific. However, up to now, it has not been able to promote any formal accord – not even in the commercial sector – acting only as *reference forum* for the economic-strategic decisions of the individual States, hoping for the liberalization of trade and investments, with long-term goals (2010-2020). The partnership gets an unexpected notoriety in

October 2001, when the US seizes the opportunity of the APEC summit in Shanghai to negotiate with Russia and China an alliance against international terrorism.

Much more interesting is the bridge thrown between Europe and Asia in 1994 with **ASEM** (proposed by Singapore), an association based on an agreement of economic cooperation between EU, ASEAN Countries (excluding Laos and Myanmar), China, Japan and South Korea.

Through ASEM, the ASEAN Countries want to counterbalance the American weight within APEC and strengthen their identity outside the Asian-Pacific area. In economic, political and security terms, they tend to establish bonds with Europe that should go beyond the mere bilateral relations. ASEM is also a significant accord for the Asian Countries that were former European colonies, since it allows them to treat on a par the representatives of States that ruled them in the past.

The first ASEM forum, held in Bangkok in 1996 with the participation of the Heads of State and Prime Ministers of the 15 European Countries and of the

10 Asian Countries, marks the beginning of a cooperation and a dialogue that encourage, until the middle of 1997, a spiralling growth of the exchanges between the two continents.

Considering the large demand of consumer goods, appliances, financing and infrastructure expressed by the Asian Countries, we can foresee that by the beginning of 2000, the exchanges between Europe and Asia will exceed by 50% the current trade between Europe and North America.

These rosy prospects are watered down by the economic-financial crisis that in 1997 hit Eastern Asia, forcing ASEM to reconsider data and estimates about the process started in view of intensifying the relations between the two continents.

The **collapse of the Asian tigers** causes a reduction of the European exports towards South East Asia, with a damage only in part offset by the decline of the costs of Asian raw goods exported in the opposite direction. Therefore, the West must lead the ASEAN Countries out of their crisis, not only by winning back the confidence of the economy managers and of the financial markets, but also dissuading them from turning to protectionist measures.


In view of this, the second summit of ASEM of 1998 decided to create, for the Asian Countries, a **Trust Fund** (within the World Bank) and a network of experts capable of guiding the financial restructuring of the single Countries.

These problems are intermingled with the strategic interests of some European Countries which sell arms and train military formations of various Countries of the Region.

For example, France and Great Britain supply 20% of the armaments.

Undoubtedly, if ASEM and APEC were in a position to express appropriately coordinated

A market at Hoi Han, Vietnam.



and significant decisions, it would be easier to find structural solutions for the systemic crises of the Asian Countries, of course through institutional organizations such as WTO and IMF.

WARNING SIGNS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1997

Until 1997 the Asian area records a high growth of its GDP, together with deep structural transformations in the production systems and remarkable changes in its institutional organization. The market share of the area, as compared with the world trade, quadruplicates in a time-span of 25 years (from 5 to 25%).

In the face of the success of the Asian Countries' economic policies, the World Bank abstains from admonishing them when they depart from the traditional prescriptions of the economic policy which, as a rule, tend to leave free space to the market, liberalize the exchanges, avoid subsidies to the industry, etc. The WB considers these policies market-oriented and not conflicting with the principles of free trade it champions together with the IMF.

The trade exchange in the Region is characterized by a **marked increment of direct investments** (the manufacturing industry is privileged), which in 1995 reach a yearly amount of 90 billion dollars.

While the trade exchange of almost all Western Countries records a 50% increase in 5 years, the Italian trade remains in a marginal position. Among the numerous sectors involved by this growth there are those concerning vehicles, electricity, textiles and clothing, agriculture, farm-industry and electronics, which assume a particular importance.

The economic-financial crisis



A rice-paddy in Myanmar.

of 1997 hits South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in a more severe way, causing a slump not easily remedied. The crisis starts in Thailand and spreads rapidly throughout the other Asian nations as a consequence of the so-called **contaminating effect**.

The warning signs of Thailand's crisis can be detected in a series of negative circumstances: deficit of current expense reaching 1.8% of the GDP, rate of exchange anchored to the American dollar and high foreign debt. The considerable devaluation of the local currency (the baht), caused by the repeated speculative attacks of the international investment funds (the so-called **edge funds**), marks the real beginning of the crisis.

Although of rather limited dimension, the devaluation of the baht spreads through the other Countries with such a speed that it provokes the ruinous effect of chain devaluations and collapse of Stock Exchanges.

The considerable depreciation of the baht badly affects the currency of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia and, in lesser way, that of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South

Korea and China. After alternate phases of fluctuations, the currencies of Indonesia and the Philippines, at the beginning of 1998, reach a devaluation of 30-40% against the dollar.

According to the theories of some analysts, the contamination among the various economies occurs when the economic operators observe significant resemblances between two economies, or a remarkable amount of commercial relations.

The currency crises automatically trigger off financial crises, because in the preceding years the rate of insolvency of the great national and international banks (i.e. the amount of the banks' bad debts) has gone up. In the banks of South East Asia, the percentage of **dishonoured credits** reaches the 10-20%, compared to 1% in the US banks. In Thailand, 58 financial companies that have a large number of bad debts were suspended at the start of the crisis.

In Indonesia, the economic crisis is added to the political crisis determined by Suharto's resignation and degenerates into interethnic tensions,

ENGAGEMENTS OF IMF AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
(in billion US\$)

Fig. 1

COUNTRIES	IMF	Multilateral World Bank and Asian development Bank	Bilateral From govts	TOTAL	Payment by IMF From April 1998 (in billion US\$)
Indonesia	9,9	8,0	18,7	36,6	3,0
South Korea	20,9	14,0	23,3	58,2	15,1
Thailand	3,9	2,7	10,5	17,1	2,7
TOTAL	34,7	24,7	52,5	111,9	20,8

dangerous for the regional balances. Tensions that are not completely appeased yet.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE ASIAN CRISIS

The interventions to rescue East Asia from its monetary and financial crisis are of such a size that, for the first time, they pose questions about the adequacy of the resources of the IMF, and of the international community at large, vis-à-vis the exceptionality of these events (fig.1).

In August 1998 the IMF organizes packages of intervention and programmes of reforms aimed at putting in order the economies of South East Asia by keeping in activity the financial channels between the economies hit by the crisis and the international markets, without freezing funds. According to the Bank of International Regulations in Basel, the bank foreign debt of the Asian Countries amounts to 357 billion dollars; **Europe holds 39% of the credits** (approx. 140 billion dollars); Japan 33% and the US only 1,8%.

The IMF intervenes with the redressing measures typical of the eighties, such as, for example,

by closing down the financial companies in trouble, fiscal restrictions and cuts in current expenditures and rising interest rates. As a whole they are aimed at containing inflation, ensuring flexibility to exchange rates and to the labour market, as well as liberalizing foreign capitals, in particular in the financial and credit sector. The deflationary impact of credit cuts, fiscal squeezes in the social field and the further risks of insolvency are underestimated. In fact, in order to be able to follow the developments of the crisis, the IMF is forced to carry out continuous and frequent **revisions of the estimates.**

Concretely, in the ASEAN Countries the crisis causes reductions in GDP, internal demands (up to 10%) and imports. The measures adopted to offset it lead to a rapid improvement in the balances of payments and in foreign accounts, and to the relaunching of exports; on the other hand, the unemployment rate grows. Since these Countries have scarce social protection, the increase in unemployment inevitably gives rise to serious tensions. Malaysia and Thailand, Countries with a share of immigrant labour,

consider the possibility of proceeding to forced repatriations.

According to the IMF, the Asian crisis may have reduced by 1% the growth-rate of the world GDP; obviously, Countries like New Zealand and Australia, more involved in the commercial exchange with South East Asia, may have suffered a greater reduction.

MACROECONOMIC EVALUATION OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AT THE END OF THE NINETIES

The ten ASEAN Countries represent 7% of the socio-economic power of the planet, considering (empirically) that they include 9% of the population and 6% of the economic spaces (3% of the emerged land and 8% of the sea areas).

However, in order to outline the great contrasts existing in the region, we must relate the GDP of the various nations with the respective indexes of the per-capita GDP. From this relation, we can observe that four models emerge in an increasing order of wealth.

The **1st model** represents the poor Countries, underdeveloped and economically closed, with a per-capita GDP of about 400 dollars per year; a per-capita surplus of 70 dollars per year corresponds (in a broad sense) to this datum, a surplus that can exist only by drawing crumbs from the monetary flows that graze it. It is defined also "survival surplus", because it admits charitable and/or mafia interventions. **Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam can be included in this model.**

The first two Countries have a small population (3% of the region) and are in serious conditions of poverty (per-capita GDP of 310 dollars per year). Their economic weight is insignificant (below 1% of the regional activity). Since they do not have an instrument of

capitalization, they are unable to develop an industrial production and, therefore, are compelled to import, at the cost of a heavy commercial deficit (equivalent to 40% of their GDP). In order to survive and try to emerge from their underdevelopment, Cambodia and Laos must accept, without conditions, more or less floating foreign capitals (fig.2).


Myanmar and Vietnam have instead a significant demographic weight (25% of the region) and are less poor (400 dollars per-capita GDP per year). They are in a position to realize a modest socioeconomic infrastructure and a minimum industrialization, even if supported by some protectionist expedients.

Foreign investments are still limited in both Countries, owing to internal malfunctions as well as to the opacity of the regimes in power, whose intentions are not easily understood.

The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia belong to the **2nd model** and are marked by a limited poverty (1500 dollars per-capita GDP per year) and by a minimum of economic resources (at Rumania's level). Their consumption takes up less than 60% of the GDP, leaving a surplus of 600 dollars per capita per year, enough to develop a reasonable industrial capability. Thanks to this surplus, they are able to realize a minimum of socio-economic infrastructure and obtain an industrial production of about 400 dollars per capita per year.

Their foreign relations are important (40% of the region) and amount to 500 dollars of the investments per capita per year.

The three Countries are the substantial component of the region, if considered in terms of foreign relations, productive activities, population and consumption (2/3 of the ASEAN area). The Philippines retain some typicality of the 1st model. Thailand, although it has the highest per-capita GDP (2700



dollars per year) holds an intermediate position in the group, because of the modest presence of foreign investments within its economic system. Indonesia approaches the 3rd model, but is too pervaded by internal disturbances portending uncertainties.

The **3rd model** includes the wealthy Countries (8000 dollars GDP per capita per year), i.e. **Malaysia** and **Singapore**. In both cases, the private consumption absorbs less than half of the production, providing a surplus which permits to create a modern socio-economic

infrastructure, a high level of industrialization, attracting remarkable foreign investments and maintain a high volume of imports (approx 10,000 dollars per capita per year). The population of the two Countries is less than 5% of the whole region, while the productivity level reaches 27%.

The **4th model** is represented only by the extremely rich **Brunei** (GDP per capita per year of 13,000 dollars) which can count on surplus of 55% of its GNP. The industrial capability of this Country is of secondary importance as compared to what



A street in Singapore.

it obtains from its oil resources. Thanks to these resources, it can import the equivalent of 7,200 dollars per capita per year. Brunei is a great exporter of capitals and, therefore, the foreign investments in its economy are very limited.

For its geographic (the same as Liguria's) and demographic (300,000 inhabitants) dimensions and for its productive structure – dominated by oil and the Royal family – Brunei is a state reality very similar to the Emirates of the Persian Gulf.

ITALY'S PROJECTION INTO SOUTH EAST ASIA

The main lines of Italy's economic-commercial policy towards South East Asia, after the Asian crisis of 1997, seem to be still rather uncertain.

It should be stated in advance that **Italy's economic presence** in the ASEAN Countries was little affected by the crisis of

1997, being a reality rather different from the similar ones of other EU Countries. Italy's policy has asserted itself in relatively recent times, has a dispersive and occasional character and reflects the national economic system. The model is based on the prevalence of small and middle-size concerns, very much inclined to exports and rather unwilling to stabilize themselves on the foreign markets with forms of investments different from the usual purchase of shares.

This presence in the past was encouraged by contingent and short-term factors, i.e. by the heavy devaluation of the Lira in 1992/1993, the expansion of the Asian internal demand – especially in the machinery sector – and the Asian governments' will to acquire a diversified productive organization. The *performance of our exports* is also favoured by two political reasons: Italy's extraneousness to the colonialisms formerly ruling in the region and its non-interference in the internal

affairs of the Asian Countries.

The exchange between Italy and the ASEAN Countries, until 1996, equals 23% of that in progress with the rest of the world and guarantees 1/3 of the global commercial assets.

Despite the many uncertainties inherent to the present world economic situation, a relaunch of Italy's economic presence in the region, according to new schemes, appears extremely favourable. As a precondition, it should be ascertained that each country is ready to comply with the principles of lawfulness, openness to the market, liberalization of foreign investments; other factors should also be well considered, such as the structure of the internal demand, the historical level of family savings, etc...

The elements emerging from these evaluations evidence immediately that the economically more dynamic Countries of the region are Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. It follows that it is convenient to widen the **network of bilateral accords** with these

Countries (especially as regards investments), reviving the existing mixed Commissions and establishing offices and sensors aimed at improving the efficiency of our Institute for Foreign Trade.

Moreover, our businessmen should be directly involved in the dialogue with the ASEAN Countries and there should be an adequate support to the initiatives of any other component of the Italian society (regions, universities, commercial and consultant societies, etc) wishing to establish themselves in Asia. One should try to strengthen bilateral relations with the most reliable Countries of the area, because ASEM finds it difficult to take root as an organization capable of making operational decisions.

This context produces a synergic whole of economic, commercial and geo-strategic factors which attract the attention to **Thailand**.

Unlike other ASEAN Countries of the 2nd model, Thailand has never been under colonial rule and therefore is more inclined to share the Western points of view on the main issues of world policy. It has joined the most important international agreements (ASEM etc.) and has participated together with Italy in the peace operations in East Timor. Besides, apparently the Italian and Thai communities have affinities as regards artistic and cultural preferences.

While Indonesia and the Philippines spread over vast archipelagos, Thailand has a unitary and central geographic configuration within the Indo-Chinese peninsula. It constitutes therefore the easiest access to all the Countries of Indochina and a crucial clearing and transit crossroads for many international air- and sea-routes. **Bangkok** is the terminal of most of the air and sea traffic that from Europe branches off to the Far East and Australia.

Tha Thai nation is surrounded by Countries that are poor but

have an enormous potential of economic development. Myanmar and Vietnam, are thickly peopled and have an emerging economic activity which, in the near future, is going to need a large infrastructure. Laos and Cambodia, at present of little demographic and economic importance, are nevertheless in an environmental position susceptible of a diversified development of economic activities. Suffice it to think of the **large project of economic cooperation in the Mekong basin**, sponsored by ASEM, which is partnered by the Countries bordering on the Mekong river, including China. The plan envisages the construction of large hydroelectric power plants, the exploitation of huge mineral resources (especially in Laos) and agricultural improvements in vast areas.

The poor countries of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, despite their

being governmentalist and not very democratic, maintain strong commercial bonds with Thailand, endeavour to promote the flow of foreign investments for the development of the respective industries and are eager to enter as soon as possible into the free-market play.

In Asia, ideologies do not have an absolute value: they count inside the Country but hinder business relations with Countries that have opposite political outlooks.

After the crisis of 1997, **Thailand was the first nation to show concrete signs of recovery** by removing the factors of its structural weakness and by adjusting its economic system to the new situation. Now Thailand has its papers in order and can reactivate its development, considering that the change bath-dollar is calm, inflation is at its lowest level, the encephalogram of consumption shows signs of

STRUCTURE OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC-EUROPE COOPERATION

PARTNER COUNTRIES	ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations	ARF ASEAN Regional Forum	PMC ASEAN Post- Ministerial Conference	APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council	ASEM Asia- Europe Meeting
Brunei	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indonesia	+	+	+	+	+	+
Malaysia	+	+	+	+	+	+
The Philippines	+	+	+	+	+	+
Singapore	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thailand	+	+	+	+	+	+
Vietnam	+	+	+	+	+	+
Laos	+	+	+			
Myanmar	+	+	+			
China		+	+	+	+	+
Japan		+	+	+	+	+
South Korea		+	+	+	+	+
Australia		+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand		+	+	+	+	+
United States		+	+	+	+	+
Canada		+	+	+	+	+
Russia		+	+	+	+	+
European Union (1)		+	+			+
India		+	+			
Cambodia	+	+				
Mongolia		+				
Papua New Guinea		+		+		
Taiwan				+	+	
Hong Kong SAR				+	+	
Chile				+	+	
Colombia					+	
Mexico				+	+	
Peru				+	+	
Pacific Islands (2)					+	

NOTES:

(1) EU members are represented in ASEM only individually

(2) The French territories of the Pacific are associated members of PECC

recovery and the Central Bank relaxes its grip on the rates of interest.

The Thai government obtains this success thanks to a rigorous package of anti-crisis measures, launched in 1999, which envisages tax reliefs, tariff reductions, facilitations for loans coming from abroad and, above all, a 7% VAT reduction.

Since the middle of 2000, the course of the Thai economy – like other ASEAN Countries' – has suffered a deceleration caused by the increased costs of the energy products, by the recessive thrusts of US and Japan and the credit situation, remarkably improved since 1997 but not completely back to normal. After a massive reflux on the Bangkok Stock Exchange of capitals deposited by international investors, foreign observers have confirmed their confidence in a favourable evolution of the Thai economic trend.

This dynamism of the economic recovery has also been fostered by Thailand's institutional soundness, its rate of democracy (greater than that of the other ASEAN Countries) and by the marked public spirit and industriousness innate in its people, especially those of Thai ethnic origin.

One should also add that, for its necessities of security and prestige, the Country can count on an **efficient military instrument**, with a force of 330,000 men (one of the most powerful of the region) capable of carrying out a very wide range of missions, such as, for example, the participation in UN peacekeeping missions and in the international campaign against the production and diffusion of drugs. Besides, the Army is engaged in the unhappily famous "**golden triangle**", and the Navy must

ensure, above all, the security of the maritime traffic (95% of the import-export of the Country travels by ship).

As regards our economic-commercial presence in the ASEAN area, we cannot avoid saying that some Italian initiatives have risked to fail because of negative factors which other Countries, (European and non-European) have managed to

desirable to do away with the useless restrictions imposed by the European Community to the trade with some Countries (cancellation of antidumping tax, extension of SPG benefits to Myanmar, etc.)

CONCLUSIONS

While the devastating effects of the economic crisis of 1997 are fading away, in all Countries of South Eastern Asia there is an increasing will to set in motion the development by opening to free market and international cooperation. Such will can be felt also in Countries that have a strong governmental organization.

Most economies of the ASEAN Countries have a **stable and positive trend of the growth rate** (in 1999 it fluctuated from 4.1 to 6.5%).

The recovery concerns especially the industrial sector, which urges for continuous orders of new machinery and/or new technologies; orders that are considered extremely interesting by the Italian manufacturers of this sector. These positive signs go together with the reborn confidence of the local populations in the potentialities of the economy, which is indicative of an **increased revival of private consumption**.

The interest of the economic operators for the macroeconomic realities of the region, today is focused on Indochina, with particular regard for the Country which, today, more than any other Country, is in a position to offer conditions favourable to the revival and relaunching of economic-commercial initiatives in the entire peninsula, i.e. in Thailand.

This Country is very interesting for its economic dynamism

GLOSSARY

AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nation
ASEM	Asia Europe Meeting
FMI	Fondo Monetario Internazionale
ICE	Istituto per il Commercio Estero
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PIL	Prodotto Interno Lordo
PMC	Post-Ministerial Conference
PMI	Piccole Medie Imprese
PML	Prodotto Mondiale Lordo
PNL	Prodotto Nazionale Lordo
PVS	Paesi in Via di Sviluppo
SPG	Sistema delle Preferenze Generalizzate
UE	Unione Europea
VAT	Value Added Tax (come l'IVA in Italia)
WTO	World Trade Organization

remove long ago; for example, the protection of the Italian investments in some Nations is inadequate, also because they have legal systems slow in deciding and inscrutable in judging. This happens particularly in controversies between Italian businessmen and local companies and citizens. It is absolutely necessary to remedy such inconveniences through suitable bilateral accords. It is also



during the years of the crisis (1997-98) and for its clear sympathy for the West. As regards Italy, this interest is corroborated by the preference that the Thai society expresses for the Italian culture, art and good taste.

In military jargon Thailand could be described as a suitable **launching base** for the Italian economic-commercial initiatives in that area.

Besides the immediate economic returns, it is profitable to expand our presence in Thailand and to the neighbouring Countries through bilateral relations aimed at finding and evaluating the commercial and business opportunities of the area, as well as appraising the real values of the reality of each State.

This political-economic option does not spring from a desire to compete with other UE or extra-UE Countries, but only from the legitimate interest to allow our enterprises to express their best operational and technologic capabilities, to promote every form of technical-scientific cooperation

and to introduce in the Asian commercial circuits the most appreciated national products.

Let us admit that in this regard there may be a surfacing of uncertainties and conflicting signs. Suffice it to think, on the one hand, of the heavy devaluations of some local currencies, useful for increasing the exports of the Asian Countries and, on the other, the considerable drop in their industrial production and home demand, which leads to fear the beginning of a recessive phase that could last many years.

We ought to point out that the exports of Thailand and Indonesia are stagnant, if estimated in dollars, and show an increase, if measured in volume of exported goods. This means that the devaluation of the currency of the two Countries and the fall in prices on the international markets have reduced the beneficial effects of the respective exports and produced a slight deflationist impact on the Western economies.

Vietnamese drilling platform at Bach Ho, in the South China Sea.

Anyhow, the **Asian South East continues to be very attractive**, because the motivations particularly favourable to the investments in the minor markets of the region (Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines) still exist. Obviously, one must try to gravitate on those more reliable for their short-medium-term economic capacities and which have no politico-social or ethnic-religious disturbances.

In a less-immediate future, hopefully, ASEM is going to fulfill its Institutional role and constitute, for the UE Countries and for ASEAN a reliable point of reference and discussion, especially in the moments of uncertainty of world economy.

□
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EVOLUTION OF THE SCENARIO AND PLANNING OF THE LAND INSTRUMENT



by Salvatore Farina*

What are the factors that have changed the international scenario, and what interventions are necessary in planning and defining the operational capabilities of the land Forces?

The following article gives some precise answers to these questions, stressing the need that the emergencies appearing in the new politico-strategic picture be faced with an acceleration of the adjustment process, which is actually being fully developed in our Army and in those of many Western Countries.

The events of September 11, if on the one hand have stricken the feelings of all those who, all over the world, share the same values of freedom, constitutional state and respect for human life, on the other have added new parameters to the complex problem of security.

It is a conceptual leap in a sector which, for more than a decade, has undergone a geo-strategic evolution, in which the Armed Forces of many Countries, and particularly the Western ones, have been engaged in a transformation process which has been rightly defined as "epochal".

In this sense, one of the most important events is certainly the crisis in the Balkan area. This crisis accelerated the process of cohesion in the political and security sectors in Europe, prompting NATO to proceed to

a critical review of its structures, in order to adapt them to the changed security requirements. As a consequence, almost all Nations of the Euro-Atlantic area have been involved in the full development of important programmes of renewal, based on quantitative reductions and on the increase of the operational capabilities, at both national and multinational level. The scenario of reference, however, was antecedent to the terrorist attacks against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.


It is therefore logical, today, to ask ourselves what were the factors that produced substantial transformations in the scenario, and consequently what changes must be introduced in the definition of the forces and in the operational capabilities necessary to meet the new security needs.

EVOLUTION OF THE SCENARIO

The general picture confirms the reduced possibility that, in the medium-long term, an international actor could directly threaten, in a "traditional" way, national and allied vital interests, such as territorial integrity, with large-scale military operations. Nevertheless, as was amply proved by the attack against the United States of America, the future scenarios will be characterized by a long series of risks, different in type and dimensions, with variable means and application points, which will also involve governmental and social structures.

From a strictly military viewpoint, the potential enemies will very likely adopt techniques capable of neutralizing or decreasing the technological advantage available which seems to be destined to increase





considerably in certain sophisticated sectors.

In general, at politico-military level, it is necessary advance some observations on the innovatory elements in the scenario of international relations. These innovations will affect the conduct of military operations, and are now as important as the strictly techno-military elements.

The first consideration derives from the possible fluidity of the politico-military coalitions in which the instruments will be called to operate. As a matter of fact, the framework of alliances and coalitions will evolve with a frequency never observed during the last fifty years. This is confirmed by the trend started with Operation "ALBA", followed by SFOR, KFOR, East Timor and the international commitment in support of the US.

The different sensitivity about crisis situations, and the potential diverging interests between partners in formal and durable alliances could lead to a decrease in the rhythm of operations guided by joint politico-military bodies and to a reduced integration of military capabilities. On the contrary, the

more and more frequent recourse to the constitution of "Coalitions of the Willing", underlines the need that in future the forces will have to be in a position to operate even with a low interoperability. In view of this, it will be necessary to evaluate each time the degree of integration of the military instruments, without accepting *tout court* the extension of the "task-organization" principle to the multinational sphere but, on the contrary, specifying **the minimum level below which "multinationalization" could hamper effectiveness and thus be unprofitable.** **The second consideration** derives from the analysis of the political institutions existing in the areas of foremost strategic interest, and indicates that, in case of crisis in these regions, the application of diplomatic and economic initiatives would not be very successful. On the contrary, the enforcement of diplomatic, economic and informative measures together with others of the military kind, would very likely turn out to be much more effective.

In these areas, it will not be sufficient to give the impression

of a capability of intervention, using power as a deterrent, but it could be necessary to actually deploy a projection combat force, in order to achieve, if necessary, a real operational impact.

The third consideration to bear in mind ensues from the new structure of the NATO forces and from the consequences on their categorization. It is a fact that the NATO decision to constitute a number of high-readiness Corps for both Art.5 and CROs (Crisis Response Operations) requires the presence of Division/Brigade-level formations capable of playing the role of readily deployable "entry forces", projectable also to non-permissive theatres, and able to create the security framework necessary for the deployment of higher-level Major Units. In this sense, this type of forces will have to meet requirements of high strategic mobility, and command protection and combat power better than the present immediate-reaction forces, in order to guarantee a high operational impact and an enduring survivability.

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The operational environment can be characterized by several variables, falling within two categories concerning, respectively, the physical and human sphere and the emerging threat.

The characteristics of the probable future Operation Areas will be different (Fig.1) from those where the traditional forces have up to now planned their employment: greater urbanization, **larger Operation Areas**, increased subdivision of the terrain, **presence of civilians**, will characterize the future manoeuvring areas. Terrain, enemy forces and civilians are the



Italian squad at a checkpoint.

three inseparable components of the situation where all units will have to operate. We are going to examine each element, in order to determine their impact on the required capabilities.

As regards the first classic factor, **terrain**, it is likely that in the future will occur again what happened in Somalia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Afghanistan: the enemy will move the fighting to **highly compartmented and/or thickly urbanized areas**, to counterbalance their vulnerability in the sectors of intelligence and highly technological weapons, thus redressing the force balances. It is therefore possible to say that in planning the future military operations, the involvement in areas with a medium/high density of urbanization cannot be ruled out.

Therefore, in order to develop the type of forces to be employed in urbanized environments, it will be necessary to take into account the following characteristics:

- tridimensionality of the space, including the subterranean level;
- predominance of **structures and buildings**, whose dimensions will hamper observation, fire, movement and Command-and-Control;
- increased indistinctness and protection of the enemy formations or of individual elements, thus making more difficult their acquisition and neutralization;
- **non-contiguity and large extension** of the battlefield and, in particular, of the area of responsibility, in relation to the forces employed;
- **high physiological stress**, due to the high level of attention required, the presence of risks on all sides and the impact of

close combat, which are elements producing a high rate of attention of the personnel.

As regards the presence of civilians, it will not be possible anymore to overlook the probable political implications connected with a military involvement of the centres of gravity located in a urbanized and **media-influenced context**.

As a consequence, the units employed in this type of environment will have to possess a diverse and increased ability to gather and process information. In particular, also the lower-level Commanders must be capable of:

- detecting the **politico-social** and **psychological** implications of the use of force;
- confronting **possible actions conducted by paramilitary units**, such as irregular forces, terrorist organizations and networks, extremist political factions, transnational crime organizations;

- acquiring in real time the directives on the lines of conduct and the rules of engagement.

The presence of international, governmental and non-governmental organizations (IOs, GOs and NGOs) in the future intervention areas will be an additional challenge for the military instrument. Relations marked by not always converging requirements and programmes could result in dyscrasias which affect the fulfilment of the mission.

The critical aspects that are going to impose a review of the **composition** of the formations are:

- **the multiplicity, many-sided nature and unpredictability** of the operational options, owing to the possible presence, in the same operational scenario of diverse types of conflicts with different levels of intensity (**conflict islands**) which will impose a selective management of military capabilities in the same area of operations;
- **the reversibility and instability** of the conflict levels, due to the continuous “**symmetric-asymmetric**” interaction;
- **the difficulty in force deployment** in the areas of intervention owing to the

possible interdiction of the main points of entry in theatre, which could also cause a greater complexity in the activities of deployment and expansion of the formations;

- the rapid **wearing out** of the forces, as a consequence of the strong tendency to disperse them, the increase of **restraints and limitations** deriving from public opinion and political power, with reference to the growing and proper sensitivity towards the safeguard of human life and natural environment.

The influence of the media on military operations is growing at the same rate as the interest shown by public opinion, which is more and more emotionally involved.

In the so-called “global village”, the crises and the military operations for the management of “hotbeds” will occur under the watchful eye of the media, that will amplify, tone down or modify every aspect of the crisis, also according to the particular “conditionings” put into effect by one or more of the opposing parties, or by “aimed” information campaigns.

The impact of one's own or enemy losses will have such a large echo arouse such a great deal of interest that it could compromise the perception of national security objectives. In consequence, public opinion will simultaneously ask for success and reduction of the physical risks, costs and collateral effects typical of military operations, such as the involvement of civilians and damages caused to the environment by the battle. The last element that must be inserted in the mosaic of the future operational environment concerns the nature and the



Layer of a self-propelled gun.



Women Officer cadets during a break in an exercise.

modus operandi of the potential enemies.

There are possibilities that the adversary may have equal or equivalent military capabilities, but very likely the enemy will consist of non-regular and non-traditional forces.

Nevertheless, our forces will have to be able to confront forces with similar operational capabilities in high-intensity conflicts.

On the other extreme, it is very likely that irregular military forces with different operational capabilities will conduct a *number of non-conventional hostile acts* against us, employing surprise and deceit, with an asymmetric and asynchronous approach in order to reach their objective.

The command centres and the logistic and training bases of the enemy could be spread, like a net, on a global scale and this would make their identification very difficult. Terrorist groups

could strike in more and more unexpected ways, and in connection with unknown events.

Very likely, the potential enemy will try to prevent us from protecting our vital points on the national territory and from taking any repressive and preventive action against terrorism, for instance through the interdiction of the air, railway and sea points of embarkation (APOEs, RPOEs and SPOEs), obstructing at the same time the access to the points of entrance to remote theatres, such as air, sea and railway points of disembarkation (APODs, SPODs and RPODs).

This makes mandatory for us to envisage and/or confirm the availability of forces deployable in a theatre even in absence of port and airport infrastructure, or to organize easily accessible entrance areas.

In the future it might become very difficult to realize a security framework using the classic means

of passive protections and high-technology surveillance devices, while greater attention should instead be directed to forms of intelligence capable of gathering information directly from the social environment, prisoners, ex-fighters, exiles or refugees or from normal civilian personnel present in the operations area (HUMINT). Finally, with reference to the spreading out of the instruments, it will be expedient to set up combat groups capable of conducting autonomous actions, centred on a lower-than-usual level such as the company.

ADAPTATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS

The evolution of the scenarios of employment thus outlined clearly has deep impacts on the



Rangers of the "Col Moschin" 9th Regiment on training.

planning of the land instrument.

At this point it should be emphasised how, from the viewpoint of force planning, the non-conventional attack carried out to the heart of the United States and the consequent reaction of the international community could be seen as a confirmation of the assumptions of the conceptual and organizational analysis, which, during the last few years, has led to the renewal of the land instrument of the major Western nations.

From the capability of confronting large numbers of armoured means, typical of the cold war, we have started long ago to orient ourselves towards capabilities of intervention, of crisis control and management in the areas of strategic interest, considering the high-intensity combat as the most demanding and most important point of reference. Nevertheless, the dramatic development of the events of our times has imposed a great acceleration of this evolutionary process and has required more attention towards the sectors that answer the needs

connected with the struggle against typically asymmetric and non-traditional attacks.

I wish to point out that the updating/improvement process of the military capabilities of the European Nations of the Alliance at present is regulated by the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI), i.e. by the process of alignment of the European capabilities to the US ones, according to convergence standards established in the

Washington summit of 1999, under the pressure of the operations in Kosovo. Considering the acceleration occurred in the programmes of the US defence and the size of the changes brought in the relevant planning objectives, it is likely that a similar updating, albeit of lower level, will take place within the Alliance in connection with the convergence standards of the abovesaid DCI.

Let us see how the US Army is reorganizing itself. Thanks to a programme started a long time ago, the US Army is trying to employ in the most effective way the considerable funds that will be at its disposal to implement the so-called transformation of the land instrument, according to standards that meet the new challenges determined by the "Joint Vision 2020". Considering that these funds are in any case still insufficient for the modernization of the entire instrument, it was decided to divide the development of the forces along three mainlines. The



Restoration of a bridge across a river.

legacy force, i.e. the force inherited from the cold war, is based on heavy units and four main weapon-systems: the "Abrams" tank, the "Bradley" APC (and deriving families), the "Apache" and UH-60 helicopters and the MLRS/ATACMS rocket launcher. This body of forces, deemed insufficient for the requirements of the totality of the new scenarios of employment, will be updated only in part, through the introduction in some units (a Corps) of indispensable systems, such as computerization, the "Crusader" self-propelled gun and the "Grizzly" pioneer tank. These units, backbone of the US Army until the end of its transformation, will have to permit to conduct counteroffensives at Corps level for solving high-intensity crises. It should be noted that the technological level of such forces is approximately equivalent to the objectives of the modernization and renewal programme of the Italian Army up to 2010 (ARIETE - APC DARD - PzH 2000 - A 129 - NH-90 - ESC - SAMP-T - SIACCON 2). The *interim force*, destined to be a gap-filler, with the aim of having immediate availability of an instrument oriented towards the new tasks, is formed by the body of the said updated *legacy* forces and the 6 IBCT (*Interim Brigade Combat Team*) medium brigades, that are being realized thanks to the acquisition - with a sped-up procedure and the choice of off-the-shelf materials, i.e. without idle times for research and development - of 2100 8x8 LAV III armoured vehicles in 10 different versions. But the final result of the entire process of transformation will be the **objective force**, which will constitute the **radical change of all the organizational components of the US Army**. It will be implemented starting from 2008, in successive stages, until 2020 (2010 is the date in which the initial operational capability will be conferred to the first unit

GUIDELINES OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE US ARMY

RESPONSIVENESS: reduced response times to achieve **EARLY EFFECT**.

DEPLOYABILITY: possibility of deploying, everywhere in the world, complexes of Brigade-level in 96 hours, Division in 120 hours and Corps (5 Divisions) in 30 days.

AGILITY: possibility of conducting the entire range of military activities.

VERSATILITY: capability of "dominating" the enemy at all moments of the missions envisaged.

LETHALITY: capabilities distributed over the whole traditional range, decidedly superior to those typical of the present heavy forces.

SURVIVABILITY: obtained mainly through *situational awareness*, in order to prevent threats to the safety of the personnel, and by applying forms of active and passive protection based on innovative technologies.

SUSTAINABILITY: adoption of measures aimed at reducing the logistic "burden", such as reductions in consumption of fuel (new propulsors) and ammunition (precision attacks, reduction of calibres), water production (depuration and conversion of combustion products, employment of dehydrated foods, etc).

Fig. 2

reorganized and re-equipped in view of the envisaged goals).

In this regard, we ought to point out that the **objective of the planning** consists in realizing an organizational structure aimed at projecting anywhere in the world, **also in situations of unavailability of entrance points or in presence of hostile forces**, a force capable of acting as **deterrent in peacetime**, having dimensions and composition suitable for carrying out the **entire assumable range of operations** (from humanitarian assistance to high-intensity fighting).

The guiding principles of this transformation are summarized in Fig.2.


The main **basic concept** of all developments is the **emphasis on personnel at all levels**. Such concept, apparently taken for granted, constitutes the real revolution that needs the support of the doctrine, materials and organizations that will have to be developed. In short, with a procedure similar in concept to the one which, in the artillery, has led to transfer the responsibility of fire delivery from the group to the single gun, it was decided to exploit in a coordinated whole the

capabilities that best characterize the young Americans: the high level of knowledge, the openness of mind and the skill in using computer systems, which stems from the extremely rapid evolutionary pace that distinguishes these tools. It was therefore decided to provide the combatants, down to the lowest possible level (the individual soldier), with a constantly updated situation in real time, by means of portable monitors that permit them to **receive** orders in graphic form and to **transmit** through simplified schemes his own comments and intentions, **contributing actively to the decision-making process**. Such possibility will permit to make the most of a large pool of intelligences from the viewpoint of **"organized" flexibility**.

As regards **materials**, the US Army is oriented towards the **system of systems** approach, obtained through the integration in an all-inclusive package, sustained by the Command and Control system, of the components necessary to perform all the operational functions. The main elements, as regards technological complexity and cost, will be the **C4-ISR** (command, control, communications-and-information, secret and reserved), in such a way

as to activate, down to the individual fighter; a flow of data of the type and size that today characterize the US Brigade Commands (in Europe, of DIV/Corps level), and the **land combat system**, a whole of platforms of high tactical and strategic mobility. There will be one or more types of land and air platforms, some of which unmanned, capable of meeting the entire range of tactical requirements, on the surface and under it, and compatible with the C-130 aircraft (a margin of weight reduction by 25% is considered optimal, with the consequent objective of 14 t). Every platform should perform two functions (e.g. indirect fire and C4). Among the unmanned platforms, the RISTA (reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition) robots and two types of unmanned aircraft (UAV), a lighter one (airscrew propulsion, stationing at about 150 m of altitude for some hours) at the disposal of platoons, and a more complex one (helicopter with 40 hours maximum endurance) for combat groups.

The transformation/revolution of the US Army, in the light of the mentioned acceleration produced by the evolution of the events, envisages the medium-term availability (10-15 years) of an instrument capable of making obsolete any system in use today in the Western world. **This assumption, acknowledged by most Western Armies, will entail the necessity to have units if not comparable (considering the foreseen complexity and costs) at least compatible with the characteristics of the objective force.** This in view of being able to cooperate actively in the possible future combined operations. In particular, the approach followed by **most European Armies is oriented towards conferring to a significant part of the available**



forces intervention capabilities including, within the formations of reference (Brigade and/or battalion/regiment), all the components necessary for an effective employment at the first moments of projection in enemy operational theatres, even if with dimensions, type of means and organizational forms clearly differentiated as regards the diverse range of starting situations. Beginning from a common factor, the major Countries of the old continent should combine (Fig.3) their operational requirements with the availability of personnel, financial

resources and materials. The results are obviously paced in time according to the objective reality of the individual Armies, but the common line is represented by the approach towards the "average" forces, whose concept has been outlined in the article "The average forces in asymmetrical conflicts" (Rivista Militare no. 6/2001).

The **European average forces** will have to possess the characteristics resulting from the compromise between the traditional characteristics of the combat power (protection, tactical mobility and fire-power)

and the new characteristics of the expeditionary forces: strategic and operational mobility; high tactical mobility; sustainability; survivability in front of new threats and reduced "logistic weight".

THE PRIORITIES IN PLANNING THE NATIONAL INSTRUMENT

Now it is important to continue on the way of modernization of the Service, confirming, above all, the validity of the "capability" effort for the development of the forces. The planning model based on the capabilities focuses on what kind of forces would be required to confront a threat that an adversary could bring to our vital interests rather than on "who" could do it and "where" it would occur.

Within this framework, the short-and medium-term planning objective of the Italian Army confers to the future average Brigades, equipped with armoured vehicles of the "Centauro"

EVOLUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES CONNECTED WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF MATERIALS




Fig. 3

family, as well as with 8x8 VBCs, soon to be in service, the possibility to produce an immediate operational impact, once they are in the theatre; this is a characteristic much more important than the mere speed of strategic deployment.

For the medium-long term, we could envisage a combat system, having a common platform,


employable for the various operational functions (Fig.4).

Therefore the fundamental capabilities of the average Brigades should be:

- high mobility (contemporaneously strategic, operational and tactical);

"Bersaglieri" at a checkpoint in Kosovo.





- high comprehension **capability of the manoeuvring space**;
- higher combat self-reliance at lower-complex level;
- combat superiority in operations on compartmentalized and urbanized ground.

Therefore, according to the new scenario, the new forces, which will allow us to complete the range of capabilities already envisaged for the professional model, will have to be developed with a greater rapidity than what has been done up to now. In particular, we shall have to pursue the following objectives, already pointed out in the Capability Packages project, which will be given maximum priority in order to permit a quick implementation of the necessary operational capabilities:

- increase of the command and control capabilities, necessary to realize the mentioned process of enlargement of the pool of minds which participate actively in the decision-making process, to be obtained through the application of the new transmission and information technologies;

- constitution of a varied pool of capabilities for reconnaissance, information, surveillance, target acquisition, electronic war (RISTA-EW), in a position to help making up a multidimensional informative picture much more composite than what was considered in the past. The most essential capabilities are those connected with the surveillance of the manoeuvring space and the acquisition of the objectives functional to in-depth operations, as well as – considering the grown importance of the human dimension, emphasized by the operations under way – the constitution of a HUMINT unit for gathering and processing information acquired through the direct contact with people and environment;
- further revaluation of the capacities of the light and airlifted forces, through the implementation of the all-weather, day- and night- combat capabilities in urbanized and particularly compartmentalized environments;
- strengthening of the component of the pool of special-operation forces for conducting direct

actions (raids and ambushes), developing anti-terrorism operations and acquiring objectives of significant strategic importance;

- widening of the nuclear, biologic and chemical (NBC) defence capabilities, already entirely adequate as regards quality but probably insufficient, considering the increased probability that these weapons could be used;
- constitution of a psychological operations (PSYOPS) capability, at regiment level, according to the guidelines being established within NATO;
- creation of a number of average forces corresponding to the assumptions of employment directly connected with the application of the just mentioned future scenarios to the force planning process necessary to implement the missions assigned to the Service;
- qualitative and quantitative updating of the manoeuvre and logistic support necessary for an effective employment of the forces listed in the preceding paragraphs. Among the latter, of particular importance are the short-range and very-short range (SHORAD and V-SHORAD) anti-aircraft defence, the possibility of carrying out in-depth fire manoeuvres in synchrony with the airlifted units (deep operations) and with all the very important activities of the engineer units in the sectors of mobility, countermobility and deployment support. The adherence logistic component must assume the operational capabilities necessary for an effective support of all of the abovesaid components.

Simultaneously it will be necessary to develop short- and medium-terms programmes (Fig.5-6) in order to acquire the equipment and the weapon systems which contribute in

implementing, within short times, these capabilities. The emerging technologies will be employed in a long-term perspective, through a diversified development plan which, generally speaking and if the allotted resources will permit it, could follow guidelines conceptually similar to the ones laid down by the US Army, with the correctives suited to the European dimension of our Service.

CONCLUSIONS

The innovations emerged from the international picture as regards the security problems require an acceleration and an adjustment of the renovation process, already in a phase of full development in many Western Armies and in the Italian Army.

The analysis of the scenario, of the risk factors and of the possible threats, offer useful hints to focalize the areas where it is necessary to intervene. Obviously the US – be it because it has always been in the vanguard of technological and doctrine innovation and in the procedures of force employment,

or because, today, more than ever before, it is determined to boost its operational capabilities over the entire range of possible interventions – it is a point of reference in this process of renewal and strengthening and will be able to provide useful suggestions for the Armed Forces of the Allied Countries. If it is not possible to converge towards a complete system integration, we shall have to pursue at least a sufficient degree of compatibility

within the Alliance. For what concerns Italy, a provisional survey of the functions and operational capabilities of the professional model shows that what has been planned is in line with the new scenarios, at least as regards the envisaged components.

In particular, for some sectors, such as Command and Control, light (paratroopers and "Alpini") and average (Centauro tanks) forces, combat helicopters and clearing of explosive devices and mines (BOE), we are in a forefront position, even if, in any case, it will be necessary to strengthen and boost these components. **The next step is to complete the instrument as soon as possible, starting from the abovementioned priorities, improving the existing lines of action, in order to optimize and make even more effective the Italian land forces, in accordance with what is done in the other NATO and EU Countries.**

*Colonel,
Head, Plans Office,
Army General Staff

POSSIBLE PRIORITY SECTORS OF INTERVENTION

OPERATIONAL FUNCTION	COMPONENT CAPABILITIES
COMBAT CAPABILITY OF MANOEUVRE FORCES	SHORT-, MEDIUM- & LONG-RANGE A/T SYSTEMS 3 rd GENERATION
	MAJFUNCTIONAL VEHICLE POOL (IN REPLACEMENT OF VM-9, VTM & AR)
	FUTURE-SOLDIER SYSTEM
	NIGHT VISION
	NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
	LIGHT FORCES (VBL, BV-2066)
	MEDIUM FORCES VBC 8x8, UPDATED "CENTAURO" & ENG, CP, RECOVERY DERIV
	HEAVY FORCES (DARDO – LEOPARD repl – SICCONA – FCS)
	AIRMOBILE FORCES (NH90 – FSC – CH47 repl – updated A-129)
	SPECIAL FORCES
SPECIFIC SECTORS	PSYOPS
	CIMIC
	SIMULATION
	VARIOUS PROGRAMMES

Fig. 5

POSSIBLE PRIORITY SECTORS OF INTERVENTION

OPERATIONAL FUNCTION	COMPONENT CAPABILITIES
COMBAT CAPABILITY OF MANOEUVRE FORCES	FIRE SUPPORT – DIRECT SUPPORT ARTILLERY (PzH-2000 – ULH C2)
	FIRE SUPPORT – DEEP ATTACK ARTILLERY (MLRS – AT ACMS – POLYPHEM)
	ENGINEERS FOR GENERAL SUPPORT (MIME CLEARING – ENG COMPLEXES – SPECIAL VEHICLES)
SUPPORTS	ENGINEERS FOR GENERAL SUPPORT (BRIDGES – EARTH MOVING EQUIP)
COMMAND AND CONTROL	Regt – BRIGATE Div. & HRF(L) HQ
	INFRASTRUCTURAL COMMUNICATIONS & COMPUTERIZATION
	UNITS' COMPUTERIZATION
INTELLIGENCE	RISTA-EW (RADAR – SENSORS – CRESO – VBL RSTA – DRONES & MINI-RPV)
AIR DEFENCE	SHORAD & V-SHORAD (STINGER – SIDAM repl – SKYGUARD repl)
	AREA DEFENCE (SAMP - T)

Fig. 6

□

THE ITALIAN CORPS FOR NATO

by Rocco Vastola * and Fabrizio Santillo **



Italy is one of the major contributors of forces engaged in Crisis Response Operations under the insignias of NATO. Notwithstanding this contribution, the lack of a suitable ability of Command and Control has, in fact, penalised the role and the visibility of Italy in the international context.

The events of September 11, moreover, have further imposed the necessity to have a capability of projectable Command and Control, able to manage highly operational resources for the performance of a wide range of missions, with the objective to guarantee the safeguard of security, in the widest meaning of the term, that goes well beyond the simple defence of the National sovereignty, but includes the contribute to stability and international security.

The project to give life to a NATO Command of elevated readiness and Italian framework, therefore, is established to fill this gap, by revisioning the "traditional" operational structures of the Commands that participate in the project.

To realise and be able to count on a High Readiness Force HQ for NATO, actually operational, also represents a useful potential in the picture of the integration of the European Defence to safeguard international security.

And Italy can give a notable contribution to the common project.

The project to give life to this Command is shaped, therefore, as a binding challenge, nevertheless surely within the reach of our organisation that, by the rationalisation process of the last years, has acquired a real ability of projection.

And the Army is not unprepared for this appointment!

In fact, its Units have already shown, amply and on the ground, a capability comparable to those of the Allies and they are fully engaged, in terms of ability to be expressed, of personnel to train and of forces to be made interoperable, in numerous multilateral initiatives: EUROFOR, MLF, Multinational Peace Force for South East Europe and Stand by High Readiness Brigade.

That's why it is also a project for NATO, for Europe and for the Army.

The purpose of this article, and of the one wich will follow, is to give a unitary vision of the general architecture, comprehensive of all the components of the Major Unit in order to transmit to the reader the clear feeling of the real significance of the project for the structure of the Army, currently in the full process of transformation toward an entirely professional tool.

It goes by itself that the article also wants to give the deserved and right recognition to all those who, every day, in a convinced and synergic way, work hard to permit our Army to win this cyclopic challenge, bringing to a conclusion one of the most important projects from the post-war period to today.

Good reading!

Lieutenant General Roberto Speciale
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army



(part one)

The project related to the constitution of a capacity of Command and Control at Corps level with elevated readiness, for NATO, has imposed to the Army **a radical revision of the structures of Command of the operational forces**. The project, in fact, has not only interested the Command of the Corps, but also the Combat Support Commands (CS), the Combat Service Support (CSS) and the Intermediate Operational Commands.

The scope and the importance of the project, as well as the imperious necessity to reach the intended objectives, must be shared by all the personnel of the Army, not to exclude us "de facto" from the group of

organisms who have a saying within NATO.

With the two articles which follow we will illustrate the **regulative aspects** of the project, complete the technical details that often stay closed in the archives of the Staffs, to realise the internal and external communication necessary for the involvement of all the resources of the Army toward the attainment of the ambitious objectives of the project.

NEW DEMANDS OF NATO: THE ITALIAN CANDIDACY

To effectively respond to the changed strategic context, NATO has started a timely process of restructuring of the




Fig. 1

Units inspired, besides, to the **active prevention of crises**.

To possess the abilities of active prevention of crises means to have both ability of Command and Control (C2) and ready Units, in quantity and quality to conduct more operations of management of the crises (Crisis Response Operations-CRO).

In other words, the process of revision of the forces has the objective to increase the **capabilities to produce security** of the alliance through the evaluation and the validation of the resources made available by the member Countries.

Within the available resources the greatest gap is referable to the C2 capabilities. In fact, today Nato has at its disposal only the ARRC Command (1). As regards the forces, instead, the situation is diversified. The forces of the CS and CSS are numerically scarce, and so is the Corps Hq, while the number and level of the manoeuvre forces are destined to decidedly improve, in virtue of the

progressive professionalization of the Units in the forces of almost all the member Countries.

In this picture NATO has presented the demand to have further C2 capabilities of elevated readiness that, together with the ARRC, will constitute the skeleton of reference for the management of

crises. The attribution of the character of **HRF (L) HQ (2)**, to the commands candidate for the Full Operational Capability (greater operational capability - FOC), will constitute - on the international plane - the watershed between the partners able to actively contribute to the security of the Alliance, i.e. able to produce security, and those that instead can play, actually, only the role of contributors of forces.

Italy, even though included among the greatest contributors of forces engaged in CROs, results deprived of a suitable ability C2, and this has determined a **limited active role in the decisions**. Therefore, the National candidacy for the constitution of a HRF (L) HQ is set to confer to Italy the ability to play the international role that it deserves.

An objective of such scope necessarily has to involve the totality of the Army.

Particularly, the Army has to strengthen and valorise the attitude to projection and the C2 capabilities, as well to as give a



Autocolonna pronta per il movimento.

complete multinational dimension to its operational component.

This was translated in a **National project** dedicated to the realisation of a composite complex of resources (fig. 1) that envisages the revision of the "traditional" regulative structures of Commands at every level.

In substance a true "revolution" for the **Land Operational Forces**, more and more destined to be fundamental producers of security.

The present article refers to the first part of the project, related to the Corps Command and to the Units of direct support [C2S/CIS (3)].


NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITIES: THE REGULATIVE CHOICE

The **mission** assigned to the HRF Commands is to operate as Command of Corps under a Land Component Commander, or to constitute a Land Component Command of Corps level, under the authority of a RHQ (Regional HQ), of a CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force) or of a JHQ (Joint HQ).

In substance, the HRF Hqs must have the capability to operate in the whole range of missions, included the operations of high intensity (i.e. operations of "classical" war), in every operational environment, performing all the possible functions of the Alliance, included the function of AJFLCC (Allied Joint Force Land Component Command). Particularly, these Commands have to meet specific **requirements** defined by NATO.

As regards the chain of Command and Control (fig. 2) it is to be underlined that the Commander of the Corps, **permanently** under Operational Command of SACEUR, manages the Operational Command on the Staff and on the units of direct C2S support.

In operations, the Corps



Commander has the Operational Control/Command (OPCON/OPCOM) over the Commanders of the Units, assigned by the contributing Nations.

In substance, the Command of the Corps has an exclusive NATO interest. The employment in operations led by the EU can take place only following decisions assumed by NATO, within the process of transfer of assets to the EU envisaged by the ESDI (European Security and Defence Identity), while the employment in operations with National guidance is to be excluded in every case.

Making the project, it has been essential to find a C2resource already in being, to be retrained in order to realize the HRF Command.

The Intermediate Operational Commands (COINT), constituted in 1997 modifying the old Corps, are the only concrete basis for the realisation of an Italian HRF.

Among the COINTs in being, the choice for the constitution of the


Multinational Staff has fallen on the Command of the Operational Projection Forces (FOP), to be located in Solbiate Olona. The motivations must be sought, besides, in the old experience of the COMFOP (Activation of the 3rd Italian Division for ARRC, Operation "Alba"), in the availability of State infrastructure and areas and in a good position with respect to the National and European transport net.

More complex resulted the solution of the problem related to the **C2S supports**. In fact, the units destined to such function, besides guaranteeing the connections and the tactical and logistic support to the Corps, should have had also the capability to practice the function of "National Contingent Command", as well as have a structure suitable to the "pre-arranged fracture" in case of projection.

It has been therefore envisaged the constitution of a **Signal Brigade**, destined to realise the

Fig. 3

NATIONAL IN-GARRISON C2 CHAIN



integration between the Operational Command (OPCOM) and the Logistic/Administrative Control, under Full Command of the Corps Commander (fig. 3). Such solution allows the Corps Commander to assume only a multinational function, while the Commander of the Signal Brigade has the necessary tools to assume the role of Commander of the Contingent.

THE MULTINATIONAL STAFF

The Multinational Staff borrows the internal organisation of the ARRC. The choice has been determined by considerations of practical and contingent character:

- the current organisation of the ARRC Command has already been evaluated in operations and keeps track of the expertise drawn by the real employment;

besides, it is fit to satisfy the totality of the operational requisites set by NATO;

- through the adoption of the same SOPs (4) issued by the ARRC Command, the Italian proposal pursues the irrenounceable objective of standardisation within the Alliance; besides, the employment of the same procedures makes the connection with the ARRC Command "easy", in case of contemporary employment of the two Army Corps within an operation;
- lacking accords on the multinationality of the Corps Command to be constituted, the organization of the ARRC Command is a certain reference on which to calibrate the employment of the personnel (percentages of presence of the leader Nation, personnel requirements already elaborated in detail, etc.) and on which to plan the relationships with the

other contributing Nations;


- the ARRC will be the first Command to undergo the process of validation as HRF, therefore it will be possible to follow and implement the possible organisational development consequent to the attribution of the FOC.

In particular, the internal organisation of the Multinational Staff draws from those consolidated within the Italian Army. Both the Corps of the past, and the COINT today, have an articulated structure on two "big jaws", operational and logistic (or support). Instead the **HRF Staff (fig. 4) adopts a structure by Divisions**, commanded by a Brigadier General.

Two Divisions follow, in a certain way, the two "big jaws", operations and support, "traditional" in the National regulations.

Fig. 4

THE HRF(°) HEADQUARTERS



The Rear Support Command (RSC), CIMIC (5) (G5), Engineer and Communications (G6) functions, are managed at divisional level in the Staff, differently from what envisaged in the Italian Corps, in which they were situated at level of Command of the rear areas (RSC and G5), of Engineers Corps Command and Signal Corps Command.

Likewise, the Fire function (land and anti-aircraft) is managed within the Staff (by the Fire Co-ordination - F COORD) rather than by the Artillery Command of the Corps.

Within the SPT Division is envisaged the Military Police (MP) function that instead in the National arrangements is directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff with technical connections with the G2 function. This is a direct consequence of the prerogatives of the Commander who, in the multinational context, are limited

to the general direction, leaving the activities of control and repression to the organisations of National military police.

Particular importance is given to the operations with rotating wing assets, also managed inside the Staff by a Cell at Division level (G3 AIR), while in the National arrangements this activity was at Command of Helicopters Regiment level.

The **Central Staff**, divided in Divisions, constitutes another particularity that has specialist functions of particular value (arrangement and organisation of the Staff, political assistant - POLAD, legal Assistant - LEGAD, public information, etc.). Particularly, the POLAD and INFOOPS functions (Information Operations), generally scheduled for the Commands of operational level, confer to the Corps the capabilities to operate as AJFLCC.

Among the specialist functions situated within the Central Staff it is to be underlined, finally, the Security and Public Order, which is fit to furnish advice and specialist assistance for the management of public order and respect of the laws in the Area of Responsibility of the Corps.

The cell responds, therefore, to an operational demand that has always been the principal responsibility of the Commanders and that in the CROs is of particular importance and delicacy, both if they engage units of the Army and if they employ units provided by of Police forces with a military organization (Carabinieri - IT, Gendarmerie - FR, Guardia Civil - SP).

The management of the **air support** is effected by the Air Operation Co-ordination Center (AOCC), implying the definitive abandonment of the old National organisation based on the JASC

(6), that was put at ROC level (7) (therefore Regional/operational level). The organizational presence of the AOCC within the Command of Corps (tactical level) allows great adherence and effectiveness of the air support. The AOCC is another organisational element that confers to the HRF the capabilities to operate as AJFLCC.

For the management of naval components the constitution of a Naval Operation Co-ordination Center is envisaged (NAOCC); taking into account that this demand is not made with continuity, the NAOCC is not permanently constituted within the Corps Command. To reduce to the least the hysteresis of the constitution, within the Corps Command the Navy Advisor cell is permanently inserted that includes the key positions (Manager and Head, Plans Section) of the NAOCC; besides, the cell provides in permanence the necessary "naval" expertise to the Corps Staff.

THE SIGNAL BRIGADE AND THE C2S AND CIS UNITS

The Corps Command must have a complex of resources able to provide the totality of the C2S and CIS support both in garrison and in operations.

Particularly, such resources have to perform the following mission:

- to assure support to the HRF(L) Command for the Command and the Control as Corps Command or Land Component Command;
- to assure the defence, the management and the logistic support of the Command to allow Command and Control;
- to furnish Logistic/Administrative support to the whole Italian personnel, regularly or temporarily assigned to the HRF(L) Command.




Fig. 5

Besides, when the HRF (L) Commander passes under a military foreigner authority (Transfer of Authority), among the Italian General Officers effective to the HRF(L) Command, a Representative of the National authority must be appointed (8) (Senior National Representative). He, assisted by a Command at Brigade level, has responsibility of:

- dealing with all the aspects related to the assignment and employment of the personnel;
- providing support to the life of the HRF(L), through the unitary management of the activities developed by the C2S depending units;
- assuring the Security (infrastructures and personnel) and National Military Police functions;
- constituting, in operations, an Administrative Center of Logistic Command and the National Support Element (NSE).

Under the **administrative aspect**, this Command must be shaped as an Agency, from which the National units with the rank of

"Ordinary Detachments" will depend, and have a devoted PPB Section, in the consideration that it will be directly connected to the Army General Staff for the financial planning.

Taking into account that the more remarkable operational element of the mission is really the communications aspect and that, among the Chief of Divisions of the Staff, the G6 will always and surely be Italian, a Command of Signal Brigade will be established (fig. 5), including all the C2S and CIS units that directly support the Army Corps.

In this way, the G6 will have a double function:

- Staff, for which it shall employ the G6 Division;
- command, for which it shall use the Signal Brigade's Staff.

In substance, a complex of resources has been envisaged, based on one "head", the Signal Brigade Command, and "three levers":

- the Signal Regiment, to realise and manage the CIS system of the Corps;


- the Headquarters Command, for the tactical and logistic support and for the security of the Corps Command;
- the Base Command, for the management of the "U. Mara" barracks.

The following chapters describe the essential ordinative elements of each of these components.

THE SIGNAL BRIGADE

The organisation of the Signal Brigade Command has been obtained adapting to the mission a classic Manoeuvre's Brigade Command of manoeuvre. The result is a "simplified" Command, in comparison with the Manoeuvre unit, of which the Personnel, Secretary, Logistics, Training and Security functions remain. In consideration of the double function performed by the Commander, a Deputy Commander has been envisaged. He is responsible for all the executive activities connected with the Brigade's mission and the ordinary administration of the Brigade Command. This last is a function normally performed by the Chief of Staff, that doesn't

THE HEADQUARTERS COMMAND Fig. 6



exist in the Signal Brigade's Command. As already mentioned, the Command Brigade has a PPB Section fit to assure the financial planning. The of Military Police organisation will be detailed later.

The Brigade's Command will be located in Solbiate Olona, the together with the Corps' Command.

HEADQUARTERS COMMAND

The Headquarters Command of the Projection Corps / HRF (L), is the unit of support of the Corps' Command, destined to satisfy the

demands of logistic support, life in the permanent Center and vigilance of the Corps' Command (fig. 6).

Administratively, it includes the organisms that carry out the function of Command and Control and the services in and outside the Center.

According to the situation, it can be strengthened (or strengthen other unites) with the insertion of "operational modules" (9).

This unit is endowed with great versatility of employment and is fit to perform all the activities related to the tasks of general support, such as:

- support to the deployment and life of the Corps' Command Posts;
- defence against observation;
- execution of protection works;
- execution of close defence;
- infrastructural urgency interventions in the Operations Zone.


In the CROs, besides the activities mentioned above, others are connected with the support to civil populations, the resumption of the normal course of daily life, the economic activities (within the limits of the available resources and the



An Italian checkpoint in Albania.

GENERAL RELAY-PLAN

Fig. 7



priority of the mission of support to the Corps' Command).

The 33rd Logistic manoeuvre Regiment of "Ambrosiano", already located in Solbiate, will constitute the base for the constitution of the Hq. Command.

THE SIGNAL REGIMENT

The Signal Regiment is responsible for the realisation of the nets and the management of: the C4 System Centres of the

Corps and STAR Command Posts. Besides, the Regiment provides net and C4 support up to a maximum of four depending Divisions and to all the CS and CSS units subordinate to the Army Corps (fig. 7).

The organization of the Regiment has been fixed taking into account the fact that the responsibility of the connections belongs to the superior Commander towards the subordinate Commanders and that the Corps is responsible for

the connections with a possible adjacent Army Corps.

Besides, the following objectives have been pursued:

- minimise the typology of materials employed;
- get the maximum flexibility of the system;
- guarantee the transportability on C130 aircraft;
- rationalise as much as possible the burdens, reemploying and possibly readapting the materials (essentially shelters) currently available within the Army.


The 1st Signal Regiment, located in Milan, designated as signal unit to be assigned to the Corps, has been therefore formed (fig. 8) on two battalions:

- the first, articulated on 3 companies respectively devoted to the C4 MAIN Systems Centre, to the support of the net and to C4 support for a maximum of 4 Divisions;
- the second, based on two companies, to give C4 to support the STAR Command Posts ("Step-up Tactical Alternate Rear and Early-Entry") and C4 support to the CS and CSS Units.

In substance, the Regiment will realise a Main Command Post (MAIN), Rear Command Post (REAR), an Advanced Tactical Command Post (TAC CP) and a Command Post for the Logistic Command of Adherence/Command of the Rear areas (RSC). Moreover, the Regiment is able to satisfy the demands of C4 support for a maximum of four Division CPs, for the CS and CSS Command Posts, for 20 CS/CSS command Posts units and for the connections with the bordering units.

1st SIGNAL REGIMENT

Fig. 8



BASE COMMAND AT THE <U. MARA> BARRACKS

The Command of the "U. Mara" Barracks, besides the general

THE "U. MARA" BARRACKS BASE COMMAND




Fig. 9

assignments of all Base Commands, envisaged by Pub. SME-DAR N. 2938 "Norms for the life and the internal service of barracks"—Ed. 1998, has the followings peculiar tasks:

- monitor the infrastructural activities carried out at the "Mara" by the technical team;
- start the activities of logistic-

administrative character, regarding the logistic aspects (contracts and services, acquisition of materials, management of assigned funds);

- continue the activities of maintenance of the infrastructure;
- verify/elaborate the preparations for the internal organisation of

the services, the vigilance and the security of the Barracks;

- start the preparation and the organisation of the structures destined to lodge the Corps' Staff;
- assure the punctual management of the activities connected with the "quality of life" of the personnel destined to operate in the Corps Hq. Particularly, it must be the only referent for the liaisons with:
 - local administrations;
 - local Social Agencies;
 - local medical centres;
 - Agencies of services;
 - schools;
 - Military Organizations of "general support";
- elaborate the "Vade-mecum" for the personnel destined to the Corps' Command. The document will be the initial, practical aid to facilitate the insertion of the new

An Italian checkpoint in Bosnia.



"PRE-ESTABLISHED FRACTURE" OF ADM SUBORDINATION LINES




Fig. 10

personnel and to contribute concretely to the solution of the problems connected with the various aspects of the daily life of the families. In substance, the Command at the Base (fig. 9) is able to assure, with a unitary vision, the punctual execution of the activities connected with the use, the maintenance and the security of the Barracks. The Command Base guarantees the management of the activities connected with the quality of life of the personnel destined to operate within the Corps.

On the multinational plane, the Base Command is organized for the constitution of the National Command responsible for the Barracks.

In case of employment of the Corps' Command, as already practised by other, traditionally

"projectable" Armies, the Base Command will be able to be the point of reference for the families guaranteeing, with continuity, assistance and support: a further innovation that puts the Italian Army closer to NATO standards.

THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE NATIONAL MILITARY POLICE FUNCTION

Administrative aspects

To be able to satisfy the requisite of the elevated projectability of the Corps' Command and the Units of direct support, it has been necessary to develop a particular administrative organisation (fig. 10). The focal point of this organisation is, obviously, the Administration office of the Signal

Brigade's Command (10), shaped as "Administrative Agency" with three subordinate "ordinary Detachments".

This model has been developed beginning from the administrative organisation in operations and it envisages that:

- the administration office of the Signal Brigade's Command forms the base for the constitution of the Administrative Center of the Quartermaster-general's Branch, maintaining in the Base only the components of personnel and materials management (according to its prerogatives);
- the Base Commander becomes the Commander of the Detachment in the Country, with its own administrative autonomy to manage the infrastructure and the external services, considering that the

C2 ORGANIZATION OF THE HRF(L) HQ




Fig. 11

"U. Mara" barracks will keep on supporting the families of the projected personnel, foreigners included.

Consequently, the administrative aspects of the Barracks have been separated from the ones tied to the support of the Command in operations (Headquarters and 1st Signal Regiment), envisaging an administrative "pre-arranged fracture", organisation fit to conform with automatism to the demands of the emergency, in line with the criterions fixed by the norms (11), justifying the apparent (12) increase in administrative organs.

It must be underlined, however, that the provisions adopted give an immediate answer to the needs of administrative management in the garrison,

while the administrative aspects related to the employment in operations of the Corps need a further study.

In fact, the reference norms anticipate the constitution of only one Administrative Center of Quartermaster-general's Branch (C.A.I.) within the Contingent. therefore, if we analyse the order of battle of the Corps (fig. 11), it appears immediately that the constitution of only one C.A.I. in the Signal Brigade could be mable to support this complex and composite Contingent.

Military Police

The NATO doctrine assigns to the National Commanders the responsibility in the sector of Military Police, while they leave the direction and co-ordination

to the multinational Commanders. Consequently, also the organisational structures present this characteristic of separation. We already mentioned the Provost Marshal and his position within the Multinational Staff,

Regarding the National organisation, it has been put in the Signal Brigade's Staff / Contingence Command (fig. 5). The structure so realised is characterised by the presence of only one National "technical" referent towards the Provost Marshal (Carabinieri Senior Officer) and by the possible multinationality of the executive component (the Carabinieri Section can be the National contribution to a multinational Military Police company, for the requirements of the Corps' Command deployed).

HRF(L)HQ - IMPLEMENTATION TIMES




Fig. 12

TIME OF REALIZATION

The times of validation/selection imposed by NATO have imposed reduced times of realisation, that have achieved the objective to complete the constitution of the Corps' Headquarters and the Units of direct support by the end of 2001.

As a premise of the reorganisation it has been necessary "to free" the FOP Command from every operational or managerial commitment, therefore at the

beginning of this year the FOP units have been transferred to other Commands.

The organization project (fig. 12), by now in an advanced phase of realisation, has conducted to the realisation:

- of the Barracks Command "U. Mara" as of 2 February of last year;
- of the Rapid Reaction Corps' Headquarters, on August 1; at the same time, the unit has been put under FOP Commander (13), suppressing

the FOP Headquarters Command;

- on October 31st was concluded the modification of the FOP Command and, as of November 1st, the Rapid Reaction Army Corps was constituted;
- on November 1st the Signal Brigade's Hq. has been constituted and, contextually the Commanders of the:
 - 1° Signal Regiment, already in phase of modification from April 1st 2001;
 - Headquarters of the Army Corps;
 - Base Commander of the "U. Mara" Barracks; passed under the command of the Brigade Commander.

CONCLUSIONS

This necessarily synthetic description of the envisaged organizational measures shows that the project for the realization of a Rapid Reaction Corps Hq has many more implications than those that can be perceived at first sight.

The realisation of the Command and of the Units of direct support, has imposed the adoption of different organisational models and its maximum projectability.

After developing the organisational models, the Army will have to face the most difficult and exacting part of the project: its realisation. The job will be made even more demanding by the times, relatively narrow, imposed by NATO, that it tends to acquire as soon as possible the capabilities of Command and Control necessary to solve the crises that the "after cold war" has brought on the international scene.



"Bersaglieri" protecting a Serbian-Kosovar Village.

Nevertheless, the attainment of the objectives of capability fixed by the project is essential for the Italian Army, in order to acquire the capability of intervention in the decisional process and to continue to be a **security producer** within the Alliance. The whole Nation is by now aware of this necessity, in order to adequately safeguard what the Italian people perceive like their fundamental interests.


□

** Lieutenant Colonel,
Section Chief,
Forces Organization Office,
Army General Staff.*

*** Captain,
Forces Organization Office,
Army General Staff.*

NOTES

- (1) Ace Rapid Reaction Corps. Its structure has a British framework.
- (2) High Readiness Force (Land) Headquarters.
- (3) C2S: Command and Control Support. CIS: Communications and Information Systems.
- (4) SOP: Standing Operating Procedures.
- (5) CIMIC: Civil Military Co-operation.
- (6) JASC: Joint Air Support Center.
- (7) Regional Operation Center.
- (8) A figure analogous, but not coincident, with that of UCRAN, envisaged by the current national doctrine. In fact, being the Commander an Italian, the figure of UCRAN is not necessary.
- (9) For "elementary module" and "operational module" it is intended, respectively:
 - the minimal entity of personnel—with a leader element, equipment and assets —organised and trained to make operational a weapon system or a combat means able to operate, according to technical-tactical procedures, within the "operational module";




- the aggregation of two or more "elementary modules" for the performance of a task, through a limited tactical action in time and space, developed according to standardised procedures of employment. For organizational ends, it can assume the configuration of platoon or section.
- (10) The office remains, however, subordinate to the Corps' Commander, up to the moment of the TOA to a multinational authority, because up to that moment the Corps Commander continues to maintain the full Command.
 - (11) Pub. N. 6583 "The administrative-

management of the contingent projected out of area and in the metropolitan territory".

- (12) The numerical increase of employees in the administrative sector is only apparent; it would be necessary, in any case, to create only a structure for the management of the administrative aspects related to the infrastructure.
- (13) The provision has the purpose to put all the Units of direct support at the orders of a National authority (the deputy' commander's position has been made available to the possible contributing Nations).

LITHUANIA

THE NEW ARMED FORCES



by Enrico Magnani *

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL JONAS A. KRONKAITIS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES

General, the Lithuanian Armed Forces are among the youngest in contemporary Europe. What were the decisive moments of the rebirth, after sixty years of oblivion?

The tragic events of WWII, and even more those preceding it, reduced our population by one third. A hard lesson has been learned but, from now on, if Lithuania's statehood is threatened again, we will defend

ourselves, with or without the support of our friends. The goal of our present defence policy is to prepare the society and the Armed Forces for general defence, and to integrate Lithuania into the Western defence structure. The physical, psychological, cultural and moral damage done by the Communist regime is hard to describe.

In 1998 we developed a reconstruction plan. We are creating Armed Forces based on a Western model, which can be



integrated into NATO and also function independently if we must defend ourselves. A Unified Command is being adopted, also in order to improve the interoperability with NATO structures and procedures. We also established a Territorial Defence Structure, which

Lithuania's Armed Forces are dealing with a difficult process of structural and operational rationalization, aimed at achieving full-fledged integrability within the Atlantic Alliance.

The participation in several peace-support operations has already shown the Lithuanian Armed Forces' aptitude for joint operations, particularly as regards the land instrument.

In the following interview, Maj. Gen. Jonas A. Kronkaitis discusses with us these and other subjects.



provides a good framework for flexible defence and facilitates the integration of the National Volunteer Force. A Basic Training Centre has been constructed and became operational last April with the collaboration of Officers and NCOs from the United Kingdom, who have already

trained 105 Lithuanian instructors. For three consecutive years, British Officers have instructed our cadets at the Military Academy. This year we took over completely, and this was a turning point in the training of our future Commanders. Many of our

Officers have graduated from US military schools, and presently we have four cadets at US Military Academies. Other Officers have attended French, German, Swedish, Danish and Estonian schools. All of our cadets are required to take English and may take French and



Above.
Civilians and military socializing.

Right.
A convoy of BRDM-2.



German as a second foreign language. As regards NCOs, the US and UK the military have helped us to establish our NCO School. We must give our NCOs more authority and responsibility. Also to this purpose, I personally appoint the "Sergeant Major of the Armed Forces" who advises me on matters essential to this important segment of the Armed Forces.

The Collective training is conducted at the units and at the Advanced Training Centre, whose computerized sector has been created with the assistance of Denmark. The existing infrastructure has been improved, a strategic radio relay network and new military sites have been built. In particular, we focused on the development of proper "host nation support" capabilities, increasing our capability to receive, when required, allied reinforcements.

Lithuania fully understands that it must share the risks and burden of collective defence, and is ready to do it. Therefore, one of the three infantry battalions of the Rapid Reaction Brigade will be available for deployment for "Article 5" operations by the end of 2002. Today, we already contribute troops to SFOR and KFOR, and some of our transport aircraft, stationed in Naples, support NATO operations.

The full integration into the Euro-Atlantic security system is

a strategic target for Lithuania. What was done to achieve full interoperability with NATO, and what remains to be done?

We have declared – and pursue – the political objective of becoming a full-fledged member of NATO. Our direct cooperation with NATO takes place within an enhanced and more operational "Partnership for Peace". We participate in the Lithuania - NATO Program and other initiatives coordinated by the Alliance. We were the second country to join the PfP in 1994, and believe that this programme is very important in preparing us for the obligations of NATO membership.

Last year we participated in 23 exercises, such as "Allied Effort" and "Amber Hope".

For the past three years we conducted combat training, here in Lithuania, with about 900 troops from an Italian "Alpini" Brigade. They always performed with distinction, and also their off-duty conduct was admirable. They really won the hearts of the Lithuanian people.

The Lithuanian Armed Forces have already acquired a certain experience in Peace



Support Operations, providing units and equipment to several missions. Could you summarize these operations? What lessons have been learned?

Since 1994, the Lithuanian Armed Forces have served in several UN and NATO operations: in Croatia (UNPROFOR), Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR and SFOR), Albania (AFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR). Currently there is one motorized infantry platoon serving within KFOR. One aircraft with a crew within KFOR/SFOR, and two Officers are with SFOR. In addition, on a rotation basis with Latvia and Estonia, we provide one company to the SFOR Danish battalion.

The service with NATO provides our soldiers with the skills and the experience essential for the development of interoperability. In fact, they get familiar with NATO command structures, know new types of equipment and weaponry and learn to deal with sensitive issues, like different cultural backgrounds and customs.

A military force does not consist of personnel and equipment only, but it includes also operational, training, logistic and administrative procedures.

On what bases and models did you build the rules and norms of your Armed Forces?

The Training and Doctrine Command coordinates the preparation of the military training programmes and tactical manuals, fixing also the standards of soldier and unit training. All these programmes are carried out in accordance with NATO regulations, publications and STANAGs. For example, all HQs and combat units use NATO Land Forces Tactical Doctrine (ATP-35(B)).

We also take into account the experience of other countries, as for example the United Kingdom. A British lieutenant colonel assigned to the Training and Doctrine Command will be replaced shortly by a German Officer. A German colonel and a Danish lieutenant colonel are assigned to our General Staff, assisting in Logistics and operational planning.

A US-Lithuanian joint exercise.

Do you have conscription in your Armed Forces? What is the role of professionals, long-term volunteers, reservists and female personnel?

Currently our Armed Forces consist of about 55% professional soldiers and 45% conscripts. Conscription is set in our Constitution. The training of conscripts lasts 12 months, after which they constitute the mobilization reserve and attend short refresher courses. Conscription is important for a Country such as ours, which moved from a totalitarian form of government to democracy, because it maintains a closer relationship with society at large and builds a stronger national identity. Those who, because of their religion or pacifist beliefs, are not willing to serve in the Armed Forces, may ask for an alternative service, whose duration is 18 months.

We have no plans to abandon compulsory military service in the foreseeable future, since it is



The Flag Detail of a Lithuanian unit in a ceremony.

Surveillance Network (BALTNET); Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL).

BALTBAT was established in 1994, and in 2000 was declared ready for all types of peace support operations. It is equipped with NATO interoperable equipment and operates according to NATO doctrine and procedures. The next step will be the establishment of 3 battalions designated for rapid deployment in peace operations. They should be operational by the end of 2005.

Since 1997 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, with the support of various western Countries, have been building a common naval squadron (BALTRON), which can participate in the naval component of international peace support operations.

The Baltic Defence College is in Tartu, Estonia. Its objective is to train Officers to assume battalion command or higher staff positions. Instructors and students come from several western countries, and the Commandant is an Officer from one of the Baltic Countries.

BALTNET is a Regional Air Surveillance Network, created by the three Baltic States and interoperable with NATO's air surveillance and defence system.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the Lithuanian Armed Forces inherited a number of bases, installation and training facilities. Has this infrastructure been used, and to what extent?

The Russians left very little infrastructure which would meet today's living and working requirements also because, in many cases, the facilities were run down and stripped of usable

vital to ensure the effective functioning of the "Total and Unconditional Defence" as well as the territorial Defence.

Women have been serving in the Armed Forces since their reestablishment in 1990.

They are not subject to conscription, and presently form 17% of the Officers corps, 19% of the NCOs, 10% of privates and 52% of civilian personnel. There are women serving in combat units; however, most of them are employed in sectors such as accounting, personnel, logistics, aerospace surveillance and medical services. Following the provisions of a law on equal rights, women can now attend the Military Academy, where they

get the same training as men. Presently there are 23 women out of 505 cadets in our Military Academy.

Regional cooperation is a very important tool for the security policy of Lithuania. In particular, there are several ongoing common projects with Latvia and Estonia. Could you give us some details about them?

Our Country carries out extensive cooperation activities with the other two Baltic States. The most important projects are: Baltic Battalion (BALBAT); Baltic Squadron (BALTRON); Baltic Air

Parade of a unit during a military ceremony.

items. In 1997 we decided to modernize them, giving priority to troop housing. Today our soldiers live in acceptable quarters. Next step will be to do the same with the remaining logistic infrastructure. 8.5% of the defence budget was allocated for the development of this sector.

What is the weight of military tradition in a Country that recently regained its independence? What is the role of the military in upholding common values? Are the Armed Forces an instrument of national and cultural cohesion?

Today's Armed Forces aim at being as transparent as possible towards society. The population knows our work, and the public participates in military ceremonies. It can be added that the Italian "Alpini" have made an important contribution, visiting various towns with their band and chorus, which were highly appreciated.

Furthermore, we carry out many cooperation activities with non-governmental organizations. Last year, for example, the Armed Forces organized 10 summer camps for teen-agers in every region of the Country. Over 1400 young soldiers, children from underprivileged families and youngsters with problems of different kinds, spent a few memorable days together.

The Armed Forces organize "Open Days", during which our citizens have an excellent opportunity to visit our Training Centres, the Military Academy and other Schools and units, in order to get more familiar with the soldiers and their daily routine. Military magazines, together with radio programs



and TV shows, contribute to a better knowledge of the present day Armed Forces, also in order to overcome the negative image left by the Soviet forces of occupation.

The rise in popularity was very dramatic in the last four years: this is a sign of the growing affection and consideration for our soldiers.

□

Major General Jonas A. Kronkaitis was born in Lithuania, and served for 27 years with the US Army, reaching the rank of Colonel.

He attended several courses, including the War College, and held many high-responsibility positions, both at operational units and in the administrative sector. In particular, he commanded the Rock Island Arsenal, the largest armament manufacturing facility, where he carried out a vast and complex modernization programme. His foreign assignments included six years in Germany – with the 4th Armoured Group, 2nd Cavalry Regiment and 1st Armoured Division – and two years in Vietnam.

Maj Gen. Kroukaitis holds numerous decorations and awards, among which the Legion of Merit, 3 Bronze Stars, 3 Meritorius Service Medals, the Army Commendation Medal, the Air Medal and the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry w/Palm.

After retirement, he served as the Director of the Atlantic Research Corporation, which he left in February 1997, to return to Lithuania and assume the position of Vice Defence Minister.

On July 1, 1999, he assumed duties as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and on August 13, 2001, was promoted Major General.

Major General Jonas A. Kronkaitis is married and has two children.

LATVIA

THE NEW ARMED FORCES



INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL RAIMONDS GRAUBE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES


Colonel, more than ten years after independence, what is the status of the Latvian Armed Forces? What are their priorities and what programmes are under way?

Within the framework of our policy of defence and security, the first priority was given to Latvia's full-fledged entry into the North Atlantic Alliance. As a consequence, the goal of our military policy is to shape Armed Forces that can increasingly integrate into the

Western mechanisms, in order to meet the expected requirements and standards.

The programmes for the development of the forces are included in two plans (4 years and 12 years). It is important to underline that these plans concern both the reorganization of the structures affecting the preparation for the entry into NATO and the organization of civil support to the armed component.

In 2000, meanwhile, three important "partnership" objectives



have been attained. The first is the realization of an adequate structure of the Land Forces Command. The other two concern the Air Force, which acquired an identification system compatible with those of the Alliance and completed the studies for the improvement of

Continuing with our interviews with the leaders of the Armed Forces of the Baltic Countries, we meet Colonel Raimonds Graube, Commander of the Latvian Armed Forces.

His answers give us a precise picture of the situation as well as of the effort being made in order to restructure the military instrument in view of the envisaged entry in the Atlantic Alliance.



by Enrico Magnani

the surface-air missiles. In 2001 we achieved nine more objectives.

So, as you said, your Country wants to become, a full-fledged member of NATO or, using an expression very

popular nowadays, of the "Euro-Atlantic" security system. What is your opinion on "Partnership for Peace"? Can it be considered a good starting point in view of your objective?

Actually, the cooperation of

Latvia with NATO is centred on the "Membership Action Plan" (MAP) of PfP and on the Council of the Euro-Atlantic "partnership" (EAPC).

I believe that the PfP programme is essential for the global process being carried out with determination by our



Above.
Infantry platoons armed with 7.62x39 mm MPiKMS.

Right.
National Guardsmen, armed with AKM, controlling a road.



policy, of which it has become an integral part.

Precisely on the basis of the PfP experience our forces are acquiring the necessary readiness for a full integrability with NATO. Through its active participation in PfP, Latvia is getting ready to conduct NATO operations. In fact, our final objective is Latvia's participation in joint international operations. Such a strong and pragmatic Euroatlantic orientation and the achievement of the main objectives are very useful for the transparency of plans and budgets and the democratic management of the Armed Forces, as well as for the interventions in case of disasters or other emergencies.

That is why we want to be increasingly active in PfP, in all activities concerns planning, decision making and political consultation.

The participation in peace missions and in operations in response to crises (CRO) has been one of the first engagements of the "reborn" Latvian national Forces. Can you describe their engagement in these sectors?

The companies included in the "Baltic Battalion" (BALTBAT) operate within SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, rotating every six months with similar Lithuanian and Estonian units. Shortly, another company will join the Danish Battalion.

A medical unit and a military-police detachment have been included in the British forces in Kosovo since February 2000.

Furthermore, we continue to assign observers to OSCE. Some have already been sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Caucasus, for border control activities.

In April 2001 group of Latvian military observers was detached to Skopje for a period of six months, for participation in a control operation along the border between Kosovo and Macedonia.

At the present time, the following units are available for crisis-management operations: one reinforced company from the 1st Infantry Battalion (this units operates within IFOR and SFOR together with Swedish and Danish contingents); some units included in the Baltic Flotilla; one medical unit which in April/June 1999 participated in the AFOR mission and in February was attached to the British contingent in Kosovo; one Military Police unit (in Kosovo with KFOR) and one naval unit of fast patrol boats.



Above.
Gunners in a firing exercise.

Right.
A Russian-made helicopter flying at low altitude.

Probably other elements will shortly be included in the Norwegian contingent. Besides, it should not be forgotten that Latvia, as a member of OSCE, participates in the observer missions in Georgia and Macedonia.

Latvia has adopted a "mixed model" based on volunteers, conscripts and on ample recourse to reservists. Do you plan to increase the number of volunteers? What are the role and size of the female component?

Our law provides that only Latvian citizens can be recruited. In peacetime the Armed Forces are constituted by: regulars, conscripts, National Guardsmen, civilian personnel and reservists on training.

Volunteers, whatever their rank, must serve for at least five years. All male citizens are subject to a conscription duty

total strength, subdivided as follows: 9% Officers, 23% NCOs, 26% privates, 42% civilians.



of 12 months. If they wish, the young recruits can ask to take up the military career. Women can enlist as volunteers, without any limitation on their employment, with both command/combat tasks and specialistic jobs (radio operators, nurses, etc.). At present, women in service are about 900, i.e. one fifth of the

We do not envisage an increase in the volunteer component.

What are Latvia's most important bilateral relations at the moment?

Our relations with the US are certainly outstanding. A rather large



Left.
Members of the Special Forces armed with HK MPS A3.

Below.
Independence Memorial, in Riga central square.

common activities, we improve our interoperability with NATO and optimize the employment of our resources. Just to mention the main projects in common with Estonia and Lithuania, it is sufficient to cite the BALTBAT Battalion; the BALTNET air-surveillance network; the BALTRON flotilla; the BALTDEFCOL defence college, attended by Officers from NATO and from candidate Countries, as well as by civilian officials.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, in your Country

group of American experts are assigned to our Ministry of Defence. They assist us in the sectors of personnel, security, information/communications, finance and logistics. Also the United Kingdom France and Canada are of great help to us in all sectors. In particular, many servicemen and civilians are attending English-language courses in the UK and Canada. Very important are also our contacts with the new NATO members: Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary.

Regional cooperation is very important for security. In particular, you are conducting several operational activities together with Estonia and



Lithuania. Can you tell us something about these initiatives?

The cooperation among the Baltic States is really very important. Through these

there are still several bases, installations and training areas formerly used by them. Do you still use them, and to what extent?

Only a small part of the large



Russian-made T-55 tank.

areas occupied by the Soviets for their bases and installations is still used for military purposes. All the rest is now municipal property. It should also be said that all the equipment was either destroyed or damaged before it was left behind. Only one of the five military airfields is used, and the Command of our Armed Forces is located in the building formerly used by the Soviet Military Region of the Baltic. We are also using some firing ranges, and are considering whether some buildings can still be restructured and modernized.

The new independent Latvia wants to become a full-fledged member of NATO, as you pointed out. How can this process be reconciled with the role of the military as a symbol of cohesion and a synthesis of the values of the nation?

The consensus of our citizens for the Armed Forces is growing all the time, together with the approval of

a full participation in the Atlantic Alliance. The last survey was conducted in August 2001: the favourable voters were 67%.

We shall continue our activity of public information, in order to spread the knowledge about

defence issues and the role of NATO, particularly as regards our citizens of Russian origin.

□

** Journalist*

Colonel Raimonds Graube was born in Riga on February 26, 1957.

He served in the Soviet Army from 1976 to 1978, then worked in a factory of electronic equipment and at "Marupa", a collective farm.

In 1992, he attended a basic course at the National Guard Training Centre and in 1993, at the same Centre, attended several courses in the sectors of operations, training, planning and field tactics, organized by the US Army. The same year, he was promoted to Major.


From 1993 to 1995 he was Company Commander; Commander, Special Ops Unit; Commander, 1st Brigade, National Guard; Chief of Staff of the same unit. In the same period he attended a Brigade-level course on planning and administration, conducted in the US by the Michigan National Guard. In 1996 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the National Guard and attended the Netherlands Defence College.

Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, from 1997 to 1998 attended the Joint Service Command and Staff College in the United Kingdom and in 1998 was appointed Commander of the National Guard.

Promoted to Colonel in 1999, he became Commander of the National Armed Forces.

Colonel Raimonds Graube speaks fluent English and Russian, is married and has three children.

THE CARIBBEAN REGION



by Ornella Rota *

Fifteen Nations, very different from each other as regards usages, customs and income. A myriad of territorial sovereignties, more nominal than real. A criss-cross of maritime claims in waters easily navigable and full of often uncontrolled landing places. All this makes the Caribbeans a politico-strategic area of vital importance in the American continent.

The fifteen Caribbean States, with as many votes at the UN, often wooed by the Great Powers of the world. A geopolitical area of vital importance, the Caribbeans spread over a group of islands (English- or Spanish-speaking plus French-

speaking Haiti) and a country on the coast (Belize). A myriad of territorial sovereignties, often more nominal than real. A criss-cross of maritime claims in easily navigable waters and rich in often uncontrolled landing places. A succession of deeply different

Countries, as regards usages, customs, culture and income (that can vary from several thousand dollars per capita to a few hundred). Examples of the extreme heterogeneity of this area are the destinies of Haiti and Santo Domingo, States adjoining the ancient




island of Hispaniola. The first, independent since 1804, is an absolutely original nation, born out of an antislavery and anticolonialist revolt, which got rid of almost all the white ethnic element; since then Haiti is the symbol of "Black". The second, independent since 1864, identifies itself with "White": in particular with Spain, to which the Dominican Republic was annexed for more than twenty years before its independence.

If the Caribbean Countries were to pursue a policy of integration, uniting little by little in a single and large area,

capable of interacting with the American continent and the rest of the world, they could constitute an immense and shared mother-country, also intellectually fertile, because of the age-old intermingling of ethnic groups and cultures. On the contrary, their life is bad: they are in fact excluded from the international decisions, frustrated, owing to a series of reasons going from the impoverishment due to emigration to the fears caused by

political and social instability, from an inadequate defence system to the sacrifices imposed by globalization, from the consequences of the not-infrequent natural disasters to the repercussions of the local and international criminal traffic.

The drug traffic, almost always




Haiti. A statue in Port-au-Prince.

connected with the arms trade, (despite the undeniable efforts, also on the military plane, made by some States) in fact extends from South America towards the North of the continent and Europe, along land and maritime roads. Next to the narco groups, elements of the mostly Colombian and Venezuelan (and for a minimal part Peruvian) guerrilla, terrorist formations, also from outside the continent, paramilitary circles and intelligence services of some Countries pull the strings of the traffic. The international crime society put globalization into practice well before we started to discuss it; terrorism and racket intermingle as a long-standing reality. In some financial havens of the region, Colombian, Russian, Italian-American, Mexican, Turkish and Italian "mafiosi" usually meet to define

their strategies. The flourishing traffic of clandestine emigrants comes first, followed by tobacco, alcohol, coffee, electric appliances, gasoline and also chemical precursors (more and more in demand, and this is a disquieting note). Next comes money laundering, accompanied by adequate financial speculations. There is a continuous growth of sumptuous resorts and commercial centres, which have no other explanation other than the will to employ capitals as quickly as possible, even at a loss. The suspicions of money laundering, if and when confirmed, stop both the granting of possible loans from international organizations, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, and the flow of foreign investments, which for some small Countries of the area are the main, if not the only, resource. The Caribbean politicians and economists insist

on the necessity to distinguish money laundering from fiscal havens. They observe that the taxes charged to foreign investors are computed on an income basis; what makes them incomparably lower as compared to those in force in Europe and the US is only the diversity of the needs of the respective communities.

Certainly the criminal society has the utmost interest in maintaining, or even making worse, the conditions of precariousness and fragmentation of powers and the socio-economic imbalances which make the structures of a Country more permeable to trafficking. So long as the Cold War lasted, the only worry of the US in the Caribbeans was to maintain stable regimes. The first Head of State that linked peace to democracy and economic development was perhaps George Bush, when the relations with



Central America seemed encouraged also by the gradual end of the conflicts previously nourished by the Soviet Union. With time, the attention of the US, and also of Europe, slackened. Nevertheless the interests involved are enormous: suffice it to remember that through the


Right.

Graphic representation of the Panama Canal Zone.

Below.

A view of the Panama Canal.

Panama Canal alone passes 33% of the total bulk of wares, that Mexico is the third commercial partner of the US (after Canada and Japan), and that, if the situation were to get worse, the migratory flows would assume dramatic dimensions. As regards the European Union, there are different positions. Spain (with Portugal, the oldest colonial power of our continent) has retained close bonds with its former American colonies and today, also taking advantage of the prestige of the Crown, is in a position to implement an ambitious cultural policy, spreading Hispanism and the teaching of the Spanish language



Some Caribbean leaders, and also many intellectuals and/or businessmen, are convinced that a progressive regional integration would solve a good part of the problems. This is certainly true, even if such a process presents tremendous difficulties of all kinds, as the Europeans have been able to verify with the construction of the European Union.

in Caracas, hero of the independence and maximum ideologist of the Latino-American "Great Mother-Country". The "anomaly" of Cuba, practically the only surviving really Communist country in the world, is, sooner or later, destined to be solved by facts, within the changed international balances. There are signs suggesting that this is already occurring. The government is now trying to strengthen the inter-American bonds essentially as a nation, while in the past the island was a reference point for the insurrectional movements of the continent, and not only. The Russians, meanwhile, (out of regard for the US but also because the initiative has become less useful) have unilaterally denounced the accord stipulated with Cuba for the spying centre (officially a "Listening Centre") set up on the island (at Lourdes) during the years of the Cold War. The US government, besides, has started a policy of slow approach, presumably destined to increase after the passing away of the elderly Fidel Castro.



in the world (Spanish has become compulsory in Brazil, for example, in view of a progressive approach of the Latin-American countries). France, Spain and Italy are well disposed towards an intensification of relations and trade with the Caribbeans but the other Countries put on the brakes.

Cuba and Venezuela are among the Countries that strongly support the idea of unification. Venezuela, which is not precisely a Caribbean country but whose coasts are washed by the same sea, has moreover added to its name the expression "*Republica Bolivariana*" in homage to Simon Bolivar, born

The progressive diplomatic, economic and political normalization will have consequences also on the community of Cuban expatriates in the US. Their *National Cuban American Foundation* was the first Hispanic lobby; today its importance is inversely proportional to the progressive



Jamaica. The open museum at Columbus Park, west of Discovery Bay.

minimization of the controversial relations between the two Countries. With the demonstrations staged during the vicissitude of Elian Gonzales (the child rescued by Florida's Coastal Guard, after the wreckage of the boat on which his mother was trying to take him to the US), the Cubans expatriates wanted to reaffirm with force, before the world, their status of victims; exorcizing their fear of a probable future isolation. As a matter of fact, the privileges enjoyed by the anti-Castro people are slowly vanishing, also because of the opposition expressed by other powerful Latin American lobbies, such as the *National Council of La Raza* or the *League of United Latin American Citizens*. It can be said that in the US, as the weight of the general Hispanic presence grows, the Cuban influence decreases. There are no doubts that the percentage of US citizens of Hispanic origin is destined to grow rapidly. Today


they represent 11% (31 million) of the entire national population. Among the various communities that form the extraordinary ethnic mosaic from which the US draws its strength, the fastest growing is the Latin American one: e.g. 38% between 1990 and 1999, as compared to a general average of 9%. If the trend lasts, by 2005 the Hispanics will be the largest minority of the Country (13% of the totality of the inhabitants, the Afro Americans being 12%); by 2050 they will constitute the 24,5%, and by the end of the Century may become the majority. A radical demographic-social change which will not fail to produce also political repercussions.

There was an evident proof of this trend also during the last electoral campaign, when Al Gore and George W Bush vied in inserting Spanish sentences in their speeches: only a hundred years ago, "the American century" had started building itself on a rigorously "wasp" tradition (i.e. White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant). These considerations obviously concern only the legal immigrants

and their descendants, but a discussion on the Caribbean clandestine immigrants is at least equally important. In fact the citizens of Central America are very numerous among the over 5 million illegal immigrants living in the US (according to the Immigration and Naturalization Service), mainly residing in California, Arizona, Texas, Florida, New York and Boston.

The racist extreme right considers them a national evil, while others, and many Republicans among them (including Senator Kemp), maintain that the US could not do without the contribution of their work. Christopher Mitchell, an expert on Central America at New York University, underlines the political dilemma. On the one side, the need to keep the illegal immigrants out of the country, or to deport them immediately after their entry, because this is what the majority of the Americans say they want. On the other, the fact that, on the economic and social plane, Mitchell says, "there is an evident need. A young couple in Los Angeles understands it when they find an Hispanic baby sitter that costs 30 instead of 100 dollars, and the consumers understand it when they eat the strawberries picked by the Latin American labourers. In this case, it is not a matter of saving but of having the desired product, because no US citizen wants to do the agricultural work that the immigrants do at a low cost".

Despite walls, electronic sensors and patrolling policemen, the flow of illegal incomers has remained unchanged. "In reality", the professor continues, "the increase of control reduces the number of clandestine entries in the major cities along the borders (which may pay in political terms), but not their total number, because the immigrants choose different, more risky ways. Moreover, the strong legislative restrictions in the accepting Country increase the number of those who settle



Aerial view of Port Antonio, with the Blue Mountains in the background.

prompt the US government to pay more attention to Central America, thus promoting the strengthening of democracy and economic development.

FRONTIER AND MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

- Cuba claims from the US the base of Guantanamo, on Cuban territory, separated from Cuba by a 29 km frontier.
- Nicaragua claims from Columbia the sovereignty over the archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia (44 sq km.- 30,000 inhabitants) as well as Banco Roncador, Banco Quita Sueno, Banco Serrana, Banco Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo.
- Guatemala and Belize have still to settle the question of their land frontier, which entails claims on the territorial waters in the Gulf of Honduras.
- Currently there is a tripartite dispute among Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador over the maritime frontiers of the Gulf of Fonseca.
- The Republic of Haiti claims the island of Navassa from the US.
- Venezuela and Columbia are unable to come to an accord over the delimitation of their territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela.
- Antigua-Barbuda, the Dominican Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadine question the statute, granted to the Venezuelan island of Aves, of an exclusive economic Zone (Zee) and of a continental platform.

down permanently. "In the past", Mitchell observes, "there were groups that arrived for seasonal work, went back home and successively returned, and so on. Now they remain, because they are afraid they won't be able to re-enter when they are needed".

At political level, the consequences of the stiffened immigration rules are substantially two: "Within the borders the upholders of the hard line have lost a lot of Hispanic votes, while on the international plane the government has had to bear the pressures of the Countries

concerned. In 1997, while visiting Central America, President Clinton realized that the various governments were chiefly, not to say only, interested in annulling the restrictions that had just been approved. Little by little and very quietly in order to avoid negative reactions, the measures were withdrawn".

At present, the general trend, at least for what regards the US, seems to prefer to regulate the flows rather than build barriers. In the long run, the growing Latin American influence should

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**Journalist,
Contributor to "La Stampa"*

COMPLETION FORCES (PART ONE)



*by Francesco Diella **
e
*Giuseppe Bongiovanni ***

MOBILIZATION: FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW

Not without pride we can state that the Army has been the first Service – and, so far, still the only one – to acquire its own “reservists”, thus putting itself on the same level as the Armies of other Countries with a long and well-established experience in the specific sector. Certainly there

are still many steps to be taken: procedures must be perfected, the potential of the Completion Forces has still to be exploited in full; but the Army “reservist” exists, lives and operates side by side with the “regular” personnel.

It is a working reality!

Thus, in order to give credit to those who, albeit for short periods of time, are willing to wear their uniform again and accept to take

a road which, in some cases is more difficult than the one they usually cover every day, we intend to illustrate, in broad outline, the figure of the Army reservist and the organization which has been set up to recruit, train and employ him.

The dynamic evolution of the last twenty years has substantially affected the social and economic realities of all European and

The decrease in the number of conscripts induced the Army and the other Services to undertake a delicate process of structural reorganization whose goal, according to the provisions of the recent laws, is to have the availability of a totally professional instrument.

In this connection, the Project Groups tasked with the rationalization of all sectors of the Army – operations, logistics, territorial organization, training and schools – have achieved concrete results which, endorsed by the Army Staff, have made the reorganization activity possible, with a view to constituting, with a unitary vision the synergies necessary to achieve the objective.

One of the studies which, probably more than others, represents a radical change vis-à-vis the past is the "Recruitment and Completion Forces Project". The study, which takes its legal legitimacy from the Decree-Law 464/97, concerning the abandonment of the old "mobilization" concept for a new one: "completion" of only the existing Bodies, Commands and Units, culminated in the establishment of the Inspectorate for Recruitment and Completion Forces. It is an ambitious project, which, since 1999, has been developing through a growing number of applications to join the "military world" as reservists. This success is certainly not due to curiosity about something new: our reservists have operated brilliantly in "out-of-area" operations and in the most important international exercises, and this is due to a deep feeling which, without rhetoric, induces citizens to wear the grey-green uniform in order to render a useful service to the Country.

Purpose of this article is to present the new organization, in all its components, to give the reader a precise knowledge of the real significance of the restructuring project of the Army.

Western countries. The international political scene has changed and so have the threats, giving rise to new security needs.

All institutional bodies had to reckon with this situation. The Army has adapted its mentality and its organizational structures, changing from an instrument quantitatively "present" on the territory to one qualitatively ready to manage diverse crisis situations and to defend national interests at risk.

The strategic decision of reviewing the concept of "mobilization" also falls within this context, adjusting the

concept to the real operational requirements.

Up to December 31, 1998 the mobilization system was based on the following standards:

- **mass mobilization:** the forces that had to be prepared in case of mobilization, were in fact on a 5 to 1 ratio vis-à-vis the active forces, both to compensate for the losses suffered in operations and to man the Units whose constitution was planned (Brigades to be established on the basis of the recalled personnel who had previously served at Schools, reserve battalions for the Major

Units, security companies for surveillance and protection of the numerous sensitive points on the national territory, etc);

- **the transition, within extremely short times, from a peace to a war organization:** some Units had to be operationally ready within a few hours, others in 48 hours. The Units to be constituted *ex-novo* had to be operational within 20 days. However, this organization implied a remarkable employment of personnel at all command levels, since every Organization had to determine its own mobilization needs and, as a



A "Centauro" heavy armoured car.

consequence, summon its personnel by sending recall-cards to the Carabinieri Stations, and contact the Military District for the recalling personnel it could not redraft on its own. Furthermore, one must consider the burden deriving from the necessary continuous updating, at the discharge of every class, of the situations concerning all Officers, NCOs and Troops.

The reorganization of the mobilization system finds its legal legitimacy in a Decree of 1997, which states that "the military instrument aims at providing permanent Command and Control structures" and, at article 1, says that the arrangements for mobilization are limited to the completion of "live" Commands, Organizations and Units. It was certainly necessary to change the regulations, and had even a politico-strategic justification in the extension of the warning times within which the mobilization operations could be completed: from the previous 20 days (a fact that made the old system necessary) to the present 180 days, in line with the commitments made to NATO.

On the basis of these elements, the Service has set up its new mobilization organization, the

"Completion Forces" system which, albeit leaving the overall legal picture almost unchanged, has completely redrawn the general standards, rules, instruments and implementing procedures.

THE NEW COMPLETION FORCES

Basic principles

The new mobilization system – or, to put it better, "completion system" – is based on the following principles:

- **simplicity and flexibility of procedures**, achieved by centralizing at the Service's top level the policy functions, leaving to the Units the possibility of proceeding to recalls according to their needs;
- **gradual start** of the mobilization activities only at the first warning sign of a crisis situation;
- **recourse, as much as possible, to voluntary recalls and only subordinately mandatory ones**, if necessary for completion of Commands, Organizations and Units;
- **custody** at the Units of 100% of materials and equipment;
- **recalls already in peacetime**

for the Army's operational requirements, both on the national territory and abroad.

These are the main changes in the system, in that, in practice, they represent a form of real recruitment – albeit for a limited time – of already discharged personnel.

The Organization

In view of giving the greatest possible impulse to the reorganization of this sector, with the appropriate visibility both within and outside the Service, on January 1, 2002 a special High Command was established, with the task of expressing a unitary *national strategy of recruitment*, together with a network of "Recruitment Bodies", which are an efficient and widespread interface with society.

The structure consists of:

- the Army Inspectorate for Recruitment and Completion Forces, located in Florence. It has been constituted through the reorganization of the disbanded Command of the Central Military region;
- three Interregional Recruitment

and Completion Forces Commands – located in Turin, Rome and Palermo – as intermediate bodies, constituted through the reorganization, respectively, of the Piedmont Military Region Command, the Sicily Autonomous Military Command, and the Rome Command. The latter, renamed Military Command of the Capital, has also assumed the functions of Interregional Recruitment and Completion Forces Command;

- seventeen Regional Recruitment and Completion Forces Commands, subordinate to the abovementioned Interregional Commands, and constituted through the reorganization of the former Regional Military Commands.

The need to adopt an organization diffused all over the national territory derives from the enormous potential, in terms of professional capabilities and willingness to participate, expressed by both the discharged personnel and by citizens who have never had previous contacts with the Army but wish to serve their Country.

These human resources are the natural feeding basin of the Completion Forces (reservists) and a precious and irrenounceable richness for the Army, also to offset the still existing shortage of Volunteers in relation to the operational commitments in Italy and abroad. These resources must be methodically sought, also through appropriate promotional initiatives.

Organization of the Completion Forces

In relation to the voluntariness of the individual to be recalled, the Completion Forces are divided in:

General Completion Forces

They are set up in an emergency

through coercive measures already planned in peacetime. They consist essentially in blocking the discharge of the last classes of conscripts; recalling the discharged personnel, starting with the younger ones; suspending the norms on retirement from regular service; increasing the number of recruits. These measures are aimed at compensating for shortages due to the absence of personnel for various reasons or to possible losses.

Voluntary Completion Forces

They are the real “revolution” in this sector. We refer, as we mentioned before, to the new figure of the “reservist” who – on a voluntary basis – is employed already in peacetime for the Army’s operational needs both **within the Country and abroad** (support in public order activities or in case of disasters, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping missions, etc.). These are discharged personnel (Officers, NCOs and Enlisted Men) who, at the moment of discharge, or later, express their generic willingness to be recalled if necessary, but accept the actual recall only upon notice.

The authorization to employ these forces is issued every year by an Interministerial Decree fixing the number of personnel and the duration of the recalls.

The Voluntary Completion Forces also include the so-called “Select Reserve”, formed by highly professional reserve Officers who can profitably operate in the Service.

The “Select Reserve” can be joined by both reserve Officers and discharged NCOs/enlisted men, who are commissioned as reserve Officers *without examinations*, and can reach the rank of Major, as provided by a Royal Decree of 1932 (the so-called “Marconi Law”) and

by a Decree-Law of 1997.

The commission is awarded, in compliance with a Decree-Law of 2001, upon agreement of the Ordinary Commission for Promotions, who decides the rank and the role of the candidate, after consultation with the Army Chief of Staff.

Recruitment of the Completion Forces

The recruitment involves Commands and Bodies of the Army at all levels, according to an order of responsibilities where the policy activities are allocated to the Army Staff, and the management is carried out at lower levels.

In general, as regards the specific responsibilities of the various levels:

- the Army Staff – after consulting the Operational Forces Command and the Inspectorates – determines the personnel necessary for the completion, prepares the Defence-Treasury Interministerial Decree which, every year, authorizes the recalls and their duration (one year maximum), and carries out the preparatory activities for the establishment of the “Select Reserve”;
- the Inspectorate for Recruitment and Completion Forces supervises and controls the management activities carried out by the subordinate commands;
- the Interregional/Regional Commands and the Military Districts update the data banks of the personnel qualified for recalls, keep contact with the reservists, perform promotional activities and acquire the availability of the discharged personnel;
- the Bodies/Units carry out the arrangements for their completion by acquiring the availability of conscripts 2 months before their discharge; select their own voluntary

SELECT RESERVE: THE SITUATION

Table 1

Application Received	Application evaluated and not accepted						Applications being examined
170 (*)	Curriculum not adequate or profession not of interest	Of interest but excluded for various reasons (**)	Not of immediate interest	Military obligations not performed (Rejected, conscientious objectors)	Military obligations performed in other Service	Total excluded 54	77 (***)
	33	13	2	4	2		

(*) They also include 39 applications of discharged reserve officers, of whom 26 with a profession of interest. These personnel, although not within the Select Reserve category, can be profitably employed for particular needs.

(**) 8 for age limit, 3 medically unfit and 3 renouncers.

(***) ¥ 7 have been declared eligible for commission by the Commission for Promotions;

¥ 20 have been sent to Personnel Directorate for further examination;

¥ 50 are waiting for the results of medical examinations.

It must be noted that some applications were not taken into consideration because the applicants, although in possession of excellent curricula, had surpassed the age limit or were about to reach it.

completion Forces with the close cooperation of the Military Districts; take care of the training and employment of their personnel.

The "recruitment" of civilian personnel for the "Select Reserve" deserves a particular mention. In fact, considering the complexity of the procedures, involving the General Directorate for Military Personnel, the Ordinary Commission for Promotions and even the signature of the Decree by the President of the Republic, the Army Staff carries out an accurate selection of the applications, constantly trying to combine the needs of the Service and the professional experience of the individuals. In particular, their *curricula* are carefully

examined, with particular reference to:

- age;
- educational record;
- specializations, if any;
- courses attended (connected or not with the educational record), with priority to those regarding military subjects, such as "master in peacekeeping", courses in human rights laws, etc.);
- foreign languages spoken, and relevant level;
- professional experience abroad;
- previous collaboration with the Defence Administration;
- performance of conscription duty (when not performed, reasons must be ascertained).

With reference to the applications already received, it is possible to say, without being rethorical, that the number of


qualified applicants is very high. They have excellent professional qualities and a deep sense of belonging to the Nation, with the consequent desire to play an institutional role wearing the Army uniform. This can be verified in the data shown at Tables 1 and 2, revised on December 31, 2001.

The duration limits of the obligation are specified at Table 3.

A widespread and continuous promotional activity is particularly important. It must be directed both outside the Service, mainly for its implications on the "Select Reserve" and within the Army itself, in order to encourage the assent of those who are about to leave the service but willing to renew their experience, showing

PROFESSIONS OF THE APPLICANTS FOR SELECT RESERVE

Table 2



an identity of values with the Military Institution.

Training of the Completion Forces

In view of this, the promoting capabilities of the web should not be underrated. They have been tested in numerous contacts received by the Army Staff thanks to the "Completion Forces" page on the Army internet site (<http://www.esercito.difesa.it/professio/riservisti.htm>).

Another form of promotion which has confirmed the warm interest in this subject, is the series of lectures given at "Rome 3" University, within the "Master in Peacekeeping and Security studies".

Finally, also the Units can carry out appropriate initiatives aimed at establishing durable social and professional relations with their Reservists, through their participation in all military and recreational activities, such as ceremonies, meetings, conferences, celebrations.

The Volunteer Completion Forces are trained according to need. The practical modalities are fixed by the specific Directives issued by the Army

Staff, and go through the following three phases:

- **Preparation:** carried out during the first recall after discharge last 3 or 4 weeks, depending on the time elapsed after discharge, the position held during service and the possible operational experiences.

There is also a particular training cycle for the civilian personnel (who may have no military experience at all) of the "Select Reserve". The training's goal is to provide these personnel with the techno-practical preparation necessary to operate in a security framework.

- **Updating:** the initial phase of the successive recalls, preparatory to the employment.

In particular, a course of training, valid for both preparation and updating has been outlined, envisaging:

- Training in the main types of operational employment (individual combat training,

Table 3

AGE LIMITS FOR DISCHARGED MILITARY PERSONNEL WITH SERVICE OBLIGATIONS

PERSONNEL			AGE LIMITS (years)		
OFFICERS	"Complemento"	Various Branches: • Sen. Off. • Capt. • 1st Lt. - 2nd Lt. Carabinieri and Logistic Corps • Sen. Off. • Capt. • 1st Lt. – 2nd Lt.	52 47 45 54 48 45		
		"Complemento" reserve (*)	• Sen. Off. • Capt and below	65 62	
		Reserve (*)	• Gen. • Col. • Lt. Col./Maj. • Capt and below	73 70 66 62	
	NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS		"Complemento" with obligations in peacetime	Various Branches and Logistic Corps • 1st Mar. • Mar. • Sgt. Maj/Sgt. Carabinieri • 1st Mar. • Mar. • Sgt Maj(Brig) / Sgt(V.Brig)	50 48 45 55 52 50
				"Complemento" with obligations only in wartime	60
		Reserve		62	
PRIVATES		PRIVATES Reserve VSP	65		
		Unlimited discharge	45		

(*) Personnel with obligations only in wartime



NBC decontamination of a VM-90

territorial control, peace support operations);

- At "minor unit" level (squad, platoon, company), a training adaptable to the trainees' skill.

Furthermore, in order to optimize the recall time, the organization and training is entrusted to regular Officers and NCOs with recent operational experiences, and the recalls are planned, as much as possible, in concomitance with out-of-garrison activities (such as a training camp). It is very important that the training be essentially practical, limiting the theoretical lessons to the equipment, vehicles and weapon systems introduced after the reservists' discharge, or to the new norms of particular interest (such as human rights, regulations on military discipline, etc.).

At the end of the preparation, the personnel are considered "ready" for 2 years; after that time they will have to be

"refreshed" with another training period (following the same training course envisaged for the preparation phase).

- **Goal-oriented training.** Its duration is variable, and its purpose is to train the reservist for specific operational activities, such as interventions in disasters, territorial control ("Vespri Siciliani" and "Partenope" Operations, etc.), peace-support or peace-enforcing operations.

Depending on the type of mission, the refresher period lasts from one week, for the operations in support of the national community, to two weeks for the operations of territorial control, up to a month for peace-support operations and up to two months for peace-enforcing and war operations.

Employment

The employment of reservists can last the entire period of time fixed by the Interministerial

Decree on recalls, or for variable fractions of it. We stress, once more, that the system is very flexible, and can adjust the recalls according to the needs of the Organization, taking also into account the reservists' requests. It is even possible to envisage, for the reservists with special qualifications (e.g. physicians), recalls of a few days only. In these cases, the reservist does not have to interrupt his work relations for long periods of time.

The recall can take place either individually, for the jobs which do not require the insertion in predetermined units, or by platoon- or company-level modules to be attached to the units so that they may operate according to the employment modalities of the Branch/Speciality.

From the human and professional viewpoint, obviously the most profitable and paying employment is in humanitarian operations. In fact, one should not underestimate the fact that the Reservists are a cross-section of the civil society which now

Right.
"Ariete" combat tank.

Below.
Riflemen on training.

and then they leave to return to the Service, taking with them a remarkable experience and an always positive cultural and professional wealth.

Particularly important has been the employment of a full-strength company, taken from the Completion Forces, within the multinational Brigade engaged in operation "Joint Guardian" in Albania. On this occasion, the reservists, after training for the mission with the "Granatieri di Sardegna" Brigade, operated in the Theatre with great professionalism and enthusiasm, and were highly appreciated at national and international level.

Also on the occasion of the most important exercises carried out outside the national territory – among them, the "Baltic" mission in Lithuania, "Koren" in Bulgaria, "Balaton" in Hungary, "Drawsko" and "Ustka" in Poland – the Completion Forces gave their precious and effective contribution, and were a credit to

their Units and the whole Nation.

Finally, another profitable employment for reservists with special skills was with the military postal service, in favour of "out-of-area" contingents.

The personnel used in this case was from the Italian Mail organization.

The experience gained and the very good results achieved "on the field" have led the Army to enhance more and more the integration between regulars and reservists, being aware that, by

drawing highly specialized resources from the Completion Forces "basin", it is possible to realize remarkable synergies, both in the organizational/functional sector and in the operational field. This is the basic concept of the activity under way which is aimed at exploiting the Army's new operational capabilities in the CIMIC and PSYOPS sectors. In particular, within the NATO CIMIC Group South, soon to be constituted at Motta di Livenza, there will be a reservist component made up of experts in Public Affairs, Infrastructure, Economy and Commerce, Humanitarian Support, Cultural Affairs. The number of reservists required for these activities is about 200, but it is also necessary to have a "reservoir" for personnel turnovers and sustainability of the operational activities.

As concerns PSYOPS, by the end of 2005 a unit of this kind will be established as part of the NATO commitments of the Army Staff. The formation, of Regiment level, will incorporate experts in ethnology, anthropology and mass communications.

It will also be necessary to find experts in anaesthesia, radiology, surgery and





Army rangers checking their equipment before going into action.

Right.
"Bersaglieri" training for combat in built-up areas.

orthopedics, for the constitution of "medical packages" to be employed in the field medical Units, considering the general shortage of specialized military physicians.

CONCLUSIONS


The intent of this short *excursus* on the general organization of the Completion Forces was to point out the high potential that the reservists can express in favour of our Service. They are a lively and continuously evolving category, whose employment will be more and more useful after the


personnel, is particularly advantageous for the Army, both for the Reservists' flexibility of employment and the low management costs, being based on the employment – in periods of great operational activity – of already trained personnel. In conclusion, it can be said that the abandonment of the previous mobilization system in favour of a more modern and effective voluntary-type organization sets the Italian Army on a level with the Armed Forces of the other European and Western Countries.

Our cognitive journey does not end here. In the next appointment we intend to illustrate what has been done for the status of the Reservists, from the regulation of their service relations with the Defence Administration, to their promotions.

□

**Lieutenant Colonel,
Section Chief,
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** Lieutenant Colonel,
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Army General Staff*





GUIDO ROMANELLI

An Italian Officer in the History of Hungary

by Piero Laporta *

This is the extraordinary story of an Officer of the Italian old school who, in 1919, wrote an unforgettable page of history in a Budapest ravaged by post-war lacerations, anticipating courageously and by many decades the modern concept of humanitarian interventions.

The protagonist has remained in the heart of the people of Hungary so deeply that in the twenties they bestowed great honours upon him and dedicated him a bronze bust.

The bust was lost during the fifties and was recently recovered on the initiative of the Hungarians.

It is an exalting epic which has become a harmonious part of the millenarian Italo-Hungarian relations and approaches Guido Romanelli to other great Italians, such as Eugene of Savoy and Innocent XI, just to mention two of the many that live in the Magyar historical memory.

On the higher side of Budapest, where the old Buda stands, there is the bronze statue of a Hussar who, for a moment has left off fighting and, standing still, listens to the story of the Italians on the Danube, who, as time went by, or despite time going by, have remained in the heart of the Magyars.

The Hussar stands with his arms folded, holding his sabre

flat, his head bent, observing the blade, like someone who has concluded a duel and, before assailing a new enemy, gives a solicitous look to his sword. It is a statue that vibrates with energy. Had he not been a warrior, he could have been a dancer in the brief moment between two whirls; but boots, shako, dolman, pelisse with the superabundant rows of buttons, and the



merciless glare, even better than the sabre, reminisce of a hissing waiting for tragedy, with the steel animated by the will to tear apart limbs all around, with the irascible determination without hate of the knights of the past.

But now the Hussar relishes this peace and listens to the remembrances that hover about the pavement of the ancient city. And not a few remembrances tell of the legendary deeds of the Italians.

The statue was shown to me by a good friend, Géza Mihályi, a living encyclopaedia of the Italo-Hungarian relations, starting from the first Magyar King, Saint Stephen, till our days.

In the morning we attended the unveiling of the bronze bust of Lieutenant Colonel Guido Romanelli; in the evening Géza guided me through the sumptuous alleys of Buda where, next to the Hussar, as many as four Italians are portrayed in bronze and stone, worthy men for the Hungarian history and for civilization.

Tha plaque on the millenarian wall of the Major Church of Our Lady of the Assumption, which the Hungarians simply call Mattias' Church, evokes the Roman baron Michele d'Aste, mortally wounded in his early thirties, on the 2nd of September 1686, freeing Buda from Ottoman rule.

You take a few more steps and not far from the War Museum – where you can find endless information about the brotherhood between Italy and Hungary – under the bell-tower, which has survived the air-raids that destroyed the Church of the Magdalen, Saint Giovanni da Capestrano, represented in bronze, reminds us of when, fighting in Belgrade against the Turks, on the 6th of August 1456, he gave courage to the armed defenders and and faith to the dying men. He would soon join the latter on the 23rd of October.



He was canonized in 1690, but earlier still he was in the hearts of the Magyars who, every year, on the October anniversary climb the mountain in Abruzzi in remembrance.

If the bronze of the monk blends the torture of battle with the suffering and ecstasy of faith, the statue of Pope Innocent XI, born Benedetto Odescalchi, has the serene, simple and yet solemn concentration of prayer. In the stone, nothing betrays the thundering crusading spirit of the Pontiff. He himself was unaware of it until he ascended the Papal throne in 1676. Before, as Cardinal of Ferrara, he had been proud of being called "father of the poor"; as soon as he became Pontiff, he catalyzed the coalition that defended

Vienna and Budapest, preserving the Christian civilization that nourishes us.

Thus, three Italians remembered in stone and bronze. They are not alone in keeping company to the Hussar with the impatient sabre.

Standing above everybody and far from everybody, as befits the proud ruler of thousand battlefields, Eugene of Savoy stands out in front of the Royal Palace.

When he frees Buda from the Ottomans, in 1686, he is in his early twenties and a Colonel. Four years later he liberates the entire Hungarian land and is Marshal of the Hapsburg Empire. His equestrian statue tells of a war won and of peace reconquered – the latter is always the beloved daughter of the

The bronze statue of the standing Hussar, arms bent to hold his sabre flat...

former - by an unforgettable leader, an Italian, once more an Italian, who humbled even the proud "Roi Soleil."

At night, the rider and his horse dominate the Danube and narrate of a thousand-year-old destiny that has joined the hands of Hungarians and Italians.

Those were our thoughts that evening. After many years another Italian has come up by the side of these illustrious men, not in the ancient city but among the soldiers of the lower town. The irascible Hussar appears vexed at the separation, but Romanelli, who was a simple and rough soldier, is glad he has found the sometimes excited, sometimes solemn or rhythmical bawling of barracks.

Nevertheless, as we shall see, things did not go exactly like that, because History, Time and Destiny, well mixed by a powerful and compassionate Hand, can provide surprises and put things back at their right place.

On the 15th of November 1919, the Rumanian troops, which had invaded Hungary at the end of July, had withdrawn.

The Hungarian authorities had decided to celebrate the regained independence with a great military and religious ceremony to be held in the square of the Parliament.

The citizens of Budapest, encouraged by an unusually sunny and clear day, rallied around their soldiers. At the end, along the avenues by the Danube, from the legendary and shining Hussars to the more modest infantry units, all the Hungarian troops offered themselves to the embrace and the applause of the crowd.

A company of cadets of the "Ludovika I" Military Academy,



On the 11th of January 2001, in Budapest, the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Gianfranco Ottogalli attended the ceremony for the unveiling of a bronze bust in memory of Colonel Guido Romanelli.

The ceremony was held at the prestigious School of Military Engineering of Budapest, directed by Professor Colonel Berek Lajos, who laid a wreath, followed by the Hungarian Undersecretary of State for Defence, Tivadar Farkas and by Lieutenant General Ottogalli.

The statue was blessed by the two military chaplains of the School, a Catholic and a Lutheran one and Romanelli's figure was commemorated by Undersecretary Farkas, by Professor Géza Mihályi and by the Italian Ambassador Giovanbattista Verderame.

The ceremony reached moments of true emotion when the notes of taps echoed among Italian and Magyar flags, which, as is well known, bear the same colours even if placed in a different manner, underlining a similarity in diversity.

In the words of everyone resounded the strong impression and the enduring memory that the figure of this Officer still maintains in the Hungarian collective consciousness and in the memory of the individual persons.

As a matter of fact, among those present there was, and not by chance, besides the distinguished members of the "Committee of '56", formed by the Hungarian refugees who animated this initiative, like Professor Lajos Pintér, a numerous deputation of former cadets of the "Ludovika I" Academy, Lieutenant General László Botz, Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Hungarian Defence and Colonel General Béla Király, present advisor to the Magyar Government.

General Doctor János Piószeghy, Deputy Rector of the Hungarian Defence University, during the party that followed underlined how the event just experienced entered perfectly in the millenarian history of the excellent relations between Italy and Hungary.

having completed their itinerary, headed towards their garrison, turning towards the National Museum and going by the residence of the Italian Military Mission, which was charged with the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles.

The flag at the head, the Commander marching ten steps behind it, preceding a square formation of a hundred cadets, rifle on shoulder, a bit proud and a bit braggart, like all cadets of the military academies when they parade. The step was cadenced, the legs stiff, according to the style still in use in the armies of Central Europe, not because inherited from the "goose step" or the "Roman step", as some

believe or fear, but because it was conceived two centuries before by Eugene of Savoy, who used it to set the pace of his invincible troops. This shows that the memory of this great Savoy is

still very much alive.

Turning around the corner of the National Museum, the cadets went by a marble bust of General Garibaldi, who had been elected to the Hungarian Parliament by the Magyars to spite the House of Hapsburg.

Garibaldi never entered the Budapest Parliament but Hungary was dear to him. As a matter of fact he enlisted quite a number of Hungarians in his "Red Shirts", such as his Chief of Staff, Colonel Turr, and General Tukory. The latter, a Muslim, died in Sicily and was buried by Garibaldi *manu militari* in the Church of San Domenico, in Palermo, overcoming the understandable – and useless – resistance of the monks.

Earlier there had been, and later there would be, numerous and significant cases of Hungarians fighting for Italy and of Italians who reciprocated for the Magyars.

Then the Great War broke out and Italians and Hungarians found themselves on opposite fronts. They did their duty, but without hate, treating the prisoners with humanity.

Thus the parade of the cadets continued with a perfectly aligned manoeuvre beyond the



A moment of the unveiling ceremony of Col. Guido Romanelli's bronze bust.

National Museum, where it met a black "Lancia" automobile, the passenger hidden by luggage packed to the roof and with an inquisitive greyhound looking out of the car window.

The car stopped, making way for the detachment.

The passenger thought it was better to remain in the car, well hidden by the luggage. He had been ordered to leave Budapest as anonymously as possible; therefore, although he very much wanted to be present, had to forgo the ceremony and decided to leave shortly after twelve, when the units were going back and the crowd hastened to their midday meal.

He had obeyed, reluctantly but had obeyed, and now he hoped that nobody would recognize him.

Nevertheless, the car and the greyhound were well known to the Budapest population. The Commander gave an order which was clearly understood as an order to render military honours.

Lieutenant Colonel Romanelli realized that the honours could only be meant for him. He alighted from the car and stood at attention.

Eleven days earlier, a commission of four Generals – one American, one French, one Italian (Gen. Mombelli) and one English – wanted by Clemenceau, President of the Paris Peace Conference, had been installed with the task of ensuring that Hungary, detached from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, would respect the clauses of the armistice of November 13th, 1918.

Moreover, according to Clemenceau, the four Generals should have "kept contact" with the Rumanian army, which had invaded Hungary and caused the fall of Béla Kun's "Government of the Soviets".

The Hungarians had already suffered from a rigid and

punitive policy carried out by the victors of the war with an economic and social crisis that had inesorably brought Béla Kun to power when Count Karoly, the former Prime Minister, in October 1918 had decided to resign, together with the entire Cabinet, after only five months of his presidency, indignant with the Allied Commission which was imposing a narrow and punitive frontier.

In March Béla Kun had come into power; and by the middle of July his destiny was already decided. He was banished by the Entente and the rest had been

As long as the Rumanians and the Czechoslovaks were advancing, the Peace Conference of Paris had kept silent. As soon as the Magyars conquered a large slice of Slovakia, together with the town of Kassa, inhabited by a Hungarian majority, the Conference decided to enforce the rights of the victorious powers.

On the 9th of June, the Conference ordered Béla Kun to leave Kassa and the entire occupied Slovak territory. Similarly, the Rumanians were to withdraw on the lines of the armistice of 1918.



done by the end of foreign trade and the collapse of the collective economy.

The breakdown could have occurred earlier had there not been the Army, in which the sudden Communist colouring, certainly far from the Hapsburg tradition, had not watered down the very strong nationalist sentiments. Therefore the Army stood firm and sustained as much as it could the struggle against Rumania and Czechoslovakia, which had brought their troops to the heart of the Hungarian territory.

Lt. Gen. Gianfranco Ottogalli, Army Chief of Staff, and Ambassador Giovanbattista Verderame, during the ceremony held in Budapest.

Had the pacts been observed, the Magyars would have gained on the east the amount of territory they were to lose on the north. Things did not go that way.

When the Hungarians withdrew, the Rumanians never thought of doing the same. Béla Kun's credibility started to



Giovanbattista Verderame, Italian Ambassador to Budapest.

decline and was definitively compromised by the successive offensive against the Rumanians, which was such a failure that it opened them the road to Budapest.

Béla Kun fled to Paris and thence to Moscow, where, years later, he was put to death by Stalin.

Archduke Joseph was appointed regent in Budapest and Stephen Friedrich was designated at the head of the Government, with the

agreement of the exiled King Karl. But Clemenceau considered the restoration of the Hapsburgs a calamity and, precisely in order to avoid it, he had appointed the four Generals.

Soon the Generals forced the Archduke to resign, so that, on the 23rd of November, he could be replaced by Admiral Horthy who, from that day on, hoisted the Hungarian flag at half-mast in remembrance of the unredeemed territories, and was

to remain in power until October 1943.

In December 1918, Guido Romanelli, an Artillery Lieutenant Colonel, when his regiment leaves the Piave region and is transferred to Catania, ignores that he is going to be projected into the Hungarian melting-pot.

Certainly, he has asked to be employed abroad; he is fluent in French and English, and knows German, but now he is only irritated at having been sent to Catania: he hates garrison life, does nothing to hide it and wants to be employed where he can have his qualities appreciated.

Romanelli has three war campaigns behind him, two in Africa and the last just concluded. He abhors idleness and loves challenges. In the past he has been idle too, but for reasons independent of his will, such as when, because of his frequent falls from his horse – he loved to break in personally the most unruly ones – he was immobilized for weeks.

During one of these periods in the Castro Pretorio barracks, his horse was chosen as model for the quadrigae with which the sculptor Fontana, adorned the summit of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

In May 1919, when he has really had enough, the Supreme Command orders him to go to Vienna, to the Joint Allied Armistice Commission. He leaves immediately, for fear that a counterorder may return him to the detested idleness of the garrison.

He presents himself to General Segre, Head of the Italian Mission in Vienna. The General keeps him under observation for a few days, then sends him to the most spiny seat, that of Budapest, where Béla

Bronze statue of St. Giovanni da Capestrano, located in front of Buda's War Museum.

Kun employs every means at his disposal to question the Commission's authority.

Segre has chosen Romanelli for this difficult task not only because he is a pleasant person, but because he realizes that he is an Officer of great worth. From that moment on, General Segre defended courageously and as much as he could the choices made by his delegate in Budapest, where the situation was very precarious.

Romanelli's predecessor, Major Pentimalli, has suffered several times the vexations of Béla Kun's militiamen. He has been insulted, abducted, has had his car stolen. The abuses have diminished after General Segre's personal interventions. But it is clear by now that Pentimalli must go and Romanelli is needed to handle the situation.

Romanelli's arrival in Budapest is a turning-point in the relations between Mission and Government, and between the Mission and the civilian population.

The first measure is to order the Government to allow those who want to leave the Country to do so. The second, no less important than the first, is the dismissal of the militia and the end of their vexations on the Hungarian population.

The residence of the Mission, the Hotel Ritz, is a few steps away from the Chain Bridge, a point of passage of extraordinary architectural charm, between Pest, on the right bank of the Danube, and Buda, on the hills of the opposite bank.

The Mission is in the heart of the city. The citizens of Budapest, without distinction of class, refer to it to obtain help and food.

Romanelli's most brilliant



quality is initiative, together with a deep and very civil sense of solidarity.


This makes him a precursor of a certain way of understanding these international missions, which restore peace precisely when they are sustained by people like Romanelli, ready to assume responsibilities that are risky but necessary in order to give a concrete sense to the mission.

Initiative is his best weapon and he uses it generously, often declaring a support from Vienna

which is uncertain or does not exist. But the man has the soldier's boldness mixed with the shrewdness of the diplomat and uses both, adjusting the doses well.

On the 24th of June there is a revolt. Some units of the Hungarian Armed Forces – the cadets of the "Ludovika I" Military Academy are among them – desperately try to overthrow Béla Kun.

They go up the Danube on river boats, armed mostly with the gascon spirit of the young. Béla



The equestrian statue of Eugene of Savoy, Marshal of the Hapsburg Empire, in front of the National Museum.

to Vienna "for consultations".

Moreover, also the communications with the Austrian capital, which in any case have never been particularly easy, are once more interrupted and Romanelli in this predicament is aware that he is alone in an isolated Budapest.

The folktale says that Lieutenant Colonel Romanelli resolves the situation by rushing into Béla Kun's office and, with a whiplash on the table, demands and obtains the release of the prisoners.

Romanelli, in fact, had a riding whip and, like many Officers of his time, had the habit of showing it off, as a gentlemen's accessory, also when his horse was not around. In addition, his firm and testy character was very well suited to the picture of a whipping irruption into Béla Kun's study.

On the other hand, the people, who had rightly sensed Romanelli's courage, were unable to imagine the subtle political facets which he had to keep into account – as he actually did – being well aware that diplomatic battles, for those who conduct them, are often more sanguinary than battles fought with guns.

The Hungarians, therefore, handed down the image of the hissing riding crop, but in reality he had recourse to the more prosaic but no less courageous, peremptory and cutting diplomatic note number 398 of the 28th of June, 1919, written in impeccable French: *...je m'adresse à Votre Gouvernement pour réclamer que la vie des otages et des prisonnier politiques soit respectée sans exception. Ce sont les gents qui se sont battus pour des idées et des principes et c'est tout juste qu'ils soient soumis au même traitement*

Kun deploys guns on the river banks and soon the cadets discover at their cost that, to win a battle, they need something more than heart and spirit. Defeated, they are captured.

Immediately the news is spread that the Government wants to prosecute them, together with other rebellious soldiers. The outcome of the trial is expected and everybody knows the place of the hanging: Octogon square, whose elegant, Liberty style street lamps are quite suitable to be employed as collective gallows.

In short, the aim is to give an unforgettable example of cruelty by executing the cadets, sons of the Hungarian high society, thus demolishing all possible counter-revolutionary ambitions.

Romanelli, whose concern towards the Budapest population is well known, is submerged by requests to stop the hangman. He does not need entreaties but, nevertheless, he knows that he is alone. His colleagues of the allied nations of the Mission, like in other previous occasions, when the situation had changed for the worse had speedily taken the road

qui est réservé par la Convention de Genève aux prisonniers de guerre.

The reader may appreciate the extraordinary modernity of the warning that Romanelli counters to Béla Kun's intentions.

It is a humanitarian reasoning of a very topical conception, which proves how Romanelli had breathed and acquired it during the long years of his military education, from the "Collegio Romano" to the Military Academy, and on the battlefields he had crossed, and could bring it forth at a suitable moment, opposing it to Béla Kun's barbarism. The latter answered with rude tones, claiming that he was attending to the internal affairs of his Government. Above all, he concluded, "it did not seem possible to him that the Italian Government could share Romanelli's initiative". It was like saying: "I know you are isolated and therefore you speak only on behalf of yourself".

It is a bad blow and Romanelli is conscious of that. He must find – quickly – a point where he can lever and force Béla Kun to stop the hangman.

That evening, the ulcer that tormented him and compelled him to keep to a strict milk diet, must have grown much worse and sleep, which usually lasted only a few hours, went away completely.

It is nighttime when Romanelli goes out in the streets of Budapest for a walk with his greyhound. He racks his brains and the next day sends a note that is a little masterpiece of diplomacy.

In substance, he says, I intervene because the armistice conditions, which I am left alone to guarantee in the name of the Entente (therefore, mind you, not

only in the name of Italy), empower me to do so for the questions susceptible to hinder the maintenance of public order.

As regards the legitimacy of Béla Kun's Government, this does not exist, because it does not stem from the "*libre expression de tout le Pays et de toutes les classes sociales*". We are in 1919 and the reader should notice how effectively and synthetically this Officer of the old Italian school expresses the criterion of democratic representation.

Romanelli continues "...if you are the expression of a faction I don't see how the Entente could allow you to issue death sentences on other factions and consider them legitimate...The friendship of the Italian Government cannot be invoked for the purposes of one faction...", and concludes, homing the point, "...I again

draw your attention on the unpleasant consequences that you would cause by disappointing the wishes and hopes of the Allied Countries".


With this, Romanelli unveils his innate quality of capable diplomatic negotiator.

He has removed the centre of gravity of the contention, avoiding to propose himself as Béla Kun's direct antagonist, but rather by pointing out, without arrogance but with due strength, that he, Béla Kun, is setting himself against the whole forces of the Entente.

The Magyar dictator fears that such a situation could produce the pretext that would allow the Entente to settle the pending scores, considering that, up to now, he has not spared efforts in order to question the authority of the Entente.



Equestrian statue of a Hussar.



The Major Church of Our Lady of the Assumption, simply called "Mattia's Church" by the Hungarians.

Béla Kun thinks it over, no less than Romanelli has done before him, finally he gives in and spares the life of the cadets and of the other soldiers, more than a hundred persons, condemned to certain death.

Guido Romanelli breathes a sigh of relief, as does the entire city with him. He has bluffed and is aware of it, for he is not certain that in Vienna they would have done anything. The proof comes when, a few days later, he makes a report and receives a good dressing-down. Thus he realizes that, had Béla Kun resisted, his superiors would have left him alone.

Despite everything, his popularity is sky-high, so that, when after a few weeks Béla Kun

falls, he can intervene with all his authoritativeness and prevent the victims from avenging themselves on their persecutors.

We don't know whether, when he visited in jail those who had been warders until the day before, any ironical hint escaped from his mouth. It is nevertheless improbable that he should have bullied them, because it would be in contrast with his character. Instead, and this is certain, for the unsuccessful executioners he has the same concern that he has shown towards the cadets. And adds some of his own farsighted ideas.

Speaking with firm decision with Clemenceau, he suggests that the Powers of the Entente send a Regiment each, in order to

implement an *ante litteram* kind of peacekeeping, like the operations being carried out by almost ten thousand Italian soldiers in various countries of the world.

Clemenceau has other things to think of; on the contrary, he is actually against such an idea and can't wait to get rid of this Italian, who makes Italy too popular in Hungary without France gaining anything from it.

Romanelli, however, undertakes to mediate between Hungarians and Rumanians. He can now use all his prestige with both parties in order to avoid that the Hungarians, after Béla Kun's fall, throw themselves into a new war against the Rumanians.

The facts that followed that terrible summer, proved the Italian Lieutenant Colonel right. Lacking an armed peacemaking intervention of the forces of the Entente, he had in fact foreseen a long period of agony for Hungary.

Peace arrived to the Hungarians, but it was a temporary peace, after three years of suffering. They were kept for three years on the threshold, imploring admittance to the League of Nations, which they obtained in 1922, but it was too late.

Meanwhile, during that long summer of 1919, Romanelli, his prestige and his ample vision of problems are cumbersome for those who are in reality unsuited to the challenges of the moment or, like Clemenceau, advocates of particular interests.

This explains the rapidity with which is brought to effect the contrast with General Mombelli, member of the "Four Generals Commission" and, above all, with Cerruti, the Political Commissary for the Italian Foreign Ministry, who keeps in the shade, and

emerges only every now and then to instigate, if necessary, Mombelli against Romanelli. A difficult situation that drags on until Romanelli, tired but untamed, some years later leaves the Army because of the persecutions.

But already now, while he lives in Budapest, his relations with the Authorities of the Conference come to a head when, on the spontaneous initiative of the people of Budapest, there are plans to confer the highest Magyar decorations to him, besides naming a street after him (as in fact was done: the street is the present Illés Utca that starts from Ludovika I Square) and erecting him a bronze bust, for which he cheerfully agreed to sit three times while the sculptor, Alajos Strobel, worked on his clay model. The casting had to be postponed because bronze was scarce.

Imagine the spite of his enemies. That was the last straw. Clemenceau and his aversion for the Italians seemed custom-made for bringing to its due conclusion the envy that Romanelli provoked among his colleagues. At that point the worried notes from Vienna to Rome, asking that the troublesome Lieutenant Colonel be called back, became more and more frequent. Not even General Segre, who continued to appreciate and defend him till the end, could do anything more. Some days later the Italian Supreme Command issued the order to return home.

When Romanelli saw the cadets unit and heard the orders of the Commander, alighted from the car, stood at attention and brought his hand to his cap. The vigorous cadence of the steps on the pavement got nearer and


nearer; a sharp order and the cadets, turning their head to render their honours, looked him in the eyes. A couple of brazen youths smiled openly.

His heart skipped a beat when the bearer lowered the flag, as if he were a Head of State. The few people around clapped affectionately.

A simple and significant tribute, the remembrance of which was dear to him when, back at home, he was followed by

the revenge of his envious enemies, which induced the Chief of Staff to get him out of the way, exiling him to the Osoppo garrison in Friuli, near Udine.

In November 1922, an unexpected letter invited him to Budapest where, in the Parliament palace, the Primate of Hungary, Cardinal Csernoch - who, according to the old Constitution, was Regent in the King's absence - awarded him



Equestrian statue of St. Stephen.

with an honour sword, preceded by a vibrant speech by the Primate himself who, having reminisched the numerous events of which he had been protagonist, concluded by wishing a long lasting peace between Italy and Hungary.

Romanelli took the sword, thanked everyone and returned to Osoppo.

As 1923 gets near, Romanelli knows that garrison life can offer him nothing more. He decides to conclude his career as a Colonel. With the experience he has acquired, the relations he has established and the unconditioned esteem of many important persons, he can start in as many professions as he wants.

He starts by being a capable diplomat, as he had previously proved to be, achieving the dignity of Minister plenipotentiary, because, Cerruti notwithstanding, he had earned himself more than a few estimators in the corridors of the Foreign Ministry. In this capacity he distinguished himself as Italy's General Consul to Barcelona from 1927 to 1934.

But he longed for Hungary too, and he returned in 1938, this time with a wife, two daughters, another greyhound and another profession: President of the Hungarian-Italian Bank. He remained there until 1943.

Versatile, energetic and clear-headed till the end, he passed away in Friuli, at San Vito al Tagliamento, nearly 97 years-old, in 1973.

When someone reminded him of the past, he was fond of repeating De Amicis' verses:

*Italy Mother, who does not
promise,
and suffices us
the proud comfort of having*

served and loved her.

A little before or a little after 1922, the statue planned in 1919 was actually realized and two twin copies were cast.

The first was located along the walls of the "Ludovika I" Military Academy and the second was sold by its author, in 1923, to the National Gallery of Hungary.

This latter copy was probably set in a decorous place, both because the subject enjoyed great favour and because its author deserved it. The author was Alajos Strobel, as we said, who at the time had realized many important works and was quite renowned.

Nevertheless, as years went by, the bronze could not be exhibited anymore, and not only for hypothetical artistic reasons. Most likely, when Romanelli's memory had ceased to be in tune with the political wind of the moment, there was probably someone who – out of scorn for the man (improbable) or to save it from unlucky destinations – transferred the statue in the storage rooms of the National Gallery, which for a fortuity is located behind the square dominated by the statue of Eugene of Savoy. Afterwards, its memory was lost until the present day.

The bronze placed inside the Military Academy had a different and more unfortunate destiny. It survived until the end of the forties, when it was decided to erect a bronze monument to Stalin, in the vicinity of Heroes' Square, where the Church of the Patron Saint of Hungary had been.

The colossal statue was actually built between 1951 and 1952, sacrificing numerous bronzes

taken from the streets of Budapest. Romanelli's was one of them.

Thus the statue was lost, but not its memory and, four years ago, it was decided to restore it.

The promoting committee that was constituted, not knowing of the other twin statue, took upon itself to realize a new one and to give it the appropriate features.

Konr d Matthaidesz, military editor of the Hungarian television, devoted himself to a research in the archives of the Magyar National Gallery that lasted almost one year and, unexpectedly, brought out the second twin of the original statue.

For some time it was thought to put this back in place instead of realizing a new statue. But it was soon discovered that this was impossible. The old statue could not leave the National Gallery to which it belongs. Nevertheless it was useful as a model for the bronze erected on January 11, 2001.

Thus the second original of the first statue, realized in 1922, stands up there in Buda, where there are the other four renowned Italians, not exactly next to Eugene of Savoy but near enough.

All the intense activity of the powerful and compassionate Hand has seemed appropriate to us and maybe also the irascible Hussar is grateful and agrees with us.

□

**Colonel,
Head, International Relations
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Defence General Staff*

ROMAN LEGIONARIES IN CHINA

by Flavio Russo *

Whatever the truth, it is certain that among the inhabited centres of China there are a city and a county called Li-Kien, a term that indicates the Roman Empire.


But that is not all. In the history of the Han dynasty there is the description of an unusual formation of soldiers who fought gallantly against the Chinese and wore an odd armour, shaped in the form of fish scales: they were Rome's legionaries who, in 53 B.C. had crossed the Euphrates and pushed forward towards the unknown territories of the East.

Five thousand kilometres of powerful crenelated wall, marked by over fifteen-thousand huge towers: this is the essence of the Chinese Great Wall. The motivation that prompted its building - a death sentence for myriads of convicts who laboured in its yards - was the intent to repress the incursions of Mongols and Huns. As far as we know, the construction started around 215 B.C., when Emperor Shih-huang-ti sent general Meng-T'ien (at the head of an army of 300.000 labourers, war slaves and criminals) to the northern

frontier, which was systematically trespassed by the invaders.

The plan was simple: a wall approximately four-men high, wide enough at the summit to allow six people to walk abreast. The layout was even simpler: it followed without exception the watershed of the mountain ranges, absolutely regardless of the environment's morphology.

Between supporters and defamers, the Cyclopean fortification remained in service for over 18 centuries. It is hard to ascertain its validity, especially because the raids never stopped completely. A significant positive



A gastraphetes from the IV Century B.C. (reconstruction).

clue could be found in the continuity of its upkeep, otherwise inexplicable; another could be the mobility recovered by the Chinese armies, which had freed themselves of an exasperating hindering action. It is not by chance, in fact, that after the partial completion of the wall, one of the first Emperors of the Han dynasty, Wu-ti (140 – 87 B.C.) started a series of expanding campaigns towards the west.

The initiative was taken up and amplified by his successors, who were perhaps puzzled by the insistent news about the increasing expansion, in the opposite direction, of a contemporaneous huge empire, headed by a city called Rome. Shortly, that little-known state entity became Li-Kien in their language.

If the Chinese somehow knew about Rome's existence, it is not excessively surprising that also the Romans could be aware of the existence of peoples living on the eastern extremity of Asia. If anything, it is

astonishing how vague the knowledge of this existence was, considering the large and varied quantity of wares that were incessantly imported from those regions. Plinius, for example, on the pretext of censuring the impudicity of some shameless matrons, who had no scruples about appearing in public wearing transparent garments, supplied a short account about the peoples that produced those very precious fabrics. He pointed out that: *...the Seris owe their celebrity to the wool of their forests, which they gather by combing the white down of the leaves, after soaking it in water.* Overlooking the obvious inaccuracies, it is easy to recognize the Chinese in the Seris and their supposedly vegetable wool in the mythical silk, secreted by silkworms on mulberry leaves and spun after boiling the cocoons in water. There is no difficulty in attributing to the merchants that traveled along the endless Silk Road the origin of this information, which was perhaps purposely confused, being the production of silk a jealously-kept secret.

In the same historical period, the Chinese kept an even more fanatical secret about another production which, unlike the first, was an exquisitely military one. It should have been - and never has the conditional been obligatory as in this case - the most delicate component of a lethal weapon belonging to the Chinese imperial army: the release-device of a Han crossbow.

The crossbow, which in the West would appear only in the second period of the Middle Ages, in the East had a long tradition already in Plinius' times, because it could be traced back as far as the 12th Century B.C. It is therefore obvious that the weapon, having been employed widely for a long time, had benefited from countless improvements. The most important must certainly have concerned the release-device, from which the functioning and correct laying depended. Precisely like today, also in those times money and fights conspired in nullifying any military secret. Probably the shrewd Phoenician traffickers, more pirates than traders, did not miss the opportunity to get hold of some specimen of the weapon. What is certain is that within a short time a rudimentary crossbow appears in the Mediterranean region, in the hands of the Punics, who use it in the campaigns of imperial expansion, particularly in Sicily. The precision and power of its throw roused a widespread terror among the Greeks of the island and, at the same time, an impelling need to equip themselves with it. It is not by chance, therefore, that at the end of the 5th Century B.C., Dionysius the Elder, the famous tyrant of Syracuse, gathered the most renowned technicians of the time, engaged with sumptuous remunerations, and urged them to reproduce, and possibly improve and perfect,

such a weapon, promising fabulous rewards in case of success. Within a few months, the *équipe* projected and realized various terrible obsidional machines, among which a lethal crossbow, called *gastrophetes* at the time: nevertheless its release-device resulted excessively big and stumpy and in any case impossible to miniature so as to permit the contruction of a real hand-held crossbow of limited dimension and weight. It is logical to conclude that the Syracusan reproduction, like the preceding Punic-Phoenician ones, had little in common with the Eastern specimen.

The Chinese release-device, like the similar devices of the medieval crossbows, must have functioned in a completely diverse manner, according to a totally different conception. Perfectly conscious of the importance of such a delicate component, the Chinese rulers not only warned their technicians against divulging its characteristics but compelled the manufacturers to refrain from exporting any model of it. In order to make the prohibition even more peremptory, they selected a very restricted number of craftsmen, the most talented ones, to whom they granted the manufacture: a kind of early manufacturing-licence!

As the imperial army operated exclusively on the north against the Mongol tribes and on the north-west against the Huns, the risk that such crossbow would spread in case of capture appeared unreal, because these nomads lacked the indispensable technology. Nevertheless this did not prevent the occurrence that specimens seized by these nomads could be resold profitably to the West, where

such capability certainly existed. The discovery of a part of a Han crossbow from the 1st Century A.D. at Taxila, (a little town about 30 km from Rawalpindi, capital of Pakistan) besides confirming this reasoning, permits to formulate different hypotheses about the area of maximum diffusion. In fact, two findings at Le Puy in central France, dating back to the 1st and 2nd Century A.D., contribute to make the story still more puzzling. The findings are two figures in bas-relief of Roman manufacture representing two crossbows, whose characteristics exclude their derivation from the *gastrophetes*, confirming an improbable autonomous elaboration or a more plausible co-optation.


Once more the question remains the same: how could the technological decanting possibly occur between socio-cultural worlds so distant from each other? Through which channels and in what chronological period?

Without considering that, the weapon being quite sophisticated, only a contact, or better a clash, between Roman and Chinese soldiers could have


created the indispensable realizing preconditions: an occurrence that finds neither corroboration in history nor indirect testimony in the famous Peutinger's Table. In fact the longitude considered by the Table undoubtedly extends beyond India, but its latitude remains always below Tibet, therefore omitting any geographical reference to China.

Nevertheless, a fleeting trace surfaces in the extreme vicissitudes of the catastrophic campaign of 53 B.C., caused by Crassus' superficiality and tactical foolishness. Strangely, but not inexplicably, these facts, overlooked by the coeval writers and premise to the subsequent oblivion, to a less scholastic investigation betray enigmatic incongruities and tragic reservations, plausible answers to the questions above. This is the story in short.

In 62 B.C., Julius Caesar is appointed *propraetor* of *Uterior* Spain, but his many creditors prevent him from leaving the City if he doesn't settle his debts. A rich man, Marcus Licinius Crassus, rescues him from the humiliating situation. What we know about him is his scarce



Detail of a Graeco-Roman release device.



Section of the release device of a medieval crossbow.

Facing page.

Detail of the release device of a medieval ambush-crossbow.

aptitude for command and an absolute lack of scruples: he was incapable of defeating Spartacus' rebellious slaves but capable of crucifying 6000 of them along the Appian Way. In any case, Caesar, freed from his economic worries, granted him his friendship, binding him with Pompeius in the first triumvirate. It was of course a political alliance aimed at sharing the power, as it was actually sanctioned at the meeting of Lucca in 56 B.C. Crassus was granted full freedom of action against Parthia, a region rich but bellicose and untrustworthy.

Despite his age (he was well into his sixties), Crassus, consul by now, the following year started recruiting the expeditionary force necessary for the planned invasion campaign. The initiative, because of the well-known risks, raised strong opposition everywhere, driving the qualified soldiers and veterans away from the recruiters. Finally, the seven legions that, with difficulty, he managed to form were constituted by young recruits or poor wretches pressed by need, lacking any significant military experience and, moreover, intractable and recalcitrant against discipline. The only exception was a modest contingent of Gallic cavalry of tried trustworthiness and pugnacity, enrolled by his son Publius.

Once in the area, the contingent was joined by Arab squadrons.

Thus, 40,000 men left for the unknown territories of the East, under the command of a leader

totally unacquainted with the enemy that he was about to attack. Leaving out any moral judgement, it seems evident that the great Roman unit would prove itself dangerous in a traditional battle, marked by clashes and dominated by close fighting. But the Parthians were indeed famous for their very high mobility and for their skill in distant confrontation: in other words, they were excellent bowmen, very skilled at arrow-shooting while riding, and formidable lancers.

In the spring of 53 B.C., the Romans crossed the Euphrates. At the beginning of March they confronted the desert, being careful to keep in the vicinity of the Belik river: soon, on the opposite bank, they got sight of the first enemy detachments. As soon as they simply appeared, the Arab allies took flight, thus depriving Crassus of an important section of the cavalry. The situation started rapidly to deteriorate and soon became critical for the inexperienced legionaries, despite their overwhelming numerical superiority. Orodes, the Parthian King, being unable to take away many warriors from the conflict he was having with the Armenians, ordered a young feudatory, a certain Surenas, who commanded 10,000 mounted bowmen hired by himself, to drive back the invaders. Paradoxically, even the numerical superiority turned into a further calamity for the Romans. Surenas, in order to remedy his

clear weakness, had organized, in far-seeing advance, a very efficient logistic support for his archers. About a thousand camels overloaded with arrows were to provision his men without interruption, allowing them to maintain an incessant shooting. When, within a few days, the Romans launched their attack, according to the trite traditional tactics, a deadly rain of arrows fell on the first wave and annihilated it. The few survivors only with great difficulty could return to their ranks, which had shut themselves up in a *testudo* formation, in order to offset the tremendous hail of arrows.

Many hours passed and nothing permitted to foresee an imminent thinning of the shooting; the situation from critical started to become tragic, since it was feared that the enemy cavalry could intervene at any moment. Crassus decided to launch a second wave of attack under the direct orders of his son. Despite his proven valour, the Romans were again exterminated and forced to retreat. As regards Publius, surrounded by Parthian cataphract soldiers, he preferred to be killed. Crassus bore the loss with dignity, inciting his soldiers to resist, while a cloud of arrows mowed down the ranks, finally routed by the cavalry. As night fell, a wretched crowd of fugitives, chased by Surenas, headed for Carrae, leaving behind a large number of wounded. There were numerous cases of desertion. The two formations met again in Syria, where the mutinous Romans forced Crassus to negotiate a surrender: a humiliation that did

not save them.

That was the end of triumvir Crassus.

At least 20,000 of his soldiers lost their life in battle; almost 10,000, after a painful march, managed to take shelter in Syria, while an equal number of them were taken prisoners by the Parthians. Thirty-three years were to elapse before the very few still-living men could be freed by Augustus' legionaries, who, in the same circumstance, managed to salvage also various insignia of the unfortunate massacred units. But not even their survived companions-in-captivity could give information about the great mass of captured men. It was confusedly said that many of them had started a new life, enlisting as mercenaries of the Parthians. Instead, the news about many others stopped after their deportation to a kind of concentration camp, at a distance of 1500 miles from the last strip of Roman land: nobody could have escaped from there!

Plinius the Elder, mentioning Margiana, described it as a region of Central Asia, surrounded by deserts, located between Ircania and Bactriana, famous for its mild climate, so much so as to permit to produce wine. Not by chance Alexander had founded there his umpteenth Alexandria, destroyed by nomads and rebuilt some thirty years later by Antiochus I Soter, between 293 and 281 B.C., with the new name of Antioch. Precisely there, continued the famous naturalist, in the city whose *...perimeter measures seventy stadia...cut in the middle by the Margo river, whose waters flow into lake Zota ...Orodes led the Romans captured after Crassus' defeat...*

While in Asia Minor the tragedy just described was coming to its conclusion, further to the east the Hsiung-nu tribes - which dominated Mongolia, afflicting China with their


incursions - were broken up by a great number of chiefs who wanted to have an absolute control over them. Among these there was a certain Jzh-jzh who, having rid himself of the major contenders, tried to establish himself firmly to the north of the Great Wall. The formation of a new Asian potentate, extending as far as Sogdiana, the region whose mythical capital was Samarkand, was immediately considered by China as an explicit threat to the Silk Road and its rich trade. Therefore, in 36 B.C., Emperor Gan Yen-Shou, urged by his ambitious adviser Chen-tang, moved towards the west, until he reached the capital of Jzh-jzh, which he sacked.

The clash has reached us vividly narrated in the history of the first Han dynasty. In its pages there is also the story of a peculiar formation of soldiers which in that circumstance fought gallantly against the Chinese and was finally entirely captured. There were a little more than a hundred men, wearing an armour whose oddity stimulated the attention of the imperial chroniclers. Never had they seen anything like that but on

fish: and they report it as "fish scales", set as protection of the professional fighters, real soldiers, not nomads and robbers, as the explicit term used by the Chinese permits us to understand. That is, soldiers of the Greek or Roman type. But Bactria had fallen almost a century before and the small, round shields of the Macedonians could not have turned so quickly into "fish-scale" armours.

The rout at Carrae, instead, dated back to only 18 years before, and the arrival of the Roman prisoners to Margiana, adjacent to Sogdiana, was even more recent. And in fact the Roman legionaries employed the lorica, precisely an armour that looked very much like the scales of a fish!

It is therefore logical to conclude that those some-hundred soldiers captured by the Chinese were an entire century, engaged by Jzh-jzh himself in Margiana and transferred more to the east, on the borders of Sogdiana, for its defence in anticipation of the Chinese attack or with the task of instructing his men. What makes the hypothesis not so strange is the Chinese description of the particular fortification that





Left.
A simple crossbow still used by Mongols.

Facing page.
Planisphere showing the three imperial areas.
(Circa year 0)

surrounded the city at the moment of their attack. It was a vallum, surmounted by a double palisade of sharpened trunks: a system having absolutely no Asian or Greek analogies, but which was typical of the legionaries' camps. There is still another clue that seems to further confirm this surmise. The official report of the Chinese talks about 145 soldiers captured on that occasion and treated very honourably by the conquerors because of their evident valour. The specification of their number leads us to assume that, besides the fish-scale armour, they probably had particular physiognomical features, quite different from their comrades-in-arms of the moment: a fundamental explanation for the rather gentle treatment by the conquerors who, on the contrary, were known for their proverbial brutality. It is not surprising, therefore, that during the journey towards China, the commanders of that peculiar detachment had the possibility to talk to the enemy general, obviously about their mysterious origin and their strange weapons. Moreover, still

according to the abovesaid imperial report, as soon as he reaches his home country, the noble leader organizes a kind of triumph, with an exhibition of tables representing the most important scenes of the campaign. A precise reproduction of the Roman practice!

Whatever the truth, it is certain that in the lists of the inhabited



centres of China, compiled in 5 A.D., there are a town and a county called Li-Kien, a Chinese term that indicates the Roman Empire. At that time, there were only two other equivalent places with analogous names, both related to centres inhabited by immigrants. It is therefore logical to conclude that the famous century was allowed to found its own village within the immense Chinese empire, a village that in some ways was destined to be reminiscent of Rome.

This series of oddities, even if they don't prove incontrovertibly the presence of the Roman legionaries in China, show a remarkable credibility. From there to the cooptation of the crossbow and its transmission to the West it is only a short step.

□
* Historian and writer



SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN



L'Europe de la sécurité et du développement. Interview du Prof. Romano Prodi, par Ornella Rota (p. 30).

La lutte contre le terrorisme international n'a pas arrêté le processus d'élargissement de l'Union Européenne. Au contraire, elle contribuera vraisemblablement à accélérer la création d'un instrument militaire intégré, à intensifier les rapports de coopération au niveau de la politique étrangère et à accroître les efforts visant au développement de la recherche scientifique et technologique. Le processus d'élargissement du vieux Continent constitue un attrait pour les Balkans également, dont l'adhésion, cependant, ne pourra pas avoir lieu tant qu'ils n'auront procédé au rétablissement du respect des droits de l'homme, à la reconstruction économique et à la restauration de l'ordre et de la sécurité au niveau national.

De nouvelles menaces appellent de nouvelles stratégies, par Maurizio Coccia (p. 4).

Les événements dramatiques du 11 septembre ont fait planer de nouvelles menaces sur notre démocratie, notre liberté, notre territoire et notre vie. Une agression qui peut préluder à une barbarie contre laquelle il faudra prévoir une défense sous tous azimuts si l'on veut exorciser la peur collective et rétablir un climat de confiance et de liberté. Mais comment peut-on contrecarrer cette menace invisible et transversale, en réduire la portée et en accélérer la disparition? Seul un partenariat ferme, basé sur l'identification et l'exaltation des intérêts mondiaux en matière de sûreté et de développement, un partenariat qui aille au-delà des méfiances et des barrières idéologiques et culturelles, peut relancer le sentiment commun d'appartenance au genre humain et de communion avec ses principes universels.

Dissymétries stratégiques, par Ferruccio Botti (p. 16).

Les événements tragiques du 11 septembre 2001 ont marqué de façon

dramatique dans l'histoire de l'humanité, faisant apparaître sur le devant de la scène de nouveaux et redoutables ennemis.

Dans l'ère de la globalisation, la guerre elle-même a changé de signification. Selon la pensée stratégique traditionnelle, elle était conçue comme un combat, un affrontement de forces régulières. Aujourd'hui, elle se manifeste comme une lutte sanglante, non déclarée, en dehors des lois du droit international, où nos armées semblent désormais obsolètes face à des ennemis sans uniforme, sans visage et sans identité. Comment peut-on relever les défis du futur? Une révision du concept de «sûreté» s'avère nécessaire.

L'Asie du Sud-Est se tourne vers l'Europe, par Francesco Semprini (p. 52).

Après la crise économique de 1997, les pays de cette région ont connu une période de profondes transformations au niveau aussi bien productif qu'institutionnel. Le cas de la Thaïlande en est l'exemple le plus significatif. En effet, ce pays a donné le premier des signes de reprise économique, de dynamisme politique et d'intérêt envers les marchés européens. Aussi, Bangkok, qui a coopéré avec l'Occident en participant avec ses propres contingents à la mission de paix au Timor Oriental, revêt une importance toute particulière pour l'Italie et l'Europe.

La planification de l'outil terrestre, par Salvatore Farina (p. 4).

Les futurs théâtres d'opérations seront caractérisés de plus en plus par un nombre élevé de risques, diversifiés selon leur nature et leur ampleur. D'où la nécessité de réviser et de réformer l'outil terrestre tout en tenant compte des éléments suivants: le niveau de la conflictualité; les difficultés liées au déploiement des unités; l'affaiblissement des forces militaires; les liens et les contraintes médiatiques. Depuis quelques années déjà, tous les pays occidentaux ont mis en place un programme d'adéquation pour le personnel et le matériel (armes et moyens), selon l'approche de la flexibilité organisationnelle.

Au niveau national, conformément aux objectifs prévus dans le projet «Paquets de capacités», le choix a été arrêté sur la «Brigade moyenne» en vue de la mise en

place rapide des capacités opérationnelles.

Le corps d'armée italien pour l'OTAN, (1ère partie), par Rocco Vastola et Fabrizio Santillo (p. 16).

La travail illustre le projet pour la constitution de la Grande Unité à framework italien. Cette initiative place l'Italie parmi les principaux pays fournisseurs de forces armées et lui permet de jouer un rôle croissant dans le cadre de l'Alliance Atlantique. En particulier, le projet fournit des éléments ponctuels de connaissance sur: le règlement et l'organisation de l'Etat Major international; le rôle de la Brigade des Transmissions; la fonction de la Police militaire nationale; les délais nécessaires pour la mise en œuvre du projet dans son ensemble.

La seconde partie du travail sera publiée dans le prochain numéro de la Revue.

Lituanie: les nouvelles Forces Armées. Interview du Major Général Jonas A. Kronkaitis, Chef d'Etat Major des Forces Armées, par Enrico Magnani (p. 46).


La Lituanie a entamé la réforme de son outil militaire. Le nouveau modèle prévoit un Commandement unifié et une Structure de Défense territoriale, en vue d'accroître le niveau d'intégration par rapport à l'Otan. Aussi, certaines Unités

Lettonie: les nouvelles Forces armées. Interview du Colonel Raimonds Graube, Commandant des Forces armées, par Enrico Magnani (p. 42).

Après avoir restauré l'indépendance, la Lettonie a reconstruit ses Forces armées et aspire aujourd'hui à devenir de plein droit un membre de l'OTAN. Depuis longtemps déjà, elle participe activement avec ses propres unités aux missions de gestion des crises aux Balkans et, avec des observateurs, aux initiatives OSCE. En outre, elle a atteint un niveau élevé d'intégration avec les pays Baltes. L'instrument militaire letton se compose de volontaires, d'appelés et d'un personnel féminin.

La Caraïbe, par Ornella Rota (p. 64).

La Caraïbe est une région regroupant quinze Etats qui présentent d'énormes différences. Une mosaïque caractérisée par une instabilité politique et sociale endémique. L'intérêt que l'Europe et les Etats Unis portent à cette région



SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN

témoigne de son importance géo-stratégique.

Les «forces de réserve» (1ère partie), par Francesco Diella et Giuseppe Bongiovanni (p. 78).

Deux années se sont écoulées depuis que le Groupe de Travail chargé par l'Etat major de l'Armée de mener une étude visant à trouver des solutions possibles pour un nouveau système de mobilisation des Forces armées, a jeté les bases d'une organisation à caractère volontaire. Aujourd'hui, nous pouvons affirmer, sans présomption de notre part, que les «Forces de réserve», une solution entièrement italienne au problème de la mobilisation, sont désormais une réalité opérante : les 4000 officiers, sous-officiers et militaires du rang qui depuis 1999 ont répondu à l'appel en opérant avec professionnalisme et en participant à des exercices ou à des activités opérationnelles en Italie et à l'étranger, en sont un exemple probant.

Guido Romanelli: un officier italien dans l'histoire de la Hongrie, par Piero Laporta (p. 98).

A la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, Guido Romanelli, Lieutenant Colonel de l'Armée royale, fut envoyé à Budapest en tant que représentant italien de l'«Entente» pour le respect des accords dérivant de l'armistice. Sur le territoire magyar, l'officier devint le protagoniste d'un événement extraordinaire qui en exalta les vertus diplomatiques, le noble héroïsme et l'esprit de solidarité humaine. Méconnu en Italie, Guido Romanelli est encore un souvenir vif dans la mémoire des Hongrois : c'est grâce à lui, en effet, que furent sauvés quelques centaines de Cadets de l'Académie militaire qui, s'étant soulevés contre le régime, avaient été condamnés à la pendaison.

Légionnaires romains en Chine, par Flavio Russo (p. 120).

Une série d'indices semblerait confirmer non seulement le passage de légionnaires en Extrême Orient mais aussi la présence d'un véritable établissement romain. Une centurie romaine, envoyée pour défendre la région de Samarkand, aurait été vaincue et emprisonnée. Toutefois elle aurait eu la possibilité de fonder son propre village à l'image de Rome. Et ce à l'époque où le triumvir Crassus menait la guerre contre les Parthes.



Das Europa der Sicherheit und der Entwicklung.

Interview mit Prof. Romano Prodi, von Ornella Rota (S. 30).

Der Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus hat den Prozess der EU-Erweiterung nicht angehalten. Wahrscheinlich kann dieser ein Beschleunigungsfaktor für die Schaffung einer integrierten militärischen Struktur darstellen, für die Realisierung einer engeren Kooperation im Rahmen der Außenpolitik und die Förderung eines starken Engagements in Richtung der Entwicklung der wissenschaftlich-technologischen Forschung darstellen. Der Erweiterungsprozess des Alten Kontinents ist mit Sicherheit auch von hoher Anziehung für die Länder des Balkans, doch kann ihr Beitreten nicht erfolgen, bevor nicht die Menschenrechte eingehalten, der wirtschaftliche Wiederaufbau geleistet und die innere Sicherheit und Ordnung wiederhergestellt sein werden.

Neue Bedrohungen, neue Strategien, von Maurizio Coccia (S. 4).

Der schreckliche 11. September hat der Welt eine neue Perspektive der Bedrohung eröffnet, die auf den Werten der Demokratie, der Freiheit, dem Territorium, dem Leben lasten. Eine Aggression, die Vorspiel einer Barbarei sein könnte, der man auf ganzer Front begegnen muss, wenn man die Kollektivangst bändigen und ein Klima des Vertrauens und der Freiheit wiederherstellen will. Doch wie kann man dieser transversalen und flüchtigen Bedrohung Herr werden, wie ihre Valenz reduzieren und ihren Verfall beschleunigen? Nur eine überzeugende Partnerschaft, die auf der Erkenntnis und der Hervorhebung der globalen Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsinteressen beruht, die Misstrauen und ideologische und kulturelle Barrieren überwindet, kann das Gefühl der gemeinsamen Zugehörigkeit zur Menschheit und seinen universellen Prinzipien wieder gewähren.

Strategische Asymmetrien, von Ferruccio Botti (S. 16).

Die tragischen Ereignisse des 11.

Septembers 2001 bedeuten eine dramatische Wende in der Menschheitsgeschichte und rufen neue, schreckliche Feinde aufs Parkett. Auch der Krieg hat in der Globalisierungsära eine andere Bedeutung gewonnen. Nach traditioneller Strategie war er wie ein Kampf regulärer Streitkräfte konzipiert. Heute ist es ein blutiger Kampf ohne Kriegserklärung, außerhalb der Normen internationalen Rechts. In diesem Kampf scheinen unsere Streitkräfte obsolet gegenüber Feinden zu sein, die keine Uniformen tragen, die kein Gesicht und keine Identität haben. Wie kann man die schweren Herausforderungen der Zukunft meistern? Unser Sicherheitskonzept muss einen Qualitätssprung vollziehen.


Südostasien schaut nach Europa, von Francesco Semprini (S. 52).

Nach der Wirtschaftskrise 1997 haben die Länder Südasiens eine Zeit tiefer Wandlungen der Wirtschaft und der Institutionen durchgemacht. Der Fall Thailands fällt ins Auge; es ist das erste Land, das Signale des Aufschwungs zeigt: politische Dynamik und Interesse für die europäischen Märkte. Italien und Europa schauen mit besonderer Aufmerksamkeit nach Bangkok, das im übrigen mit dem Westen zusammengearbeitet hat, indem es ein eigenes Kontingent zur Friedensmission nach Osttimor entsandt hat.

Planung der Landstreitkräfte, von Salvatore Farina (S. 4).

Die zukünftigen Szenarien werden durch hohe Risiken gekennzeichnet sein, die nach Art und Ausmaß unterschiedlich sein werden. Es ist daher dringend nötig, die Landstreitkräfte neu zu gestalten, wobei man sehr auf folgende Faktoren achten muss: Konfliktebenen, Schwierigkeiten bei der Aufstellung der Einheiten, Kräfteverschleiß, die einschränkenden Sachzwänge und die Beeinflussung durch die Medien. Alle westlichen Länder haben bereits seit einigen Jahren ein Anpassungsprogramm in Gang gesetzt, das Mannschaft, Waffen und Fahrzeuge betrifft. Das Kriterium ist organisatorische Flexibilität. Auf italienischer Ebene hat sich die Wahl der «mittelgroßen Brigade» («Brigata media») bewährt, die alle Hauptziele verfolgt, die bereits im Projekt «Leistungspakete» («Pacchetti di Capacità») definiert worden sind, um eine schnelle Durchsetzung der operativen Fähigkeiten zu erlauben.

SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN



Das italienische Armeekorps für die NATO (1. Teil), von Rocco Vastola und Fabrizio Santillo (S. 16).

Die Arbeit illustriert das Projekt der Schaffung einer Großen Einheit italienischer Struktur. Eine Initiative, die unser Land in die hauptsächlichlichen Streitkräfte stellenden Länder einreicht und ihm erlaubt, eine immer wichtigere Rolle innerhalb des Atlantikbündnisses zu spielen. Insbesondere liefert die Arbeit Elemente zu: der Ordnung und Organisation des internationalen Generalstabs, der Rolle der Fernmeldebrigade, der Funktion der nationalen Militärpolizei, den Realisierungszeiten des gesamten Projekts. Die Veröffentlichung des zweiten Teils der Arbeit ist in der nächsten Nummer dieser Zeitschrift vorgesehen.

Litauen. Die neuen Streitkräfte. Interview mit Generalmajor Jonas A. Kronkaitis, Heeresstabschef der Streitkräfte, von Enrico Magnani (S. 46).

In Litauen ist eine radikale Umstrukturierung des Militärs im Gange. Ein zusammengefasstes Kommando und eine territoriale Verteidigungsstruktur sind die wesentlichen Elemente des neuen Modells, das immer mehr auf volle Integrationsfähigkeit in die NATO ausgerichtet ist. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, nehmen einige Einheiten an gemeinsamen SFOR- und KFOR-Operationen sowie an gemeinsamen Manövern teil, häufig etwa mit den Gebirgsjägern des italienischen Heeres. In dem baltischen Land gibt es die Wehrpflicht noch, doch zu den Wehrdienstleistenden gesellt sich ein beträchtlicher Anteil von Berufssoldaten.

Lettland: Die neuen Streitkräfte. Interview mit Oberst Raimonds Graube, Kommandant der Streitkräfte, von Enrico Magnani (S. 42).

Nach der Wiedererlangung der Unabhängigkeit hat Lettland die eigenen Streitkräfte wiederaufgebaut und strebt danach, Vollmitglied der NATO zu werden. Seit einiger Zeit nimmt es aktiv mit eigenen Einheiten an den Krisenmissionen auf dem Balkan und mit eigenen Beobachtern an den Initiativen der OSZE teil. Sehr eng ist im übrigen die Integration mit den baltischen Ländern. Das lettische Militär besteht aus Freiwilligen, Wehrpflichtigen und weiblichem Personal.

Die Karibikregion, von Ornella Rota (S. 64).

Die Karibik ist eine Region mit fünfzehn untereinander grundverschiedenen Staaten. Ein Mosaik, in dem politische und soziale Instabilität endemisch sind. Die geostrategische Bedeutung dieser Gegend ist auch am wachsenden Interesse Europas und der USA ersichtlich.

Die Ergänzungstreitkräfte (1. Teil), von Francesco Diella und Giuseppe Bongiovanni (S. 78).

Es sind wenig mehr als zwei Jahre vergangen, seitdem die vom Generalstab des Heeres damit beauftragte Arbeitsgruppe, die möglichen Lösungen für ein neues Mobilisierungssystem der Armee zu sondieren begonnen hat, die ersten Konzepte bezüglich einer Zeit- und Berufssoldatenarmee auszuarbeiten. Nun können wir ohne Hochmut bestätigen, dass die «Ergänzungstreitkräfte», eine rein italienische Lösung für das Mobilisierungsproblem, bereits operativ sind: Das belegen 4000 Offiziere, Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften, die von 1999 bis heute diesen Truppenteil gewählt haben, dort ihren Dienst versehen und mit Professionalität in Italien und im Ausland in Manövern wie in operativen Einsätzen operieren.

Guido Romanelli: ein italienischer Offizier in der Geschichte Ungarns, von Piero Laporta (S. 98).

Guido Romanelli, Oberstleutnant des königlichen Heeres wurde unmittelbar nach dem Krieg als italienischer Vertreter der «Entente» für die Beachtung der Waffenstillstandsvereinbarungen nach Budapest geschickt.

Im Magyarenland wurde der Offizier Protagonist einer außergewöhnlichen Geschichte, die seine diplomatischen Tugenden, den edlen Heldenmut und den Geist menschlicher Solidarität hervorheben.

In Italien unbekannt, ist Romanelli heute noch in Ungarn bekannt: Sein Verdienst ist es, dass sich Hunderte Kadetten der Militärakademie retten konnten, die sich dem Regime entgegengestellt hatten und zum Strang verurteilt worden waren.

Römische Legionäre in China, von Flavio Russo (S. 120).

Eine Reihe von Indizien scheinen nicht nur die Anwesenheit, sondern auch eine römische Siedlung im Fernen Osten zu bestätigen. Eine römische Zenturie, die zur Verteidigung der Region von Samarkand ausgesandt worden war,

wurde besiegt und gefangengenommen. Es wurde den Soldaten jedoch die Gelegenheit eingeräumt, ein eigenes Dorf zu gründen, das an Rom erinnern sollte. Dies geschah, als der Triumvir Crassus gegen die Parther kämpfte.




La Europa de la seguridad y del desarrollo. Entrevista con el Profesor Romano Prodi, por Ornella Rota (p. 30).

La lucha contra el terrorismo internacional no ha detenido el proceso de ensanchamiento de la Unión Europea. Incluso, hay probabilidades de que contribuya a acelerar la creación de una herramienta militar integrada, a intensificar las relaciones de cooperación en el ámbito de la política extranjera y a incrementar el empeño por el desarrollo de la investigación científica y tecnológica. El proceso de ampliación del viejo Continente constituye un atractivo seguro para los países balcánicos también. Sin embargo, la adhesión de los mismos no podrá producirse hasta que no se restablezcan el respeto de los derechos humanos y el orden y la seguridad nacionales y hasta que no se realice la reconstrucción económica.

Nuevas amenazas requieren nuevas estrategias, por Maurizio Coccia (p. 4).

Ese terrible 11 de septiembre hizo cernerse nuevas amenazas sobre el mundo, haciendo peligrar sus valores de democracia, libertad, territorio y vida. Una agresión que preludia una barbarie contra la cual se deberá intervenir a todo campo si se quiere exorcizar el miedo colectivo y restablecer un clima de confianza y libertad.

¿Pero cómo podemos contrastar esta amenaza invisible y transversal, reducir su alcance y acelerar su desaparición? Sólo un partenariado firme, basado en la identificación y exaltación de los intereses mundiales en lo que respecta a seguridad y desarrollo, un partenariado sin desconfianzas ni barreras ideológicas y culturales, permitirá reanimar el



SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN

sentimiento común de pertenencia al género humano y de comunión con sus principios universales.

Asimetrías estratégicas, por Ferruccio Botti (p. 16).

Los trágicos acontecimientos del 11 de septiembre de 2001 han marcado un viraje decisivo en la historia de la humanidad, haciendo aparecer nuevos y temibles enemigos. En la era de la globalización, hasta la guerra ha cambiado de cara. El pensamiento estratégico tradicional la concebía como un enfrentamiento de fuerzas regulares. Hoy día se manifiesta en cambio como una lucha sangrienta, no declarada, fuera de las normas del derecho internacional, en la que nuestros ejércitos resultan obsoletos a la hora de encarar a enemigos si uniforme, sin rostro y sin identidad. ¿Cómo aceptar los retos del futuro? Es preciso un salto de calidad en el concepto de seguridad.

El Sureste Asiático mira hacia Europa, por Francesco Semprini (p. 52).

Tras la crisis económica de 1997, los países del Sureste asiático experimentaron un periodo de profundas transformaciones a nivel tanto productivo como institucional. Es significativo el caso de Tailandia, el primer país que dio señales de reactivación económica, dinamismo político e interés por los mercados europeos. Para Europa e Italia Bangkok reviste particular importancia puesto que ha cooperado con el Occidente enviando sus propios contingentes a las misiones de paz en Timor Oriental.

La planificación de la fuerza terrestre, por Salvatore Farina (p. 4).

Los escenarios del futuro se caracterizarán por un elevado número de riesgos, diversificados según su naturaleza y su extensión. Urge por lo tanto revisar y reorganizar la fuerza terrestre, según módulos en los que se tomarán en cuenta los distintos índices de conflictividad, las dificultades en el despliegue de las unidades, el desgaste de las fuerzas, las condicionantes y los vínculos mediáticos. Todos los países occidentales llevan ya varios años desarrollando programas de adecuación, tanto de los hombres como de las armas y de los medios, inspirados en un criterio de organización flexible.

A nivel nacional se ha optado por una «Brigada mediana», persiguiendo con esta elección los principales objetivos del

proyecto «Paquetes de Capacidad», es decir una rápida puesta en marcha de las capacidades operativas.

El Cuerpo de Ejército italiano para la OTAN (1a parte), por Rocco Vastola y Fabrizio Santillo (p. 16).

El trabajo ilustra el proyecto para la constitución de la Gran Unidad con framework italiano. Con dicha iniciativa Italia se coloca entre los mayores proveedores de fuerzas, desempeñando de esta manera un papel creciente en el marco de la Alianza Atlántica. En particular, esta Unidad proporciona elementos puntuales de conocimiento acerca de: el ordenamiento y la organización del Estado Mayor internacional; el papel de la Brigada de Transmisiones; la función de la Policía militar nacional; los plazos necesarios para la puesta en marcha del proyecto en su conjunto. La segunda parte de este trabajo se publicará en el próximo número de la Revista.

Lituania. Las nuevas fuerzas armadas. Entrevista con el General Jonas A. Kronkaitis, Jefe de Estado Mayor de Defensa, por Enrico Magnani (p. 46).

Lituania emprendió la reforma de sus fuerzas armadas. Con miras a una mayor integración en la Otan, el nuevo modelo prevé un Mando unificado y una Estructura de Defensa territorial. Con este fin, algunas unidades participan en las operaciones SFOR y KFOR así como en ejercicios conjuntos. Entre éstos, cabe señalar los ejercicios con las unidades alpinas del ejército italiano. No obstante el servicio militar siga siendo obligatorio en Lituania, existe una fuerte componente de voluntarios profesionales.

Letonia: las nuevas Fuerzas armadas. Entrevista con el Coronel Raimonds Graube, Comandante de las Fuerzas Armadas, por Enrico Magnani (p. 42).

Tras restaurar su independencia, Letonia reconstituyó sus Fuerzas armadas y ahora aspira a ingresar en la OTAN como miembro de pleno derecho. Lleva mucho tiempo participando con sus unidades en las misiones de gestión de las crisis en la península de los Balcanes y con, sus observadores, en las iniciativas OSCE. Además ha logrado un alto nivel de integración con los países bálticos. Las fuerzas armadas letonas están integradas por voluntarios, reclutas y personal femenino.

El Caribe, por Ornella Rota (p. 64).

El Caribe es una región que abarca 15 Estados muy distintos unos de otros. Un mosaico endémicamente caracterizado por su inestabilidad política y social. El interés creciente de Europa y Estados Unidos por esta zona demuestra su importancia geoestratégica.

Las «Fuerzas de Complemento» (1a parte), por Francesco Diella y Giuseppe Bongiovanni (p. 78).



Han transcurrido más de dos años desde que el Grupo de Trabajo, encargado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército de estudiar las posibles soluciones para un nuevo sistema de movilización de la Fuerza Armada, empezó a elaborar los primeros conceptos relativos a una organización de tipo voluntario. Ahora, podemos afirmar, sin presunción alguna, que las «Fuerzas de Complemento» (solución totalmente italiana para el problema de la movilización) es una realidad operante: lo demuestran los 4000 oficiales, suboficiales y militares de tropa que desde 1999 han respondido a la llamada prestando servicio en las unidades y participando con profesionalismo en Italia y en el extranjero en ejercicios o actividades operativas.

Guido Romanelli: un oficial italiano en la historia de Hungría, por Piero Laporta (p. 98).







Al finalizar la primera guerra mundial, Guido Romanelli, teniente coronel del Ejército real, fue enviado a Bucarest como representante italiano de la «Alianza» para el respeto de los acuerdos derivados del armisticio. En el país magiar, el oficial se vuelve el protagonista de un hecho extraordinario a través del que resaltaron sus virtudes diplomáticas, su noble heroísmo y su espíritu de humana solidaridad. Desconocido en Italia, Romanelli quedó grabado en la memoria de los Húngaros: merced a él se salvaron cientos y cientos de Cadetes de la Academia militar que por rebelarse al régimen habían sido condenados a la horca.

Legionarios romanos en China, por Flavio Russo (p. 120).

Una serie de indicios confirmaría la presencia de legionarios romanos en Extremo oriente e incluso la existencia de un asentamiento propiamente dicho: cuando el triunviro Craso luchaba contra los partos, una centuria romana fue enviada para asegurar la defensa de la región de Samarcanda, y, tras ser derrotada y apresada, fundó su propia aldea a semejanza de Roma.



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
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Dear Readers,

after almost two lustres of intense editorial activity, I leave the office of Chief of the Journalistic Centre of the Army and Chief Editor of "Rivista Militare".

During these years, well aware of the serious risks that arise when decisions connected with Defence are taken without informing public opinion, I have become more and more convinced that the purpose of my work had to be the improvement of the relations between the military and the civilian world.

It is often difficult to understand what to "invest in communication" means. Many have the reductive idea that "to communicate" means to inform, to propagandize, to develop public relations. All these activities are certainly useful and necessary but, by themselves, could prove insufficient and counterproductive.

The image of chaos and absence of strong values which, at times, is conveyed by society, is not the product of a standardization process but rather the result of the widespread desire to be visible and to count. In this scenario, therefore, a complex and many-sided organization, such as the military is, if it wants to legitimate itself, must learn more and more to find its place, and act in the information market in a competitive manner. It must ask itself how it can be present and participate in what sociologists call "reality through the media". This means being capable of constructing one's own communication strategy. It means realizing that the military world communicates in any moment of its social life and that this communication, be it directed inside or outside, will be effective only if it succeeds in expressing the goals of the organization, so that they can be continuously redefined and negotiated.

To achieve this, communication must not be seen as an additional problem, as a number of new specialisms to be added to the old ones, but as the interiorization by the individual members of the Armed Forces of a way of being and acting and, therefore, of skills and cultures capable of incrementing all the available resources, guiding them towards shared objectives.

This produces a culture which, in its turn, generates a coherence among the different forms and modalities of communication, which mutually reinforce each other.

Our daily work went along the lines of this conviction, in the effort to present our Readers with a product characterized not only by a pleasant format but especially by a careful selection of contents, in order to put our Periodical on the same level as the best expressions of the national press and to make it a reliable vehicle of the Army's thought and image among the Country's citizens.

The manifold initiatives undertaken by "Rivista Militare" during these years – among which I'd like to mention, besides the basic editions, the publication of "Rassegna Militare" (the Army Review), the English Edition of the "Rivista", the organization of prize-winning competitions and, above all, of courses and round tables – had precisely the purpose of starting a project of cultural pluralization. A project aimed at:

- starting a process of internal communications involving the best and most blooming intellectual resources of the Service in a lively and constructive exchange of opinions;
- favouring interdisciplinary courses for professional qualification and retraining;
- spurring and encouraging strong intellectual tensions, and fruitful discussions of ideas;

- developing, especially among the youngest, a more aware participation in the necessities of the organization, inciting them to express a professional vitality and interpret, with a modern vision, the present and the changing future of the military Institution;

- increasing the citizen's awareness that today the Army and, more generally, the Armed Forces, express themselves not only in terms of safeguard of the internal and international security, but also carry out a task of education and reinforcement of the national identity.

It is certainly an ambitious programme, based on the firm belief that the moral courage of men can win only if it springs from deep ethical roots, upheld and fortified by knowledge and culture.

Obviously we did not expect conclusive results from our initiatives, since they could not be a point of arrival but rather a labourious stage in a long and complicated journey which reaches the future of our Institution.

We only wanted to produce some light electric shocks, launch some disrupting fragments, develop mechanisms of implosion of ideas and emotions, capable of rousing minds and hearts, especially those of the young Cadres, the dawn of our Army.

"Tell me and I forget; teach me and I remember; involve me and I learn". This short epigram by **Benjamin Franklin** has always been our reference, in order to help the young to believe in the great pedagogic values that must sustain them in the rediscovery of the ethical conception of life and State, the patriotic spirit, the acceptance of labour as civil commitment, discipline as adhesion, military life as a dimension of the spirit.

The achievement of these noble goals was made possible also by the thoughts and ideas collected by "Rivista Militare" from the most distinguished "opinion makers" from the academic and cultural world: an initiative that provided us with an anthology of reflections and appraisals on the Defence's strategic decisions and enabled us to establish a mutual relationship with the best "intelligentzia" of our Country.


It is not necessary to produce balance sheets. The judgement on the soundness of our decisions belongs to the Readers only and they – this I can say with absolute certainty – have always shown an active and empathic interest in our proposals. If anything good has been done, this depended mainly on the confidence that we felt coming from our Readers during the performance of our daily work.

In this respect, I must also point out the courageous farsightedness of my Superiors, who succeeded each other in these ten years. They always supported and encouraged me, both in my editorial work and in the manifold cultural activities.

My convinced and sincere appreciation and gratitude goes to my wonderful collaborators, both military and civilians. Everyone of them expressed enthusiasm and professionalism, with an intelligent contribution of ideas, in the difficult moment when the Service went through a severe process of structural, organizational and operational rationalization. I want to thank them warmly, particularly for their loyalty and their convinced sharing of the programmed objectives.

To Colonel Giovanni Maria Giuseppe Tricarico, who succeeds me as Chief Editor. I express my best wishes of good and fruitful luck.

B. General Giovanni Cerbo



The particular aptitude of the Italian soldiers for human and social relations is an increasingly important element for the success of the peace-support and humanitarian-aid operations conducted within the present international scenario.

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The production of this magazine has been supervised by Omero Rampa Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

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THE ITALIAN ARMY FOR WORLD PEACE

**Lecture by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army
at the *Forum* on
“Solidarity: the New Name of Peace”
(Messina, January 24, 2002)**

With the beginning of the new Century, the studies and the interpretative debates on the not always evolutionary changes occurred on the post-Cold War international political scene have remarkably increased.

This phenomenon, growing on the political-cultural plane, has suddenly extended to the horizontal plane of global public opinion after the events of September 11, 2001, when the mass media recorded, in all Countries, a new and strong request for information on the issues of peace, war, internal and international security, employment of the Armed Forces for peace.

The ensuing debate, for which public opinion still shows a lively interest, emphasizes especially three subjects, which I am going to take as guiding threads of my presentation.

First: what kind of interpretative model can be taken as reference, in order to understand the international political scenario and to identify its trend ?

Second: what can, and must, the international community do in order to prevent conflicts, guarantee the internal and regional security of the States and safeguard the universally recognized rights, i.e. to maintain peace in the world ?

The third subject has a more direct interest. What type of Armed Forces should be employed by the Countries which intend to assume this command responsibility and must, therefore, share the operational costs of maintaining world peace? (For Italy, in substance, it is a matter of verifying the congruence and suitability of the new Army, in accordance with the international policy established by the Government and the other political Institutions).

As regards the first point, I believe that, in the present period, characterized by changes, and by the acceleration of changes, there is a rather unstable international geo-political core whose surface is the basis of a still uncertain international policy that proceeds by little steps.

Thus it is only possible to outline evolutionary trajectories and identify the most probable trends by using interpretative models. In any case, this operation cannot be avoided, because the configuration of the long-term international scenario is a necessary prerequisite for planning a defence model.

Among the various interpretative models, I would like to mention two of them, recently thoroughly covered by the media, which represent, in the common opinion, two very antithetic and extreme theories. The model conceived by Samuel Huntington, on the clash of Civilizations, is perhaps the most discussed; the other, by Francis Fukuyama, theorizes the end of History.

Personally I believe – and I am going to try proving it – that these two models are paradoxically complementary, even if antithetic.

Huntington, a Professor at Harvard’s “Albert Weatherhead University”, author of “The Clash of Civilizations and the New World Order”, translated and published all over the world, an analytic

development of his famous article "A Clash of Civilizations?" of 1993, wants to provide an interpretative model *"a lens through which to observe – as the Author writes – the new phase of world politics after the end of the cold war"*.

He then illustrates a thesis, defined as *"central"*, on what *"global politics will probably be in the next few years. The first source of conflicts in this world – Huntington says – will be neither essentially ideologic nor essentially economic. The great divisions within mankind and the predominant source of conflict will have a cultural character. The Nation-States will continue to be the most powerful protagonists in world affairs, but the main conflicts of global politics will take place among different nations and groups of civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate over world politics. The faults between civilizations will be the frontlines of the future"*.

Fukuyama, Professor of International Political Economy at the "John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies" in Washington, is known for his theory on the end of History after the cold war.

The scholar refers the term "History" *"...to the progress of mankind, through the centuries, towards a modernity characterized by institutions such as liberal democracy and capitalism"*. Since more and more vast areas of the world aspire, and will aspire, to this modernity, *"History tends to finish"*.

"The Western institutions" – Fukuyama maintains – are like a scientific method which, although discovered in the West, is universally applicable. There is a basic historical mechanism that encourages a long-term convergence beyond the cultural borders. It acts first, and with more strength, in the economic sector, then in the political field and finally, at long distance, in the cultural environment". The motors of this mechanism are the advanced technologies. *"The semiconductors technologies or the biomedical sciences are the same for Muslims, Chinese or for Western people and the need to master them imposes the adoption of particular economic institutions, such as a free market and the rule of law, which promote growth"*. Since these institutions thrive in individual freedom, *"the economic development tends to generate a liberal democracy"*.

As I mentioned before, I believe that these two complementary models are useful and sufficient to understand the trend of the world policy from which the possible missions of a Nation's or of an international Organization's foreign policy can be derived, and thence the model for the national Armed Forces.

The demonstration of my idea of complementarity is based on the two scholars' interpretation of the current conflict in Afghanistan according to their respective models.

According to Huntington, the clash of civilizations started with Afghanistan, which is one aspect of the wider and more insidious Muslim conflict which has replaced the cold war. Huntington says that *"the era of the Islamic wars begins in the 80s, when the cold war is about to end"* and mentions the Iran-Iraq conflict, the invasion of Kuwait, the violence between the Muslims and the other ethnic groups in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kashmir, India, the Philippines, Indonesia, the Middle East, Sudan and Nigeria.

The "International Institute of Strategic Studies" has pointed out that Muslims were involved in about 70% of the armed conflicts in progress in 2000, while they represent only 20% of the world population. The deep reasons for this diffused violence go back to the social, political and cultural reaction of the Muslim populations to modernization and globalization. Therefore, according to Huntington, the "new war", in all its interpretative and operational forms, is not "so new".

This conflict, which will be immanent for a long time, will require a constant control by the international community. It will be necessary to detect the symptoms of crises at their onset, act on all political, social, demographic, economic, migratory and culture levers, in order to prevent, in a global manner, the risk of the expansion of violence (according to Huntington, the clash of the Islamic world against the West).

Although with different diagnoses. Fukuyama prescribes the same therapy. For him, the Muslim conflicts are an almost physiological response of these Countries to modernity and its organizational cornerstones: liberal democracy and capitalism. They are almost like "movements" of adjustment to a slow process of international amalgamation which, in fact, "will dismiss History" in the sense pointed out by the scholar.

The new war, after September 11, *"... is not a clash between equal and separate cultures which fight against each other, as was the case for the European Powers of the 19th Century. The clash consists in a succession of rearguard actions carried out by societies whose traditional existence is actually threatened by modernization..."*. According to Fukuyama, the struggle that the West is conducting today against international terror extends to the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism, which must be kept under control in all its hotbeds of tension, doing away with its feeding causes.

In substance, the two interpretative models are opposite as regards the diagnosis but absolutely complementary in the therapy they suggest. Fukuyama's march towards modernization or the opportuneness to slow down the conflicts in order to avert the clash of civilizations, upheld by Huntington, both require an increasing acknowledgement of the values of peace and human rights and, in addition, **the will**, i.e. the orientation of foreign policy, and **the possibility** - i.e. the availability of an Army readily and effectively employable in support of peace – of participating in the common security.

In this credible and long-term scenario, suitable for the definition of missions and plans, it can be surmised that the concept of sovereignty yields some of its dominion to the solidarity elements

characterized by the general interests of the international Community, and protection of human rights will be one of the most frequent cases. In short, the protection of human rights will be less and less under the exclusive sovereignty of the State.

In consideration of the above, we can tackle the second subject which refers to the future tasks of the international Community and to the interests and responsibilities of the individual Nations. The Western Countries, bearers and nourishers of the modernity model outlined by Fukuyama, as well as active and inflexible participants in the efforts for the maintenance of world peace, will, frequently and with increasing intensity, be called to carry out humanitarian interventions with their Armed Forces.

This concept has deeply entered the mission and even more the reorganization of the international institutions operating in the field of defence and security. Suffice it to think of the new activism of the UN, the evolution of NATO, the headway of the EU which has launched the project of a "Euroforce: the Rapid Reaction European Corps", OSCE, the pan-European Organization for Security and Cooperation, which includes among its tasks also peacekeeping and international security, as well as the various enlarged partnerships. Still, there is the knotty problem of how to streamline the decision-making process. This knot will remain unsolved for a long time. The events of the last years, anyway, have shown that the real catalyzer of the decision-making process is represented by the interventionist thrust of public opinion.

Western societies, in particular, give the utmost importance to the formation of consensus. Public opinion's approval of humanitarian missions – ranging from peace-keeping to peace-enforcing – is also decisive for the functional legitimation of the Armed Forces.

The Army for peace can be well organized only if the political forces feel it is in the interest of the Country: the soldiers for peace can operate with motivation and success only if they perceive the consent of society.

An essential point is therefore the ethic, moral and legal legitimation of the humanitarian interventions and, in a wider sense, the so-called right of humanitarian interference.

The ethic and moral legitimation of the so-called humanitarian interference is given by the acknowledgement of the fact that human rights, as an integral part of man's dignity, cannot be separated from the human person and have a universal value.

John Paul II, in his message on the occasion of the World Peace Day of 2000, wrote that "...he who offends the human rights offends the human conscience as such, offends mankind itself..." and also "...the duty to defend these rights transcends the geographic and political borders within which they are violated..." "...therefore the crimes against mankind cannot be considered as internal affairs of a Nation..."

The present global era has delivered to the history of culture (philosophy of law, peace studies, war studies, etc.) the theme of the "reason for war" and with it the discussion on the usefulness of war and the just war, shifting the attention to the duty to guarantee the right to humanitarian assistance and to the just principle of preventing and containing conflict situations. More and more the rights of men and peoples surpass and subordinate the principle of non-interference among States which, if interpreted in an absolute sense, is anachronistic and anti-historical. Exactly as anachronistic and anti-historical is the absolute concept of intolerance of military interventions. The pacifist culture, at this point, acknowledges the legitimacy of the interventions decided by the international Community for the purpose of stopping criminal events, provided that the methods employed are acceptable by common feelings and values.

I conclude this second subject by quoting the words of two distinguished personalities: Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini and Admiral Guido Venturoni, pronounced at the forum on "W0ar and Peace in the 21st Century" held in Rome in July 2000.

Milan's Archbishop invited to acknowledge *"the legitimacy and obligation, in certain clear-cut cases, of a more direct humanitarian interference, envisaging the use of weapons"*.

Admiral Venturoni, former Chief of Staff of Defence and my highly regarded teacher, affirmed that *"what gives moral content to the role of today's military is not the means (war) but the further goal, i.e. the aspiration to peace"*.

Admiral Venturoni's excellent declaration presents the right tone for introducing the third and last subject, the Army for Peace, a matter which is more directly within my province, closely connected with the two preceding topics and certainly consequential to them. I shall illustrate this theme trying to offer an interpretation of what is commonly defined as the surprising and positive phenomenon of the Italian Army's success in the recent peace-operations.

This success is now widely acknowledged in the most prestigious circles and, initially, it surprised the international public opinion.

The main reason for this was an unfortunately very widespread aura of mistrust, fed not so much by our military tradition, less brilliant than that of some other Countries – suffice it to think of the initial ironies on our "Bersaglieri" in Beirut – or by the alienation of certain cultural environments, due to the well-known events of WWII and, in particular, to the criticized military leadership of that time.

The initial distrust was also related to the image offered by the Italian Armed Forces in the last forty years.

Conscription Armed Forces, quartered in their barracks, continuously bombarded by stereotypes such as "army life, boring life" and "nonnismo" (harassment of recruits by senior soldiers). Armed Forces which

belonged to a Country which had managed its defence in an opportunistic way "under NATO's umbrella" and even more the United States', without taking full care of the financial burdens. In the 90s, very few would have bet on the efficiency of the Italian Army in the new peace missions, despite the fact that a far-reaching and swift structural reform was under way.

However, those who knew our Army well could have bet with confidence. I bet and I won.

In order to begin, a mission must have political consent, but to be successful it must be supported by public opinion, which must legitimate and acknowledge the role carried out.

Our Army has succeeded, and our politicians, well aware of the changed geo-political scenario, have understood the requests of international law, humanitarian law and the peoples' self-determination, and have therefore supported the out-of-area interventions. Furthermore, public opinion, by showing its consent, has supported, on all occasions, our participation in the various missions.

The journey that led our Army to enjoy the widest appreciation for its work, was favoured by the non-intrusive approach of our soldiers and by their capability of positive interaction with the local populations. In this sense, the empathic characteristic of the Italian spirit emerged on all occasions.

In 1992, precisely on the day of departure of our contingent for "Operation Ibis" in Somalia, the Army presented the volume "Overseas", which highlighted the participation of the Service in the various peace missions - today's peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations - , since Italy's unity. Well, from the statistical research, carried out for the realization of this work, emerged a special Italian inclination for this type of interventions. In these missions, the Anglo-Saxon soldiers were proud of being bearers of the values of a superior civilization, the German mainly expressed the pride of belonging to a particular Corps, while our men were enthusiastic about their task and given to solidarizing with the local people.

The Italian servicemen, in various occasions, revealed very special talents and characteristics, including the capability of socializing, of entering into relations with others, of integrating within the operations without being "cumbersome"; on the contrary, they were a precious support in the little and great difficulties suffered by a population just out of a conflict or a humanitarian disaster.

This "aptitude for communication" may be something genetic that we Italians have in our chromosomes; we place ourselves in the situations with the attitude of those who want to help, always considering the ways and feelings of peoples with traditions and customs different from our own.

It was precisely this peculiarity of the Italians, together with their organizational imagination, the determinant factor of the successful completion of the missions, starting with Lebanon in 1992.

In substance, it is a very special attitude of the Italian soldiers, which falls within their culture, meant, in a Spenglerian sense, as a complex of values shared by the whole people.

As a matter of fact, the real breeding ground of this peculiarity was operation "Vespri Siciliani", in which the whole Italian Army participated. Eventually, more than 150,000 servicemen, almost all conscripts, and all the Cadres, operated in an environment requiring the full solidarity of the entire community, in order to rebuild the authority of the State. The intense training activity, related also to the character of "public security agent" attributed to our military, enhanced by the full participation of the Sicilians, started a process of "primary training" which was passed on to the organizational learning of our Commands and Units.

I am honoured for having been the Commander of the "Aosta" Brigade, the Major Unit which started operation "Vespri Siciliani" in July 1992 and, therefore, a direct witness of this process of organizational learning.

The experience of "Vespri Siciliani" traced out the training furrow which made the various peace missions successful, even during the military reorganization, and without a clear defence model as a reference.

To sum it all up, I mention the various missions:

- under UN aegis: Lebanon (from 1979), Namibia (1989-1990), Somalia (1992-1994), Mozambique (1993-1994) and the last one, just started, ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan (from January 2002);
- under NATO command: IFOR/SFOR, in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1998, "Joint Guarantor" in Macedonia (1998-1999), KFOR in Kosovo from 1999, Allied Harbour, in Albania (1999), "Task Force Essential Harvest", in Macedonia (2001);
- multinational missions: Lebanon 1 and Lebanon 2 (1982-1984), "Airone" in Iraqi Kurdistan (1991), "Ippocampo" in Rwanda (1994) "Alba" in Albania (1997), "Stabilize" in East Timor (1999-2000);
- national missions: "Pellicano" in Albania (1991-1993).

I wish to conclude my presentation by mentioning an aspect that I have very much at heart and is particularly connected with the subject of this Forum: solidarity as the new name of peace.

In out-of-area missions we put into practice a concrete and constant synergy with the NGOs (non-governmental organizations) which pursue the same objective: offering solidarity to the community.

Safeguard of human life, food self-sufficiency, preservation of the environment, promotion of women and children are the concrete actions carried out by the NGOs. The Italian Army cooperates with these Organizations, looking for what unites people and discarding what divides them.

Lieutenant General Roberto Speciale

THE «NEED TO KNOW»


in the new operational scenario

In the previous issue we examined the aspects concerning the planning of the land instrument, as regards the evolution of the scenario following the tragic events of September 2001. With a view to this, we pointed out the priority of constituting a well-constructed pool of RISTA-EW capabilities, in a position to help composing an information picture well-detailed and available, in time for imposing one's own initiative.


The "need to know" - being impossible to base one's own forecasts on the familiarity of the doctrine and proceedings of a known adversary - has become

more and more manifest. The operating forces, in fact, have been engaged for more than a decade in operational theatres where indefiniteness is the awkward companion of all Commanders and where "knowing in advance" increasingly represents the only element that permits to achieve success.

Hence the Army Staff's interest in starting a critical examination of the operational Forces' capabilities in this sector, preparing a project which, from the conceptual and organizational viewpoint, could optimize the efficiency of what



After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, a doctrinal lesson, on which there is unanimous agreement, is the need to confer a greater efficiency to intelligence, through a closer cooperation of the structures charged with that function, as well as a qualitative and quantitative improvement of the said structures. The forces that operate in the various theatres, where the empty spaces outnumber by far the protected areas, for a long time have been subjected to a disastrous vagueness. Hence the necessity to take into account the foreseeable developments of the operations in the scenarios of employment. The following article, which is related to the work "Evolution of the Scenario and Planning of the Land Instrument", published in the preceding issue of the "Rivista", offers an accurate picture of the efforts being made to align our Country to the Countries that are already projected towards a real policy of European security.



by Salvatore Farina *
and Pietro Serino **

is available, outlining the picture within which the Armed Force's potentiality could be increased.

The project "RISTA-EW Capabilities Package", approved by the Army Chief of Staff in the summer of 2001 and entered in its realization phase at the beginning of 2002, is part of the wider process of reorganization of the Army and its operational component, which is the

objective of the project known as "Packages of Operational Capabilities of the Army".

This programme, started in 1997 with the aim of preparing an instrument suited to the new missions entrusted to the Armed Forces, has its strong points in:

- capability planning, where determinant importance is given to the definition of maximum effort, in terms of

scenarios, forces engaged and length of operations;

- combat approach which, in acknowledging the greater complexity of high-intensity symmetrical operations, envisages an instrument capable of confronting the wide range of possible operations;
- task organization, as organizational principle which permits to prepare packages of

forces suitable for any situation, combining modules of various operational capabilities, quantitatively and qualitatively suited to the mission.

The model that derives from the programme is that of a body of forces comparable to a single Corps, consisting of:

- one national-framework Corps Command (1), in a position to operate also as Land-Heavy JTF HQ and integrated within the structure of the NATO Forces, with a C2S dedicated support;
- three Division Hqs, one of which with a readiness of 180 days, in order to meet the needs connected with long-term CROs;
- ten manoeuvre Brigades of various types, which include also the "Pozzuolo del Friuli" Cavalry Brigade, charged with carrying out a reconnaissance activity by fighting (recce by force) which is outside the specialistic RISTA considered in the mentioned study;
- combat-support (CS) and logistic combat-support (CSS) units, assembled in homogeneous Brigades and Groups.

The RISTA-EW specialistic structures, which are the object of the plan we are dealing with, are placed in the sphere of combat support.

THE NEED

The project therefore is aimed at developing a specialistic RISTA-EW capability in order to answer the needs of a Corps engaged in traditional as well as crisis-management operations, at tactical-operational level.

Such capability, in order to meet the requirement of maximum synergy and efficiency of the resources employed in that sector, will

have to be integrated and in a position to supply the Commander, at any level, with a picture of the situation as complete as possible and in real time, which, by making use of the capabilities of the Command Staff (G2 branch), should include the possible actions of the adversary (PAN) and the relevant evaluations. In short, the "situational awareness" indispensable for acquiring a decision-making superiority over the adversary, imposing one's own initiative and achieving success.

Therefore the RISTA-EW component will have to possess a twofold capability:

- acquisition of information data;
- processing of the said data by

principles according to which the specialistic assets are employed and assigned to the Major Units, depriving of significance the schematic references connected with predetermined distances, which were so dear to the operational planners of the cold war. In principle, in a scenario of the new kind, characterized by interruptions in the presence of forces on the ground, the RISTA-EW units are called to create an indispensable connection among the various formations, by providing an "information" cover of the empty spaces in the deployment of the Major Unit's

An American UAV Hunter taking off.



the synergic employment of the potentialities of the Staffs of the special units and the of capabilities of the Commands' G2 branches.

This twofold capability will have to be used without interruption, in all operational and environment conditions and, above all, will have to be impervious to any countermeasure taken by the adversary.

It is quite clear that, in the scenarios found in crisis-management military operations, marked by indeterminateness and lack of geometry, there is also an alteration in the


Commands, in favour of which they operate. (fig.1). This cover can be ensured by operating within the garrisoned areas, by using the range of the sensors, or by going physically inside the non-garrisoned areas.

THE SITUATION

The survey on the "RISTA-EW capability package" was prompted by the study of the situation, with reference to the Italian Army's, as well as that of the main allied Armies.

The Italian situation appeared

Fig. 1



multifaceted, being influenced by the previous organization, where the assets were integrated within each individual operational capability (consider in this regard the present Target Acquisition Group – GRACO – of the missile Brigade and the electronic-warfare battalions under the transmission Command of the Major Units, or to be constituted in case of emergency, such as some structures tasked with HUMINT, e.g. the UMIs) and by the first measures aimed at obtaining a greater integration of the assets. This led to the concentration, under the former CIDE, of the assets charged with electronic-war surveillance in the COM and NON-COM sectors

It was moreover noticed (and it is not by chance that, up to now, the RSTA acronym has been used within the Army) that there was a clear division of tasks among the specialistic assets – which are charged with

gathering information – and the Major Units' Commands, which are tasked with planning the research and processing of the information. This requires a high specialization and professionalism of the G2 Branch personnel, which is made difficult by the scarce training opportunities, owing to the shortage of RISTA-EW assets within the Army Major Units.


Various organizational models have been verified in the international sphere, which embody three different systems.

The first, which we shall call "shared", envisages the situation described for the Italian Army, where the RISTA-EW assets have a primary vocation, which links them to a specific Branch Command. This situation is mainly found in Armies oriented towards traditional operations, such as the German Army.

The second, which we shall

call "concentrated", envisages the RISTA-EW assets concentrated within several specialistic units of different organizational level ("military intelligence" Brigade and battalion), subordinate to Major Units (Army and Division). This situation is found in the US Army, which is characterized by a dimension unusual for any European Army, with the exception of the Russian Army.

The third model, which we shall call "centralized", envisages the whole RISTA-EW assets assembled in a specialistic Major Unit, subordinate to the Commander of the Operational Forces, who employs it as a whole or by packages, according to need. This situation is found in the French Army, which was the first to adopt the principle of task organization. The is reportedly being studied by other European Armies, such as the British Army.



In terms of effectiveness and of resources employed, the "third model" appears to be the best suited to meet the requirements of the Italian Army which - and this should not be forgotten - is also engaged in an important and unavoidable quantitative reduction, in the context of the integral professionalization of the national military instrument.

THE SOLUTION

In view of what we have just illustrated, it was decided to constitute a centralized pool of RISTA-EW resources (fig.2) consisting of:

- one Command and Control capability, at Group level, entrusted with the functions of:
 - preparation of the specialistic assets;
 - direction of the said assets, in case of employment in support of the Corps level, also contributing (together with the Hq's G2 branch) to the preparation of the research plan and to the processing of the gathered information;
- several specialistic units, capable of covering the entire range of the information activities. These units will have to operate in the sectors of:
 - research of information data;

- transmission, in order to forward the acquired data to the RISTA-EW Command which has ordered the mission (this, therefore, does not concern the diffusion, which follows the processing and is a responsibility of the Major Unit Command to the advantage of which the specialistic asset operates).



Some of these units are charged with establishing an information tactical group (we are going to deal with this unit in the following pages) and will have to provide functions of:

- command, for the management of assets coming from various specialistic units;
- processing of information

data, which can be defined of 1st level (2), in order to distinguish it from the function assigned to the Command's G2 Branch, in favour of which the information tactical group operates;


- logistic support.

The ideal level of employment of an information tactical group is in support of a Division Hq. Therefore, in order to solve the operational problem of the Army which, in long operations, envisages the employment of no more than one Division-level Hq (or, as an alternative, Corps - level), it will be necessary to have the availability of at least 4 information tactical groups. In this way it will be possible to proceed to a cycle of employment which would envisage the alternation of the 4 groups in the operational theatre, or the simultaneous employment of 2 groups only in

Helicopter-borne "Creso" radar system.

the phase of utilization of the Corps Hq, accepting a more frequent rotation of the assets.

On the other hand, one cannot exclude in advance the employment of particular assets in support of Brigades



which, due to their mission or to the general situation, may require special capabilities. This could be the case of Brigades operating under the direct orders of a Corps Headquarters.

The solution is moreover completed by the structure entrusted with the personnel's specialization, which will be characterized by a "joint" conception as regards information courses and direction of activities, and will be integrated with the structure tasked with the operational training of the specialist units.

In short, the basic elements of the adopted solution are:

- on the procedural plane, the interaction of the G2 branch of the Major Unit Commands with the RISTA-EW groups/tactical groups Commands.
- on the organizational plane, the group Command and the information tactical group,
- on the training plane, the unitary direction.

THE INFORMATION CYCLE

The management of the ever increasing flow of information that reaches a Command, necessary in order to detect the more significant bits and arrange them in a system, thus achieving the information important for carrying out one's mission and protecting the friendly forces, is implemented through a group of activities, already codified, which define the information cycle (3).

From a doctrinal viewpoint, the essential lines of this process are still fully valid. The innovation consists in the wish to increase the involvement of the RISTA-EW assets into the cycle itself so that, besides being protagonists of the gathering phase, they and their staffs may share in the direction and processing phases.

This need arises from the observation that, in the sectors of high specialistic and technical contents, only he who participates in their preparation

has a deep knowledge of the potentialities and limits of the assets and is in a position to fully appreciate and utilize the results.

It is not by chance that anyone possessing the necessary resources employs as organizational model the one in which each Commander has his own RISTA-EW asset.

In the operational mechanics pointed out (fig.3), the operational staff (S2/S3) of an information tactical group working in support of a Division Command (i.e. the G2/G3 branches of the RISTA-EW group Command operating in support of the Corps Command) will be placed in a position physically contiguous to the G2 of the Major Unit, so as to:

- participate in drawing the "research plan" by supplying advice on the acquisition capabilities of the dependent specialistic assets and the elements concerning their cost/effective employment;
- establish relations with the G3,



Launching of a Franco-German CL 289 Drone.

is charged with conferring and verifying the ability of every unit of the package (as regards both its subordinate units and, through suitable Command and Control relations, those attached to other Commands for reasons of convenience), to develop and perform its RISTA-EW functions. Moreover, the Group Command, also by availing itself of the mentioned specialization centres, will be entrusted with the detection, verification and improvement of the operational procedures for the integration of the various systems.

The Group Command is also entrusted with preparing the augmentees of the Command of the national -framework Rapid Reaction Corps included in the planning Office of the said Command. It is an organizational solution, employed also for other combat-support functions (4) which, on the one side, permits to train the personnel by making them live in the context of the capability package and, on the other, facilitates the harmony between the staffs of the Group and the Corps' Staff.

Finally, as regards the employment function, the Group Command will be able to operate:

- as a unit, as specialist Command in support of the national framework Command of the Rapid Reaction Corps;
- by teams, with the aim of strengthening with specialists the staffs of the Division Hq or, exceptionally, those of the Brigade Headquarters.

The maintained subordination to the C4 IEW Command, will ensure the necessary integration with the Communication

upon delegation from the G2, with the purpose of "deconflicting" the employment of one's own assets (i.e. tendentially removing the "blue on blue" situations;

- complete the 1st level elaboration, supplying the G2 with the information useful for drawing the "information appraisal"
- supply, on request, its cooperation in every phase of the information cycle.

On the whole, it is a matter of supplying the G2 with the indispensable specialistic advice, so that it may carry out its task by properly using the potentialities of ever more complicated and diversified systems.

THE RISTA-EW GROUP COMMAND

The RISTA-EW Group Command, which is being constituted using as a basis the preexisting Office of the Commander of the IEW Group of the IEW C4 Command at Anzio, will represent the centre of the system.

It will be, in fact, responsible

for the personnel's specialization and for the preparation and employment of the assets.

As concerns the specialization function, the Group Command, through the subordinate "IEW qualification centre" is already responsible for a part of the training of the specialists who operate in this sector. This responsibility will have to include the indication of the objectives to be pursued by the "RISTA-EW Training Group" at Montelibretti, which operates in the sector of procedural integration of the different assets.

As an indication, considering that the studies on the matter are still under way, a possible hypothesis for a solution would envisage, with the unitary direction of the group Command:

- the IEW qualification Centre, responsible for training the staff at all levels;
- the RSTA training group, responsible for training the information tactical groups as a whole (Command and various components).

As regards the preparation function, the Group Command




Fig. 4

support, indispensable both in the phase of data gathering and in that of diffusion of the information.

This gives an example of concrete implementation of the concept of C4ISR capability, which can give the Commander all the necessary instruments that enable him to direct an operation, employing, after due consideration – that is, on the basis of a complete, updated and true picture of the situation – the combat, combat-support and logistic-support assets available to him.

The RISTA-EW Group Command will have to be strengthened, particularly from the qualitative viewpoint, so that it may be able to carry out the planned tasks, devoting equal attention and competence to the entire range of the information functions.

THE INFORMATION TACTICAL GROUP

As we have pointed out, the information tactical Group will

represent the typical employment pawn of the RISTA-EW assets.

It will be a multifunction formation consisting of:

- a framework, supplied by one of Regiment-level units of the package, including modules for command functions, processing and transmission of acquired information, logistic support;
- research modules, of different specialization and potentiality, gauged on the envisaged mission, supplied by the various units of the package and equipped with particular elements for completing the elaboration, support and transmission modules, if they are supplied by a different specialist unit.

Therefore, in order to form the 4 information tactical groups deemed necessary for helping to solve the operational problem of the Army, it will be necessary to have 4 RISTA-EW Regiments, with a similar organizational structure, particularly for what concerns the Regiment Hq and the

logistic support company. These 4 Regiments will be:

- the already constituted Surveillance and Target Acquisition 41st Regiment;
- the preexisting Target-Acquisition 185th Paratroop Regiment;
- one Electronic Warfare Regiment, to be constituted by transforming the 33rd "Falzarego" battalion;
- one "Recce by Stealth" Regiment to be constituted by reconfiguring a Cavalry Regiment.

Other units, which will be called to supply only research modules for completing and increasing the RISTA-EW capabilities of the tactical groups, will be:

- the long-range recce company;
- one flight unit, equipped with helicopter-borne radars;
- one unit of HUMINT specialists.

The whole organization will have a modular structure, at a "4 basis", in order to permit to assemble all-inclusive tactical

groups (fig.4). This complex structure, in order to obtain results adequate to the effort required of the Army in terms of human and financial resources, will have to be tested through repeated cycles of increasingly complex exercises, conducted under the control of the RSTA Training Group.

THE HUMINT FUNCTION

As we have mentioned, the HUMINT function several times, more details seem to be appropriate.

This is a very ample sector that includes a wide range of activities and concerns responsibilities and competences of many organizations.

The HUMINT dealt with in the study on the specialistic RISTA-EW capability of the Army, is exclusively the function performed at tactical level, i.e. within the responsibilities of a Corps Commander, by operators belonging to units of the Service, specialized in the direct acquisition of information by entering into uncontrolled territory or obtaining it from human sources (refugees,

prisoners, one's own personnel who happened to come into contact with the enemy) or also through the examination of documents and materials found or captured, but always operating openly, with one's own identity and uniform.

THE SPECIALIZATION FUNCTION

As we said, the training of units and operators of the RISTA-EW sector will be carried out under the sole direction of the RISTA-EW Command, which will coordinate all the available resources within the Army and, particularly, the activity of the RSTA training group.

This body, in particular, will have to transfer to the Cavalry School all the tasks connected with the basic training of the Cavalry personnel and attend to the preparation of the information tactical groups, whose complexity requires a special Centre.

A particular care will be devoted to the training of the staffs of the RISTA-EW Commands (Group and Regiments) which, as we said,

Facing page
US-made UAV Shadow.

will be responsible for the phases of the information cycle as a whole, with special attention to the draft of the research plan and the 1st level elaboration, which necessitates a specific technical know-how. On the other hand, it will not be possible to exclude a deep knowledge of the areas of possible intervention and of the hostile, friendly and neutral actors who live in these areas.

Another challenge is the preparation of the operators in some intelligence functions, which deserve great attention because of the importance they have in the CRO scenarios.

CONCLUSIONS

The realization phase of the project got started at the beginning of 2002. The objective is to conclude the doctrinal, procedural and organizational studies by the end of this year.

The executive provisions for the realization of the structures will continue until the middle of 2003.

At this point, the RISTA-EW project will only have completed the "draft", the definition of the organizational structures within which the operational capabilities will have to grow. This will be a long process that – based on the first verifications on the ground and on the evolutions concerning the forces – will surely need suitable corrections to what was defined at the study stage. For example, the necessity to equip the future "average Brigades" with pre-established



An inhabited area visualised by a Drone.



information tactical groups deserves further investigation.

The awareness that a complex capability such as RISTA-EW cannot be reconfigured in a short time, on the one hand must give a greater impulse to the realization of the project, and, on the other, should make everybody conscious of the need to firmly abide by the principles which are at the

basis of the project, so that all that has been done should not be nullified.

A RISTA-EW capability is a primary requirement within the framework of the medium-term tasks that the Army has to carry out in Europe and inside the Alliance, and it is indispensable if one wants to express a Corps -level Command and Control capability adequate to the needs

and in a position to work within the entire range of the missions that can be envisaged in the present and in the foreseeable operational scenarios. This is because Italy, also through its Armed Forces, wishes to enter permanently the circle of Nations which decide the trends of Europe's and the West's Security Policy.

□

ACRONYMS

RISTA-EW:	Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Electronic Warfare;
JTFHQ:	Joint Task Force Headquarters Land-Heavy;
C2S:	Command & Control Support;
CROs:	Crisis Response Operations;
CS:	Combat Support;
CSS:	Combat Service Support;
HUMINT:	Human Intelligence;
UMI:	Mobile Units for Interrogation of prisoners;
C4IEW:	Command & Control, Communication, Computer, Information, Electronic Warfare;
C4 ISR:	Command & Control, Communication, Computer, Information, Surveillance, Reconnaissance;
G2:	Ground 2;
G3:	Ground 3

*Colonel,
Chief, Plans Office,
Army General Staff
**Lieutenant Colonel,
Section Chief, Plans Office,
Army General Staff

NOTES

- (1) Rapid Reaction Corps Command, being constituted at Solbiate Olona.
- (2) Technical interpretation and assembling of the data acquired by sensors, preliminary to the 2nd level processing, pertaining to the G2, which drafts the information appreciation and the PANs.
- (3) Succession of conceptual, organizational and executive activities, through which the information necessary for planning and conducting the operations is acquired. It develops according to a cyclic trend and includes the following phases: direction, gathering, processing and diffusion.
- (4) In particular for Air Cavalry (oriented towards the development of combat operations), land Artillery, A/A Artillery and Engineers.

THE ART OF LEADERSHIP



by **Maurizio Coccia** *

Co-operation activities characterise all kinds of relations in our developed, democratic and globalized world.

Small groups tend to expand their initiatives everywhere, like spacecraft launched into the outer space, to find new

opportunities, integrate their background of knowledge and establish new synergies. Thus, there is a substantial increase in the number of those who are called upon to take on a leadership role.

Not only is leadership a function, but also a natural quality or a contingency-based commitment, usually taken by a person who feels that he is

destined to assume command.

This definition may not be exhaustive, but gives an idea of the rationale behind it. In fact, various elements should be taken into account to legitimate a person's call to become a leader, such as a number of possible actions and reactions, a mix of collective and individual factors affecting the situation in the field both internally and externally,

To better understand what qualities are necessary to become a military leader, one should read Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*. This text, written two thousand years ago, narrates the deeds and the thoughts of ingenious Commanders who left an indelible mark on the history of mankind.

They were excellent warriors in wartime and enlightened leaders in peacetime, like Alexander and Caesar, law experts and champions of republican values, like Coriolanus and Cato Uticensis, who were endowed with all the exceptional qualities a leader should possess, such as stamina, balance, poise, foresight and intelligence. These capabilities are of vital importance even in the present political and strategic scenario, where war is more likely to break out, being less lethal and global than in the past.

In this framework, the art of leadership, which in ancient times was practised by few and godlike personalities, may become both a subject to be studied through the testimonies of an authentic military culture and a legacy for those who are called upon to be at the helm of participatory democracies in this post-modern era.


personal ambitions, intentions and natural or acquired capabilities, coupled with ingenuity and craftsmanship.

Leadership is not a science, but an art, as it aims at directing the actions of a great number of people in real time, and in the case of the military, of large groups under stress or threat conditions.

It is an art as it requires talents, purpose and high-level capabilities, with the aid of some good luck as well.

Like all other complex functions, leadership requires that natural qualities be adequately developed through training and education, to reach outstanding results. When these natural qualities are poor, education and training become even more pivotal.

Irrespective of personal capabilities, the art of leadership translates into making a synergetic effort to balance



*Bust of Alexander the Great
(Capitoline Museum, Rome)*

different elements, in order to attain an established goal. This art should adapt to the reference scenario, to people's socio-cultural, economic and technological development, and take into account the nature of the opponent.

In actual fact, most changes have been brought about over time by the above-mentioned factors, as men have always felt the urge to better themselves, have new ideas and establish new missions and goals. However, a change has occurred in the subtle relation between civic virtues and vices in social behaviour, where virtues are on the wane and vices slowly but constantly on the rise. As a consequence, leaders are often called upon to operate in a hostile environment where hurdles in the field are not placed by the enemy only.

Before describing the historical development of the art of leadership, I feel it necessary to warn those who have in mind to exert their power. Everyone can exercise command, but only few with ease, consistency and authority, while most leaders will only keep their actions within acceptable standards. It should also be recalled that command may entail suffering, due to its inherent risks. In fact, it is possible to make a mistake and lose one's moral integrity, health and clarity of mind, together with social credibility, as a consequence of possible reactions from the public. This risk, which goes hand in hand with personal success and the attainment of an established goal, can only be ruled out through a proper leadership development and the awareness of one's own limits.

These introductory remarks have already made it clear that the art of leadership is becoming more important today than in the past. This way, it is possible to extol leaders' inner talents, reduce the uncertainties of the

less talented and carry out actions consistent with the established political directives and the sensitiveness of society at large.

A REVIEW OF THE PAST

What are the main characteristics a good leader should possess even today, and in particular a commander, who has to exert his function in close contact with his subordinates, bear the brunt of possible errors and sometimes of their fatal implications?

At present, a fault-finding approach may be adopted to evaluate the management function. In fact, faults defined as such by common sense may be helpful to identify the necessary characteristics of a leader.


This analysis may be easily done by our readers, who have a large experience in the sector, provided that present events are fairly interpreted, by separating leaders' inherent characteristics, limits, physical and mental capabilities from their mistakes.

A short historic overview now follows, which may be further expanded, integrated and elaborated, if required.

Two types of approach may be adopted, either taking into account each country's most important leaders or the collective will of its Government, people and Armed Forces, inspired by common views in the field of security.

Thus, two kinds of analysis are possible: the study of the alliances and partnerships made by societies, nations and states or that of the deeds of the most prominent figures in history.

In our country, the issue of security has often been overlooked, to the point that military leaders had to compensate for political and social inadequacies, as is the case even today. The second option, even if not necessarily the best,



Mosaic depicting Alexander the Great's victory over Darius III during the battle of Issus in 333 B.C.

has therefore been adopted.

In ancient times, men could display their natural qualities, though not fully developed, in a very favourable environment, where all war-fighting techniques could be adopted and a wide freedom of action was allowed. People and soldiers at war were strong, tough and warlike, but ignorant and fearful enough to be easily subdued by more educated and trained leaders.

Plutarch's renowned *Parallel Lives* have been preliminarily taken into account, in an effort to



trace the origins of our founding fathers, see what changes have occurred since then, for better or worse, and indirectly reply to modern strategists and experts, who still compare the US to the Imperial Rome. This book is made up of 22 sections, each comparing the biographies of two Greek and Roman outstanding personalities. It has been considered for almost two thousand years as an unparalleled best seller and a reference text for western culture. The success of the book is not only linked to its historical content. In fact, it illustrates the lives of those heroes who changed the course of human history. They were peacetime and


wartime leaders, like Alexander and Caesar, champions of duty, like Coriolanus, and of republican values, like Cato Uticensis and Brutus. They have often been referred to as models in the course of history, when the need was felt to update, confirm and restate values and trends.

In this wake, we shall carry out a study focused on the lives of Alexander and Caesar, to highlight the main elements of the art of leadership practised by these two actors ranking among the most charismatic leaders in the history of mankind.

Alexander (Pella, Macedonia, 356 B.C, Babylon, 323 B.C) was a strenuous supporter of physical training and always prone to

risk-taking. He never complied with the limits imposed on military actions by the traditions of his time (night-day, religious holidays and so on). He was an uncompromising man, who fought against all constraints, but let himself be guided by reason to resume his sense of duty. He often took rash decisions, not based on rational evaluations. He liked to be in convivial company, as an occasion to establish social relations, but always lived a very frugal life.

He was very generous by nature, especially when he had large availability of resources. He donated his wealth graciously and succeeded in gaining people's gratitude. He took advantage of



Left.

Bust of Pompey the Great (Hadrian period).

Right.

Statue of Julius Caesar wearing a military uniform (Trajan period).

against him from town to town, after signing a peace agreement. Moreover, he hanged many philosophers, for insulting the Kings who had surrendered to him and stirring the populations not yet subjugated. Those cruel actions were probably aimed at eliminating, once and for all, recurring and predictable dangers which would have made his conquest longer and more difficult. It was the only case in which he infringed the rules he always used to comply with.

Caesar (Rome, 100/101 B.C. – Rome, 44 B.C.) was very good-natured and tempered, an aspect which misled his enemies; in fact, against all appearances, he had an indomitable and uncompromising spirit. He was great-hearted and so eager to be loved and respected that he got deeper and deeper into debt. He always succeeded in establishing the right relations which would allow him to obtain new offices and titles. He established a special bond with the people. Many of his enemies were afraid of his special link with the populace, as it could trigger an uprising of the poor who placed all their hopes in Caesar.

He gained his fame as a leader both because he did not accumulate wealth to live in luxury, but to reward his meritorious soldiers, and because he was always ready to face all risks and endure all hardships.

Soldiers were not amazed by his love for risk, being well aware of Caesar's ambitions. They admired him for his endurance, notwithstanding his frail and delicate build, pale complexion

his reported divine origin to subdue others, though he was not particularly proud of it. Aristotle recalled that he wanted to distinguish himself for his knowledge rather than for his power. Tyreus, speaking to Darius, made the following comment on him: "Alexander is as noble when winning as he is terrible when fighting". During the battle against Darius's overwhelming forces, he replied to those who suggested him to engage the enemy at night to hide his numerical inferiority, by saying the celebrated sentence: "I do not steal victory" which summarized that great strategist's capabilities. He clearly wanted to convince Darius of his absolute superiority, putting an end to the conflict once and for all.

He used to repeat to his friends, weakened by wealth and luxury

: "Don't you know that the conquerors should not behave as the conquered?". On the occasion of a military action in pursuit of the enemy, when water was in short supply, he refused it by saying: "If I am the only one who drinks, all the others will get discouraged". His soldiers, amazed by his self-restraint and generosity, asked him to confidently lead them; in fact, as long as they had such a leader, they would not feel weary, thirsty or even mortal.

He always became blind with rage, cruel and merciless, when he knew people were disparaging him, as he deemed that his reputation was more important than his power or even his own life.

In India, he committed a grievous crime by killing many mercenaries who kept on fighting



and epileptic fits. To counter his weaknesses, Caesar lived a very frugal and hard life

He was an unparalleled warrior and strategist, who fought in rough and hostile environments, conquered large stretches of land, defeated a great number of

enemies and came into contact with very different and foreign traditions. He was always kind and merciful towards the conquered populations, made large donations to his comrades-in arms and fought an unprecedented number of battles.


Under his leadership, soldiers became dauntless and capable of overcoming all obstacles, to glorify Caesar more than Rome itself. He succeeded in spurring his officers' pride and enhancing their role in the presence of soldiers, thus compelling even those who were not very ambitious to commit themselves to the mission.

In peacetime, he sent his legionaries to settle in the colonies and provided them with large donations and resources, being aware that experienced warriors could not be easily reinstated into society in peacetime, and could even be tempted to become revolutionaries.

Caesar succeeded in building a bridge over the large river Rhine in less than ten days, to the amazement of the engineers of that time. He carried out very risky military actions commonly considered as follies. During his expedition against the Britons, he crossed the limits of the lands then known to wage war on an island whose dimensions and potentialities were still undiscovered. He was always ready to run all risks to satisfy his ambition, being conscious of his valour and of that of his men. In fact, he was convinced that only the bold could attain glory and that wounds, harsh winters or obstacles on the ground could not stop him.

Like Napoleon many centuries later, he thought he was the Man of Destiny, who could not be overwhelmed by anyone. Being an enlightened strategist, he often turned the course of events to his advantage, by exploiting terrain features and adopting new warfighting techniques and means. He was particularly able to exploit all chances, manipulate human feelings, deceive enemies and utterly galvanise his troops.

Caesar was a great leader in wartime and an excellent manager in peacetime, who defused all tensions at town level



Miniature depicting the Mongolian conqueror Genghis Khan.

and settled all claims between debtors and creditors.

Caesar's greed for power and glory accounts for his rise and fall. He died four years after Pompey. He gained almost nothing from his search for power, which brought about civil war and gained him the hatred of his fellow citizens.

His love for glory, a mix of ambition and honour, had dominated him since his early years. Plutarch gave a negative interpretation of that feeling: *Power, honour and glory, with the first contaminating the other two.* The final outcome was the triumph of tyranny and the end of democracy.

His demagogic policy, which

eventually led to the establishment of tyranny, followed three trends mainly. Firstly, he used all means to systematically bribe his people for electoral aims. Secondly, he resorted to the use of force. In fact, until defeating Pompey, Caesar benefited from a large popular support. But when public pressure alone was no longer capable of curbing the will of the Senate, Caesar brazenly had recourse to street violence. Thirdly, he allied with the major opponents of the Senate.

Behind the facade of a demagogue, in turn charming and violent, he was a cunning and subtle politician. Being a valiant leader and a shrewd corruptor, he used to say: *There is a time for waging war and a time for applying the law.*

In the "Life of Anthony", Plutarch defined Caesar as follows: *Like Alexander and, before him, Cyrus, he had an insatiable lust for power and an insane desire to dominate.*

One should not forget that during his entire life, Caesar had to confront his direct opponent, Pompey, he himself an extraordinary military leader, extolled for his valiant actions. That long-distance duel was so intense that the two rivals overlooked the anarchy that was spreading in Rome and which led to civil war. That conflict went on even after the death of Pompey. Moreover, Caesar wanted to outdo himself and always tried to improve his previous achievements.

If a parallel is made between Alexander and Caesar's lives, many common elements can be found.

We are faced with two very valuable leaders, driven by ambition to go beyond the limits of human capabilities. They were relentless, indomitable and uncompromising warriors, endowed with courageous and extremely daring characters. They lived a very frugal life, became role-models, were very generous and friendly towards their men and had the charisma necessary to make the people and the military feel that they were at the centre of history. They were instinctive fighters, applied shrewd tactics and had a grand vision and an enlightened strategy spanning over the long range.

At the same time, they were refined politicians, who were ready to use all available tools, such as corrupting people, resorting to the use of force, and even trespassing the rules established by the ethics of the time.

They were two extraordinary men, who exploited favourable conditions and exceptional occasions.

Their fame is considered to be well deserved even after so many centuries. But, as it often happens in history, there is the risk of idealising the most famous characters. In fact, even major leaders, such as Alexander and Caesar, were exceedingly ambitious, greedy for power and personal glory, to the point of idolising themselves and resorting to tyranny. These flaws, projected externally, usually trigger cruel and unfair actions, sparking equally degenerated reactions, a fact modern leaders and societies should be aware of. Usually the greater the leader, the wider the possible negative repercussions to attain a major goal. But, as in the case of a corporate budget, there is always the hope that the final settlement may be to the advantage of the people, who have pinned all their hopes in their leader.

Many years later, in 1513, Niccolò Machiavelli wrote *The Prince*, in which he gave a seemingly negative description of a leader as a shrewd, cunning, deceitful and immoral person, in line with the poisoned social scenario of that time. Moreover, he stated the primacy of politics and considered military values as low priority.

Many analysts have given both positive and negative interpretations of Machiavelli's theories, which are today gaining new ground. The question of whether this new consensus may be ascribed to the merits of Machiavelli or to the decay of our present reference scenario is still to be fully answered.

Carl von Clausewitz wrote the *Art of War* in more recent times, in 1832. The book set a new balance between political and military matters, reasserting the basic link between politics and warfare in a celebrated phrase, where the latter is considered as a spiritual



activity and not only a show of force.

Clausewitz stated that a military leader should have the following qualities: fortitude, physical and intellectual military capabilities, stamina, knowledge, initiative, imagination, foresight, courage, boldness, tenacity, resolve and determination, creativeness and shrewdness.


Machiavelli and Clausewitz share the same vision, as both belong to the category of disenchanted thinkers. Today, this same path is followed by General Carlo Jean, an enlightened and impartial scholar. He is capable of identifying and describing the complex links between the political and military worlds, as well as the profiles of modern leaders and the characteristics necessary to exert the art of leadership in our times.

His essay *Guerra, Strategia e*

Tamerlane, Turkestan's Mongolian King and leader of troops.

Sicurezza (Sagittari, Laterza, 1997), recognises that the qualities required to exert leadership are more demanding than in the past, as both the reference scenario and the personal capabilities of most people have deteriorated. Today, a leader should possess a more extensive fund of knowledge and satisfy two preconditions to gain initial credibility: gathering consensus, upon which to establish his policy and strategies, and being pragmatic, to objectively evaluate all threats and rule out wishful pacifist temptations.

Further and diverse capabilities are required to monitor present events and draw up adequate plans. A



XV Century French miniature portraying the wedding of Philip II of Macedonia and Olympiade, Princess of Epirus.

leader should be rational, keep his emotions under control, avoid inconsiderate reactions and manipulation attempts.

He should adopt a hands-on attitude, as regards political-military matters, to reconcile the collective will of the Government, the people and the Armed Forces. In fact, the requirement is felt for an effective co-operation between political and military leaders, based on common values and actions, to legitimate the Armed Forces in the eyes of society at large. This implies the existence of healthy institutions and sound political and institutional values, as well as public

awareness of political and military requirements. Leaders and people should share a common security concept going beyond all party lines.

A leader should always recognize the supremacy of politics over the military, both before and during a conflict, as war is never the only possible answer. At the same time, as strategy is concerned, he should know that political issues are not to prevail over military requirements. He should be therefore capable of reaching a compromise solution, through an exchange of information, knowledge and expertise.

He should have a sense of identity, upon which to base his personal action plan, assess reference values, as well as his own possibilities and those of the reference scenario, so as to exploit all opportunities.

He should have a deep knowledge of the different types and characteristics of possible opponents, who may be extremists at different levels of technological development and hackers. He should be also aware that though western societies presently possess cutting edge technologies, they have become more and more vulnerable.

He should be ready to resort to the use of force in cold blood and with no political bias, having a global and forward-looking vision and bearing in mind that present wars are limited in time and scope.

He should show resolve and strategic insight; in fact, a war is a battle of wills and the stronger is the winner.

He should have understand human values and feelings, as strategy and politics are not

sciences but arts. In fact, a leader is often called upon to identify and manage complex strategies, harmonizing and maximising different components.

He should skilfully link tactics, strategies and political goals, as well as material, moral and intellectual elements, and balance risks, losses and profits. He should also be aware that the media have always been considered as prevailing over the military.

He should adjust his conduct to the situation on the ground, as strategies and policies can be better focused by interacting with an adversary. In fact, actions, enemies and environments are constantly changing; therefore there is not an established set of rules to abide by, but only historical records to refer to.

This is the most important capability a leader should have. As Napoleon used to say, strategy is mainly based on practice. A hands-on approach should be adopted when dealing with an adversary in an increasingly unpredictable scenario, where imagination, resolve, foresight and initiative play a key role. In fact, warfare has never been a simple action, which could be governed by rules or field manuals. To date, there are no pre-established formulas or solutions to achieve victory and here lies the secret of the art of strategy.

In wartime, a leader should keep his poise among adversities, take on responsibilities, seize the opportunities at hand, be self-confident and daring. Understanding the reality in the field and showing resolve are at the basis of all decision-making capabilities, both at tactical and strategic level. This concept was also subscribed by Mao Ze Dong, who thought that the outcome of a war not only was

determined by material and spiritual factors, but also by a leader's command capabilities.

As it can be easily understood, leader development is a complex process, requiring the study of operational plans, as well as human, managerial and technological sciences. Moral values should inspire all practical and conceptual considerations. The staging of a war is also a spiritual issue. Military valour should not be confused with individual bravery. It is a well-established discipline, based on esprit de corps and sense of duty, which turns individual bravery into a collective effort driving the entire military machinery. These qualities cannot be improvised, but require a continuing educational process.

An even more complex development should take place in the society where a leader is called upon to operate and, from this point of view, Italy has still a long way to go.

Wars are no longer fought to defend mere national political interests only, but also to safeguard national justice ideals, religious tenets and development levels.

In a world where war is more likely to be waged, being less dangerous than in the past, the more developed and democratic societies, like Italy, are reluctant to go to war, usually delay their interventions and lack effective security policies.

The most dangerous risk looming ahead is a possible trade off between security and threat, where barbarians acquire the technologies used by western countries and the latter rediscover the uncivilised traditions of the former.

2002. In his *Arte del Comando* (Rizzoli, 2002), sociologist Francesco Alberoni addresses all potential leaders, both civil and military. Also in this

context, the importance of the above mentioned moral, intellectual and personal qualities is reaffirmed.


The author gives in-depth and wide-ranging historical interpretations. For instance, Alexander and Caesar are no longer considered as tyrants, being inspired by a grand and forward-looking vision. They had a dream, an ideal and a goal to achieve. In fact, there is a great difference between those who want to obtain personal power and those who carry out changes to the advantage of the people. Alexander did not want Greece to dominate over Asia, but aimed at establishing a world-wide empire, where Greek and Asian peoples made up a single political community. The distinction between fanatics and innovators lies in the fact that the latter are leaders that want to change things for the better.

There are several conceptual aspects that deserve a further analysis.

For instance, the concept of legitimate power encompasses traditional, charismatic and legal components. Therefore, problems may arise when leaders are unable to exert their power properly or gather the necessary consensus.

Leaders are not required to take care of everything, keep everything and everyone under control; on the contrary, they should bear their goal in mind, remind each echelon of command of their mission objectives and commitment to duty. They should do so by setting an example, establishing strong moral ties, common objectives and turning their subordinates into true leaders.

A leader should have the following virtues: sincerity, impartiality, stamina, modesty, courage, generosity, justice, together with clarity of expression, order and simplicity.



A Roman legionary fighting with the head of a barbarian between his teeth.

He should also be faithful and determined, enthusiast and extremely energetic. He should not be anxious and afraid of making a mistake, but should be able to manage internal rivalries and conflicts within his organisation, as well as to oppose the most unpredictable and insidious enemies. He should be creative and develop a strategic concept to identify the main issue at stake, allowing for the solution of all other problems. His reasoning should be linear, clear and factual to always find the most simple and winning alternative. He should be able to take into account minor changes, which may eventually bring about major revolutions.

He should have the natural qualities of a charismatic leader and gain the consensus, support and trust of his people. In fact, great leaders always have charismatic qualities.

A modern leader should be open to competition, accept the limits of his role and feel the need to continuously refocus his actions to attain a future goal. As a consequence, he should restrain his self-esteem. Moreover, he should always respect the troops assigned to him, the populations conquered, as well as his predecessors and followers.

He should be fair towards his subordinates from the beginning, choose his co-operators based on their real qualities, and then work with them, love them as a father, praising and punishing them as necessary, ensure a fair personnel rotation and respect their young and naive enthusiasm.

Great innovators have always based their decision-making process on the following milestones: a preliminary comprehension of the spirit of their time; an insight into the situation in the field and an in-

depth analysis of the possible repercussions of their decisions, which are to be carefully implemented in all their phases and supported by general consensus.

Leaders have both strong and weak points. Today, as in the past, they may be considered as positive or negative models, from the point of view of their efficiency or morality, or from both. Power, especially if exerted in a wide and discretionary way over a long time, can sometimes be administered very negatively. There is a long list of dubious leaders including narrow-minded bureaucrats and procrastinators, and people who can exploit and even destroy the organisation under their command. They can also be greedy for personal power, arrogant, over-confident, tyrannical, violent, envious, overbearing, revengeful, wicked and corrupted.

SOME SIDE-LINE CONSIDERATIONS

The most important difference between the present and the past lies in the management of power and in the synergy of efforts.

Leadership, exerted by few and godlike characters in ancient times, has increasingly become a responsibility of the entire political-military world, which encompasses the whole political, institutional and social apparatus and thus represents all citizens.

As early as the II World War, great political actors played side by side with equally capable and determined military leaders, who shared a same moral and ethical vision and were strongly supported by the people.

From then onward, the decision making power has been further

distributed and expanded, thanks to the notion of participatory democracy. As a consequence, today there is the need for a great number of leaders inspired by common ideals.

Sharing command responsibilities is an important component in the civic and social development of each country. This way, individuals are trained to shoulder responsibilities and better understand the problems of leaders at each level of command. At the same time, there is a lack of coherent and effective decision-making structures, as compared to the past. In fact, today, the need for knowledge, solidarity and determination has become more dramatic.

The main problems affecting the international scenario heavily impact on the availability of enlightened leaders and hinder their actions. For instance, though there is an increasing need for security experts, military personnel is mainly mobilised. Proactive and open minded citizens are required, but their number is very limited. Security is an important factor, but awareness is first priority.

Another main difference between the present and the past is the existence of a close-knit network of agreements, procedures, customs, treaties, limitations and restrictions bridging each country's freedom of action.

The media, which have a say in all spheres of activity, further limit all decision-making powers.

If this build-up had led to the cohabitation formula wished for, there would have been nothing to complain about. But, unfortunately, this is not the case. International relations have increasingly deteriorated and both action and reaction capabilities have weakened even at conceptual level.

There is a lack of global cohesion. Certainly nations cannot

refer to the UN as a reference model for their behaviours. The US, though strong, articulated, coherent and determined, is driven by a narrow national vision, which can be detrimental to its own interests and to those of other nations as well. Consequently, the US too has to resort to quid-pro-quo solutions to solve all emergency situations and delay problems over time, with possible negative repercussions.

At present, the foresight, the global cohabitation vision and grand strategy of the past have been replaced by feudal rivalries and riots. Thus, the insignificant, costly and sectarian victories of today are only aimed at pleasing public opinion, whose power is on the rise in a scenario where security is increasingly at risk.

Theoretically, politics has a forward-looking and globalized vision, but practically it pursues national, local and particular aims, trying to gain the necessary cross-party consensus. As things stand, no one has the courage of making a ground-breaking action, universals are crumbling and all concepts are constantly revised. As a consequence, exerting leadership has become an even more demanding task. Decisions are no more based on transparency, national cohesion and international synergy; now there are only short-range plans, with an increasingly limited focus and commitment.

A third element of change from the past is that in Plutarch's times military values, fundamental in gaining success, glory and political power, were constantly rewarded. The peacekeeping concept of that time largely coincided with the interests of the ruling class. The same approach was shared by Machiavelli's *The Prince*, then by Clausewitz's *The Art of War* and it was still common in the XX Century, until the nationalistic concepts followed by major European countries triggered World War One.

The establishment of the League of Nations and the entry of the United States into the world scenario gave way to a complex political, economic and social revolution, whose repercussions are felt to these days. This change, however, is midway; in fact, those who die for their countries are still considered as more gallant and worthy of honour and glory than those who die in peacekeeping missions or in conflicts abroad.

The present scenario is marred by over-ambitious aims. We should resolutely follow the path to democracy without hesitation, if we want to see better days.

To properly exert the art of leadership in this transitional period of cultural revolution, there is an increasing need for artistic qualities, such as insight, sensitiveness, creativity, fantasy, presence of mind and high direction capabilities.

This is a reassuring conclusion, as commanders who exert leadership for their own aims are not endowed with these qualities, which only belong to those who want to free human beings from their capital sins, being aware that, though hard and demanding, leadership is a great privilege.

Meritocracy prevails in this sector. Today's successful leaders must be judged by their merits. Therefore, they can be more easily selected, trained and employed, based on global reference values. It would be extremely dangerous not to apply this rule of thumb.

This way, mature societies can more easily choose their leaders whose tasks, on the contrary, are still very demanding. In fact, the path to success, once to glory, is still full of hurdles, compelling would-be leaders, who believe they are the men of destiny, to undergo a first natural selection.


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* Major General (ret.)



A COMMANDER'S REFLECTIONS

by Antony C. Zinni *



"We want the battlefield commander to be a model who accepts the profession of arms as a calling. We want him to take care of our sons and daughters and treat their lives as something precious - putting them in harm's way only if it means something that truly counts. We'll expect him to stand up to civilian leadership before thinking of his own career.


I hope that along the way we shall remember to show them our respect".

These noble words were pronounced by the Commander-in-Chief of the Marine Corps at the end of his presentation at the U.S. Naval Institute, on leaving active duty after forty years in the Service.

Those were highly pedagogical words, witness of an extraordinary experience which, especially today, can assist us in planning our future.

We wish to propound to our readers these stimulating reflections, with the convinced awareness that from them we can take the faith, the courage and the strength to proceed on our way as citizens and soldiers of yesterday, today and tomorrow.

In the hidden folds of the memoirs of the U.S. General - in whose veins runs the heritage of a millenary Italian culture - we can read an old but still valid admonishment, particularly addressed to the younger Cadres of our Service: "Ideas and values are like flowers: if they are not watered every day they risk wilting and withering".



I joined the Marines in 1961, so it's been 39 years. My retirement date is 1 September, but I plan to step down and go on terminal leave in July.

I'd like to talk about who we were, the military generations who went through the past four decades, from the 1960s up to the new millennium. If you looked at a snapshot taken when I first came into the service, all the generals looked the same - older white males with Anglo-Saxon names and Southern drawls - despite the fact that the troops they led came from lots of different places. Let's just say that the generals didn't speak Philadelphia the way I speak Philadelphia.

But things were changing in the 1960s. Marine Corps officers were still coming in from the service academies and military institutes, but more and more were coming in from Catholic colleges in the Northeast (like I did), from state colleges and universities around the nation, and from other schools with strong NROTC units or other strong military traditions. At the same time, we were seeing people coming up through the enlisted ranks to become officers - not just the old mustangs or limited-duty officers with mid-grade terminal ranks, but quality people we would send to school as an investment in the future of the Corps.


Back then, whatever our various backgrounds, we all came into the service with a code - something imprinted on each of us by family, school, or church. In my case, nuns and Augustinian priests had drilled one into my head.

Those who had come from military schools received the imprint from their officers. One way or another, all of us were programmed to believe that what we were doing was not a job; not even a profession; but a calling.

For me, joining the Marines was the closest thing to becoming a priest.

Certainly, I took a vow of poverty when I joined the Corps, although

World War II: the historical picture of the Marines raising the Flag at Suribachi Hill, Iwo Jima.



One of the biggest was World War II, which has proved to be both a blessing and a curse to my generation. The blessing was that it preserved our freedoms and our way of life and lifted us out of a severe depression on a wave of prosperity and moved us into a role of world leadership. The curse is that it was the last Good War-with moral clarity, an easily identified and demonized enemy, unprecedented national unity in mobilization and rationing, pride in those who served in uniform shown by blue-star flags hung by the families of those who fought and gold-star flags by the families of those who died, and welcome-home victory parades for those lucky enough to return home from overseas. Every war should be fought like that.

Our family military tradition in America started with my father, who was drafted to fight in World War I - the War to End all Wars - shortly after he arrived here as an immigrant from Italy. He got here and he was drafted. When I looked into it, I found that 12% of America's infantrymen in World War I were Italian immigrants. And they were rewarded for their wartime service to their new homeland. My father loved the Army for the relatively short time he served in it - and along with his discharge papers he received his citizenship papers. He came out of the War as a full-fledged citizen of the United States. Just imagine what that meant to him!

During and after World War II, I learned about war at the knees of my uncles and cousins, who fought at the Battle of the Bulge in Europe and all over the Pacific-on the ground and in the air. A few years later, my older brother was drafted and fought in Korea. Their war stories were remarkable: sometimes gory and horrible, but

I stopped short of taking a vow of celibacy. Lately, though, it seems as though we have been driven more and more toward a "warrior monk" ethic, and I just wish that we'd start spending as much time on the warrior part as we seem to be spending on the monk part.

Perhaps part of the move toward monkishness is prompted by the realization that the young people today don't seem to be coming into the service with that code imprinted. It's not necessarily their fault, but the code is not there.

Until recently, our recruit depots, officer candidate schools, and other institutions responsible for socializing recruits and new officers have operated on the assumption that the code was

there, imprinted beforehand. So now we have to regroup.

A lot of things affected my generation over the years. In addition to having good genes and DNA, those who did well also seemed to have come from families that functioned normally, as opposed to the dysfunctional ones seen so often today. We also grew up in school systems that actually taught us something and imprinted us with that code, which helped move us along the path toward being useful citizens. And for most of us, our religious upbringing gave us an acceptance of a Higher Being in one form or another, at the core of our beliefs.

We also were shaped by events. Some were our legacy; some were events we actually lived through.

always positive in the end. It was like winning the Big Game against your archrival - always clean and always good.

So this was my generation's legacy: World War II was the way you fight a war. And all throughout our four decades of service, this notion kept getting reinforced. Former Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger's famous statement of doctrine is a recipe for re-fighting World War II — not for fighting the operations other than war (OOTW) that we face today. In fact, if you read the Weinberger Doctrine and adhere to every one of its tenets, you will be able to fight no war other than World War II.

I've been attending all the World War II 50th anniversary and follow-up celebrations in Florida, where I live and work, and sometimes it is unnerving to face the old veterans who look at me and seem to be saying, "How in hell did you screw it up? We had it right and we did it right and we fought and we understood and we did all this...."

It's hard to escape the feeling: God—I've let them down, because the second major event that affected us was the Vietnam War—our nation's longest and least satisfactory. It was my second-lieutenant experience, and I wondered at the time just what in hell our generals—my heroes who fought in World War II - thought they were doing. Those of us who were platoon commanders and company commanders fought hard, but never could understand what our most senior leaders were doing. The tactics didn't make sense and the personnel policies - one-year individual rotations instead of unit rotations in and out of country - were hard to comprehend. In time, we lost faith in our senior leadership.

Today, of course, we are seeing a stream of apologetic books by the policy makers of that era—as though saying mea culpa enough will absolve them of the terrible



responsibility they still bear. Beyond all his other shortcomings, I'll remember - as an infantryman - former Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara for one indelible thing: He decided that all services should have a common combat boot. Further, he decreed that to economize there would be no half sizes. So I had to wear size 10 boots instead of 9 1/2, my regular size. My feet are still screwed up to this day, thanks to Robert Strange McNamara. And that just about symbolizes the leadership we had back then.

The third thing that affected my generation was the Cold War—which actually was a 40-year attempt to re-fight World War II, if ever the need arose. Once again, we were energized to engage in global conflict against the evil Red Menace. Problem was that we never could figure just how this particular war would actually start. After playing a bazillion war games at the Naval War College and other places, I still could not come up with a logical or convincing way such a war would kick off. It was just too hard to show why the Soviets would want to conquer a burning, devastated Europe, or how that could possibly benefit the communists in any way. So we would just gloss

Korean War, September 1950: Marines in action in the streets of Seoul.

over the way the miserable war got started, jump into the middle of things, and play on. Deep down inside, I don't think many of us really believed it ever was going to happen.

To be sure, there probably were some armor or armored cavalry folks with not much to do in Vietnam who sought to patrol the Czech border, in the belief that World War III would erupt there. But that's not where my life was focused at the time. The Cold War was ever-present, and it was great for justifying programs, systems, and force structure - but no one seriously believed that it would actually happen. Still, it drove things. It drove the way we thought; it drove the way we organized and equipped; and it drove the way we developed our concepts of fighting.

Then suddenly, at the end of the 1980s, the Berlin Wall came down, the Evil Empire collapsed, and we found ourselves in the post-Cold War period. It would require a major adjustment. I was serving in the European Command when the Wall came down so quickly and unexpectedly - and in turn we

drew down too quickly, in the worst possible way. On the way down, we broke a lot of china, in the form of contracts with U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines - and in particular the soldiers. We drew down our Army too far, almost ripping it apart in the process - ten divisions is just too low a force level - I'm here to tell you.

In addition, we have let manning levels sink way too low, not understanding that the post-Cold War would bring more chaos instead of a smooth transition to world peace. Not fully understanding the Cold War force structure we were drawing down - and the kind of structure we would need for the post-Cold War period, we have been drawing down to a mini-version of the Cold War force. Today's high-demand, low-density units are paying the price for those decisions. Let's admit it - we've screwed up again.

The next influential event was Desert Storm, which, as far as I am concerned, was an aberration. It seemed to work out okay for us, but ultimately it may be an aberration, because it may have left the impression that the terrible mess that awaits us abroad—to be dealt with by peacekeeping or humanitarian operations—or coercive diplomacy, for some - can somehow be overcome by good,

clean soldiering, just like in World War II.

In reality, though, the only reason Desert Storm worked was because we managed to go up against the only jerk on the planet who actually was stupid enough to confront us symmetrically - with less of everything, including the moral right to do what he did to Kuwait. In the high- and top-level war colleges we still fight this type of adversary, so we always can win.

I rebelled at this notion, thinking there would be nowhere out there someone so stupid to fight us that way. But then along came Saddam Hussein, and "good soldiering" was vindicated once again. Worse yet, the end of any conflict often brings into professional circles the heartfelt belief that "Now that the war is over, we can get back to real soldiering." So we merrily backtrack in that direction. Scary, isn't it?

Still trying to fight our kind of war-be it World War II or Desert Storm-we ignore the real warfighting requirements of today. We want to fight the Navy-Marine Corps Operational Maneuver from the Sea; we want to fight the Army-Air Force AirLand Battle. We want to find a real adversarial demon - a composite of Hitler, Tojo, and Mussolini—so we can drive on to his capital city and

crush him there. Unconditional surrender. Then we'll put in place a Marshall Plan, embrace the long-suffering vanquished, and help them regain entry into the community of nations. Everybody wants to do that. As a retiring CinC, I would love to do that somewhere before I step down - just find somebody for me!

But it ain't gonna happen.

Today, I am stuck with the likes of a wiser Saddam Hussein and a still-elusive Osama bin Laden - just a couple of those charmers out there who will no longer take us on in a symmetric force match-up.

And we're going to be doing things like humanitarian operations, consequence management, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

Somewhere along the line, we'll have to respond to some kind of environmental disaster. And somewhere else along the line we may get stuck with putting a U.S. battalion in place on the Golan Heights, embedded in a weird, screwed-up chain of command. And do you know what? We're going to bitch and moan about it. We're going to dust off the Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell Doctrine and throw them

in the face of our civilian leadership. But at the same time, there's the President, thinking out loud in a recent meeting and saying, "Why can't we ever drive a stake through the hearts of any of these guys? I look at Kim Jung II; I look at Milosevic; I look at Saddam Hussein. Ever since the end of World War II, why haven't we been able to find a way to do this?"

The answer, of course, is that you must have the political will - and that means the will of the administration, the Congress, and the American people. All must be united in a desire for action. Instead, however, we try to get results on the cheap. There are



Vietnam War, March 1966: Marines embarking on a CH 46 helicopter.


Afghanistan, Operation "Enduring Freedom": suspected Al Qaeda members captured by Marines of the 26th MEU in the Helmand province.

congressmen today who want to fund the Iraqi Liberation Act, and let some silk-suited, Rolex-wearing guys in London gin up an expedition. We'll equip a thousand fighters and arm them with \$97 million worth of AK-47s and insert them into Iraq. And what will we have? A Bay of Goats, most likely. That's what can happen when we do things on the cheap.

But why can't we muster the necessary political will to do things right? It goes back to cost-benefit analysis, especially in terms of potential casualties. Nobody in his right mind can justify the possible human cost and the uncertain aftermath of strong military action. The bombings at Beirut and the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the debacle in Mogadishu have affected us in bad ways - making us gun-shy to an extreme degree. But every time I testify at congressional hearings, I try to make the point that there is no way to guarantee 100% force protection while accomplishing the variety of missions we undertake out there. Somewhere, sometime, we are going to lose people again - to terrorist or other actions that take advantage of our own less-than-perfect protective measures.

For example, I have more than 600 security-assistance people working throughout the Central Command's area of responsibility. Some of the detachments are quite small - in twos and threes. They live in hotels and try to keep low profiles. Their mission is to work with host-country military organizations and try to improve them. They travel a lot. They get targeted; they get stalked; they can get hit. If anyone really wants to take them out, they can and they will.

And, you know, we are going to see it happen some day. The only



way to stop it from happening is to shut down all our activities overseas, if we want 100% security for all our deployed people. But 100% definitely seems to be what more and more people want these days, as we send our people into operations other than war. These OOTW are our future, as far as I am concerned. But in a sense, it's going to be back to the future, because today's international landscape has some strong similarities to the Caribbean region of the 1920s and 1930s - unstable countries being driven by uncaring dictators to the point of collapse and total failure. We are going to see more crippled states and failed states that look like Somalia and Afghanistan - and are just as dangerous.

And more and more U.S. military men and women are going to be involved in vague, confusing military actions - heavily overlaid with political, humanitarian, and economic considerations. And representing the United States - the Big Guy with the most formidable presence in the area - they will have to deal with each messy situation and pull everything

together. We're going to see more and more of that.

My generation has not been well prepared for this future, because we resisted the idea. We even had an earlier Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who said, "Real men don't do OOTW." That just about says it all. Any Army commander worth his salt wanted to take his unit to the National Training Center and any Marine commander would want to go to the Marine Air-Ground Training Center for live-fire maneuver and combined-arms work rather than stay on their bases and confront a bunch of troops in civilian clothes, throwing water balloons and playing the role of angry overseas mobs. It just goes against the grain to have to train our people that way.

Going beyond these events, what other things have affected my military generation? There have been trends in law and policy making that have had a profound effect. The National Security Act of 1947, for example, set up the most dysfunctional, worst organizational approach to military affairs I could possibly

imagine. In a near-perfect example of the Law of Unintended Consequences it created a situation in which the biggest rival of any U.S. armed service is not a foreign adversary but another one of its sister U S services.

We teach our ensigns and second lieutenants to recognize that sister service as the enemy. It wants our money; it wants our force structure; it wants our recruits. So we rope ourselves into a system where we fight each other for money, programs, and weapon systems. We try to out-doctrine each other, by putting pedantic little anal apertures to work in doctrine centers, trying to find ways to ace out the other services and become the dominant service in some way. These people come to me and the other CinCs and ask, "What's more important to you - air power or ground power?"

Incredible! Just think about it. My Uncle Guido is a plumber. If I went to him and asked, "What's more important to you-a wrench or a screwdriver?" he'd think I'd lost my marbles.

The real way this stuff gets worked out is not in the doctrine centers but out in the field. The joint commands and the component commanders can figure things out because we're the warfighters. We have to work things out, so we actually do. We could not produce a joint fire-support doctrine out of Washington or the doctrine centers to save our ass. But we can produce one in the Central Command, or in the Pacific Command or European Command or any joint task force we create. They can produce one in a heartbeat-and they have. We can make a JFACC work. We can make a land-component command arrangement work. There will be no more occasions in the Central Command's area of operations where the Marines fight one ground war and the Army fights a different ground war. There will be one ground war and a single land component commander.



But we've been brutalized in the process. We've had to be pushed into cooperating with each other by legislation. And those of us who have seen the light and actually put on joint "purple" uniforms-we've never been welcomed back to our parent services. We have become the Bad Guys. The only thing we are trusted to do is to take your sons and daughters to war and figure out ways to bring them back safely.

Virulent inter-service rivalry still exists-and it's going to kill us if we don't find a better way to do business.

Goldwater-Nichols is not the panacea everybody thinks it is. I'm here to tell you that it did not increase the powers of the CinCs-not one bit. A CinC still owns nothing. I own no resources and no assigned forces. All I get is geography and responsibility. And the CinCs have to go up the chain of command through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For more than a quarter-century, we have been operating with an All-Volunteer Force - and the American people tend to forget that, until the volunteers stop showing up and reenlisting. And that's what is wrong right now. But the troops are not getting out because they're deployed too long and too often. I will bet anyone that the forward-deployed units - the carrier battle groups, the

Marine expeditionary units, the air expeditionary forces and wings - have the highest retention rates.

So what does that say about the high operations tempo and personnel deployment rates? The people who deploy are not the ones getting out. The guy getting out is the guy who's left back home and has to pick up the slack with a workload that's been increased by a factor of eight or ten. We were building an All-Volunteer Force with professionals, not mercenaries. The troops certainly don't mind a better paycheck, but they find it insulting that we seem to think that's all they want. Deep inside, there have been negative reactions to the recent pay raise. They see their benefits continuing to erode. Their families are telling them, "Look at what happens to your medical care when you retire. You can't even pick up a telephone and get through to someone who might see you." And despite all the smoke and mirrors around TriCare and Medicare and other programs - even if they do work - the perceptions are bad. To top things off, the quality of life back at the home base is terrible. We still have too much infrastructure eating up funds that should go toward improving the quality of life. But don't count on DoD and the politicians going through another base-closure drill or anything like it.

So this all-volunteer, highly professional force we built - to give quality performance with quality support - has been allowed to erode. That came with the "peace dividend." The All-Volunteer Force has become something else - something less attractive than opportunities on the outside, in many ways. The troops want to be caught up in a calling - but they're not. They are involved in a job.

Over the past 40 years, we also have seen strange things happen with regard to the media. To be sure, there are no more Ernie Pyles out there, but there's nothing inherently wrong with the media, which has the same percentages of good guys and bad guys as other fields. But technology has changed things. The media are on the battlefield; the media are in your headquarters; the media are everywhere.

And the media report everything - good things, warts, and all. And everyone knows that the warts tend to make better stories. As a

you are a lieutenant or a captain and you see another officer get fried, you react differently. The message is clear: "Avoid the media." And the message hardens into a Code: "They are the enemy. Don't be straight with them." And that is bad.


That is bad because we live in the Information Age. Battlefield reports are going to come back in real time, and they are going to be interpreted - with all sorts of subtle shadings and nuances - by the reporters and their news editors. And the relationship between the military and the media, which should be at its strongest right now, has bottomed

Left.

Operation "Enduring Freedom": US soldiers protecting a hangar in a forward base.

Below.

Operation "Enduring Freedom": a Marine of the 26th MEU, observing through night goggles probable terrorist hideouts in the Helmand province.



CinC, I've probably been chewed out by seniors about five times - and four of the five were about something I'd said to the media. At this stage of my life, it doesn't really bother me - because where in hell do I go from here? But if

out. At has begun to heal a little, but a lot more must be done. We need to rebuild a sense of mutual trust.

My uncles in World War II generally experienced a friendly press - with Willie and Joe

cartoons and Ernie Pyle stories - that was part of the war effort. G.I.

Joe was lionized and bad news was suppressed - if not by the military then by the media. The relationship generally remained positive through the Korean War, despite its ambiguities. But the relationship soured during and after Vietnam, for a number of reasons - not the least of which was a mounting distrust of government by the media and the American people.

My generation and those who have followed over the past 40 years are still dealing with social issues that swept across the nation in the 1960s and 1970s. The racial and drug problems that peaked during the Vietnam years and persisted well beyond them are largely behind us now - but they came close to destroying the military from within - something no enemy has ever accomplished on the field of battle. We still wrestle with problems associated with the massive infusion of women into the ranks of the military, seeking a final adjustment that meets the twin requirements of fairness and common sense. A final adjustment on the issue of gays in the military - largely sidestepped up to now - still lies ahead.

Today, we are suffering through the agony of watching and waiting for our political masters and the American people to decide what the U.S. military should look like in the future. It is especially agonizing because the political leaders - and the population in general - have very little association with the armed forces. Consequently, they have very little awareness of how we function.

For example, they don't understand the Uniform Code of Military Justice - the UCMJ. If you work for IBM and don't show up for work, you might get fired. If you are in the Marines and don't show up, you might get locked up. Further, the military doesn't hire the handicapped in the same



Operation "Enduring Freedom": physical training on the flight deck of a LHD5.

percentages as IBM or other corporations – probably for good reason. The military is different, but not enough Americans are aware of that.

Over this 40-year period, we have made some significant internal changes. We made a magnificent recovery from the Vietnam War, and my hat goes off to the Army, because I think they led the way in making the needed transformations. In general, we have professionalized our non-commissioned officer corps, but still not enough NCOs are doing the jobs that officers had taken away from them when I first came in. The rank structure is holding them back, despite the fact that their educational attainments – bachelors, masters, and even doctoral degrees – have far outstripped the structure. This

needs to be fixed.

The one thing that makes us a standout among the world's military services is the quality of our NCOs. Don't ever believe it's the officers; it's the noncommissioned officers.

All of the events that have shaped us over the past 40 years have not been negative. Somewhere in the mid-1980s we began to experience a renaissance in the operational art. We actually started to take war fighting more seriously. Once again, I want to credit the Army for leading the charge, and the other services for following suit, in one way or another. Today, we see highly qualified, professionally competent, operationally sound officers and noncommissioned officers as a result.

There's also been a technological revolution—the Revolution in

Military Affairs, which already has gone beyond the point most may think. Whenever I go to my command center in the basement of my Tampa headquarters, I can pull up a common operating picture – every ship and aircraft (commercial, bad guy, good guy) in real time. With a six-hour delay – which I could crunch to two hours if I wanted to—I can get a complete ground picture. That's the good news. The bad news is that the White House and the Pentagon will probably be interested in the same picture, and might be tempted to make decisions on their own, without input from the folks actually on the scene. That could be disastrous, as history amply demonstrates.

As we close out this 40 years of service, those of us who served must ask: "What is our legacy?" My son is a newly commissioned second lieutenant of the Marines. What have we left for him to look forward to?

We all know that burgeoning technology will widen his horizons beyond anything we can imagine. It also will present new questions of ethics and morality that we barely have begun to fathom.

But he also must live with an organization that I have had to live with for 40 years. Napoleon could reappear today and recognize my Central Command staff organization: J-1, administration stovepipe; J-2, intelligence stovepipe – you get the idea. This antiquated organization is oblivious to what everyone else in the world is doing: flattening organization structure, with decentralized operations and more



Operation "Enduring Freedom": an observer and a sniper from the 10th Mountain Division on duty near Bagram airport.

Operation "Enduring Freedom": Marines from the 26th MEU searching for "Al Qaeda" hideouts in the Helmand province.

direct communications. This must be fixed.


My son will have to deal with the inevitable military-civilian rift and drift - which will become more severe in the future. He also will have to deal with the remaining social issues. And they will get tougher, within a national debate over why we still need a strong military.

In addition to dealing with these social issues - which will worsen - to shape their potential heritage, my son's generation must ultimately face the question of how much the military should be a reflection of U.S. society. The people of America will get the military they want, in due course, but it is up to the military to advise them about the risks and consequences of their decisions.

My son will face non-traditional missions in messy places that will make Somalia look like a picnic. He will see a changed battlefield, with an accelerated tempo and greatly expanded knowledge base. He will witness a great drop in the sense of calling. People entering the military will not be imprinted with his code. They will not be candidates for priesthood; at best, they will be part-time lay ministers.

On his watch, my son is likely to see a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) event. Another Pearl Harbor will occur in some city, somewhere in the world where Americans are gathered. When that nasty bug or gas or nuke is released it will forever change him and his institutions. At that point, all the lip service paid to dealing with such an eventuality will be revealed for what it is - lip service. And he will have to deal with it for real. In its wake, I hope he gets to deal with yet another Goldwater-Nichols arrangement.

What will we expect of him as a battlefield commander? Brains,



guts, and determination - nothing new here. But we would ask for more than battlefield skill from our future commanders. We want character, sense of moral responsibility, and an ethical standard that rises above those of all other professions. We want him to be a model who accepts the profession of arms as a calling. We want him to take care of our sons and daughters and treat their lives as something precious - putting them in harm's way only if it means something that truly counts. We'll expect him to stand

up to civilian leadership before thinking of his own career.

And I hope that we would think enough of him and his compatriots to show some respect for them along the way.

□

** General
U.S. Marine Corps (ret.)*

Address at the U.S. Naval Institute -
March 2000
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Gen. Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps (retired) holds a bachelor's degree in economics, a master of arts degree in international relations, and a master of arts in management and supervision.

Serving in Vietnam as a company commander in 1970, Zinni was wounded and evacuated.

He then went on to hold a number of command and training positions within the Marine Corps.

From 1987 to 1989, Zinni served on Okinawa as the Regimental Commander of the 9th Marines and the Commanding Officer of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which was twice deployed to the Philippines to conduct emergency security operations and disaster relief operations.

Following Desert Storm, he served as the chief of staff and deputy commanding general of combined task force Private Comfort, a Kurdish relief effort in Turkey and Iraq. He also was the military coordinator for Operation Provide Hope, the relief effort for the former Soviet Union. During 1992-1993, he directed the Unified Task Force Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. Also in 1993, he was the assistant to the U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia during operation Continue Hope. From 1992 to 1994, Gen. Zinni was deputy commanding general of the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Va.

In early 1995, Zinni commanded the Combined Task Force for Operation United Shield, protecting the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Somalia. He joined the U.S. Central Command in September 1996 as deputy commander in chief. From 1994 to 1996, Zinni served as the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.

General Zinni, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, was named a distinguished senior adviser at CSIS. On behalf of President Bush, Gen. Zinni is negotiating the cease-fire between Israelis and Palestinians.

A EUROPEAN ARMY?



The Union has two projects under way: to develop an autonomous capacity to conduct military actions and the enlargement to the East. Both will impact heavily upon the quality of the decision-making process

■ The Fifteen EU Members

■ European Nations Candidates for EU membership

■ Other candidates for membership

by Pier Paolo Lunelli *

Source: EU site

The war in Kosovo reemphasized the old debate on the future of European defence. The EU has emptied the responsibilities of the WEU and is constituting the so-called European Corps. The speed and scope of these reforms are astonishing and open a sequence of question marks. Will we have a European Army or a European defence? Why does the European Union want to conduct autonomous operations? Is it in a position to do that? How much will it cost? What will change after the September 11 massacre at the World Trade Centre? We shall try to give an answer to these and other questions, with the growing awareness that now, as never before, the transatlantic link must be made stronger.

NATO has undergone an increasing wear and tear since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In absence of a common threat, the centrifugal interests prevailed, materialized by autonomist European ambitions, which started to take shape in 1993. But in the face of the events of Sept. 11 we see the outburst of a feeling of belonging to the Western values that goes beyond rhetoric.

With the unanimous invocation of Art.5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the members of NATO wipe out old jealousies, age-old suspicious and ancient mistrusts. Never before has been so essential to strengthen the transatlantic link with no ambiguities, not so much for a rhetoric solidarity, but because Europe and America must show their cohesion in a common battle. Nevertheless, after a few months, the United States and Europe seem to be going different ways.

This article, centred on the emerging role of Europe in the sectors of common security and defence, wishes to point out some key aspects and prospects of a process which, since the twilight of the 20th Century, has undergone an impressing and incredible acceleration. It is our intention to discuss the first European turning point of Saint-Malo and Helsinki, focusing on its effects on the Union's decision-making structures and then, successively, we propose to analyze the implications of the enlargement process of NATO and EU, examining the issues under discussion and ask ourselves whether we shall ever have a European Army. We shall conclude by mentioning a second turning point, i.e. the consequences of the attack to the heart of the United States carried out on September 11,

a black Tuesday in the history of mankind.

WHAT ROLE FOR EUROPE?

What is the international role of the European Union? Official sources (1) indicate that the European Community and its member States provide more than half the amount of funds to international aid for development, as well as over 50% of the world humanitarian aid. They finance one third of the aid to the Middle East (50% goes to the Palestinian territories), about 60% for Russia and the Republics of the former Soviet Union, besides 40% of the reconstruction efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Shortly, this remarkable aid is going to be completed by a key political aspect: the capability of deciding and conducting autonomous military actions.

Already in 1948 the well-known political scientist Hans Morgenthau (2) had pointed out that in foreign policy the objectives must be supported by military strength, which is an indispensable element. The European initiative, started in 1993, follows precisely this trend.

FIRST TURNING POINT: HELSINKI, SAINT MALO, THE BALKANS

At the Helsinki summit, in December 1999, the European leaders made an irrevocable decision on the development of a common European policy in the field of security and defence (3): to attribute a strong role of leading actor to the EU, providing it with a credible military force. This collective expression of the will to constitute an autonomous European capability could at last see the light in 2003, after the 1954 unsuccessful attempt of the European Community of Defence (see box at p. 41).

Two events led to this decision. The first originates in 1997 with the "changing of the guard" between Conservatives and Labour in the United Kingdom. Probably in order to compensate for the British self-exclusion from the participation in the common currency project, Labourite Tony Blair, during the Franco-British summit at Saint Malo cancelled the veto of the preceding Conservative Governments on matters of European foreign policy and



*Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman,
first promoters of the European Union.*

security. The French and the British have many things in common when it comes to defence: they are the Union's only nuclear powers and European permanent members of the UN Security Council, they have the highest expenditure for defence in relation to the GDP, and Armed Forces developed according to the philosophy of the Expeditionary Force abroad.

Certainly, Saint Malo has outlined a new approach to European security. *For the first time we listened to the French leit motiv: "the Union must be capable of conducting autonomous actions in the field of defence... the Union must be provided with appropriate structures, decision-making and situation-analysis capacity, intelligence sources and capability to make strategic plans, without unnecessary duplications".*

Great Britain, toning down its traditional alignment with the United States, opened a window on the future of European defence, while the French pressed for even more radical solutions, with the intention of maintaining the independence from NATO, and therefore from the US, of the European resources and the decision-making structures.

The second decisive event is the awareness, matured during the air operation "Allied Forces" over Yugoslavia (in March-June 1999), of the enormous technological gap between Europe and the US. The conflict in Kosovo brought once more to light the European shortcomings in crisis management, even in geographical areas close to the EU.

On the land operations in Kosovo, a British commentator (4) observed that *"the European forces must be able to deploy better equipped units with a much shorter warning and to support them for a longer period. It is not a matter of reproducing the hi-tech approach of the US. The "stand-off" bombings*

from high altitude are not the best approach in civil or ethnic conflicts. It is more a question of readiness, rapid deployment, training and sustainability. This implies a painful reorganization, professionalization and higher expenses for defence, particularly for material, equipment and logistics".

Furthermore, the Balkan operations brought to light the American aversion for all-out involvements and for risking casualties in the European Theatre. Hence, the necessity to have a common European capability in cases where the US, and therefore NATO, does not intend to participate in peace-support operations by decision of the US Congress (5).

The ascertainment of the fact that Europe is unwilling to assume greater responsibilities implies that security must be paid for with the US presence on European soil. For this reason, the EU aims at establishing a more balanced relationship with the US, spurring cooperation but without jeopardizing the transatlantic link. *"We Europeans should not expect the US to intervene in every crisis in our backyard. The EU must be able to carry out some tasks on its own"* observed Tony Blair on this subject in 1999.

During the NATO summit held in Washington in April 1999, NATO acknowledged *"the Union's determination to acquire the capability of conducting autonomous actions and approving military actions when the Alliance does not intend to commit itself as a whole. Some weeks later, in Cologne, the EU declared that "the Union must be capable of conducting autonomous defensive actions, counting on credible military forces, on the instruments to make them intervene and on the willingness to do it, in order to respond to international crises, leaving nevertheless unprejudiced*

the actions undertaken by NATO".

The decisions reached in Cologne were formalized at the Helsinki summit six months later. The Global European project, according to an American observer (6), should consist of five points. First: modernize the Armed Forces since what is missing is not so much the ability to make autonomous decisions, but rather the military ability to act (7) (diplomacy backed by force). Second: limit to the minimum the creation of new decision-making structures. Third: grant NATO the first military option and, at the same time, avoid that the European intervention overlaps in areas where NATO already operates. Fourth: consider some NATO assets available for use by the EU (8). Fifth: establish the necessary liaisons between EU and NATO, to prevent different perceptions by the two separate bureaucracies. Sixth: strengthen the cooperation through the integration of the defence industries. Seventh: involve the non-EU allies (Norway, Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary) in the creation of structures similar to those of Partnership for Peace.

The European Summit in Helsinki, only eight months after NATO's Washington meeting, brought about a great deal of changes, on the wave of the process of European integration. Suffice it to think that ten years ago the debate about the common currency was on "whether it would take place". Today it is a reality, albeit in an unfavourable situation. Only five years ago, many sneered at the idea of a common security and defence policy. Now it is taking shape. The lessons learned from the war in Kosovo, therefore, have broken the old schemes which prevented the EU from guiding military operations. Besides having utterly political reasons, the cooperation in the field of defence will do away with redundancies and lead

THE 1952 EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY (CED): A LOST CHANCE?

May 9, 1950: Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, proposes to the European Nations to put together their production of coal and steel, on the basis of a plan worked out by the French politician Jean Monnet. This proposal, already accepted by the German Chancellor, Conrad Adenauer, is favoured by the United States but not by the United Kingdom, because of its bonds with the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the work continues until April 18, 1951, when the institutive Treaty of the European Community of Coal and Steel (CECA) is signed, together with various protocols on privileges and conventions with the European Council.

The Schuman Plan is immediately followed by the Pleven Plan, also suggested by Jean Monnet. Paris must face the American pressures in favour of the rearmament of Germany and its participation in the defence of the free world – a real bugbear for the French and the British – precisely when the US are involved in the Korean war. Only two years have elapsed since France, the United Kingdom and Benelux had signed the Brussels Treaty, stipulating their mutual assistance in case of reemergence of an aggressive German policy within the following 50 years. The spectre of German rearmament is, from the American viewpoint, a necessary evil for the defence of the European theatre from the new threat looming from the East.

How can Germany participate in the effort of collective defence without the reconstruction of a German army, opposed by France? Monnet proposes to extend to the Armed Forces the mechanisms created for coal and steel: putting under a joint Command, with the same uniform, the soldiers of the European Nations joining a European community with defensive purposes.

In September 1951 the Atlantic Council meets in Ottawa and approves the proposal to rearm Germany, called Pleven Plan, within the safeguarding structure of a European army. The European military integration is on the starting line on May 27, 1952 in Paris, with the signature of the institutive Treaty of the European Defence Community (CED), whose advocate is the Belgian politician Paul-Henry Spaak. Contracting Countries are France, Federal Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland. Modeled on the CECA Agreement, the CED Treaty envisages supernational bodies (Commission, Council of Ministers, Assembly and Court of Justice). On the military plane, the preferential link with the US remains intact, thanks to the decision to assign CED's Armed Forces to the Supreme NATO Commander in Europe (SACEUR).

In 1953, during the Eisenhower administration, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, urges the European signatories to ratify the commitment assumed the previous year. Adenauer's Germany ratifies the Treaty, while in Italy its text is not submitted to Parliament by Defence Minister Pacciardi, awaiting for the French decisions. Precisely in view of the initiative of European military integration, Pacciardi puts off, among other things, the discussion of the laws on the status and promotions of officers and NCOs of the three Services, considering that the military were going to move under a supernational body, with a specific status and European salaries.


In 1954 the French and British opposition to Dulles' pressures become relentless, not only at Government level but also in the national Parliaments. After a long discussion, on August 30 the Community of European defence is buried by the French National Assembly. Stalin's death, the attenuation of the Cold War, some contrasts with the Americans and fear of having to renounce national sovereignty make the ratification of the Treaty unnecessary.

The void created by the failure of CED is partially filled by the Paris Agreements of 1954, where Europe gives up the idea of developing an autonomous defence identity, but keeps the principle for the future. As a consequence of the failure of the "European Army" initiative, the German forces are integrated within NATO through the creation of a new Alliance, the Western European Union (WEU), which includes the signatories of the Brussels Treaty plus Italy and Germany. Eisenhower announces the signature of a unilateral peace treaty with Germany which, together with Italy, joins the Brussels Treaty. WEU, conceived as an anteroom for the successive admission of Federal Germany to NATO, the following year enters a state of "institutional lethargy" (see box at p.).

With CED's burial in August 1954, the European Defence becomes a sort of taboo until 1999, despite a timid French attempt to revive it in 1962. In any case, today's concept of European defence is very different from the one conceived by Monnet in the Pleven Plan. This is why we can say that the CED initiative was, and still is, the only attempt at shaping a "real" European Army.

Strutture Decisionali UE e NATO

Fig. 1



The EU decision-making structures at politico-military level reproduce those already envisaged in NATO (NAC-PSC, MC-EUMC, IMS-EUMS). At strategic and operational level duplications are not envisaged, but an "ad-hoc" command-and-control structure is employed when necessary.

to a better efficiency of both industries and forces. This could also be advantageous for the US, in a framework of division of tasks and responsibilities, especially after the events of September 11.

DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES, FORCES AND ACTUAL CAPABILITIES

Although there are still many questions on the concrete implementation of a global

project of European security and defence, a decision-making organization has been established and charged with the task of aligning the military instrument to the already acquired economic and financial capabilities. Moreover, three structures have been established at institutional structure governance level (Fig.1)

The first structure is the Policy and Security Committee (PSC), which deals with every aspect of both the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the common policy of European security and defence (CESDP). In case of crisis, the PSC would be entrusted with the politico-strategic direction of the operation, under the authority of the European Council. The second structure is the European Military Committee, made up of

the defence Chiefs of Staff of the Union's member Nations or their permanent representatives; its task is to advance proposals and recommendations to the PSC. The third structure is the Military Staff (EUMS), which supports the European Council and the PSC with its military expertise. The EUMS' task is early warning, situations assessment and strategic planning for the activities of conflict prevention and crisis management.

The EUMS Chief of Staff (9) notes that these are basic structures, considering that the EU does not intend to create either specific military Commands or permanent Command-and-Control structures similar to NATO's. As a matter of fact, the EU has the intention to have recourse, on a case-by-case basis, to the




Fig. 2

The decision to conduct "Petersberg-type" missions was made by the Defence Ministers of WEU in 1992. In 1999 this function passed from WEU to EU.

national or multinational Commands of the members of the Alliance.

Should the need arise to manage a crisis, an Operation Commander will be appointed (OPCMDR, at NATO SACEUR level) and the Headquarters for the Operation (OHQ) will be selected among the existing national structures (e.g. Italian COINT, British PJHQ, or similar French or German organizations which, however, will have to become multinational). At operational level, the headquarters of the intervention force (FHQ) could be the Euro-

corps (Strasbourg), the Central Multinational Division (Reindhalen), EUROFOR (Florence), EUROMARFOR or other "double-hat" (NATO and EU) high-readiness headquarters now being constituted.

To enable these organizations to operate, principles and procedures are being developed, in order to prepare and implement the necessary decisions in case of crises. This includes the interaction between the civilian and military components, exercises and planning policy. Considering the experience acquired by NATO and WEU, the plans will not be carried out in a vacuum, and cooperation between NATO and EU will be essential. An initial capability in the procedural field was achieved in 2001, as was stated during the

European summit held in Laeken.

As regards the forces, the member States intend to achieve the so-called "Headline Goal", according to which, by the end of 2003, the EU should be able to deploy, up to 15 Brigades (50-60.000 men) for Petersberg missions (Fig.2) with a 60-day warning, guaranteeing their sustenance for a year.

This multiservice and autonomous Corps-level force, equipped with about 500 aircraft and 15 ships, will have its own intelligence, logistic and Command-and-Control capabilities. In order to reach this objective approx 150,000 men will be needed for the necessary rotation, together with concrete procedures for



It is necessary for NATO and EU to involve non-EU Nations in a body similar to "Partnership for Peace", in order to give a univocal response to international crises.

consultations and cooperation, as well as clear rules for a greater "transparency".

However after September 11, the framework of the Petersberg missions has been questioned. The supporters of a reductive revision, including the Italian Defence Minister Antonio Martino (10), prefer to limit

European interventions to humanitarian missions, peacekeeping operations and crisis management. The reasons are mainly pragmatical. First of all, the resources for peace-enforcing operations could be available, at best, between 2007 and 2015. Secondly, NATO is better suited for more complex missions, since it has a Command-and-Control chain that works while, at the moment, Europe does not have these capabilities. Lastly, there are still internal disputes to be settled such as, for example, Greece's veto on the agreement with


Turkey for EU's access to NATO assets.

EU INITIATIVES IN COMPETITION WITH NATO

Besides the autonomous development of the capability of conducting military actions, the Union pursues another pivotal project: the enlargement to the East. Both will heavily bear upon the quality of the decision-making process. The European institutions were originally conceived for six nations, and now are labouriously working with fifteen members. It is true that the introduction of the procedure that permits to make decisions by a "qualified majority", instead of unanimously, could revitalize the process. In the long term, however, the enlargement to 27-30 members will bring about a crisis in the international working system. In substance, the enlargement of the EU to the East will require a thorough reform of the European institutions (Fig.3). How can we imagine a European Council with 30 Heads of State and Government?

Thirty Chairmanships? How long will the sessions of the Council last? Days? Weeks? How is the compensation of interests going to be reached within the present 30-member institutional structure? How will the decisions be taken, and how will it be possible to act thereafter? What can be done to prevent the Union from becoming inscrutable? How to prevent the compromises from becoming less and less understandable, to the point of losing the citizens' consent? How will it be possible to agree on a complex military action, when it was impossible to agree on a common position about the dispute between Greeks and Turks over an islet in the Aegean (1996) or on the intervention in Albania, successively led by Italy

Fig. 3



Above.
NATO, EU and WEU are not perfectly coincident "Chinese boxes". This can cause differences when leaving the core and going to the periphery. Most contrasts could take place between NATO and EU.

Right.
September 19, 2000: meeting between the NATO NAC and the EU PSC. From left to right: Michel Duclos, Lord Robertson and Javier Solana.

preliminaries, the European security-and-defence policy is "a journey to a destination still unknown (11)". There are different perceptions among the various members, and it is

necessary to unify them, building a net capable of toning down the internal polarizations, transforming the EU into a factor of stabilization and a model for the new multipolar world. Suffice

in 1997? It will be for the Convention of the European Union to find the possible solution of some of these questions, as pointed out in the Laeken "Declaration", which started its work on February 28. The stakes are the reform of the Union's decision-making procedures, in order to avoid a paralysis in 2004, when 10 more Countries will join the EU.

Undoubtedly, with these



THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU): A "SLEEPING BEAUTY"

The first symptoms of a substantial divergence between the US and the Soviet Union starts to emerge already during the Yalta Conference and, in the successive years, they lead to a climate of tension, to bipolarism and the Cold War, of which the Berlin blockade, in June 1948, is a premonitory signal. Already in March of the same year, another important event takes place: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and the United Kingdom sign a treaty aimed, on the one hand, at strengthening the links among the signatories in the economic, social and cultural fields, in order to lay the foundations for the reconstruction of Europe's economy, ruined by WWII and, on the other, at creating the bases for mutual assistance against any armed aggression, within a legitimate collective defence.

On the other side of the Atlantic, an occurrence worth mentioning is the adoption of the "Vandenberg Resolution" on the basis of which, in accordance with the Truman doctrine of 1947, the US can participate in agreements for the maintenance of peace through collective security measures.

In 1950 the outbreak of the Korean War puts the Europeans up against the wall: it becomes necessary to establish a defence integrated within a European design based on the principles of the community of coal and steel (CECA) and with the essential contribution of Germany. This revolutionary project – born in 1952 and called European Defence Community (CED) – founders two years later, owing to the non-ratification by the French National Assembly (see box at p.).

On that occasion, a makeshift solution is found: it envisages the enlargement of the Brussels Treaty, to include Italy and Germany, with the constitution of the "Western European Union" (WEU), an intergovernmental organization aimed at "promoting the union and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe". Although it deals with defence and security, this structure does not leave much space to the military, in that, on the one hand it is a cooperation arena among Foreign Ministries and, on the other, a multilateral organization without a supranational character. In any case, the responsibility for the collective defence had already been assumed by the Atlantic Alliance five years earlier, in 1949; therefore WEU enters a state of "institutional lethargy", becoming, as noted by Gen. Jean, "a sleeping beauty".

The WEU reawakens in the mid-eighties as an organization for European security, and asserts itself in 1991, after the Maastricht Treaty, which includes in its agenda the Common European Policy of Security and Defence. WEU not only tends to assume the configuration of NATO's European pillar, but becomes a basis on which to develop the initiative of European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. In the attempt to achieve a pre-eminent role, WEU involves, with different forms of status, Greece, Norway, Turkey, Austria, Finland and Sweden, assuming also operational roles through the creation of a military component and the conduct of military operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans.

With the revision of the Treaty, adopted in Amsterdam in 1997, the EU includes in its tasks the so-called "Petersberg missions", which had been conceived five years earlier within WEU. In 1998, during a meeting in Saint-Malo, the EU, for the first time in its history, assumes a role as a military power; this is the beginning of a new chapter of the European security policy.

The Cologne summit, in June 1999, decides, among other things, that the EU must take the responsibility for Petersberg missions, taking them away from WEU. In substance, the responsibility of crisis management and collective defence is going to be conducted separately by different organizations, with different members and on the basis of different Treaties. Contrary to what was envisaged by the Amsterdam Treaty, which entailed the full integration of WEU into the EU, the function of collective defence is no more assumed by the Union. WEU, anyway, ends its current operational activities (WEU missions in Albania and Croatia, transferred to the EU), while the institutional treaty for the safeguard of collective defence (Art.5) remains in force, together with NATO cooperation. On July 1, 2001, the WEU Headquarters moves to another infrastructure, and the Secretariat is reduced to a Council Section, an Administration Section, Archives and Post Office. The Military Committee enters a state of "institutional lethargy", and so does the Eurogroup. The Satellite Centre and the Study Institute for Security will still be subordinate to WEU, until equivalent agencies are created within the EU in 2002. WEU (1) remains "active in the following areas: supervision of the obligations of mutual assistance envisaged by Art.5, while the military aspects connected with these commitments are still NATO responsibilities; cooperation in the armaments sector; activities as a forum for the governments and parliaments of the 28 WEU nations on the issues of security and defence. After only 15 years from its last awakening, WEU is again "a sleeping beauty".

(1) The Future Role of WEU, Jim Marshall, Chairman of the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly, on "Les Dossiers de L'Abecedaire", 2nd trimester 2001.

it to think of the "tug-of-war" where, on the one side, France and Italy press the Union to take care of the Mediterranean issues and, on the other, Germany and Sweden insist for a greater

European interest in the Baltic. It will be necessary, then to conjugate consensus with effectiveness, and different perceptions with unity of action.

The United States has been

supporting the European cause – within the WEU framework of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) – declaring its willingness to provide NATO assets for European



March 26, 2001. Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of Defence.

"autonomous" operations. But those were only formal statements because no one, at that moment, was willing to bet on the success of the common currency (see box at p. 46). In 1999, facing the *fait accompli*, the US of President Clinton could not oppose it, and was obliged to take note of the emergence of a new actor on the international scene. "America needs a stronger Europe", said the US Deputy Secretary of State in December 1999, adding... "we envisage a Europe capable of acting effectively through the Alliance, or on its own if NATO were unwilling to be engaged".

Nevertheless, behind the official proclamations, some basic differences were taking shape. First of all, the US believed that a security system based on the EU would

guarantee a "back door" to NATO for the EU members not covered by Art.5 of the Treaty. Finland, Sweden and Austria, which are not NATO members, could press the Alliance through the EU, demanding perhaps the US military assistance, without having to pay the cost. A second worry was the danger of seeing on organization (EU) inside another (NATO), with the consequent weakening of the US leadership.

The British change of course in Saint Malo did not only shift the balances, but also compelled Washington to accept, as an accomplished fact, the existence of a European common policy of security and defence, albeit with some distinctions. The American concerns, pointed out by Madeleine Albright, are summarized in the well known "triple D" concept. Washington wants neither the transatlantic divorce (no decoupling), nor the duplication of efforts and

capabilities (no duplication), and rules out the discrimination of the Allies not members of the EU (no discrimination). NATO, through Secretary General Lord Robertson, has later softened that formula, underlining the indivisibility of the transatlantic link, the need to strengthen the European capabilities and the advisability to involve all the allies in the decisions concerning the European policy (see box at p. 48). This outline shows the convenience of establishing a new balance of power between EU and NATO, therefore between Europe and the US. Differently from WEU, which has always been an unequal partner of NATO in the defence field, the EU wants to play a more assertive role in the sphere of European security, putting forward not only its military capabilities, but also its economic and financial weight as well as its political instruments of institutional governance.

DEVELOPMENT STAGES OF THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE

1992: the Foreign Ministers and the Ministers of Defence of WEU meet in Petersberg, near Bonn, with the purpose of implementing the decisions connected with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. It is agreed to assign WEU an operational role, centred on the so-called "Petersberg missions": humanitarian aid, rescue of nationals abroad, peacekeeping, peace enforcing. The participating States pledge to assign forces which, when necessary, will be answerable to WEU (Forces Answerable to Western European Union - FAWEU);

1993: the common foreign and security policy (PESC) is sanctioned by the Maastricht Treaty which came into force, after ratification, on November 1, 1993. The provisions on this specific sector are reviewed by the Amsterdam Treaty, signed on October 2, 1997 and come into force on May 1, 1999. Articles from 11 to 28 specifically deal with PESC;

1998: at a Franco-British summit held in Saint-Malo, the following official declaration is formulated: the European Union must have the capability of conducting autonomous actions in response to crises. It must have moreover the support of a credible military force, the means to decide to employ it and the necessary readiness to implement it. To achieve this aim, the Union must have appropriate structures, capability of situation analysis, intelligence sources, capability of strategic planning, without creating unnecessary duplications of already existing structures.

June 1999: the European Council adopts the first common strategy of the European Union towards Russia, and issues statements on Kosovo and on the reinforcement of the common European policy on security and defence. Javier Solana is appointed High Representative for PESC and Secretary General of the Council. It is reaffirmed that the Union must have a capability of autonomous actions supported by a credible military force, the instruments that allow to use this capability, as well as high-readiness forces for conducting "Petersberg-type missions".

December 1999: the European Council meets in Helsinki, Finland. The member States resolve on achieving the so-called Headline Goal, according to which the EU, by the end of 2003, will have to be able to deploy up to 15 Brigades (50-60,000 men) for "Petersberg-type" missions, on a 60-day warning and with a sustainability of one year. This Corps-level force must be autonomous, include intelligence, logistic and Command-and-Control capabilities, besides having joint-service characteristics, with about 500 aircraft and 15 ships. The Council establishes a security/defence decision-making structure which includes a policy and security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff.

June 2001: the European Council meets in Göteborg, Sweden; the member States take a series of decisions. First, they determine to hold a conference for the development of capabilities at the end of 2001. The Union members will have to undertake to fill the already ascertained shortages. Secondly, they decide to consider the offers, in terms of capabilities, made by non-EU Nations and to fix the mechanisms for their evaluation. In the third place, they initiate procedures for the cooperation between NATO and EU in relation to the possibility of making use of assets and capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance. Last, an action plan is worked out in relation to the civilian aspects of crisis management (use of police forces and of a pool of on-call judges). At present, within the EU, there are activities aimed at ensuring the political control and the strategic management of the "Petersberg-type" operations directed by the Union, deciding on the realization of the operations with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, as well as on the procedures for the participation in the operations of EU members, European NATO-members and associated partners of WEU.

Therefore, no more "Europe: economic giant, political dwarf and military worm" (12).

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Going back to the European capability of acting autonomously, three questions are still pending. The first concerns the duplication of capabilities and institutional structures. The second refers to the costs involved in the implementation of a European power projection for Petersberg-type missions, and the input of the strategic balance on the

industrial basis of European defence. Number three on the one side concerns the relation between EU and NATO and, on the other, the erosion of the centrality of the latter.

The duplication dilemma, according to the French, conceals the emergence of a new partner, with which the US will have to compete: the European Union. At infrastructural and decision-making level the duplication appears to be modest: a Military Secretariat which responds to Javier Solana, a Policy and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Staff consisting

of 135 Officers. As regards forces and equipment, additional financial resources are indispensable, in order to acquire 1st and 2nd class weapon systems made in Europe. Therefore, the need to avoid unnecessary duplications, which was emphasized in Helsinki, does not concern the bodies that are essential for the institutional governance, i.e. the abovementioned PSC, EUMS and EUMC.

In this regard, it is interesting to note the point of view expressed by Stefano Silvestri, a well-known expert in military

strategy (13), on the issue of duplication of capabilities: he does not consider it a negative factor. On the contrary, he deems it useful in some areas, such as strategic mobility, in-flight refuelling and SEAD (14), in order to guarantee a certain redundancy. In principle, Dr. Silvestri proposes three "rules of behaviour", to avoid dangerous duplications of capabilities. First of all, shun investments in sectors where materials are overabundant compared to the real need (e.g. tanks). Second, engage only in sectors connected with strategic intelligence, force projectability, sustainability and interoperability. Last, avoid creating new complex projects in competition with similar ones already started by NATO (e.g. ACCS, NACMO (15), etc.). As regards the second dilemma, i.e. costs, one must consider that in 2000 the European defence budget was about 60-70% of the US budget. With two million men and women in uniform, Europe has difficulties in putting together 40,000 soldiers for a regional conflict, not to mention the fact that the European forces, conceived in the iron-curtain years, have a limited strategic mobility. In short, as Lord Robertson said in 1999, "with a budget equal to 60% of the US; *the Europeans express, in terms of capabilities, 10% of the real capability of the United States*".

If one adds the increase in the US defence expenditure as a consequence of the new war on terrorism, the asymmetry can only become more marked.

What is the cost of acquiring the capability of conducting Petersberg-type missions? Can we afford it? Can the European industry do it? Do we really want it?

It is not easy to make sure estimates, since there are so many variables. A German observer (16) reckoned that the



A plenary session of the European Parliament.

creation of a global and autonomous European capability of power projection would cost between 290 to 520 billion Euro depending on whether 1st or 2nd category weapon systems are selected. "Spreading" these costs over 15 years, and taking into account the savings deriving by synergy (work-sharing and standardization), the EU Nations should pay in addition from 17.5 to 32 billion Euro. Translated into percentages, it would be a matter of keeping the defence budget of the members States between 2.5% and 3% of their GDP. In terms of budget we could afford it, considering that we spend more than that just to buy alcoholic drinks. If we also consider the advantages deriving from a common market of armaments, the operation would certainly be worthwhile. Since the whole thing would be managed by the EU, the annual payment of 17.5-32 billion Euro would be included in the budget managed by the European Commission, increasing it by 25 to 50%, thus making the defence

component of the budget predominant vis-à-vis all the others (agriculture, education, projects, etc.).

Is the European defence industry in a position to interact within the process? A key event was the decision made at Farnborough in July 2000, where the Defence Ministers of France, Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Sweden signed a framework agreement for the reorganization of the European defence industry. On this subject, Alessandro Corneli (17) observed that "*the military-industrial complex must reconvert from the logic of conscript armies to that, of professionals. The European conventional-war scenarios have vanished, and Europe's industries must change their research projects, production lines and profit prospects. As the appropriations decrease, the national industries can survive only if they accept to become segments of a single production line. Instead of fighting against each other on the world market with more or less similar weapons systems, the European industries could keep a certain competitiveness on the international market through a high-quality production.*"



A better politico-economic-military coordination between NATO and EU would make the nascent European Armed Forces more vigorous.

Theoretically, Europe could propose to itself the aim of reaching the American technological level in 20 years".

The third dilemma concerns the attenuation of NATO's centrality in Europe. Turkey and Norway, members of the Alliance and not of the EU, are well aware of this and have openly expressed their wish to be involved in some way in the construction of European defence. Also the US is aware of this, and has proposed to formalize the relations

between NATO and EU, despite France's opposition. Paris, in fact, maintains that the forum for debating the European defence issues is still WEU to which Turkey, Norway and the US belong, albeit in different forms. Finally, also the British are conscious of the problem, and have pressed for the approval of a formula, according to which NATO maintains the right of first option on possible interventions.

As regards the participation in EU-led operations, procedures will be equal to those applied within NATO. Considering that the decision will remain national, we could see "by 15" decisions (with constructive abstentions) with "by 12" participations, or

"by 15" decisions and "by 15 plus" participations, with the contribution of non-EU nations.

The EU intentions are also welcomed by Russia, which has always been against US supremacy in Europe. In Moscow's outlook, the EU is not perceived as an antagonist, nor is the WEU, to which the Baltic states are associated partners. One can also add that Russia has never hampered the EU plans, since it does not see them as a threat to its security. In fact, the focus on the Petersberg missions have laid the foundations of cooperation, such as that of offering assets for strategic transport in case of need.

All this, up to September 11. Before that black Tuesday, it was believed that the Alliance would lose its central role on the stage of European security. All the indications were there. On the one side, the US contested a Europe which had commenced to act in an autonomous way, especially in its relations with China, North Korea, the so-called "rogue states" and Cuba. On the other, there was the expectation of scenarios where Europe would make decisions and conduct autonomous actions, also independently of the US consent, with the consequent break of the transatlantic link and, therefore, the beginning of NATO's end, followed by the creation of a "fortress Europe" and a "fortress America". But concretely, and this should be underlined again, the possibility of launching an autonomous European operation appears remote. For many more years Europe will have to depend on NATO command structures, as well as on the US logistic and information structures.

GIVING THE EU "ONE FACE AND ONE VOICE"

Focusing on Petersberg-type missions, the EU has, in point of

fact, limited regional ambitions. The decision of eluding Art.5, of the Brussels Treaty, keeping the WEU alive (see WEU box at p. 46) goes in this direction. Nevertheless, different projects have emerged. Tony Blair has said that the EU will operate "within Europe and at its periphery", Solana would like it to intervene in Africa and East Timor. Schroeder wishes it to defend Western interests and values all over the world.

Henry Kissinger observed that the EU could be considered as such only if and when it had a "single telephone number. On the formal plane, it suffices to dial +32-2-285-500-00, the number of Solana's situation centre. At substantial level, Friedbert Pfluger (18), Chief of the Bundestag EU Committee, says that it is necessary to contact every member every time in order to have a vague idea of what the Union thinks about the US activities in Iraq, the dispute between China and the US, the situation in the Middle East and even in the Balkans. When a Secretary General/High Representative was appointed for the first time, the EU was hoping to give "one face and one voice" to its common Policy of security and defence. But after Javier Solana's election in 1999, each foreign policy representative seems to be speaking his own account. There is no sign, therefore of the "single telephone number". After September 11, it would have been logical to convene the European Heads of State and Government in order to agree on the support to be given to the US and then entrust Javier Solana with the task of going to the US to present the European offer. Nothing of this kind was done and each European country acted autonomously (19). Three months later, at the Laeken conference in mid-December 2001, the Belgian Foreign Minister announced that a



crucial event in European history was taking place, i.e. the creation of a European peacekeeping force for Afghanistan. This statement angered the British, who had autonomously taken the leadership of the international mission of security and assistance in Afghanistan for three months. The fact is that the Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, President of the European semester, was compelled to remove from the official documents all the references to the collective EU action. Many faces, many voices, many telephone numbers: this is the bitter reality of the European Union.

NATO AND THE EU

NATO and the EU have always acted in cooperation. Both are strongly committed to their respective enlargement process, which nevertheless proceeds in parallel according to different logics and at a different pace (20). NATO – which proceeded more rapidly, since it is easier to enlarge a politico-military alliance than a European governmental system at multiple levels – after the first round of

May 9, 1950: In the Quai d'Orsay's Clock Room, Robert Schuman delivers the opening speech on the Economic Community of Coal and Steel (CECA).

enlargement is going through a period of consolidation and reflection, during which its members have to redefine the internal balances. The enlargement of the EU is much more complex for several reasons: the convergence criteria, complicate decision-making procedures, the future of the agricultural policy and of the structural funds, multipolar leadership, weakening of the Franco-German axis, which had a cooperative hegemony, the implications of the Schengen agreements for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The Union was and is working for the most complex project of its history, and the connected policies concern money, delegation of power and sovereignty.

In any case, both the project of European integration and the development of autonomous capabilities in the defence sector,



The cooperation among the EU Armed Forces engaged in peace missions helps to strengthen the European identity of security and defence.

as well as the enlargement of NATO, will go on, albeit with lesser energy and probably some temporary stops. The transatlantic relations will be somehow rebalanced, to take into account the emergence of the new European actor.

AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN PROJECT?

On this subject, Alessandro Corneli (21) maintains that the US should be considered the "stone guest" of the process of European integration, since, on the one hand, it is impossible to imagine a Europe without systematic relations with the US at all levels while, on the other, no argument on the integrated

future of Europe can be considered complete if the Americans are not among the participants in the process.

The present Minister of Defence of Italy (22) echoed these words two years ago, when he declared to "Foreign Affairs" that it was time to give a strong boost to the EU-US relations, tasking perhaps a group of "wise men" to draw an institutional outline of the vital relations with the main ally, which is also the recipient of the largest portion of the European foreign investments. According to the Hon. Martino, the risk of social and political decoupling must be avoided at all costs, to ward off the dangers of a protectionist spiral and commercial conflicts that could also assume a political character.

Adrian Price (23) widened this prospect by saying that it is necessary to negotiate a vision accepted within OSCE, and proposed, as a starting point, the

platform of the "Model for European Security in the 21st Century", agreed upon in Istanbul in November 1999.

A EUROPEAN ARMY?

Will we have a European Army? If the dreams of Robert Schuman, Altiero Spinelli, Jacques Delors and Joschka Fischer, (i.e. the transition from Union of States to a complete "parliamentarization" of a European Federation) were to come true, we probably would. This would entail a European Parliament, a European Government, a constitutional Treaty and, therefore, a European army based on the CED model of 1952. But Fischer's idealism clashes with the pragmatism of Giuliano Amato (24), who observes that *"the EU is a daring joint venture among partners: a Union which proceeds by successive advances and adaptations, combining*

integration and cooperation, common structures and classic intergovernmental compromises, standards to be reached, authority of arbitration and mutual monitoring". Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, reaffirms this thesis. Two years ago, in an official declaration, he imagined the future of the Union as *"a Europe of States rather than the United States of Europe"*.

As long as the European project remains a "joint venture", albeit with more and more "Brusselized" decisions, there will be no room for a "European Army" such as the one prefigured in CED (see box at p. 41). On the other hand, this was remarked at the Göteborg summit (25), where it was said that *"the European determination of developing an autonomous capability of action... does not imply the constitution of a European Army. The allotment of the Member States' military resources for these operations will remain a typically national decision"*.

Therefore, rather than a "European Army" we could afford a "European defence" within some fifteen years. At political level, in any case, the "decision-making" question will have to be solved, and numerous variables are at play. First of all, it is necessary to take into account the neutralist inclinations of Austria, Sweden and Finland, Denmark's unwillingness and France's national pride. Secondly, it is necessary to compensate the Union's priorities, making the citizens "digest" the increase in the defence expenditure (up to 2.5-3% of the GDP), which would go to the detriment of instruction, education, public health, pensions and infrastructure. Thirdly, it is essential to solve the problem of the political control of the military force, since it would be unthinkable to depend on the opinions of all national parliaments for every decision.

ACRONYMS

ACCS: Air Command and Control System
CED: Comunità Europea di Difesa
CESDP: Common European Security and Defense Policy
CFSP: Common Foreign Security Policy
ESDI: European Security and Defence Identity
EUMC: European Military Committee
EUMS: European Military Staff
FHQ: Force Headquarters
NAC: North Atlantic Council
NACMO NATO: Air Command and Control System Management Organization
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHQ: Operational Headquarters
OPCMDR: Operational Commander
OSCE: Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSC: Political Security Council
SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SEAD: Suppression Enemy Air Defence
UE: Unione Europea
UEO: Unione Europea Occidentale

REPERCUSSIONS OF SEPTEMBER 11

The economic consequences of September 11 cannot be foreseen yet, because whole areas of the world could be dragged in an extremely dangerous "domino effect". The risk of recession, already around the corner before that black Tuesday, could still appear with all its virulence, since the economy of the world is going through a difficult moment. In Europe the stability pact, which should have made the Euro fly high at the beginning of 2002, is now at risk. Japan has been going through a ten-year crisis, with a growth close to zero, while the internal consumption in the US, its traditional commercial partner, is decreasing. The US locomotive, which had been reducing its speed for some time, is now slowly recovering its pace. In Latin America, with the collapse of Argentina and the troubles in Venezuela and Colombia, the project of a free-trade area – which was almost in the finishing straight – is now vanishing.

A key aspect emerging from September 11 is the growing technological gap between Europe and the United States. The US military technology, tested in Afghanistan, belongs to a generation which is ten years ahead of Europe's. This adds to the already evident worry about the growing American unilateralism and the consequent loss of power by the European partners, a loss which will last until Europe acquires a united political action and an effective and cohesive military force. These subjects enlivened the recent conference held in Munich, to the point that Richard Perle, security adviser to President Bush, said that *"the US has never been so determined even to act alone, if necessary, to defend itself from terrorism"*. On the same occasion and in this regard, Lord Robertson underlined the need for the Europeans to improve their military capabilities if they want to operate side by side with the US and influence its decisions. In 2003, according to Blomberg, the European members of NATO

will spend 140 billion dollars, and the United States 379 billion. With one billion dollars a day, the highest increase in the last 20 years, the US will devote to defence more than the total spent by the 15 Countries that follow. This asymmetry will further widen the technological gap between the two sides of the Atlantic to the point that, as a German official remarked, *"in a short time we shall not be able to communicate with the Americans, let alone fight together"*. Minister Antonio Martino (26) recently observed that the challenge consists precisely in reducing the unbalance of capabilities between Americans and Europeans. Since Europe and the US share a common destiny, any discussion on the European will to act autonomously appears insignificant: the strength – and therefore the credibility – of Europe can only be achieved through the implementation of balanced relations with the US on the plane of expressible capabilities. Lord Robertson, in his turn (27), on the one hand asked Europe a stronger financial effort in order to help the Europeans overcome the condition of military pygmies and, on the other, called upon the US to drop its restrictions on technology transfers and industrial cooperation, in order to facilitate the modernization process in the field of European defence. Inaction in these sectors would have devastating effects on the allies' interoperability and inevitably widen the technological gap between the two shores of the Atlantic.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

The Euro is a reality under everybody's eyes. It is the result of the political renunciation of an essential component of the national sovereignty of the

The Italian Armed Forces are employed in peacekeeping operations in a number of unstable areas.

States: the power to coin money. On the ground of common foreign policy (PESC) and foreign and security policy (PESD) the time is not ripe for the conferment to a supranational body of such an important part of the sovereignty still jealously guarded by each Nation. The lessons learned from the "Enduring Freedom" coalition against international terror and the international force of assistance and security in Afghanistan revealed a bitter reality: Europe does not have yet "one face, one voice, one telephone number". To understand the new basic trends, we shall have to wait for the election in France (Spring) and Germany (Autumn), and for the proposals which will be put forward next year at the European Convention. Waiting for better times, the rapid-intervention European force could become "partially" operational in 2003, and be employed in peacekeeping or humanitarian missions by mandate of the UN Security Council. NATO will take care of the rest.

□

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Joint Operational Command*

NOTES

- (1) "The EU Council and the common security policy". Internet: www.europa-eu.int.
- (2) "Politics Among Nations", Hans Morgenthau, 1948.
- (3) "Europe's New Defence Ambitions: Implications for NATO, US and Russia". Peter Van Ham, "The Marshall Center for Security Studies, Paper 2001. It is a reference text for studies".



- (4) "Lessons Learned from the NATO Experience in the Balkans", Sir John Goulden, lecture given in Milan on April 2, 2001.
- (5) "Their Own Army? Making the European Defence Work", Philip Gordon, "Foreign Affairs", August 2000, p. 114.
- (6) Ibid.
- (7) It must be said that in 2000 the US devoted to defence 285 billion dollars (3.2% GDP) and the Europeans 165 billion dollars (2.1%). With unemployment at 10%, the Europeans have different national priorities.
- (8) An important point is the European shortage of assets such as airlift, cruise and PGM, which are US rather than NATO assets.
- (9) Rainer Schwirb, "The Military Dimension of the ESDP: Intention and Reality", on "Abecedaire"; June 2001, p.53.
- (10) "Why I'm Ending Conscription",



Daily Telegraph, Feb. 22, 2002 by Min. Antonio Martino: Italian Minister Explains His Plan for a Smaller but More Efficient Defence Force to John Keegan, Defence Editor.

(11) "European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?" Jolyon Howorth, Institute for Strategic Studies WEU, Paris, May 2000, p.97.

(12) Slogan coined by Gen. Luigi Caligaris.

(13) On "European Defence; Making It Work", edited by François Heisbourg, Institute for Strategic Studies WEU, Paris, Sept. 2000, p. 48.

(14) Suppression Enemy Air Defence.

(15) Air Command and Control System (ACCS), a complex control system of NATO air operations. NACMO stands for NATO Air Command and Control System

Management Organization.

(16) "How much does the EU Military Capability Cost"? Conversation with Professor Seidelman, Frankfurt University, Oberammergau, March 1, 2001.

(17) "Europe, Military Integration and the US"; Alessandro Corneli, "Foreign Affairs", no. 123, October 2000, p.784.

(18) "Critical Comments on EU's Foreign Policy"; Friedbert Pfluger, Chairman of the EU Committee in the Bundestag, on "Abecedaire", June 2001, p.53.

(19) Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, to the Joint Committees of Parliament, Feb.5.

(20) "The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargement and Reshaping the European Order", Adrian Price, "Strategic Studies", Summer 2001, p.138.

(21) "Europe, Military Integration and the US", Alessandro Corneli, "

Foreign Affairs, no. 123, October 2000, p.784.

(22) "Which Europe?" Antonio Martino "Foreign Affairs" no.123, October 2000, p.708.

(23) See note 20.

(24) "Fischer, Europe and the Instruments of its Difficult Journey", Giuliano Amato, "Foreign Affairs", no.127, July 2000. P.471.

(25) "Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy", Press Release no. 9526/1/01, Brussels, June 11, 2001, para II.

(26) "International Terrorism: The European Impact", Minister Antonio Martino, 38th Conference on Security Policy, Munich, Feb 2, 2002.

(27) Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, "Speech at the 38th Munich Conference on Security Policy", Feb 3, 2002.

EUROPEAN UNION

A COMMON POLICY FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS AND SECURITY


At present the centrality of the security policy has become central within the general framework of foreign policy. From this point of view, military strategy enhances its function as an instrument no more exclusively in the service of national interests but as a factor of support to continental security. A special structure has been created through the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties in order to start a process of foreign and security policy known as PESC. Unfortunately we cannot avoid noticing unilateral behaviours that conflict with this common line. In this regard, we should like to have your comments.

Through the various instruments adopted after Amsterdam and

by Ornella Rota *



In a globalized world, the area of national interests is destined to be greatly reduced, but the current attempt to develop a common foreign and security policy does not mean that the goal of a single political line has been attained. This is a long-term enterprise and one of the most demanding challenges in the context of the enlargement of the Union. These and other reflections have been the subject of our talk with Javier Solana.



INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR JAVIER SOLANA MADARIAGA

UE Representative
for common foreign and security policy



Maastricht, the EU partners have decided to strengthen a "common" policy of security and defence, not a "single" policy. Therefore PESC is only a common policy of security and defence. If we had a single defence policy we should create a European Army. And this is not the case. The member Countries have decided that they will act

together when the common European values and interests are at stake. This does not prevent any state from acting alone if it perceives a threat to its exclusively national interests. It is true that in a globalized world and within the framework of the European integration the area of

exclusively national interests tends to shrink a great deal. PESC is also a process aimed at constantly drawing together the interests of the foreign and



Italian and Spanish servicemen in Albania.

security policies of the Partners. It is a long-term enterprise, and one of the toughest challenges in the context of the enlargement of the Union.


Italy is increasingly becoming the frontier Country of Europe and has to keep watch not only on its security but also on that of the rest of the Continent. It is not by chance that Italy is considered one of the possible launching pads of the West towards the Euro-Asian and Euro-African critical areas. It is a delicate role that implies a step forward also in the military and industrial sectors; a role that cannot be confronted without an adequate support by the Union. What is the attention given by the EU to the Italian geo-political situation?

Italy is one of the founding States of the European Union. As such, it has always played a leading role in the European construction and has all the qualifications for asserting its function of frontier Country before Continental and Mediterranean Europe. Along the years, and together with other Countries, it has also effectively endeavoured to obtain that Europe would devote the attention and the resources indispensable to maintain systematic relations with those areas, which are part of our strategic environment. Such policies are in the interest of all EU Partners. The problems of those regions affect all Countries and not only those geographically close to them. In view of this, you are correctly emphasizing the importance of the security and industrial policies. Both develop in their particular context which, nevertheless, in both cases, is distinguished by the seal of



Above.
An Italian-Greek checkpoint in Albania.

Right.
A Spanish servicemen of the FMP on surveillance duty.



increased solidarity among the member Countries.

The recent initiatives aimed at building a common European policy of security and defence not separate from NATO are giving rise to a lively discussion. There have been worries that this could lead to a separation of the European security from that of the non-EU Allies. Don't you think that, in the field of defence and security, Europe has a pressing need to increase its military capabilities in order to avoid being confined in the future to a useful, but limited, reactive role?

I have no doubts as to the need for the EU to improve its capability of military action. This is of capital importance for a credible and effective foreign and security



Left.
A German infantryman.

Right.
Italian, British and German servicemen employed by NATO in a peace mission in the former Yugoslavia.

of several Countries and for the establishment of a more integrated and competitive industrial basis. To tell the truth, up to now, the results have been rather disappointing. In the light of the tragic September 11 and the Afghan conflict, can one foresee a relaunching of the industrial sector of European defence?

After the end of the Cold War it was normal to decide to cut the budget of defence. But this has not made the world more secure. The number of open conflicts has increased during the last decade. We must re-examine the question of the resources for security. The development of a real and competitive industrial and technological basis is part of this task.

The nature of the threats to security has changed and so has the range of instruments necessary to counter them. In the world, and in the solution of crises, the socio-economic dimension has assumed greater importance. Nevertheless, we still need the military instrument because, when we are faced by possible rogueries and acts of force, the threat of making recourse to a credible force remains an extreme deterrent and remedy. The events of September 11 have revealed new and exceptional challenges. In this regard, the democratically elected governments must pay attention to the wishes and priorities expressed by public opinion, but they must also assume a leading role in explaining the real price to be paid in order to protect our societies and to preserve their security, democracy and prosperity.

policy. Considering its economic, financial and diplomatic importance at world level, the European Union must be able to assume greater responsibilities in the security sector. The common policy of security and defence has precisely this purpose. It is an open project which involves all European Countries - be they candidates to EU partnership or European Allies that are not members of the Union - because the security of our Continent is

indivisible. This is what is firmly stated in the decisions of the European Council and this is what is occurring in reality.

The new geo-strategic order has implied, among other things, a shrinking in the armament market and a reduction in the budget of Defence. As a consequence, there have been plans for a close cooperation both for developing programmes involving the common interests



In your opinion, is a war no more among States, like the one we are fighting now, likely to remain an anomaly or could it become the kind of conflict most common in the future?

The kind of war we will fight in the future will be different, because of two essential factors: the nature of the actors involved in the conflict and the technological advances. On the scene of armed conflicts, the crises of the last decade have introduced non-governmental bodies and also individuals, or groups of individuals, pursuing objectives different from the traditional aims of the wars among Nations. The consequent asymmetry of warfare requires new answers. The revolution in military technologies has produced new types of military resources which will change the future wars. Undoubtedly some systems have

been conceived in order to respond more effectively to the asymmetry of warfare. But I believe that conflicts and wars among States will not disappear, for a series of reasons which generally concern the nature of international relations and certain local conditions of instability or rivalry. To settle conflicts, the European Union has developed an

alternative to force: cooperation and integration. This is why the foremost priority of our common foreign policy is to contribute to peace and cooperation among Nations and promote the European model of integration.

□

** Journalist,
Contributor to «La Stampa»*

Javier Solana Madariaga, a scientist gone over to politics and diplomacy, is the author of about thirty publications on the physics of solids and for some years has taught this subject at Madrid "Complutense" University.

He is a member of the Spanish section of the "Club of Rome" and has been elected to Parliament in 1977. He has been a Minister in every government from 1982 to 1995. In 1995, Professor Solana was appointed NATO Secretary General and held this office until 1999. In the autumn of three years ago he was appointed Secretary General of the Council, High Representative of the European Union for the common foreign and security policy and Secretary General of the Western European Union.

THE EUROPE OF SECURITY



INTERVIEW WITH THE HON. LUIGI RAMPONI

*President of the Defence Committee
of the Chamber of Deputies*

by Giovanni Cerbo *

For the first time in its history, with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 the European Community affirmed its will to gradually establish a common defence policy.

What has been done since then?

The Maastricht Treaty not only introduced the concept of European common defence, but started also a common policy for foreign affairs and security (PESC) and a European policy for defence and security (PESD).

Certainly many steps forward have been made. The most



Certainly there are favourable conditions for the development of a European Security and Defence Identity, but there is still a long way to go. First of all it is necessary to create the appropriate synergies also in other connected fields: industrial cooperation, for example, is one of the most important sectors. In fact, the operational effectiveness of the military instrument goes side by side with the update of the weapon systems. In the following interview we discuss these and other subjects with the Hon. Luigi Ramponi.

management bodies, such as the Political Committee, the Military Committee and the European Military Staff.

After that, the individual Countries proceeded to decide on the size of their participation in the common effort. In this connection, Italy's contribution will be equal to that of France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

I am convinced that, by the end of 2003, this instrument will be fully operational, and capable of carrying out autonomous operations of peacekeeping and peace-enforcing. Certainly, if this Major Unit had already been operational, Europe could have employed it in Afghanistan in support of peace, security and President Karzai's policy.

Within this framework, what are the prospects for the development of a European Security and Defence Identity?

Consistently with what I just said, the very fact that a European force is established, capable of performing Petersberg tasks in a framework of full autonomy, means that this European Identity has already a concrete value.

Certainly there are favourable

conditions for the development of a common policy in the field of security, but we still have a long way to go. The "landing place" could be the constitution of a European Army, within the general context of the Atlantic Alliance. But, in order to reach this target, it is necessary to achieve the appropriate synergies also in other connected sectors. Industrial cooperation is one of the most important: the operational effectiveness of the military instrument proceeds at the same rate of the development and updating of weapons systems.

I am sure that we are on the right path, as shown by the agreements signed by Italy, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK for promoting the integration of the European industries.

What could Italy's role be in the perspective of a closer interconnection among WEU, EU and NATO?

First of all it must be said that WEU is progressively disappearing.

As regards NATO, it must be clearly noted that the Alliance is a fundamental structure of Western security and defence. Italy's role will not be different

interesting was that made in Helsinki at the end of 1999 when it was decided that, for Petersberg missions, the European Union would constitute a military operational instrument of 60,000 men with air and naval supports and, at the same time, establish some

from the one played so far, approved by the Helsinki Resolution, Our Country undertook to give a contribution equal to that provided by the other main European Countries – Germany, France and the UK – both as regards the strengthening of the Atlantic pillar and the realization of European Security and Defence Identity. Let's not forget that the first plan of constituting a European Defence Community (CED) was prepared by De Gasperi, together with Adenauer and Schuman. It was a very brilliant plan, which still retains its validity and deserves a high consideration.

Our course, therefore, goes in this direction, and we are sure that we shall effectively contribute to the construction of a common European defence, in close interconnection with the other side of the Atlantic.

In an international scenario where organized crime plays an ever more destabilizing role, the activity of the multinational contingents engaged in Peace Support Operations becomes increasingly difficult.

In this regard, also in the light of the experience made in the Balkans, how could the role of the Italian Army evolve?



To tell the truth, organized crime is a subject by itself, even if there is a close interaction between crime and other subversive activities. But I do not think that the fight against crime could fall within the responsibility of the Armed Forces which, as in other circumstances, can only be called to give their contribution to the Police Forces. In this regard, the activities carried out lately by the Army for the control of the national territory are very significant.

I like to mention “Vespri Siciliani”, “Forza Paris” and many other operations.

But I also believe that we should not go further than this kind of cooperation, even while carrying out peacekeeping missions. The problems related to the fight against crime are a primary responsibility of the intelligence organizations.

Do you think that an enlargement tout-court of the Atlantic Alliance to the Countries of South East Europe could imply a weakening of NATO's politico-military cohesion, particularly in view of a presumably long fight against international terrorism?

I don't think so. After the end of the bipolar era, the fall of the





Above.
Italian servicemen on surveillance duty in the centre of Kabul.

Left.
An Italian patrol outside Barracks 57, in the outskirts of Kabul.

Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, we legitimately asked ourselves: does this Alliance, which was born to oppose the expansionist aims of the Communist bloc, still have a reason to exist?

Little by little we became aware of the fact that, particularly in the new politico-strategic scenario, where the great challenges are represented by asymmetric threats, the Alliance is a sure defence for Western civilization and the only far-reaching instrument

capable of intervening in support of the UN decisions, as in fact happened in several circumstances. Vis-à-vis new threats, it was necessary to find new strategies. As a consequence, the new "strategic concept" considers NATO not only a defensive pillar, but also a decisive factor for the security of larger and larger geographical areas.

In view of this, the enlargement to the East cannot but strengthen the security project. But the enlargement must not be considered just a mere cooptation.

The Countries wishing to join the Atlantic Alliance "must have their papers in order". If they are to be accepted, they must not only guarantee good standards of efficiency and operational capability on the

military plane, but also give a concrete demonstration of democracy and respect of human rights.

If it is so, then the enlargement will represent a sure factor of reinforcement: as the number of the joining Nations grows, so grows the stability of the world's politico-strategic balances.

Enlargement means also to facilitate the relations with the Countries which are at the borders of the NATO organization. This is especially true for Russia, which today begins to seriously consider the possibility not only of being involved in the present change, but even to become the 20th full-fledged member of the Alliance. A lot has been written on the enlargement issue but, I believe, in an inappropriate manner. The idea of establishing a European

Corps has immediately caused the fear that the initiative would bring NATO's internal cohesion into question.

I've never shared these fears. A united Europe cannot but make the Atlantic Alliance even more solid.

The Italian Army is becoming more flexible, adaptable and projectable, proving to be an effective factor of cooperation in foreign and security relations.

How can this trend be strengthened?

The trend can be reinforced through a sound capitalization of the effort that the Country is making for its defence.

An Italian foreign policy projected towards the realization of the European political union, with equal rights and titles, requires a greater financial effort.

Macroscopic differences, such as the present ones, between the percentage of the GDP devoted to defence by our Country and the defence budget of the other major European Nations, are not acceptable anymore. In this way, we disregard the commitment made with the Helsinki Resolution. Everybody knows, but is good to underline it, Italy, in percentage terms, spends for defence one third, two thirds and one half of the amounts invested, respectively, by the British, the Germans and the French.

On the contrary, if we compare the Italian appropriations for social security, education, agriculture and other sectors with those of the other Countries, we realize that the gap is below one or two thirtieths or downright nonexistent.

So, what could be the conclusion?

If we proclaim our will to contribute to a European

Defence Identity, albeit limited to Petersberg missions; if we want to participate with equal dignity in the realization of a common foreign and security policy, with the European Army as the fundamental pillar; if we say that we want all these things, then we are compelled – compatibly with the national economic situation – to make a greater effort for defence.


Otherwise, we will continue to “carry coals to Newcastle”.

The value of a military instrument is not expressed only in the specific sector of security and defence policy and through the struggle against international terrorism. The Armed Forces are also a non secondary element through which the Country can exercise its influence and overall weight in international relations. Don't you think that today the Armed Forces could be an extraordinary factor of foreign policy?

Certainly, but not for a “gunboat policy”, as was the case in the past.

Today all the Countries in the world converge in the fight against terror, which is only possible with two fundamental instruments. The first is a coercive factor, which is expressed through the employment of the Armed Forces, indispensable for peace enforcement or peacekeeping. The second instrument is the effort that the most advanced nations must make in order to eliminate the onset and growth of extremist movements and to remove their religious fundamentalism, ideologic extremism, etc.

This is what we have been doing and will continue to do with the operations in support of peace.



Territorial control is one of the tasks entrusted to our contingent in Afghanistan.

What is the net result, up to now, of our participation in peace operations?

Despite the financial difficulties, the results achieved so far by our Armed Forces have been very brilliant, thanks to the hard work and professionalism of our soldiers, who have been capable of performing honourably in all types of employment.

All Italians must be grateful to them, for their dignified and efficient response to the summons of the international community. This is witnessed



by the appreciation of the Countries in favour of which we intervene and the consideration of their political and religious leaders.

In conclusion, to give a pertinent answer to your question, I wish to confirm that, albeit with an economically anaemic Defence, our personnel have given excellent proofs of efficiency in all international contexts.

Unfortunately, despite these gratifying success, there was not, in terms of political returns, an adequate political recognition as regards political relations.

□

** Brigadier General,
Editor in Chief, Rivista Militare*

Lieutenant General (ret.) Luigi Ramponi is a "Bersaglieri" Officer, a pilot and a paratrooper. After attending the Staff course, he remained at the War College as a lecturer.

Gen. Ramponi commanded the 1st Bersaglieri Regiment, the 8th "Garibaldi" Brigade and the Military Region of Sardinia. He carried out important managerial tasks within the Central Organization of Defence, and held the office of President of the Armed Forces' High Council. As Military attachè at the Italian

Embassy in Washington, he was awarded the "Legion of Merit-degree Officer" for his wise diplomatic action aimed at safeguarding the national interests and at keeping special relations of friendship with the Authorities of the Allied Nation.

He has been Commanding General of the "Guardia di Finanza" and Director of SISMI, the Military Security Service.

Gen. Ramponi is decorated with the Gold Medal for Air Navigation, the "Mauriziana" Medal and the Knight Grand Cross, Order of Merit of the Republic of Italy.

Elected Senator with "Alleanza Nazionale" for the 12th Legislature, he has been Vice-President of the Anti-Mafia Committee, member of the Security Department of "Alleanza Nazionale", and Member of the AN National Political Executive.


At present, Lieut. Gen. Luigi Ramponi is the Chairman of the House Defence Committee.



THE ITALIAN CORPS FOR NATO

by Vincenzo Maugeri * and Vincenzo Pitagora **

The concepts
expressed in this
article reflect the
Author's personal
views.



The following article is a continuation of the one presented with the last issue and points out the necessity to constitute two fully operational and highly projectable Division Headquarters.

It describes their possible organization, distribution of responsibilities and tactical-logistic support.

The capability of preparing and employing effective and credible Command-and-Control structures represents the real qualitative leap of our Service.

In planning the forces to be assigned to NATO, Italy, some time ago, undertook to provide a Division that was meant to be attached to the British Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in Germany. In 1995, after the conclusion of the preventive accords with the Allied Nations, the Staff of the 3rd Italian Division was established in Milan. This Command would be completed only in case of employment, using the resources of the Projection Forces Command (FOP). In periods of operational inactivity, the activation Staff was located within the FOP Command. This solution, owing to the lack of permanent resour-

ces for the specific requirement, did not achieve the desired results: in substance, the Headquarters of the 3rd Italian Division never "took off".

The HRL(F) Project, also implemented through the transformation of the FOP Command into a Rapid Reaction Corps Hq, implies the need to find new solutions, aimed at fulfilling the earlier commitment undertaken with the ARRC.

Furthermore, the HRF(L) project brings in a new requirement: to supply the new Corps with a Division. The Italian commitment meets the absolutely necessary operational needs of the Corps.

As a matter of fact, the subordination bond of the forces assigned by the contributing Nations is the operational control (OPCON) which, in practice, makes it impossible for the Commander to assign the mission to the forces received. This limitation reduces the freedom of action of the Corps Commander and is incompatible with the need to have on hand a "reserve"(1) without the previous approval of the mission by the contributing Nations.

The Italian proposal to assign an OPCOM Division to the new Corps falls within this context, safeguarding the Corps



(Part Two)



COMPLEX OF RESOURCES TO BE PREPARED




Fig. 1

Commander who, even if destined to operate in permanently multinational environments, will at any rate "wear" an Italian uniform. The international commitments mentioned above imply the *operational requirement* of establishing two fully operational and highly projectable Division Headquarters.

The Project also involved the Headquarters and units of tactical and logistic support (CS and CSS). Therefore, the CS and CSS Commands, with the exclusion of the Air Cavalry Command, are an integral part of the "HRF(L) resource package" (Fig.1), with the addition of the "Friuli" Air Mobile Brigade, whose prior task is the conduct of deep operations. Besides, the CS Commands must provide reinforcements to the HRF(L), in order to move from a situation of peace to one of war or crisis.

The CS and CSS Commands of the land operational forces (FOTER) are organized as follows:

- Artillery Group Command, located in Portogruaro, supported by an "ad hoc" Command Team, included in the unit in garrison, associated with the "Vultorno" 3rd Artillery (MLRS) Regiment;
- A/A Artillery Group, located in Padua, supported by a specific Headquarters Command;
- Engineer Group Command, located in Udine, supported by an "ad hoc" Command Team, attached to the Unit in garrison, associated with the

3rd Sapper Regiment;

- Information and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Group, included in the C4IEW Command, at Anzio;
- Air Cavalry Command, located in Viterbo;
- Logistic Brigade Command, located in Treviso.

The response to the new requirements connected with the HRF(L) consists in the operational reorganization of these Headquarters, turning them into CS/CSS Brigade Hqs, capable of exercising their Command and Control over the subordinate units in operations as well as managing the in-garrison preparation of the subordinate formations.

THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

Organizational model

In order to meet the Division Headquarters' operational requirement, the solution adopted was based on the reorganization of the Intermediate Operational Commands (COINT).

This setup envisaged a Division Hq "separated" from COINT but



An MG 42/59 defending a sensitive point.

organized within its compass (Fig.2).

In particular, the organizational model envisages three basic components:


- **COINT** Commander, responsible for the preparation and full upkeep of the subordinate units and Commands;
- **Coordination Staff**, tasked with the implementation of all the Staff activities concerning the preparation of units and Commands, the relations with COMFOTER and the other Area Commands and the management of the cooperation with the other Institutions;
- **Division Hq**, responsible for planning and conducting the operations.

The main characteristic of this structure is the constitution of the **Planning Div Hq**, with no subordinate forces during periods of operational inactivity.

Sharing of responsibilities

At first sight, the organization of COINT in three components could give rise to doubts and perplexities about the sharing of responsibilities, particularly between the Coordination Staff and the Division Hq, also because this organization implies the adoption of mental schemes new for our Army. The organization of the new structure is based on the following criteria:

- The COINT Commander, as mentioned before, is responsible for the performance of the assigned task, which is essentially to prepare and maintain the readiness and operational capability levels of the Division Hq and subordinate Brigades. In the performance of this task, he avails himself of the Coordinating Staff, which is in contact both with the Division Hq and the Brigades;



- The Division Commander is responsible for preparing and maintaining the readiness and capability levels of the Division Hq. In view of this, he takes care of the individual training and amalgamation of the Staff;
- Upon reception of an order requiring the employment of a Division, the Division Hq concerned begins to develop its planning and implements – also in connection with the Brigades/Units whose allocation is planned (2) – the arrangements envisaged in view of the specific mission. In this phase, according to doctrine (3), COMFOTER acts as a “Mounting Hq” (4) of the Major Unit. This procedure can also be adopted for the exercises in which the Division Hq participates;
- **upon Transfer of Authority:**
 - the Division Commander becomes subordinate (FULLCOM/OPCOM/OPCON) to a Corps Commander or to a Force/Component Commander;
 - the Commanders of the assigned Brigades/Units are transferred under the Division Commander (FULLCOM/OPCOM/OPCON). Therefore, the Division

becomes a tactical-level “complex Major Unit”, made up of a variable number of Brigades and manoeuvre, combat support and logistic support units(5).

In short, COINTs will continue to exist, and will be responsible for the logistic-administrative management and training of the subordinate units and Commands. The present Brigades will remain under their command, with the co-located mentioned Division Headquarters. The latter, together with the ARRC, are the real operational instruments of the Army, and are tasked with drafting the plans connected with the employment options, organizing complex training activities and will finally be projected in Theatre for the conduct of complex operations, assuming Command/Control of the forces assigned to them.

Division Headquarters to be constituted

- The Army, in order to meet its international commitments, will have to ensure the availability of:
- two high-readiness Division



Rangers of the 9th Regiment.

Hqs, to be assigned to the new ARRC at Solbiate Olona and to the one in Germany;

- a third Division Hqs, with a lesser degree of readiness (180 days), in a position to guarantee the in-Theatre rotation, in case of protracted employment, of one of the two abovementioned high-readiness Division Hqs.

As a consequence, the 1st and 2nd Defence Forces Commands (FODs) will produce the high-readiness Division Hqs, while the Alpine Troop Command will set up the Div Hqs with a lower level of readiness.

In particular, the 1st and 2nd FOD Divisions, will be attached, respectively, to the Corps Hqs at Solbiate Olona and to the ARRC in Germany.

The Coordinating Staff

The Coordinating Staff carries out the functions of a COINT

Staff in its capacity as preparation and management Command. Besides, it serves as a reserve of resources, in that it is a ready and spendable reservoir of reinforcements for the Division.

The Coordinating Staff is organized as follows:

- Coordinating General, responsible, by authority of the COINT Commander, for the COINT's routine administration;
- Personnel Office, dealing with personnel issues (employment, legal-administrative aspects, transfer requests, personal records, status and promotions, awards and decorations, completion measures), legal advice/military law, accidents and Military Representation of the whole COINT, including the Div Hqs;
- Security and MP Office, as a directing body of the Military Police and security service within the COINT. Among other things, it supervises the sector's training and the

technical-professional updating of the Cadres;

- Training and CIMIC Office for the 1st and the 2nd FOD, as directing body and Staff for "training" functions and cooperation activities with other Institutions. It is tasked with:

- programming, coordination and control of training (exercise documents, training directives and programmes, management of training areas and ranges), planning of courses and air-cooperation activities;
- drawing up directives for the cooperation with other Institutions, and contacts with the appropriate civilian authorities.

Within the COINT of the Alpine Troops, CIMIC is replaced by the mountain meteorologic function;

- Logistic Office, directing body of the "preparation" and "in-

garrison" logistics. It controls and coordinates all the activities of Transport and Materials, Health, and Veterinary Medicine and Quartermaster Services, as well as the activities connected with the management of the infrastructure.

- Plans, Programming and Budget Section, which:
 - advises the Coordinating General and every sector manager on the employment of the assigned funds;
 - plans and conducts, on the basis of the directives issued by the Coordinating General, and with the approval of the Coordinating Staff and the various Branches of the Division Hq, the sharing out of funds to the various budget items, the formulation of the employment plans for the allocations and control on the employment of funds.

A particularly delicate aspect is the one relevant to the direct connection between COINTS and Prefects. The reference norms assign the exclusive responsibility for civil defence to the Minister of the Interior, who avails himself of his representatives, Prefects included, who are responsible for public security at provincial level. The Prefects must also involve the COINTS responsible for a particular territory.

The direct connection between Prefects and COINTs could present some difficulties, and even saturate the COINT's capabilities (CIMIC Office of the Staff and possibly, the matter being operational, the G5 of the Division Hq), especially in the initial phases of analysis of the situation and assessment of the threat to the national territory, which Prefects carry out on their own initiative at the beginning of crises that could have an

impact on the metropolitan territory.

In order to avoid the inconvenience and assist the Prefects in their initial decision-making process:

- the Recruitment and Completion Force (RFC) Commanders carry out an advisory function for the provincial Authorities (6) within the limits of their autonomous institutional activities of evaluation and planning;
- the operational responsibility remains within the COINTs, which implement the

organization is the "Command and Control", Ed. 1999 publication. The organization into Branches, from G1 to G6, closely mirrors the functional organization of a Major Unit Command Post, as outlined by the Publication, which can be consulted for further information.

Briefly, in operation, the Div Hq can constitute, two Command Posts (Main and Substitute) capable of:

- planning, coordinating and synchronizing all the operational functions connected with the fulfilment of the mission;
- avoiding to assemble all functional areas in a single physical structure;

A "Centauro" heavy armoured car.



planning/directives/orders issued by COMFOTER in accordance with the decisions made within the national decision-making process.

The Division Headquarters

The structure of the Div Hq contains all the components necessary for performing the task and, therefore, does not need reinforcements.


The conceptual basis of the

- assigning the development of the decision-making activity to a special body (Decision Centre);
- preserving the oneness of the Command and Control function;
- ensuring the continuity of the Command and Control functions in case of neutralization or transfer of the Command Post.

In particular circumstances if a Main CP and a Rear CP must be

THE COMMAND AND TACTICAL SUPPORT UNIT

Fig. 3



realized in accordance with the criterion of modularity, the Main and Rear CPs can respectively assume the functions of:

- **Main**, which assembles the cells in charge of the functions connected with the development of the tactical manoeuvre;
- **Rear**, which assembles the cells in charge of the logistic manoeuvre and the personnel and administration management.

As a consequence, the Main and Substitute CPs, in order to be capable of replacing each other, have a specular structure as regards the Functional Areas but keep different physical and organizational structures.

Tactical and logistic support

The tactical and logistic support to COINT is supplied by the Command and Tactical support Unit, a battalion-level formation tasked with:

- logistic and security support to the Division Hq;
- realization and management of the Headquarters' communication system (7);
- upkeep of the infrastructure

and support to the functioning of the COINT's Coordination Staff.

The Support Unit, permanently subordinate to the Division Commander, is organized in two separate functional components:

- logistic Command/Support and Communications, formed by the modules for the support, security and management of the communication system of the projected Div Hq;
- services, tasked with the in-garrison support to the Coordination Staff.

The projection of the Division, entails the constitution of a "Battalion Detachment". This formation includes a Command Centre and a Service Company, which will also comprise the C4 module responsible for the management of the infrastructural systems of communications and information (C4 "perm". plat.).

CS AND CSS COMMANDS

Organizational model

Within the revision of the FOTER's structure, aimed at acquiring the capabilities

envisaged by the Army Operational Concept, a study has been developed for transforming the Group Commands into CS/CSS Brigade Headquarters, divided in two sections: one for the in-garrison preparation of the subordinate units (a function which must be assured with continuity, also in case of employment of the projectable part) and the other tasked with the establishment of the Peculiar Commands in operations, or with the specialistic reinforcements of other Commands engaged in operations. The organizational models of the study can be called "separate. Structure model" (Fig. 4), in that it makes a clear distinction between the two sections. The markedly operational characterization of the HRF(L) project:


- does not exclude the need to meet the double "simultaneous" requirement of preparation and projection;
- calls for a close coordination within the CS Commands in operations;
- increases the working load of the CS Command;
- has changed the decision made earlier for the CS Commands and adopted instead the "predetermined fracture" model (Fig.5).

The selection of this model, already adopted for the manoeuvre Brigade-Headquarters responds also to the standardization requirement within the similar organizational structures of the Service, permitting to adopt doctrine and procedures already developed and tested for the manoeuvre Brigades. For the CSS Brigade, on the contrary, the separate-structure model was adopted. Later we shall discuss the essential organizational elements of each individual body.

The Logistic Brigade Headquarters

The Projection Logistic Brigade Hq. is FOTER's only CSS Command, and also the sole CS/CSS Command adopting the separate structure. This decision derives from the Command's heavier burden, in terms of work and functions. In fact, the Projection Logistic Brigade Hq., besides guaranteeing the functions of in-garrison generic and specific preparation (for one or more adherence support groups (GSA) in favour of the subordinate units, will have to assure both the "Supporting" Command function of the Corps and play the in-theatre National Logistic Command role (in case of deployment of the Reaction Corps; if a lesser contingent - Division or Brigade - is deployed, the only deployed GSA will operate also as in-Theatre National Logistic Command).

The CSS Command's organizational structure envisages two Deputy Commanders; one "support" (Colonel) and one "operations" (Brigadier General), responsible for the two "macrofunctions". For the performance of his tasks



each Deputy Commander avails himself of a Staff; in particular, the Deputy Commander for Operations makes use of the Operations and Plans Office which, in case of projection, transfers the training Office under the Deputy Commander for Support.

Finally, we underline that the name "Brigade", apparently in contrast with the Commander's rank (Major General) was adopted in order to stress the organizational level of the projected Headquarters, as well as to maintain the level of certain allowances for the personnel of


the subordinate Manoeuvre and transport Regiments.

The Brigade Headquarters (Artillery, A/A Artillery, Engineers)

The planned reorganization envisages the CS Commands as Brigade Headquarters with complete functions. In particular, the organizational structure:


- adopts the "Brigade" denomination (instead of "Group") which, by analogy with what was done for the Logistic Brigade, entitles its personnel to an "operational-employment allowance" identical to that of the other units;
- includes two "predetermined fracture" structures, capable of carrying out two "macrofunctions": "in-garrison preparation" and "in-operations specialistic Brigade";
- envisages the figure of Chief of Staff (a Lieutenant Colonel on Staff duty) and organizes the Peculiar Command like those of the manoeuvre Brigades;
- provides for the organizations of the Offices in such a way as to make them qualitatively and quantitatively capable, of carrying out all Brigade-level Staff functions. At any rate, the

ARTILLERY, A/A ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERS BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS



THE INFORMATION PROCESS

Fig. 6



LEGEND:

RFI: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

CCIR: COMMANDER CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

PIR: PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT

- setting up intelligence and counterintelligence activities based on the requests made by the Corps Hq. (1);
- organizing the search (2) and collection (3) of intelligence data, based on the requests made by the Corps Hq.;
- processing (4) and releasing (5) intelligence data in favour of the Corps Hq. and its Italian Units.

The constitution of the RISTA EW Group is a first step towards the acquisition of a real capability in the specific sector and, in the short term, can meet the obligation assumed within the HRF(L) project.

The Airmobile Brigade

The acquisition of a Brigade-level air mobile capability derives from the Service's need to split the airmobile units between the "combat" and "support" macroareas. In particular, the "Friuli" Brigade Hq. has been selected for the "combat" area, with the same organization as the other manoeuvre Brigades of the Army.

Within the HRF(L) project it is envisaged that, in case of

strength of a CS Command is about 50% of a manoeuvre Brigade;

- includes all personnel earmarked for the reinforcement of the HRF(L) Hq. within the Plans Section of the Operations Office, which is also a "flywheel" of skilled human resources, at the Commander's disposal when not employed by the HRF(L);
- lists the "job descriptions" down to Section-Chief level; later, also those of the Plans Sections will be worked out within the HRF(L) Project.

The RISTA EW Group Hq

As regards the RISTA EW component, considering its present inclusion in the C4-IEW Command, it was decided to reorganize the IEW Group Command, training it into ISTAR EW Group Command, in order to have on hand the human and organizational resources suitable for:

- constituting, in operations only, the RISTA EW Group Command;

- reinforcing the Projection Corps in the G2 sector.

In substance, the permanent structure of the RISTA EW refers only to the "operations/Intelligence" branch, while for the other branches the structure will be completed, only in case of employment, with personnel from the C4IEW Command.

In operations, the Group includes only national RISTA and EW units, either subordinate or attached, and is suitable for:




Riflemen training in a swampy area.

employment, the "Friuli" Airmobile Brigade be assigned to the HRF, in order to give the Corps the airmobile capability necessary for in-depth operations. Furthermore the "Friuli", like the CS Commands, must be in a position to provide the HRF(L) with the necessary reinforcements for its transition from PE to WE/CE.

In the specific sector, the Army doctrine is represented by the Publication "The Operations of the Airmobile Units", which envisages a Command-and-control chain organized as follows:

- Airmobile Force Commander, coincident with the Air Brigade Commander, responsible for the detailed plans and execution of the operation. The Commander of the airmobile force is normally entrusted with the OPCON, and he exercises it over all the forces under his command in the specific operation;
- Commander of the helicopter component coincident with the Commanders of the attack or transport helicopter regiments, depending on whether the operation is airmechanized or airmobile. He is subordinate to the Commander of the airmobile force. He also provides specific advice on the employment of helicopters and, therefore:
 - participates in the planning and drawing up of orders;
 - provides the operation Commander with advice on the possibilities of employment of helicopters;
 - submits to the Commander of the operation the specific logistic requirements of the helicopter units;
 - supervises the connection and liaisons that the helicopter units must set up with:
 - the operation Commander and the units of the land component;



•• the A/A units and the Agencies responsible for airspace control and air-tactical surveillance, for the aspects closely connected with the conduct phase.

The Airmobile Force Commander entrusts the Commander of the helicopter component with the TACON, to be exercised in general over all the helicopter units engaged in the operation.

In case of employment of Attack Helicopters within a JAAT tactical air support, the helicopter component Commander normally becomes responsible for the operation. He

must therefore have at his disposal the equipment (usually helicopters) and the communication systems which enable him to personally control the action and keep in contact with the SAOC team of the land artillery, the Commander of the EA units and the FACs.

- Commander of the land component: coincides with the Commander of the land unit attached to the airmobile force, and is directly subordinate to the Commander of the airmobile force. He is responsible for carrying out the "land" phase of the operation and for other possible tasks assigned to him.
- Commanders of the air cavalry units (Corps).

THE AIRMOBILE-BRIGADE HQ




Fig. 8

Furthermore, the Headquarters must have the expertise necessary for Command and Control of all components conducting in-depth operations (RISTA, land and air fire, engineers, EW, etc.).

In accordance with the above conceptual elements, the organization adopted for the Airmobile Brigade Hq. (Fig.8) can:

- assign the function of helicopter-component Commander (8) to the Brigade Deputy Commander, rather than to one of the Commanders of the Air Cavalry Regiments;
- take as basic reference the organization of a manoeuvre-Brigade Hq., with the addition of particular functions such as "airmobile operations", "connection with air forces" and "meteorology" within the Ops, Tng, Info Office, and

"flight safety" under the direct control of the Brigade Commander;

- keep the responsibility for land and air fire, engineers, EW, etc.;
- maintain the organization of a manoeuvre-Brigade Hq. also as regards the constitution of the Command Post in operations;
- envisage, like the manoeuvre Brigades, the constitution of an in-garrison Detachment in case of employment of the Major Unit;
- include, like the CS Commands, all personnel destined to reinforce the HRF(L) within the Plans Section of the Operations Office.

The adoption of the abovesaid organization gives the Army the C2 capability necessary for conducting airmobile

operations, keeping at the same time the capability of employing the Brigade Hq. as Headquarters of an isolated land contingent. This gives the "Friuli" Brigade a unique versatility within the Service. On the other hand, still under consideration are the issues connected with the employment of the SOATCC (Tactical Sighting Command and Control Subsystem) which, integrated with the C2 SIACCON system will give the Brigade Hq. the automated capabilities indispensable for the exercise of Command and Control in an airmobile operation.

Moreover, the organization of the Command Posts in Operation will have to be further developed, with particular reference to the constitution of a helicopter-borne TAC CP, in order to give the helicopter-component Commander, or the Airmobile Force Commander, the possibility of effectively controlling the development of the action, keeping in contact with the SAOC team of the land artillery, the Commander of the Attack Helicopter and forward air-control unit.

The Air Cavalry Group

The Air Cavalry Group Command, resulting from the reorganization of the Air Cavalry Command, heads the "support" area. Therefore it does not comprise any structure destined to projection, inclusive of the personnel destined to the reinforce the HRF(L). Actually, the latter is concentrated within the Headquarters of the Airmobile Brigade.

The problems connected with this new configurations are still being studied, considering that these measures are closely connected with the decision about the Command to which the



functions previously performed by the Air-Cavalry Inspector will have to be entrusted. These functions now fall within the sphere of the Air Cavalry Command. Another element of the study will be the reorganization and subordination of the Air Cavalry Training Centre.

Particular organizational decisions

We have already mentioned the presence of the Plans Sections within the CS Commands and the "Friuli" Brigade Hq.: they solve the problem of the reinforcements to the Corps Hq., and are a flywheel of qualified human resources for the whole Army. But the personnel destined


to the reinforcement of the HFR(L) Command, envisaged within the CS Commands/ "Friuli" Hq. does not completely meet the need of augmentees necessary to bring the Corps Hq. to the CE/WE levels. The remaining personnel will have to be found within other structures of the Service (IFS, ISPEL, etc.) through the designation of personnel already in service with those bodies or their subordinate units. In this way it is possible to meet the specific requirement without additional burdens.

Besides, the CS Command are characterized by their peculiar functions, connected with their special equipment (A/A system, combat helicopters, etc.). In order to better guarantee the "logistic" management of these

A riflemen squad on a VM-90 protecting a logistic compound.

materials the Logistic Office of the A/A Artillery Brigade, the Air Cavalry Group Command and the "Friuli" Hq. have their own "Special Material Section".

Finally, it must be underlined that the present reorganization process considers these Commands responsible for some highly specialized sectors. In fact, within the Plans Sections as well as in the Special Material Sections there are personnel who, owing to their training and their assignment, have a great deal of experience in the field of the Army's most sophisticated systems.

Fig. 9**THE TACTICAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT COMPANY**

Hence the advisability of establishing a link between the CS/CSS and the respective Branch Schools. This liaison, typically "cultural", could take place through the "ad hoc" employment of the specific personnel, forming a "virtuous circle" which would prevent the dispersion of the experiences acquired, and multiply their spin-offs within the Service-Nevertheless, when necessary, it will always be possible to entrust the CS/CSS Commands with the executive activities needed to carry out the theoretical projects assigned to the School Commandants (Branch Deputy Inspectors).

Tactical and Logistic Support

The need to exert the C2 function on the subordinate units entailed the necessity to provide the CS/CSS Commands with a specific support-instrument. During the study phase, in line with the need to establish "real" Brigade Headquarters, it was deemed necessary to proceed to the establishment of Command and Tactical Support Units identical, or at least very similar, to the corresponding formations envisaged for the manoeuvre Brigades.

This possibility is certainly suitable for solving the problems connected with the support to the CS/CSS

Commands, but is not achievable at the moment, considering that the Army does not have on hand the necessary human resources. Besides, taking into account that the CS/CSS Commands will have to operate within the corps Hq., the decision to establish "heavy" support organizations could be excessive and cause the overloading of the C2 structures of the Corps as a whole.

In view of this, it was decided to adopt a "light" model, envisaging:

- for the Artillery, A/A Artillery, Engineers and CSS Commands:

formation of Tactical and Logistic Support Companies (Fig.9) divided into two sections, one for the in-garrison support and the other for the support in operations;

- for the RISTA EW Group Command and Air Cavalry: establishment of a Tactical and Logistic Platoon, respectively destined to the support of the RISTA EW Group in operations, and of the Air Cavalry Group in garrison.

The Airmobile Brigade, on the contrary, has a Tactical and Logistic Support Unit identical to that of the manoeuvre Brigades, owing to the Brigade's double capability (airmobile and land) and to its possibility of operating independently of the Corps Headquarters (deep operations)

At present, there are no signal units particularly tasked with connecting CS/CSS Commands and subordinate units. This task is carried out by the Signal Regiment of the Corps, which is

A checkpoint in Kosovo.



ACRONYMS

ARRC – ACE RAPID REACTION CORPS;
FOP – PROJECTION FORCES;
HRF(L) – HIGH READINESS FORCE (LAND);
C.A. – ARMY CORPS;
OPCON – OPERATIONA CONTROL;
OPCOM – OPERATIONAL COMMAND;
TACON – TACTICAL CONTROL;
FULLCOM – FULL COMMAND;
CS – COMBAT SERVICES;
CSS – COMBAT SERVICES SUPPORT;
SM – STAFF;
PM – MILITARY POLICE;
RFC – RECRUITMENT & COMPLETION FORCES;
CIS – COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATIONS SYSTEMS;
Ca. SM – CHIEF OF STAFF;
RISTA – RECCE, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION;
EW – ELECTRONIC WARFARE;
EA – ATTACK HELICOPTER;
FAC – FORWARD AIR CONTROL/CONTROLLER;
SAOC – SURVEILLANCE, TARGET, ACQUISITION, TACTICAL LINK;
IFS – TRAINING & SPECIALIZATION INSPECTORATE;
ISPEL – ARMY LOGISTIC INSPECTORATE;
F.A. – SERVICE (Army, Navy, Air Force, Carabinieri);
C2 – COMMAND & CONTROL
PC – COMMAND POST

also organized for the C4 support of the Command Posts of the CS/CSS and its units.

As a whole, the decision on the support to the C2 function of the CS/CSS Commands will have to be examined and possibly perfected after the validation process carried out by the Corps Hq. As a matter of fact, only after a cycle of exercises on the ground it will be possible to proceed to a full assessment of the requirements and find out possible organizational redundancies.

CONCLUSIONS

The capability of preparing and employing effective and credible Command and Control structures is a real step forward in the quality of the Army. In this context, the reintroduction of the divisional level as Planning Command will have

important spin-offs on the instrument's readiness, and so will the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Corps at Solbiate.

It is therefore indispensable that the Division Hqs be perceived as the "raison d'être" of their Intermediate Operational Commands, in that they are their real operational expression. The efficiency of the Division Hqs will be repeatedly and carefully scrutinized by NATO and EU, i.e. by the final "users" of the capabilities they are able to express.

The reorganization of the CS/CSS Commands is the consequence of the operational upgrading of the CS/CSS Commands, which makes them comparable to manoeuvre-Brigade Headquarters with full functions. At the end of the process, the CS/CSS Commands will be capable of exercising the

C2 function on their units in operations guaranteeing, at the same time, the continuous management, preparation, and maintenance at the highest operational – readiness level, of the in-garrison units.

Furthermore, the inclusion of the "Plans Section" in their organization on the one hand solves the problem of reinforcements for the Corps Hq. and, on the other, makes a reservoir of qualified human resources available to the whole Army.



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NOTES

(1) Complex of "free" forces, to which the Commander must be in a position to assign missions with full autonomy and decision-making power.

(2) These Brigade/Units could also belong to the FOTER supports or to a COINT different from that of the Division Headquarters.

(3) Publication "Command and Control – Ed.1999", par 7.e.


(4) Mounting: all preparations relevant to the area selected for an operation. They include the assembly in the area, the preparation and maintenance within the area, the movement to the loading points and the subsequent embarkation on ships, boats or aircraft (AAP6 – Ed.95).

(5) See "Military Nomenclator – Army – Ed. 1998".

(6) On the other hand, this function is already included in the in-garrison responsibilities.

(7) The communication system of the Division as a Major Unit will be realized by a projection Signal-regiment.

(8) The doctrine describes him as a "specialistic" adviser to the Brigade Commander entrusted with planning tasks. Therefore it seems appropriate to "raise" his position above the Air Cavalry Regiment-Commanders.



by Giorgio Battisti *

ITALIAN SOLDIERS IN KABUL

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the initiative of deploying a peacekeeping mission to Afghanistan has been taken at international level. The aim was that of assisting interim institutions in Kabul and create the legal framework necessary to establish a multi-ethnic reconciliation government.

Our Armed Forces take part in the multinational force, made up of troops from 18 nations, with a joint contingent of 360 men, (326 from the Army and 35 from the Carabinieri), which deployed in Kabul between January 15 and February 15 of this year.

The Italian soldiers have once more proved to be efficient, professional, sympathetic and have gained the gratitude and appreciation of the local populations.

ORIGIN OF THE MISSION

The *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) was established by Security Council Resolution no. 1386, dated December 20, 2001, based on the Bonn agreements (1) of December 5, 2001. An international force was therefore deployed to Kabul and neighboring areas to assist the Interim Authority in stabilizing the Afghan capital and creating the legal framework necessary to establish a multi-ethnic reconciliation government. The aim was that of guaranteeing the peaceful and democratic cohabitation of different ethnic groups in a country plagued by decades of war.

The mission is part of the initiatives taken after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, which spurred the US to lead an international coalition against world-wide terrorism.

The role of *Lead Nation* in the ISAF mission has been initially assigned to the United Kingdom, while Turkey will probably take over in June 2002.

The multinational contingent is made up of more than 4,600 troops from 18 countries (2) and is based on a Divisional Command (UK), a multinational Brigade Command (initially UK, presently GE), 2 Battle Groups (led by the UK and GE

respectively), plus combat support and combat service support assets.

Major General John Mc Coll (UK) is the contingent Commander.

ISAF reached its initial operational capability on January

the Taliban regime and the ensuing establishment of a transitional government led by Amid Karzai.

Given the distance from port facilities and the poor conditions of the road network, troops were mainly deployed by airlift, an




16, 2002, and became fully operational on February 18, 2002, when the force inflow to the theatre was completed.

The mission carried out by ISAF is different from that of Operation *Enduring Freedom*. The latter was the air-land battle waged by the US in Afghanistan to support the North Alliance, together with the multinational force. It ended with the demise of

A ranger with some Afghan children.

operation which was particularly difficult, as only one suitable airport was initially available (Bagram). Only at a later stage, the Kabul International Airport, duly repaired, was employed. Moreover, airlift operations were sometimes affected by adverse weather conditions, taking also



Map of Kabul.

into account that aircraft approach and landing procedures were carried out through visual observation, as no instrumental assistance was available.

THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

ISAF Area of Operations (AO) and Area of Responsibility (AoR), spanning over approx. 1,390 Km², overlap with the Kabul-Bagram area and include the road network linking these two towns.

It is a low flat area, 60 km long and 25 to 6 Km large, whose elevation ranges from 1800 m in the Southern sector (Kabul) to 1500 in the Northern sector (Bagram). The latter is closed up within an intricate array of

narrow valleys and mountains, which can reach an altitude of 4600 m.

Kabul and Bagram are 60 km apart. Off-track movements are not allowed, given the presence of scattered mines. There is a continental-type climate, very hot and dry in summer and cold in winter. Terrain features include barren mountains, desert-like stretches of land and green and cultivated valleys, whose characteristics vary at different altitudes.

In the Kabul plateau (1,765 m) temperatures reach 40°C in the shade during summer and

-20°C during winter. It snows from mid-December to early March (snow level can reach 2 m). Rainfall averages 500 mm per year and the most rainy months are March and April. The temperatures rapidly shift from 20°C in late March to 30°C in late

May. In June there are mosquitos and dust winds.

THE AIM OF THE MISSION

ISAF is aimed at supporting interim political institutions in Afghanistan (IA-Interim Authority), creating the conditions necessary to reintegrate the country into the international community, based on the terms established by the Bonn agreements.

The Force is tasked to:
-assist the interim authorities in keeping a safe environment in Kabul and neighboring areas;

-conduct patrol operations in the AO;

-support the Afghan government in the reconstruction of the country (also in the humanitarian sector);

-co-operate with local


authorities in the establishment of new security structures, the Armed Forces included, and organize training activities; ,

The mission entails the same risks as those of all "crisis management" operations, but these risks are worsened by an unstable situation, the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance and adverse weather conditions.

The main matters of concern are:

- a climate of hidden tension, linked to the presence of Taliban elements and Al Qaeda operatives in the Kabul area, who are not easily identifiable among the local population;

- war operations carried out in several Afghan regions against the last pockets of resistance from the Taliban and former Al Qaeda members, who were not mopped up by pro-government and Coalition forces led by the



US, during Operation *Enduring Freedom*,

- local inter-ethnic strives, aimed at controlling the main provinces of the nation.

An Italian patrol on vigilance duty in a Kabul street.

THE HISTORY

Afghanistan connects the Mediterranean-Iranian Middle East to the Indian sub-continent and is an important strategic linchpin at the intersection of the main trade routes ("the silk road") and axes of expansion.

In the III Century B.C., following in the footsteps of the Persian Kings Cyrus and Darius (VI-V Century B.C.), Alexander crossed the country to reach the Turanian steppes (Turkistan), India and China. He founded many *poleis*, such as Herat, Qandahar, Alexandria ad Caucasum (Kabul/Bagram).

In 300 B.C. the Indian Maurya dynasties occupied the Hellenic towns in Afghanistan, paving the way for a cultural Buddhist colonization, whose expansion was halted by the onset of Sunnite Islam in the year 650 A.C.

In 1219 Gengis Khan's Tartar hordes, coming from the Chinese-Mongolian highlands, invaded the region; later on, in the 1370-1384 period, Tamerlane's Turkish tribes arrived from Samarkand.

In 1504 the Sultan of the Great Mogul (great empire) launched several war campaigns to conquer the region. Thus, the refined Indian-Muslim culture was contaminated by the Afghan tribal traditions, as a consequence of the constant invasions of predators from the Hindu Kush mountains.

During the XVI Century the Pashtun mountain ethnic group consolidated its feudal power. The 1709 Loya Jirga ("Grand National Assembly" in the Pashtu language) put an end to the Persian Safavid dynasty and in 1747 the tribal federation set up a dynastic state led by Ahmed Shah.

In the XIX Century this melting pot of ancient cultures and trade cross-roads was involved in the Russian-British dispute over Central and Eastern Asia. To halt Russian expansion and control Eastern trade routes (East India Company), the British tried to conquer the region -1st and 2nd Afghan wars in 1839-42 and 1878-79- by exploiting dynastic strives. They left the country in 1879 upon signing the Treaty of Kabul. But the region was still kept under a de-facto British protectorate. The Northern borders were agreed with Russia, while the Durand line, running along the Suleiman mountains on the border with Pakistan, marked the separation from the British Empire of India.

Afghanistan is a buffer nation, difficult to understand, being both xenophobic and impenetrable. It was officially recognized in 1907 and became independent in 1919.

In 1933, nineteen year old Mohammed Zahir Shah ascended to the throne to replace his father Nadir, who had been murdered after reigning four years only.

ISAF contingents' Rules of Engagement (ROE) (3) follow the principles set by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (use of force to implement a mandate).

The troops engaged in the ISAF mission should make an effort to reconcile their ROE with social, religious and local traditions and customs, act impartially towards all ethnic groups, be polite in the performance of their duties and observe private property rights.

THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT

The deployment of the Italian contingent, 360 strong and equipped with over 200 vehicles and other means, took place between January 15 and February 22, 2002, and required 25 airlift missions carried out by C 130s, 16 by Iliushin 76s and 15 by Antonov 124s (personnel inflow to the theatre was completed on February 4).

The first national team, comprising the designated commander of ITALFOR, arrived

in the theatre as early as December 30, 2001, to establish functional relations with the Multinational Force HQ and create the preconditions necessary for the arrival of the first echelon.

ITALFOR is made up of different tactical, logistic and specialized assets and comprises:

- one Regiment-level contingent HQ

- one Deputy Commander for the Army elements and one Commander for the Carabinieri unit;

- one Company-level unit tasked with the security of the ISAF contingent (Force Protection- Coy/FPC) drawn from the 19th "Guide" Cavalry Regiment. This Company also comprises one Platoon from the "Tuscania" 1st Paratroop Carabinieri Regiment;

- one Carabinieri unit, made up of a MP team and the above-mentioned Carabinieri Platoon;

- one Engineer Company from the 10th Combat Engineer Regiment, which includes two Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams;

- one C4 Company from the



11th Signal Regiment;

- one Company-level Combat Service Support Group, made up of modules from the 1st and 6th Maneuver Regiments, 10th Transport Regiment, "Ariete" Logistic Battalion, as well as from the Field Vehicle Unit of the Administration and Quartermaster School;

- one Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Platoon from the 7th NBC Regiment;

- one operational detachment from the 9th "Col Moschin" Assault Paratroop Regiment.

Left.

"Barracks 57", where part of our contingent is quartered..



ITALFOR is deployed in three different locations within the Kabul area:

- the contingent HQ is based within the Italian Embassy compound;

- the Force Protection Company is quartered in an infrastructure placed within the Force HQ area, called "Fort Italy";

- combat support and combat service support assets are sheltered in barracks formerly used by the Soviets in the Eastern outskirts of Kabul. These facilities, called "Barracks 57" also host elements of the British, Greek and Spanish contingents.

ITALFOR TASKS

The "Force Protection" Company (FPC) ensures the

Left.

Italian soldiers controlling a key area of the city.

Below.

Decontamination of an NBC operator.



security of the ISAF HQ compound in Kabul, called the *Military Sports Club* (4), through a static and dynamic defence structure, tasked with deterrence and reaction missions in the case of hostile actions. The unit must also:

- set up a task force, up to Platoon level, to carry out escort missions throughout the ISAF Area of Operations;

- perform patrol activities (mounted or dismounted) in the Area of Responsibility (AoR);

- provide reserve forces to the units already operating in the AoR of the FCP;

- set up a task force, at Platoon level, to operate in the AoR as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF).

The AoR of the FCP covers the centre of the town and includes several sensitive targets, like the houses of Afghan government authorities, the residence of the former King Zahir Shah, the embassy of the United States, as well as the houses of NGOs' representatives.

FPC personnel carry out dismounted and mounted patrol missions round-the-clock, ensuring direct and indirect security to diplomatic missions in Kabul and the Afghanistan Interim Government. In fact, they are authorised to react against threats and attacks of different kind and, at the same time, represent an extraordinary deterrence element to people hostile to ISAF.

The Engineer Company is tailored to provide direct support to the Italian contingent and to the ISAF multinational force.

It is tasked with:

- carrying out works to protect major multinational Command Posts (ISAF HQ, Engineer multinational group, etc.)

- improving living conditions of the different components of the Italian contingent quartered at different cantonments;

THE ETHNIC GROUPS

Few countries in the world include such a large number of different ethnic groups as Afghanistan. The Pashtun group is the largest (39% of the population). The present Prime Minister Karzai and former King Zahir Shah belong to this group. Pashtuns are settled in the Southern and Eastern provinces of Afghanistan and in Western Pakistan. Most of the Taliban fighters are from the Pashtun ethnic group.

The Tajikis form the second largest group (25% of the whole population). The majority of the rebels of the Northern Alliance, who live in the North-Eastern part of the country, belong to this group. They are of Persian origin and make up the élite educated in the francophone high schools of the capital. The most important Tajiki enclave is represented by the Panshiri ethnic group, from the name of the Panjshir valley on the Southern slopes of the Hindu Kush

The Hazaras, forming a minority ethnic group, live in the central mountainous regions (approx 1.3 million people). They are Shiites, like the Iranians and the Iraqis, and are hated and persecuted by the Sunnite majority of the population. The entire Islamic world which includes 1.3 billion people, is divided between Sunnites (83%) and Shiites (16%).

The other minority ethnic groups – Uzbeks, Baluchis, Aimak, Pamiris, Kirghiz, Turkmen, Nuristanis – form the remaining 36% of the whole population.

This multiethnic variety can be an inexhaustible resource for the country, if properly managed and finalized. The collapse of the Taliban regime has revitalized inner conflicts for power among the different factions under old and new "warlords". In fact, they all aim at gaining control over important areas of the country, like the opium poppy plantations in the North-Eastern plains and in the Southern pre-desert region, the natural gas and oil fields in the Northern areas bordering on Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as well as the emerald veins in the Hindu Kush valleys.

- improving road trafficability throughout the AoR;

- carrying out specialized maintenance works at public infrastructure sites (orphanages, police stations, etc), to support local authorities within the framework of CIMIC cooperation;

- enhancing the multinational force security by clearing ISAF areas of interest from unexploded ordnance and providing immediate intervention units, to rapidly respond to accidents due to the discovery of regular (mines, ammunition, etc) or improvised explosive devices (explosive traps, etc).

The C4 Company manages all secure and insecure communication services. In particular, it ensures strategic, satellite and radio links with the mother country, as well as

tactical operational links between the contingent HQ and its subordinate units within the area of operations.

The NBC Platoon carries out

chemical and radiological detection activities, in cooperation with a similar unit from the United Kingdom, within all areas, structures and buildings of military interest, with particular attention to cantonments and all areas under the control of ISAF personnel.

The Platoon also provides support to medical units during the disinfection and sanitation of national cantonments.

Today, the presence of a NBC Platoon is considered as normal in every national contingent operating abroad, mainly as a precautionary step to detect any possible environmental contamination caused by wars and industrial activities within war-stricken areas.

FINAL REMARKS

The mission of the Italian Armed Forces in Afghanistan has undoubtedly been a demanding commitment. In fact, Italy had to project and then support its forces, in a

A patrol from the "Guide" Cavalry Regiment checking a street in the Italian sector of Kabul.



THE WARS

July 17, 1973: putsch by Gen. Sardar Muhammad Daoud who ousted King Zahir Shah and proclaimed himself President of the Republic. In April 1978, he was killed by a group of conspirators from the Army and from the pro-soviet "Democratic Party of the Afghan People" (DPAP), which supported the coup.

July, 1978: Hafizullah Amin, an ethnic Pashtun, was the new Prime Minister. Indiscriminate repression of the Islamic opposition. A Khomeini-type political development in Afghanistan was feared by the USSR.

December 24, 1979: Operation "Storm 333". The 40th Army Corps of the Red Army entered the country, based on a request for help by the Democratic Party of the Afghan People. The Soviets instated Babrak Karmal who was replaced in 1986 by Mohammed Najibullah, a Pashtun and former chief of the intelligence services.

1980-88 War against the USSR. Casualties amounted to hundreds of thousands (15,000 were Soviets) and displaced people to millions. February, 15, 1989: the last Soviet units left the country.

April 16, 1992: the Tajiki Moujahidin ousted Najibullah; Rabbani was the new President and Massoud the new Minister for Defense. An ethnic Pashtun, Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, is the leader of the resistance groups against the Moujahidin.

September 27, 1996: the Islamic regime of the Taleban, students of the Koran in the madrassas (Koran schools), was instated in Kabul under the Mullah Omar. Najibullah was hanged in a public square.

1996-2001: The Moujahidin of the Northern Alliance, mainly Tajikis, fought against the Taleban ruling over 80% of the country. Osama Bin Laden, friend of Mullah Omar, set up the Al Qaeda organization and announced the Jihad against Americans, Jews and Christians.

September 9, 2001: Massoud, the "Lion of Panjshir" and leader of the rebels, was killed.

November, 2002: After the September 11 attacks, a US-led international coalition launched Operation *Enduring Freedom*: a global war on terrorism.

November 13, 2001: The Northern Alliance entered Kabul, the Taleban disbanded. The Pashtuns, Tajikis, Hazaras and other tribes took control of different sectors of the capital and of the country.

December 22, 2001: following the Bonn Agreements, the Interim Authority was instated at the Government of the country under Prime Minister Karzai.

January, 2002: ISAF deployed in the Kabul-Bagram Area.

between different civilizations and social habits, our personnel, effectively pre-trained on Afghan religion and traditions, have always shown respect for rites and traditions. They have paid attention not to offend local religious feelings with direct or indirect behaviours, which are commonly accepted in our society but are forbidden by the Islamic law (drinking alcohol in the presence of local people, eating forbidden food like pork, etc.)

Relations with the local population can be considered as fully satisfactory, being aimed at providing a decisive, though small-scale, contribution to the reconstruction of the Afghan society.

Our personnel, at all echelons of command, have proved to be mature enough to effectively operate everywhere in the world and in any social-cultural framework.

□

** Brigadier General,
former Commander,
Italian Contingent in Kabul*

theatre of operations over 5,000 km distant from the mother country, only by air lift.

Four months after the beginning of the ISAF mission, 55 flights by C130, 15 flights by Iliushin 76 and 15 flights by Antonov 124 were carried out.

All this called for a careful planning in the organization of the units and their capabilities, to tailor the flight schedule to the requirements of the forces which were entering the area of the mission.

In this area a conflict is still going on few kilometers from Kabul (to eradicate the last groups of resistance of the Taleban and Al Qaeda), there are harsh climatic conditions and no local resources to employ for initial support purposes.

Works aimed at improving the

living conditions in national bases have been carried out over the entire period of our stay.

Laundry, messing and baking services have had a positive impact on the morale of the troops and are going on regularly. Personnel are fully aware of the importance of the mission and its inherent risks and carry out all operational and logistical-operational activities very professionally, receiving the appreciation of the other national contingents and the ISAF Command.

Also local people deeply appreciate the efforts made every day by the Italian soldiers to help restore the capital town and provide relief to a population stricken by many years of war.

As regards the relationship


NOTES

(1) After the collapse of the Taleban regime, representatives of the Afghan ethnic groups met in Bonn, under the UN aegis, and asked for assistance in setting the preconditions for a the long-term political stability, in order to reintegrate the country within the international community. On that occasion, the decision was taken to send a multinational force to Kabul.

(2) FR, GR, NO, NZ, SP, SW, GE, NL, DK, UK, RO, TU, IT, AU, FIN, BU, CZ, PO.

(3) ROE (Rules of engagement) are directives concerning military forces, personnel included, which define circumstances, conditions and modalities to resort to the use of force (or to actions which can be considered as threatening or lethally dangerous)


(4) Facility previously used as Officers' Club in Kabul.

A photograph of two soldiers in winter camouflage gear crouching in a snowy forest. The soldiers are wearing olive green suits with yellow accents and balaclavas. They are holding a map or document. The background consists of tall, thin trees covered in snow.

ESTONIA THE NEW ARMY

by Enrico Magnani *

Interview with
Vice Admiral Tarmo Kõuts
Commander of the Defence Forces



We conclude our tour of the Baltic area interviewing the Commander of the Defence Forces of Estonia.

Vice Admiral Tarmo Kõuts gives us a precise picture of the difficult work being carried out for the structural and operational reorganization of the national military instrument, ten years after the Country regained its independence.

Estonia has been a member of "Partnership for Peace" for some time and wishes to join the EU and NATO.

Admiral, Estonia regained its independence 10 years ago. What were your first steps towards the institution of national Defence Forces?

Already before the liberation from the Soviet occupation, in 1990, hundreds of patriots had reconstituted the Defence League, a voluntary military organization. Its main task was to patrol and watch the occupation Army: The defence forces have been recreated starting from this organization. The League and its special Corps are now more than 14,000 strong.

First of all we reestablished the General Staff, followed by the General Staff Guards Company.

There were several problems with armaments and living standards, but they were not insuperable, and training was successful. At any rate, we had to start from scratch. We had no plans, no documents and not enough qualified personnel.

At the beginning we established three infantry battalions: "Kalev" in the north, "Viru" in the north-east and "Kuperjanov" in the





BTR 60 armoured vehicle.

south. But our first objective was the union of all defence forces within a single and working system. This is, in fact, the most important factor in case of mobilization.

The majority of the battalions were named after units which existed before the Soviet occupation of 1940-41. Actually the Estonian Republic was first established in 1918, and almost all battalions were constituted during the Independence War of 1918-20.

Ten years are a short time for developing a defence force. What objectives have been achieved so far, and what are your programmes for the future?

As I said, we started reconstructing our Armed Forces from scratch. As of today, we have rather good armaments and

a conscription system that works. The number of highly trained Officers is growing from year to year. Also, we started a good military cooperation with many countries.

Naturally, we shall continue on this course. Estonia will continue to be present in the UN-led peacekeeping operations and in the UN observer missions in Lebanon.

We will maintain the conscription system and the reservist Army, but will have to make some reforms. The General Staff and those of the three Services will be assembled in a single Staff. Seven battalion-level "Recruit Training Centres" will operate regularly in peacetime. By the end of 2006, several territorial -defence units will be established on the basis of the Defence League, together with a "Special District for Northern Defence", protected by a reservist Brigade. The Navy will continue its mineclearing activity, and the Air Force will go

on with the development of the surveillance of the airspace and the defence of strategic objectives.

What were the steps taken by the Defence Forces in order to join the EU and NATO? What is your opinion about "Partnership for Peace"?

Every institution of our government pursues its specific objectives with the aim of preparing Estonia to become a member of the EU. We have already submitted our proposals to the Union on 29 chapters out of 31. As a member of MAP (Membership Action Plan) we qualify for NATO membership. Also we avail ourselves of the ANP (Annual National Plan), a leading project in the preparation for membership. Furthermore, Estonia takes an active part in peace operations. Right now, one of our companies is in Bosnia and Kosovo. A

military police team is part of the Italian-led "Special Multinational Unit" of KFOR: We also have a military observer in Lebanon. The PfP programme has been very useful. Cooperation helps us to improve our defence capabilities and to harmonize them with the NATO norms and procedures, especially with the introduction of the "Partnership Objectives". At the beginning of 2000, Estonia agreed with NATO on 62 objectives; most of them were related to MAP, therefore closely connected with the MAP/ANP objectives.

The Defence Forces have actively participated in many Peace Support Operations. Can you tell us what were the lessons learned?

The "Peace Operations Centre" was established in 1994, with the aim of training our units and supporting the cooperation among Baltic states within BALTBAT (Baltic Battalion).

Last year we constituted ESTBAT, to support our growing participation in peace operations. The employment of our troops in international contingents is not a political measure only, but also a good opportunity to evaluate the interoperability of the units and their training level. Between 1995 and 2001, more than 700 servicemen (77 of them Officers, about 15% of those on active duty) have taken part in multinational operations. I believe that the experience gained by them concerns mainly the acquisition of the knowledge of international procedures and the capabilities necessary in order to work together with our partners.

What are the bases of your military regulations and



procedures? What model did you follow?

Training with mortars.

The Defence Forces are the bearers of the traditions of the Armed Forces constituted before the Soviet occupation of 1940. In 1991 we have taken almost all our norms from those regulations, adapting them to the present time. Of course, we have changed many rules in order to update them, but the basic ones remained. Many procedures also come from regulations in force within NATO and the Finnish Army.

The Estonian Defence Forces are based on conscription. Do you also have a professional Army and reservist units? Why did you take that decision? Are there changes in view? What are the duties performed by women within the military?

Our Defence Forces are basically reserve forces. Military service is compulsory for all male citizens physically and



Tactical Command-Post during a winter exercise. The Fritz/Passgt hebnets have just been acquired by the Estonian Army.

activities of bilateral cooperation. But the logistic areas are included in this cooperation as well.

Regional cooperation is very important for the defence of the Nation. What kind of collaboration is under way with the other Baltic States?

Estonia is carrying out four cooperation programmes with Latvia and Lithuania:

- **BALTBAT** (Baltic Battalion) was created as a catalyst to improve the technical level as well as to show the Balcan countries' will and capability to cooperate, both among themselves and in multinational environments. Some **BALTBAT** units participate in the IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, the battalion supports the national Defence Forces, contributing to their development.
- **BALTRON** (Baltic Naval Squadron) contributed to the development of our Navy. Its main task is mineclearing. There are tens of thousands of mines in the Baltic, a heritage from the first and second world-wars. **BALTRON**'s objective is to find and destroy them, in order to clear the routes.
- **BALNET**: its objective is to improve international cooperation between civilian and military authorities in the field of aeronautics, increasing the operational efficiency of the three Nations. The project is a combination of the efforts of many Countries for developing the surveillance of the air space and traffic in Central and Eastern Europe.

mentally healthy, between 18 and 27 years of age. The duty lasts from eight to eleven months, according to the speciality. Thereafter the recruits are assigned to the reserve of their unit. The reserve force is the most profitable system for a small country like Estonia. The cost of the Armed Forces based on conscription is lower, therefore maintaining the defence capability is easier. The professional servicemen are tasked with the training of recruits, maintenance of the operational capability in peacetime and development of the cooperation objectives within

NATO. Women work in the same positions as men and many of them are Officers and NCOs.

How do you cooperate with the NATO and PfP Countries?

Estonia has entered into bilateral cooperation agreements with 14 NATO Countries, and bilateral or trilateral accords with 6 partner Nations of the Alliance. The bilateral agreements aim at preparing our Country for its future NATO membership.

Training and instruction are the preponderant part of the general

Servicemen of the Estonian National Guard on training in a swampy area.



- **BALTDEFCOL** (Baltic Defence College) is the first joint military institution for high studies, and aims at creating a common culture for the Officers of the three Services. The College organizes an annual Staff Course for Officers from the Baltic States. In the future there will be courses for civilian employees as well.

The Soviet Army left many structures in the Baltic Countries. Do you use them, and how?

When they withdrew, the Soviet destroyed most bases on our

territory, and many buildings were in very bad conditions. However, many structures were reutilized and the majority of our

battalions are now occupying those buildings and using those firing ranges. An example is the airport built by the Soviets at Amari, now used by our Defence Forces as an air base. The huge problem that still remains to be tackled is how to dispose of the immense amount of trash left behind by the Red Army.

Vice Admiral Tarmo Kõuts was born in the island of Sarena, Estonia, on November 27, 1954.

A graduate from the Naval Department of the Maritime College in Tallin, in 1985 he attended the Navigation Course at Kaliningrad Technical Institute.

From 1973 to 1990 he served, as Captain and Instructor, on several ships of the Estonian Naval Company.

From 1990 to 1993 he was the Commandant of the Military Academy, where he introduced university-level studies in Estonian.

In 1993 he was appointed Director General of the Border Guard, becoming an advocate of its rapid development. In a short time, the Guard earned international consideration as an efficient, reliable and skilled professional structure.

In 1999 Adm. Kõuts attended a special course at the Finnish National Academy.

On September 21, 2000 the Parliament of the Estonian Republic appointed him Commander of the Defence Forces. On February 20, 2002 he was promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral.

Vice Admiral Tarmo Kõuts holds the following decorations and awards:

- **Order of the Eagle Cross, 2nd class;**
- **Order of Merit of the Defence Forces;**
- **White Cross of the Defence League, 3rd class;**
- **Cross of Merit of the Border Guard, 1st class;**
- **Cross of Merit of the Border Guard of Finland;**
- **Cross of Merit of the Border Guard of Latvia.**


Are military traditions strong in your Country? Does civil society support the Defence Forces?

The citizens of Estonia have great confidence in the Defence Forces. According to the last survey, 74% of the male population would resist and protect their Country in case of external attack. The Defence Forces are one of the institutions most respected by the citizens (59%), after the President of the Republic (67%) and the Border Guard (67%). Six citizens out of ten are in favour of Estonia joining NATO.

□

** Journalist*

THE ROMANIAN DEFENSE COLLECTIVE



by Giovanni Sulis *



Ten years ago, Rumania set up a post-graduate Institute which actively co-operates with national and international organizations dealing with defense and security issues. That extraordinary event, full of cultural and social implications, has increasingly drawn a former Warsaw Pact country closer to the area of the Euro-Atlantic values.

The National Defense College is a post-graduate institute aimed at specializing top managers, both military and civil, belonging to all organizations dealing with Rumania's national defense and security issues or, more generally, with those of South-Eastern Europe. The College training syllabus focuses on the following targets:

- developing students' capabilities to analyze events connected with national defense and security issues, and refine their ability to identify and manage crisis situations in a complex geopolitical and geostrategic scenario;
- practicing the managerial skills necessary to carry out managers' demanding duties within those organizations and institutions dealing with security and defense issues and connected matters;
- consolidating civic awareness and a sense of responsibility towards the democratic organization of the Rumanian society and its integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic security architecture;
- informing students on the practical implementation of the national security strategy, as stated by the Government's White Paper on Defense.

The College also sponsors the following activities:

- enhancing the relations among civil and military high-ranking

officials, in order to promote a mutual understanding and better face national security and defense issues;

- setting up an effective system to achieve the goals set by the reorganization of the military in Rumania;
- taking part in the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) and establishing ties with similar organizations belonging to NATO members or co-operation partners.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The national defense and security sector has been deeply affected by the changes occurred in Rumania following the December 1989 Revolution. The concept of national security and defense has been thoroughly reviewed, thanks to the implementation of the principle of civil control over the Armed Forces, which was unknown in the former Soviet Empire but widely applied by all democratic countries.

The need was therefore felt to set up a legal framework and prepare the tools and skilled managers necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the system.

In such a context, the National Defense College was established on February 1, 1992 within the Academy of High Military Studies.

The first course, held on an experimental basis and attended by 22 military and civil students,



The "Cercul Militar National" in Bucharest.

proved the effectiveness of the selected training syllabus.

As a consequence, the College was given an autonomous status by Government decree no.438 of August 5, 1992, and was put under the direct authority of the Minister of National Defense.

The establishment of the new College was looked upon by society as a further and fundamental step towards the integration of military institutions into the social and political framework of a constitutional state.

The College has rapidly established ties with cultural and scientific institutions, both governmental and non governmental, based at home and abroad. In particular, it was the first School of this kind to be established in South-Eastern Europe, after the demise of the Communist era.

Today its activities are constantly monitored by the most important political groups wanting to keep abreast in the sector of security and defense; in fact, the subjects dealt with by the College are considered as first priority issues for all electoral manifestos and for the development of political concepts.

The National College Foundation was set up in 1993 by the professors and students of the College, with a view to updating and refining the knowledge in the field of national defense and security, as well as sparking a public debate and disseminating such interesting cultural wealth. At present, the Foundation is one of the most renowned and prestigious non governmental organizations in Rumania. It sponsors several cultural and scientific activities and publishes an interesting magazine dealing with geopolitical and geostrategical issues.

In short, over this last decade of activities, the College has been a venue for dialogue and co-operation among the Armed Forces, State institutions, political parties and civil organizations. It has proved to be a structure tailored to face major long-term issues. This capability, coupled with ad-hoc political options, will allow the young democracy of Rumania to move ahead in the third millennium.

THE ORGANIZATION

As stated above, the College is under the direct authority of the Minister of Defense, while the

Advisory Committee is the collective body responsible for setting general principles and overall guidelines supervising educational activities. As a rule, it meets at the beginning of each course and is made up of representatives of the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Education and Scientific Research, as well as of the whole Parliamentary Committee for defense, public order and national security.

At present, the Dean of the College is Colonel Mihai Vasile Ozunu, a University professor (even if an officer with the rank of Major General should cover this position, based on the College organizational diagram), who is supported by two Assistants, both with academic qualifications, belonging to the military and civil world respectively.

The College comprises:

- the Faculty of National Defense and Security, which carries out educational tasks only in this particular sector;
- the Administration, Public Relations and Training Section, tasked with supporting educational activities and international relations.

Logistic-administrative matters are a responsibility of the Academy of High Military Studies, within whose infrastructure the College is placed.

This organization will change with the establishment of a Military University, scheduled for 2003. It will group all educational institutions, mainly the Military Academies of the three Services and the College as well, which is at the top of this educational system.

TRAINING SYLLABUS

In order to reach the established educational goals, the

Monumental staircase at the entrance of the "Cercul Militar".

training syllabus comprises the following subjects:

- core subjects (36% of the hours available):
 - international security system;
 - general problems affecting international security;
 - international security institutions;
 - geopolitics and geostrategy;
 - national security strategy;
 - conflict prevention and crisis management;
- specialized subjects (60% of the hours available):
 - major subjects (56%):
 - national security management;
 - present problems in the field of national security and public order;
 - national defense policy and management of defense resources;
 - Rumanian military strategy;
 - educational trips.
 - elective subjects (4%):
 - partnership and international military co-operation;
 - Armed Forces and society;
- subsidiary subjects (4%):
 - international humanitarian law;
 - human rights;
 - main aspects of the history of the holocaust.

At the end of the course, lasting six months, students have to write a thesis whose subject is chosen with the assistance of the professor chairing the course on national security and defense.

During the first ten courses, held until the end of 2001, the training program was constantly updated, with the aim of:

- balancing the number of courses and hours of study devoted to security and defense



- problems respectively;
- initiating new courses reflecting the most recent outcomes in the field of national and international security, as well as the main political changes and the progress made in the reorganization of military institutions;
- adapting the lectures on international security to the programs chosen by the most important foreign institutions, and tailoring the courses to particular national problems.

Educational trips are to be dealt with separately. Students receive a detailed briefing before setting out for a journey, which may take place in Rumania or abroad, depending on the resources

available. The aim is that of directly questioning local political administrative authorities about regional problems, focusing on national security and defense issues. Students may gain access to institutional sources, come into contact with high-ranking officials at the top of each sector and illustrate the information acquired during the debates/discussions usually held after each trip.

The issues under study are wide ranging and comprise political, economic, legal, commercial, sociological and military matters; the work program is also varied, including meetings with local authorities, as well as visits to large industrial groups,



The Monastery of Suceviza (UNESCO patrimony).

businesses, natural preserves, military bases, training and exercise areas for special troops, etc.

In some towns, round tables and debates are organized, with the support of local authorities, to discuss present matters of concern, in the field of defense and security. The most important representatives at the head of several sectors (energy, environmental protection, defense and security, etc.) are usually invited to take part in the discussions. On such occasions, some students make a short presentation of the thesis they are writing for their final examination. The debate and comments stemming from these discussions are beneficial to both sides.

During the past ten sessions, the College has organized many educational trips both in Rumania and abroad, to visit similar institutions linked by co-operation ties.

TEACHING METHODS

Teaching methods and techniques encourage students to actively participate in the lessons and develop strategic concepts,

which are both independent and original.

The professors usually carry out their activities with the support of external co-operators and try to reconcile training programs with the systems employed or, from another point of view, traditional and new methods.

Training is mainly carried out through the co-operation with associate professors, but a proactive and participatory teaching method has prevailed over time, based on lectures followed by debates,

Debates can also be held within working groups to analyze particular problems, followed by plenary sessions. Students may work individually and do research for their final thesis, or further analyze the subjects dealt with in some seminars. To this aim, they can avail themselves of very effective structures, such as the Library of the Academy of High Military Studies, have access to Internet, etc.

The College tries to achieve the best results in training its civil and military students, by exploiting trainees' capabilities and high-level skills in some particular sectors. Academic freedom and University

regulations are combined with the rules

governing military training and ethics, such as discipline, in-depth study and accuracy.

EVALUATION SYSTEM

The evaluation system takes into account the active participation of the students.

At the end of the first session, in March, students will take part in a series of open-door debates and briefly illustrate the subject they will discuss during the round-tables held at territorial level. At a later stage, they will further expand their work to include all suggestions and observations in the thesis they will discuss during the final examination, prior the awarding of diplomas.

To this end, professors meet regularly with their students to assist them in writing their theses, some of which have been highly appreciated, at scientific level, during the past sessions of the College.

A proficiency report is drawn up for each student, with a final evaluation of his work, to be forwarded to his parent civil or military institution.

COURSE ATTENDEES

Attendees of both sexes are selected based on their qualities, experience and capability of reaching top-level positions within the institution to which they belong. The College gives them the opportunity to follow post-graduate education courses in the field of national defense and security.

In particular, military personnel should have the rank of Colonel or General, cover top-level positions and have outstanding personal records.

The she-wolf, symbol of Latinity, in Bucharest's Roman Square.

From a technical point of view, the selection process includes two stages. The various institutions operating in the national security and defense sectors (Parliament, Office of the President, Government, Ministries, Information Services, other public authorities at central level, etc.) initially communicate the names of their candidates, based on the numbers of positions available. Then, candidates are selected through an interview aimed at assessing their capabilities and knowledge in the security and defense sector. Those who are accepted for admission are split up into four groups, whose composition changes at the end of each training cycle, to allow for rotating trainees in the various assignments and encouraging interpersonal relations, which are key to their future institutional tasks.

Groups meet regularly every day under the direction of a group leader, selected by students on a rotational basis.

The ratio between civil and military personnel has changed over the years, to the advantage of the former. Moreover, considering that national security and defense problems involve all branches of society, students representing social institutions and attending the College courses have been highly diversified. In fact, besides military and civil attendees serving in administrations co-operating with the defense sector, such as health, transports, communications etc, the College includes personnel belonging to the Department of Education, the clergy, labor unions, non-governmental organizations, and press and television media.

As regards student numbers, the 11th session, which is presently underway, is made up

of 80 attendees, 60% of whom belong to the civil world and 11 are women.

As regards student quality, there are four deputy ministers (or State Secretaries), seven members of Parliament, one representative of the Orthodox Church and a member of the Royal Family (Prince Hohenzollern-Veringen Duda Radu), legal experts, university professors, diplomats, entrepreneurs, trade-union officials, journalists, manager.

Among military personnel belonging to the Armed Forces and Police Forces (Police, Gendarmerie and Financial Police), there are also three Officers from Italy, Germany and the US.

Most of those who attended the College presently cover very important positions in the Government, Parliament, Office


of the President of the Republic, as well as in the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Justice and in the Special Intelligence Services.

To date, 420 students have passed the courses - 22 coming from abroad - and the number of those who wish to enroll is increasing year after year. In fact, being a member of this College is considered as a credential for the introduction into the civil and military elite of the Rumanian State.

In order to meet all requirements, since the year 2000 the number of attendees has been increased from the initial 22 of the first experimental session to the present 80.

TEACHING STAFF

Notwithstanding the limited number of professors, all teaching goals are fully achieved,



thanks to the support of associate professors and, in particular, of experts and public officials. These personalities are invited to hold high-level lectures, in line with their very important positions within public institutions or private organizations. Thus, in turn, the podium will be given to members of Parliament and Government, legal experts, generals, researchers, diplomats, industrialists, managers of large State enterprises, foreign speakers, etc.

Lectures are always followed by free and high-level debates, given the prominent roles covered by the attendees.

In short, the prestige of the College constantly attracts renowned personalities even among lecturers.

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY

The international activity of the College is in line with Romania's Ministry of Defense strategy as regards international military relations, as well as with the bilateral plans of military co-operation and the guidelines of the Directorate for the Euro-Atlantic Integration of the Ministry of Defense.

In particular, the international activity is carried out by the College through:




- lectures given by foreign speakers;
- official visits to similar training institutions abroad;
- educational trips to Rumania organized by similar foreign institutions for their students;
- participation in international seminars and lectures within the PFP initiative.

All these activities, which could be illustrated by further examples, show the willingness, openness and readiness of the College to co-operate at an international level, to bring Rumania into line with the standards envisaged for the integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

CONCLUSIONS

The National Defense College is well-known and appreciated internationally. The resources invested in education and training programs have yielded a wide range of long-lasting effects, with positive repercussions on national security and defense issues as well. So much so that, in Rumania, university level military institutions have become symbols of reform and integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic security set-up. The College will continue to train managers and leaders as in the past, mainly in the national security and defense sector to meet Rumania's requirements. The positive results obtained are also to be ascribed to the efforts made by the college staff, who have committed themselves to this difficult mission.

Notwithstanding the limited financial resources available, the Rumanian Armed Forces are among the most modern armies in the world, as regards



A Rumanian radio operator.

personnel training and education.

Rumania is making every effort to play a stabilizing role in the area. It supports NATO's values and interests in South-Eastern Europe, by taking part in some Alliance-sponsored missions and major co-operation activities, both military and civil, in the region.

Prague 2002 is an opportunity not to be missed. According to recent polls, in Rumania 80% of the people are in favor of NATO membership. As a consequence, the Rumanian Armed Forces, together with other institutions operating in the defense and security sector, do their best to ensure that their country is fully prepared to enter the Alliance, when its application for membership is finally approved.

Today, Rumania has no alternative but join the area of the Euro-Atlantic values, consolidate its institutional government, enforce human rights and promote democratic principles.

□

Rumanian helicopter pilot ready to take-off.

** Brigadier General,
Italian Representative,
Rumanian General Staff*

COMPLETION FORCES

(Part 2)

This article wraps up our overview of Build-up Forces, an emerging issue which will play an important role in the future of our Service. The aim is that of giving increased visibility to a new legal person, the *reservist*, who will be increasingly pivotal in the Army professionalization process.

LEGAL STATUS OF RECALLED OFFICERS, NCOs AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL

The term "status", as used in this article, refers to all rank-related rights and responsibilities. Upon being appointed to their ranks, Officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel acquire legal status which lasts until they are divested of their ranks. It must be pointed out that military personnel do not lose their ranks when discharged. Ad-hoc law provisions, which will be detailed below for all categories of military personnel, set the



by Francesco Diella
and
Giuseppe Bongiovanni

conditions under which personnel may lose their ranks. In fact, military members, whether in service or retired, may lose their ranks based on their engagement conditions.

The following laws govern the legal status of recalled personnel:

- Officers: Government Decree no.215 of May 8, 2001;

- NCOs: Law no.599 of July 31, 1954;

- Enlisted personnel: Decree Law no.451 of December 28, 2001, turned into Law no.15 of February 27, 2002.

In general, these rules establish that, when recalled to serve in Build-up Forces:

- Officers and NCOs have the

same legal status as regular forces;

- Enlisted personnel, who served as draftees or as one year volunteers, have the same legal status as short term volunteers.

Personnel of the Build-up Forces, who have been equalized to those on active service, are not automatically included into permanent rolls, which can only be accessed through public competition. However, they are granted special opportunities/incentives to enter the permanent force, such as reserved quotas in the number of positions allocated through competition, higher age limits and maintenance of the same rank held upon enrolling in the permanent force.

Officers

The status of Officer is generally governed by Law no.113 of April 10, 1954.

In particular, Part 1 specifies that an officer, upon being appointed to his rank, acquires "the status of officer, which lasts until he is divested of it".

Moreover, the above mentioned law establishes that Officers:

- are officially commissioned by Presidential Decree (Article 4);
- lose their ranks for the following reasons (Article 70):
 - voluntary discharge. However, it is to be recalled that this option is not possible when Build-up Forces are set up on an emergency;
 - mandatory discharge, in the case of disqualification/debarment from public offices, absence without leave, activities incompatible with the status of officer, Ministerial order;
 - striking off the rolls, in the

case of loss of citizenship; enrolment –with any rank– in an Armed Force/Armed Corps different from the parent organization; enrolment - with a rank below officer – in the parent organization and unauthorized enrolment in the Armed Forces of foreign countries;


- dismissal in the case of oath breaking or breaches of discipline, following a decision by a Discipline Council;
- indictment when the military penal legislation envisages dismissal as ancillary punishment or in the case of willful offence.

Based on the special engagement conditions established between the Defense Administration and military personnel, Officers' careers are split up as follows:

- regular officers who signed an open term contract with the Defense Administration;
- discharged officers who are no longer under a regular long term contract but have to perform tours of duty as established by the law. The officers of Build-up Forces belong to this category;
- fully discharged officers who are not obliged to perform service duties but maintain their ranks and the privilege of wearing their uniforms.

It is important to stress that those recalled sign a fixed term contract on a voluntary basis, which can be immediately terminated upon request. This relationship is established when personnel are re-engaged after a first or a second call-up or following a direct appointment to the rank of officer, based on the "Marconi Law" on Selected Reserve.

Following Article 25 of



Government Decree no. 215 of May 8, 2001, this recall period may not last more than one year and be extended only once, upon request. Each year the Minister of Defense issues an ad-hoc Ministerial Order to establish the terms of the recall period and its possible maximum extension (one year), as well as the physical and vocational requirements necessary to perform the duties assigned. At the end of the recall period, Officers belonging to Build-up Forces are discharged.



With reference to the above-mentioned Government Decree, a distinction must be made between Officers belonging to Build-up Forces and the new categories of "Fixed -Term Officers" and "Auxiliary Officers", as provided for by Articles 21 and 23.

In particular, "Fixed -Term Officers", belonging to all Services, are recruited through public competition for one year and a half, including the training period.

On the contrary, "Auxiliary

Officers" make up a larger category and include citizens, both male and female, who have been recruited as:

- Non regular Officers on active duty;
- Non regular Pilot Officers;
- Fixed Term Officers or Re-engaged Officers;
- Officers belonging to Build-up Forces.

To sum up, reservists belong to the wider category of Auxiliary Officers, just like Fixed Term Officers.

Italian patrol from the ISAF Contingent in Kabul.

Non-commissioned officers

As in the case of Officers, the status of Non-commissioned Officer is governed by the law. In particular, reference is made to Law no.599 of July 31, 1954 and to Government Decree no.196 of May 12, 1995, which define the status of Non-commissioned Officer and its underlying conditions (from

the attainment to the loss of rank).

Moreover, Government Decree no.196/95 establishes that ranks are appointed in compliance with Recruitment and Promotion laws. A Ministerial Order is required in the case of sergeants and a Ministerial Decree in all other cases.

More precisely, personnel may lose their ranks for the following reasons:

- loss of citizenship;
- unauthorized service in the Armed Forces of foreign countries or in an Armed Force/Armed Corps different from the parent organization;
- disqualification/ debarment from public offices;
- absence without leave;
- dismissal in the case of oath breaking or breaches of discipline, following a decision by a Discipline Council;
- indictment when the military penal legislation envisages dismissal as ancillary punishment or in the case of willful offence.

As in the case of Officers, NCOs' careers can be split up into the following "sub-categories" based on the engagement conditions established with the Army:

- NCOs, voluntarily engaged or re-engaged, who are obliged to serve for a fixed term, whose length is established by Recruitment Laws;
- Regular NCOs who have signed an open term contract with the Defense Administration;
- Discharged NCOs: this category includes NCOs belonging to Build-up Forces. They have no employment relationship but, in peacetime, are statutorily obliged to perform service duties up to the age of 45-50, depending on the rank covered;
- Fully discharged NCOs, who are not obliged to perform

service duties but maintain their ranks and the privilege of wearing their uniforms and are subject to the law provisions concerning rank and discipline matters.

Law no. 599/1954, Article 47, sets the legal grounds for the recall of NCOs, who can be

mandatorily or voluntarily re-enlisted by Presidential Decree and Ministerial Decree respectively, as provided for by the Law.

Also Law no. 15 of February 27, 2002, Article 10, restates the legitimacy of the recall system, which includes all categories of military personnel.





Enlisted personnel

Law no.958 of December 24,1986, Article 1, establishes that "all citizens and other eligible categories are obliged to perform their military duties, as established by the existing laws".

In particular, all male citizens

are subject to conscription, even though they have acquired citizenship after the call-up of their year-group (Presidential Decree no.237 of February 14, 1964)

Those who have been declared physically and psychologically fit are enrolled in the Armed Forces. This condition lasts

until the end of the year in which a citizen turns 45.In fact, he is liable to perform service duties within the Defense Administration, both during his active and temporary discharge periods.

A distinction must be made between temporary discharge and final discharge. In fact, unlike final discharge, temporary discharge envisages the liability to perform military tasks even after the end of active duty.

Accordingly, the Army enlisted members who have been temporarily discharged can be re-engaged based on the following criteria: year-group, year-group quotas, parent branch, corps, specialization, assignment or Military District.

A Presidential Decree is necessary to recall Build-up Forces on an emergency. However, while the official publication of said decree is still pending and upon receiving a call-up card, personnel must report to the military authority within the established time-limit.

As regards voluntary Build-up Forces, the Minister of Defense may recall troops, subject to the previous endorsement of the Minister of Economics, without a Presidential Decree.

Discipline rules for reservists

The following rules apply in general to Officers, Non Commissioned Officers and Other ranks.

As a matter of fact the official rules for military discipline apply to the military as a whole. In particular, said rules are based on:

- the "Principles for Military Discipline" – Law no. 382 of July 11, 1978 - which apply to all military when they are:
 - on duty
 - within military areas or

where they carry out their duty

- wearing uniforms
- among military personnel
- "Rules for Military Discipline" – Presidential Decree no. 545 of July 18, 1986 - which apply ... "in due course of the law to all citizens who are part of the Armed Forces as volunteers or conscripts", then to all ranks of the Build-up forces.

Promotion to higher ranks

Officers, Non Commissioned Officers and Other ranks discharged to the reserve are promoted to higher ranks on the basis of different procedures.

By law no. 1137 of November 12, 1955 as amended by Decree Law no. 490 of December 30, 1997 reserve officers may be promoted up to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel by seniority when:

- in general, they are part of the Build-up forces
- they have taken part in a 5-day update course at Arms Schools or Logistic Corps
- they have been recalled to the Build-up forces for as long as 3 months (also three one-month periods as stated by Decree Law no. 490 of December 30, 1997, art. 31).

Officers who had commanded units before they were discharged to the reserve are not called for update courses.

Reservists are selected for promotion by Headquarters, Inspectorates and Army Staff with the following procedure:

- on the basis of the Build-up forces planning the Army Staff notifies how many officers are to be promoted to the higher ranks (in 2001 there were 41 of them)
- the Inspectorate for Recruitment of Build-up forces personnel proposes a number of officers to the

Army Staff which select those who will be promoted to the higher rank. Inspectorate for Training – responsible for organizing update courses – is also involved in this process

- Headquarters in charge of recruitment for Build-up forces and Military Districts recall the selected officers who are finally promoted to the higher rank by Directorate for Military Personnel.

In 2001 the Inspectorate for Recruitment of Build-up forces had proposed to promote as many as 88 officers among whom the Army Staff selected:

- 22 Infantry officers
- 2 Cavalry officers
- 7 Artillery officers
- 5 Engineer officers
- 3 officers of Logistic Corps
- 1 Medical officer

The above mentioned 40 officers were selected:

- by seniority (priority to long service)
- by age (priority to older ones)
- and according to their merits

The rules and the procedures followed for promoting reserve Non Commissioned Officers and Other ranks are being reviewed and adjusted to the demanding requirements of a professional Army.

Salary

Recalled reservists are given a salary depending on their respective ranks as if they were on active service. In particular:

- Officers' and Non Commissioned Officers' salary depends on their rank and on how long they had served before they were discharged to the reserve
- former conscripts' and one-year volunteers' salary depends on their rank and equals the short term volunteers' one (Decree Law

of December 28, 2001, art. 10 - Law no. 15 of February 27, 2002.)

Recalled reservists who work as civil servants are granted by law (Decree by the Office of the President of the Cabinet of August 29, 1997) at least the same salary they have as civil servants.

THE RESERVISTS' RIGHTS

Recalled reservists and vacant positions

This issue must be considered from different points of view because on the one hand recalled reservists are given temporary jobs by the Armed Forces, but on the other hand when they go back to the reserve they also go back to their positions.

By law no. 370 of May 3, 1955, art. 1 ... "when civil servants are recalled for any reasons they will go back to their positions upon discharge. And the time spent in the Armed Forces shall be considered as civil service".

It is worth noting that upon discharge recalled civil servants must go back to their positions within 5, 8 or 15 days, depending on how long they were recalled for (respectively one-month, one- to six-months or more than six-months).

On the contrary, private employees applying for Build-up forces must negotiate their absence from work with their respective employers. By law they will have to be paid their full or partial salary. Moreover recall time and absence from work will not affect their career.

Public examinations and benefits for draft

By Presidential Decree no.



Italian-British patrol from ISAF on surveillance duty.

237 of February 14, 1964 and Governmental Decree no. 215 of May 8, 2001, art. 26 - the latter only referred to officers -during public examinations at all levels recall periods are considered as civil service.

Officers with the rank of captain from the Build-up forces are granted by Decree Law no 215 of 2001, art. 20 the possibility to become professional officers of special staff through public examination when they meet update requirements and are less than 40 years old. Moreover, officers who served

with merit are reserved up to 80% of the available positions during public examinations aimed at enrolling regular staff officers.

CONCLUSIONS

We have made a picture of the Build-up forces to describe how we shifted from the mobilization pattern to the volunteer-based Build-up forces, and also to emphasise an organization which is becoming ever more important to today's and tomorrow's professional Army.

It was an effort taking reorganization process which can be made better, help reshaping the reservists' employment and increasing the

number of reservists applying for Build-up forces, in particular of enlisted personnel.

We can do that but we need exact rules and enthusiasms while bearing in mind that good working Build-up forces are made up of good working headquarters, Military Districts, etc., as it generally happens in the Armed Forces.

We paved the way to a successful future. Now we only need to keep up or commitment and good will.

□

** Lieutenant Colonel,
Force Organization Office,
Army General Staff*

*** Lieutenant Colonel,
Force Organization Office,
Army General Staff*

INFLATABLE FLOATS

by Flavio Russo *



For thousands of years the goatskin water-bag was an important part of the equipment of bygone armies. Every soldier was equipped with one. He inflated it every time he had to cross a river or stream and deflated it, filling it with water, when he had to store an abundant water-supply for moving long distances on foot. Numerous Assyrian and ancient Egyptian bas-reliefs have handed down to us portrayals of pontoons which are actually forerunners of modern ferry-boats. This is further proof that military culture anticipated progress in the journey through man's history.



Almost fifty years ago a famous ethnologist, unwittingly and prophetically ironic, pointed out that there was not a more practical means that could be utilized by masses of people, either migrants or at war, to cross rivers or streams, than an inflated float, that is a leather bag filled with air. Comparing throngs of wretched refugees trudging along to modern armies marching proudly may seem incongruous, but only as a first impression. However, a

river obstructing the way is enough to give both aggregates a similar human identity, levelled by the same problem: how to reach the other side. Discontinuous land, in common with narrow straits significantly called channels, turn into the most classical obstacle to freedom of movement, whether it be civilian or military. It is certainly no accident that stretches of water, artificially reproduced around fortifications by flooding ditches, have been used as obstacles for little over five thousand years, with very little changes.

Day after day, the drama unfolds in a repetitive sequence on the TV news: a wavering beam of light pierces the darkness of sea and sky and picks out a speeding rubber boat crammed with wretched people. Besides the arching waves raised by the prow and the wake left by the propeller, the only whitish blobs are the terrified faces of the illegal immigrants, who are, however, also fascinated and awed when that example of technological civilization bursts into their

Men intent on inflating leather bags before crossing a river in Mesopotamia.





Bas-relief of the IX century B.C. figuring raiders and archers besieging a fortress surrounded by water.


archaic lives. Distressed by the violent pitching of the rubber boat, by the splashes of icy water and by the fear of being caught, it does not occur to any of them that this improvised and risky way of crossing water began many thousands of years ago, right in the lands they are fleeing from!


There is documentary evidence that armies have used floats to cross rivers or narrow straits since the second millennium B.C., although the practice actually began long, long before. And never, as in this case, has technological progress changed so little the way floats are used, leaving the basic criteria unchanged. Certainly the ancient goatskin bag, the *ghirba*, has by now given way to inflatable rubber cylinders, hence the name

rubber boat or rubber raft, but the idea of floating, held up by a big air bubble, is at least antediluvian or, to be generous, diluvian.

The Bible says that the mythical patriarch, tossed about for months in the

Raft on inflated leather bags, used to transport huge boulders: a second figure is clearly visible, swimming with the aid of his own leather bag.






Anonymous, IV century A.D. A bridge of leather bags. The four moorings on the river banks, with the ropes to fix them, can be clearly seen. The two big bellows on each side show that it was necessary to inflate the leather bags constantly.

creature reported by history to make use of an inflated float, nor would he have been at all interested in it.

Obviously, the actual event must have been slightly less fanciful though not so

catastrophic, as it can substantially be set in the same places and similar circumstances. In fact, it is easy to imagine that the two important rivers in Mesopotamia overflowed, as they did recurrently, dragging along

crowded and evil-smelling floating crate and unable to know the weather forecast from any bulletin, had the bright idea to launch his own scout in the air. At the end of the day, the scout had not returned and this was interpreted negatively: water still covered the earth's surface and was seething with rotting carcasses which the black bird had alighted on to feast, certainly tired of its daily ration of corn. It was an archipelago of disgusting, bloated dead bodies capable, however, of holding up and, as in this case, feeding live bodies. Noah could not have known that his crow was the first living




Francesco Di Giorgio Martini: A military bridge on big leather bags.

Crossing the Volturno River with inflatable boats under German mortar fire on the night of 14th-15th October, 1943. From The Sphere, 6th November, 1943.

numerous carcasses of animals swept away by the raging waters. It is also easy to imagine that, while trying to remove some of the carcasses caught up along the river bank and enormously bloated as they decomposed, their extraordinary capacity to float was empirically ascertained, far greater than that of living animals. However, there is no reason why we should not believe that the experience just recounted is further confirmation of another one, much earlier in time and better known, which comes up every time a goatskin bag is filled with water. For thousands of years this particular container has been in a way endemic among nomads in general and Middle Eastern peoples in particular, for a great



Himalayan region: big cattle-hide leather bags, used by two men at a time to cross a river.



number of undeniable advantages.

Earthenware containers are not the ideal thing for ethnic groups that have to roam

constantly with their flocks. Terra-cotta amphoras, jars and any kind of pot, just to mention the main types, are too heavy and cumbersome and above all too fragile for those who continually have to move their household goods to follow the animals. Therefore it is no wonder that, unlike sedentary societies, pastoral ones did not need pottery and consequently no handicrafts originated and, in the long run, no towns. As far as containers were concerned, the best solution arose from the very cause of the problem: in fact it was the sheep and goats themselves that provided a capacious amphora for water with their skin, in Arabic *ghirba*.

These nomads may have got the idea from the anatomy of the animals they fed on and soon realized that a sheepskin, or better goatskin which was more insulated by its long hair,



appropriately tanned and sewn up, became an absolutely water-tight container. Where there was no lack of water, it gave rise to an extremely popular musical instrument called bagpipe by the scholarly and "*zampogna*" by boors. On the contrary, where drought prevailed, satisfying one's throat was preferable to pleasing one's ear and the capacious bladder was filled with water which kept quite cool despite the scorching heat, or at least seemed to do so.


It is possible to know at once how much water is left in leather water-bags. They fit perfectly over a horse's back or even on a man's, and enable one to drink even while going at a gallop or through a sallet. They are ideal containers, to the

extent that they have not needed any improvement over the more than ten thousand years of use. The inseparable companions of shepherds, wayfarers,

merchants and brigands, they are only a little refractory, almost reluctant when it comes to entering water to be filled. A small amount of air left inside is enough to keep them afloat and not even the weight of a person on them does the trick. It takes a tremendous effort to sink them right in the natural element that requires a tremendous effort not to sink in!

One does not have to be particularly brilliant to realize that this considerable tendency to float gives an extremely effective helping hand not to drown. Thus it is a container with a double use, but both equally fundamental, firstly to allow one to drink enough to keep alive, secondly not to drink enough to die! When it is full it ensures survival on land a long way from water and when it is empty, survival on water a long way from land. Once again the goatskin water-bag is confirmed as the perfect viaticum for those who have to face the dangers of travelling long distances in desert regions.

Very soon the goatskin water-bag, owing to its two functions, became a constant for the



Sudan: girls with goatskin leather bags used as floats to cross a river.



with straps used for the pack-animals, and furthermore each one will be anchored to the river-bed by means of a rope with a rock for ballast. At this point I'll moor the row of leather bags on both sides of the river and spread a layer of dry branches and earth on them, thus forming a pathway. You won't drown because each bag can support two men without sinking"...

On that particular occasion the bridge was not constructed, since a large contingent of the enemy cavalry had stopped on the other side of the river ready to go into action. However, this ingenious invention was not forgotten and was repeatedly put to use by armies, both as an

Left.


A Sherman tank climbing up the bank of the Volturno after fording.

Below.

A bridge on floats constructed across the Volturno on the night of 14th October. 32-ton Sherman tanks could not pass over it due to its limited carrying capacity. From The Sphere, 13th November, 1943.

equipment of each individual in bygone armies. Consequently, every soldier always carried one with him, emptying and inflating it when he had to cross a river or stream and deflating and filling it with water straight after. To get baggage waggons across a river, early attempts were made by attaching goatskin bags and barrels directly to the waggon, then it was considered more practical to construct special rafts, placing numerous goatskin bags tied together under the planking. Many Assyrian and Egyptian bas-reliefs show us such rafts, which are the immediate forerunners of real bridges on inflated floats. Xenophon, who lived between the end of the V century and the

first half of the IV century B.C., was the first to refer to such a bridge being built, in his *Anabasis*. Thus, while he was in a meeting with his staff to work out how to cross the river Tigris, a humble soldier from Rhodes demanded a hearing and then said: "O Sirs, I can help you cross the river, four thousand hoplites at a time: however you must let me have what I ask for and pay me a talent". Having gained the attention of the Commander and the astounded officers, the soldier went on, "I need two thousand leather water-bags. As there are a lot of donkeys, oxen, sheep and goats around here, we only need to slaughter and skin them, then inflate their hides. The leather bags will then be tied together



individual float and as a raft and especially as a bridge for attacks. Suetonius, for example, stated that Caesar's legions moved with such incredible speed because they used leather bags to cross rivers. On the other hand, Caesar himself mentioned that leather bags were part of the Lusitanians' equipment. As for Pliny, he affirmed that Arab warriors used them and Livy that Spanish warriors did so, too.

By the time the Empire rose, inflated floats were being employed systematically. As for bridges, this is how an unknown writer of the IV century A.D. described them: "To prevent rivers from being an obstacle along the route the army has to take, as often happens, necessity, which is the mother of invention, devised a remedy which costs little, is extremely practical and which is prepared in the following way. Calf skins are tanned Arab-style. In fact there is widespread use among Arabs of a special technique for treating skins, as they draw water from wells with leather buckets. Therefore leather bags

three and a half feet long can be made out of skins like these by sewing them up carefully, so that when they are inflated, there are no bulges and they are uniformly flat. The bags are tied to each other with thongs attached to their lower sides, while hooks on one side of the upper part are fastened to rings. This is how all the elements linked together take the form of a bridge. Owing to the strong current, the construction reaches the other side more easily if it is oblique with respect to the river. Once iron poles have been fixed on the two river banks and strong ropes passed under the bags themselves in the central part to support the weight of those passing over them and along the sides to keep the bridge stable, this structure is ready in a short time for people to cross the river. Hand-operated ballistae are placed on each side of the river to prevent an enemy attack from stopping those working on the bridge." Incidentally, it is worth noting that there are large bellows beside the leather bags in the accompanying

figure, as in all similar ones that follow. The idea is almost too explicit, meaning that only pumping air continuously can counterbalance inevitable leakages, quite often caused by enemy arrows.

The idea of a bridge for military attacks constructed on inflated floats does not fade out with the Empire but continues all through the Middle Ages into modern times, as some masterly drawings by Francesco Di Giorgio Martini prove. Besides, the same idea to employ inflated leather bags as floats can be found in almost all civilizations and ages, and in every corner of the earth. Even the hordes of Mongols made use of them to cross the Danube in 1241 and plunder Eastern Europe. Strangely enough there is no trace of a similar use of leather bags in pre-Columbian America, although something else extremely interesting in this regard has been found in some Peruvian coastal areas.

From the XVI century on, local fishermen made large inflated floats, cylindrical and





egg-shaped, by sewing several seal-skins together. Joining two of them by their tips formed the prow of a boat whose sides were obtained by binding other cylinders to the opposite free ends. Planking lay on top of the two parallel rows and acted as a deck for this unusual craft. A thick layer of grease smeared along the seams and joints followed by the application of a special paint ensured that the floats were absolutely waterproof. Taking such prudent care must have been because the boat was used for sea-sailing, the perfect forerunner also from this aspect of the future rubber boat, as it anticipates its basic features. In fact the former became obsolete at the same time the latter appeared on the scene.

The most recent modification

of the floating bridge came to Italy from the New World: an eight-ton model constructed over the Volturno River near Triflisco during the night of 13th October, 1943 by the B Company of the 10th Battalion Engineer Corps of the 3rd Division of the 5th U.S. Army. Pinpointed within a few hours by the German artillery, many floats were ripped by shrapnel and, just as in the past, compressors had to work continuously to try and make up for air leakages. However, the bridge survived only for eight hours.

Another bridge, this time a thirty-ton one, was constructed close by during the following night. The B Company of the 16th Armoured Engineer Battalion put it up in just six hours under the short-lived

After 14 minutes, the last panel is inserted at the centre and the bridge is completed.


protection of darkness and smokescreens: it remained intact after dawn thanks to a clear air superiority.

Since that day pontoons and inflatable boats, as well as being a basic military resource, have been employed in civil defence both when major natural calamities occur and as support during local disasters. In particular, the inflatable boat has become extraordinarily popular as a pleasure craft in the last few decades, and....for illegal immigration!

□

** Historian and writer*

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Le besoin de «savoir» dans le nouveau théâtre opérationnel, par Salvatore Farina et Pietro Serino (p. 6).

L'ensemble des capacités RISTA-EW se propose de créer de nouvelles structures susceptibles de satisfaire, aux niveaux conceptuel et organisationnel, les exigences d'un Corps d'Armée engagé, sur le plan tactique-opérationnel, dans la conduite d'opérations traditionnelles et de gestion de crises. Le projet s'inscrit dans le cadre d'un plus vaste processus de réorganisation concernant la composante opérationnelle de l'Armée.

L'Art du commandement, par Maurizio Coccia (p. 16).

Le commandement ne consiste pas seulement en une fonction mais aussi et surtout en une énergie naturelle générée par la volonté de servir de guide à ses semblables.

Ce n'est pas une science, mais un art qui s'exprime à travers de dons naturels, éduqués de façon opportune. Plutarque, Machiavel, Clausewitz, Mao et, même le contemporain Alberoni sont autant d'exemples exaltants de Commandants géniaux dont les vertus prodigieuses peuvent, aujourd'hui encore, constituer un modèle de comportement pour tous ceux qui sont appelés à diriger et à gouverner des hommes et des structures complexes, et ce dans la sphère aussi bien militaire que civile.

Réflexions d'un Commandant, par Antony C. Zinni (p. 28).

L'article est une analyse courageuse du monde militaire aux Etats-Unis, menée, tout au long d'une quarantaine d'années de milice, par un Général (d'origine italienne), ancien Commandant en Chef des Marines.

Le récit autobiographique, écrit dans un style journalistique subtil, est une véritable moisson de renseignements sur les principales opérations menées par les Forces armées USA au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, sans oublier la guerre du Vietnam, la Guerre Froide, la «Desert Storm» et l'ère post-bipolaire.

Il se conclut par une série de réflexions

dont le contenu hautement formatif constitue le «testament moral» d'un haut Commandant qui quitte le service actif.

Une Armée européenne?, par Pier Paolo Lunelli (p. 38).

La constitution d'une Armée européenne parfaitement intégrée et autonome sur le plan opérationnel, décidée lors des conférences au sommet de Helsinki et de St. Malo, s'avère un projet très complexe qui ne va pas sans poser de difficultés.

L'étude des structures décisionnelles et de l'organisation des forces, dans le cadre de l'adhésion des pays de l'Est à l'OTAN et à l'UEO, soulève d'importantes questions d'ordre politique, financier et organisationnel.

Union européenne, politique étrangère et de sûreté commune. Interview du Professeur Javier Solana

Madariaga, représentant de l'UE pour la politique étrangère et de sûreté commune, par Ornella Rota (p. 56).

Pour pouvoir compter sur une force effective de dissuasion, l'Europe doit disposer d'une force militaire basée sur une compétitivité industrielle et technologique réelle.

Les guerres du futur ne seront vraisemblablement plus déclenchées par les gouvernements mais par des individus ou des groupes d'individus. D'où la nécessité de mettre au point de nouvelles stratégies visant à faire face à des menaces non traditionnelles.

L'instabilité qui caractérise la situation actuelle appelle la consolidation du processus de coopération et d'intégration du Vieux Continent. Dans un tel contexte, l'Italie se doit de contribuer à cet affermissement en tant que pays frontalier entre l'Europe et la Méditerranée.

L'Europe de la sûreté.

Interview du Député Luigi Ramponi, par Giovanni Cerbo (p. 62).

L'Union européenne est en train de mettre au point un instrument militaire comptant 60 000 hommes. Il s'agit du premier pas vers une politique de sûreté concrète et commune dont l'aboutissement serait la création d'une armée européenne dans le cadre général de l'Alliance Atlantique qui représente encore un outil sûr pour la défense de la civilisation occidentale face à une série de menaces asymétriques.

L'interview offre en outre une occasion pour réfléchir sur des points tels que l'adhésion des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est à l'OTAN; la lutte contre le terrorisme international; le rôle de l'armée ita-

lienne en tant que facteur de coopération et de développement des relations internationales.

Le Corps d'Armée italien pour l'OTAN (2ème partie), par Vincenzo Maugeri et Vincenzo Pitagora (p. 68).

Dans le cadre de la constitution d'un Corps d'Armée italien pour l'OTAN il est prévu d'introduire un niveau de division afin de garantir un Commandement de Planification effectif. A la suite de la réorganisation des Commandements Combat Support (CS) et Combat Service Support (CSS) de FOTER, les Commandements Opérationnels Intermédiaires sont devenus des Commandements de Brigade de Manœuvre ayant des fonctions opérationnelles complètes et, par conséquent, étant capables de remplir la fonction C2 sur les Unités dépendantes et d'en gérer la préparation sur place.

Il est également prévu de créer, au niveau de division, une Section «Plan», visant à assurer les renforts pour le niveau supérieur et devant constituer un réservoir de ressources dont pourra disposer l'ensemble de la Force Armée.


Les soldats italiens à Kabul, par Giorgio Battisti (p. 82).

Conformément à ce qui a été stipulé dans les accords de Bonn, la mission ISAF a démarré au mois de janvier de cette année. La mission s'est avérée d'autant plus difficile et complexe que les soldats ont du affronter une situation caractérisée par la conflictualité endémique des différentes ethnies afghanes, le manque d'infrastructures portuaires et aéroportuaires, des conditions météorologiques défavorables, des réseaux routiers en très mauvais état. L'article fournit des renseignements ponctuels sur le but de la mission, le champ de responsabilité, les tâches et la composition du contingent italien.

Estonie: les nouvelles Forces armées. Interview du Vice-Amiral Tarmo Kõuts, Commandant des Forces de Défense, par Enrico Magnani (p. 90).

Les Forces de Défense de l'Estonie ont été formées à partir de l'ancienne Ligue de Défense constituée avant même la libération du pays de l'occupation soviétique. Suivant la 'politique du pas à pas', l'outil militaire est en train d'atteindre le niveau d'efficacité à travers la création d'unités mobiles bien entraînées et pouvant s'intégrer dans des contextes multinationaux.

Le système de recrutement est fondé sur la conscription obligatoire pour



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tous les jeunes d'âge compris entre 18 et 27 ans. La durée du service varie de 8 à 11 mois selon la spécialité. Tous les conscrits passent ensuite au forces de réserve.

D'étroits liens de coopération ont été entamés entre les Forces armées des pays baltiques et celles d'autres Nations européennes. Cette coopération se concrétisant par la participation active d'unités spécialisées aux opérations de soutien de la paix en Bosnie et au Kosovo.

Le Collège de la Défense roumain, par Giovanni Sulis (p. 96).

Fondé en 1992 dans le cadre de l'Académie des Hautes Etudes Militaires, l'Institut a immédiatement entamé des relations avec des institutions gouvernementales, culturelles et scientifiques nationales et étrangères. Il s'agit de la première école de ce genre créée en Europe orientale après la chute du communisme.

Le programme d'études prévoit des matières politiques, économiques, juridiques et sociologiques, ainsi que des activités collatérales telles que des conférences avec les représentants des autorités locales, des visites aux bases militaires ou aux installations industrielles et la mise en place d'initiatives culturelles concernant la défense et la sûreté.

L'Institut jouit déjà d'un grand prestige à l'échelle internationale en raison, notamment, de sa vocation universitaire: il se propose en effet de préparer, dans le cadre d'une approche interdisciplinaire, des Cadres dirigeants dans tous les secteurs de la vie publique nationale.

Les Forces de Réserve (2ème partie), par Francesco Diella et Giuseppe Bongiovanni (p. 103).

La deuxième partie du travail décrit les lignes directrices du rapport d'emploi entre l'Armée et les «Forces de réserve». Sont examinés en particulier les points suivants: l'état juridique de officiers, des sous-officiers et des militaires du rang rappelés; leur avancement; leur traitement et leurs droits. Toutefois, la nouvelle réglementation, qui sanctionne le passage du vieux système de mobilisation à une organisation du type volontaire, sera susceptible de remaniements, notamment en ce qui concerne les procédures, les critères d'emploi et les encouragements au recrutement.

Le flotteur pneumatique, par Flavio Russo (p. 110).

Xénophon, dans son récit l'Anabase (IV siècle av. J.-C.), parle déjà de l'emploi de l'outre de peau de bouc comme moyen

expéditif pour traverser un cours d'eau. Mais cet usage s'est perdu dans la nuit des temps: les premiers radeaux utilisés pour le transport de soldats et de chars consistaient en effet en une peau de bouc remplie d'air en vue de sa flottaison.



Die notwendige Kenntnis der neuen operativen Szenarien, von Salvatore Farina und Pietro Serino (S. 6).

Das «Kapazitätspaket» RISTA-EW sieht vor, neue Strukturen zu schaffen, die vom organisatorischen Konzept her die Bedürfnisse eines Armeekorps befriedigen können, das auf taktisch-operativer Ebene mit der Durchführung traditioneller und auch Krisenmanagementoperationen betraut ist.

Das Projekt steht im größeren Zusammenhang der Neuordnung der operativen Komponente der Streitkräfte.

Die Kunst des Befehls, von Maurizio Coccia (S. 16).

Der Befehl ist nicht nur eine Funktion, sondern vor allem eine natürliche Energie, die aus dem Willen herrührt, sich zur Führung Seinesgleichen aufzuschwingen. Es ist keine Wissenschaft, sondern eine Kunst, die sich durch die Ausübung natürlicher, angemessen ausgebildeter Anlagen erklärt. Plutarch, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Mao und sogar der Zeitgenosse Alberoni liefern uns erhebbare Zeugnisse von genialen Kommandanten, deren unerhörte Tugenden auch heute ein Vorbild für all diejenigen sein können, die aufgerufen sind, im militärischen oder zivilen Bereich Menschen und komplexe Strukturen zu führen.

Reflexionen eines Kommandanten, von Antony C. Zinni (S. 28).

Die Arbeit ist eine mutige Analyse der Welt des Militärs in den Vereinigten Staaten, die in 40 Jahren Kampf entstanden ist. Autor ist ein General italienischer Herkunft, ehemals Chef der Marineinfanteristen.

Die autobiographische Erzählung journalistischen Zuschnitts liefert ohne

Reserven eine Menge von Informationen über die wichtigsten Militäroperationen, welche die US-Streitkräfte im 2.

Weltkrieg, im Vietnamkrieg, im Kalten Krieg, im «Desert Storm» und in der Ära nach dem Ende des Bipolarismus geführt haben.

Die Darstellung endet mit einer Reihe von lehrreichen Überlegungen, die eine Art moralisches Testament eines hohen Kommandanten beim Verlassen des aktiven Dienstes darstellen.

Europäische Streitkräfte?, von Pier Paolo Lunelli (S. 38).

Die Aufstellung europäischer Streitkräfte, die perfekt integriert und autonom operativ sein sollen, sind bei den Gipfeln in Helsinki und Saint-Malo entschieden worden. Es stellt sich heraus, dass das Projekt äußerst kompliziert ist und etliche Fragen und Zweifel aufwirft.

Eine Untersuchung der Entscheidungsstrukturen und der Anordnung der Kräfte im Rahmen der Osterweiterung der NATO und der WEU stellt wichtige politische, finanzielle und organisatorische Fragen.

Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU; Interview mit dem EU-Vertreter für GASP, Prof. Javier Solana Madariaga, von Ornella Rota (S. 56).

Damit Europa sich ein effektives Abschreckungspotential zulegen kann, muss es eine Militärmacht haben, die auf einer echten industriellen und technologischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit beruht.

Die Kriege der Zukunft werden vermutlich nicht von Staaten, sondern von Individuen und Gruppen von Individuen geführt werden. Es ist also nötig, neue Strategien zu entwickeln, die in der Lage sind, nicht-traditionellen Bedrohungen entgegenzutreten. Die heutige Situation internationaler Instabilität verlangt danach, den Prozess der Kooperation und Integration des alten Kontinents zu konkretisieren. In diesem Zusammenhang ist Italien in seiner Rolle als Grenzland zwischen Kontinentaleuropa und Mittelmeerraum aufgefordert, einen immer wichtigeren Beitrag zu leisten.

Europa der Sicherheit. Interview mit dem italienischen Abgeordneten Luigi Ramponi, von Giovanni Cerbo (S. 62).

Die EU ist dabei, eine Streitkraft von 60 000 Mann aufzustellen. Dies ist der erste Schritt zu einer konkreten gemeinsamen Sicherheitspolitik, deren Ziel eine

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europäische Armee im Rahmen der NATO sein sollte, welche angesichts einiger asymmetrischer Bedrohungen immer noch ein sicheres Bollwerk zur Verteidigung der westlichen Kultur ist. Das Interview liefert darüber hinaus signifikante Anstöße zum Nachdenken über die Erweiterung der NATO auf die Länder Südosteuropas, dem Kampf dem internationalen Terrorismus, der Rolle des italienischen Heeres als Kooperations- und Entwicklungsfaktor der internationalen Beziehungen.

Das italienische Armeekorps der NATO (2. Teil), von Vincenzo Maugeri und Vincenzo Pitagora (S. 68).

Im Zusammenhang des zu schaffenden italienischen Armeekorps für die NATO ist die Einführung der Divisionsebene vorgesehen, um ein echtes Planungskommando zu garantieren. Die Reorganisation der Kommandos Combat Support (CS) und Combat Service Support (CSS) der FOTER wandelt die operativen Kommandos mittlerer Größe in Manöverbrigadekommandos mit vollständiger operativer Funktion um. Daher ist sie in der Lage, die C2-Funktion über die ihr untergeordneten Einheiten zu erfüllen, und die Bereitstellung vor Ort durchzuführen.

Auf Divisionsebene ist im Übrigen die Schaffung einer Reihe von «Plänen» vorgesehen, die geeignet sind, die Verstärkungen auf höherer Ebene zu gewährleisten sowie ein nützliches Reservoir an Ressourcen (Personal) darstellen, das den gesamten Streitkräften zur Verfügung steht.

Die italienischen Soldaten in Kabul, von Giorgio Battisti (S. 82).

Nach den im Bonner Abkommen festgelegten Bedingungen wurde im Januar die ISAF-Mission gestartet. Dies ist eine sehr komplexe Mission, die zusätzlich durch die endemische Konfliktualität der verschiedenen Ethnien Afghanistans, das Fehlen von Flughäfen, die ungünstigen Wetterverhältnisse, der sehr schlechten Straßeninfrastruktur erschwert wird. Der Aufsatz liefert genaue Kenntnisse über das Ziel der Mission, den Verantwortungsbereich, die Aufgaben und die Zusammensetzung des italienischen Kontingents.

Estland. Die neuen Streitkräfte. Interview mit Vizeadmiral Tarmo Kõuts, Kommandant der estnischen Verteidigung, von Enrico Magnani (S. 90).

Die Verteidigungskräfte Estlands haben sich nach dem Modell des vorher existierenden Verteidigungsbündnisses herausge-

bildet, das vor der Befreiung des Landes von der sowjetischen Besatzung bestand. Schrittweise werden die Streitkräfte durch die Schaffung von wohlausgebildeten Einheiten, die mobil und in internationale Kontexte integrierbar sind, effizienter. Die Rekrutierung basiert auf der Wehrpflicht für alle jungen Männer im Alter zwischen 18 und 27 Jahren. Der Wehrdienst dauert zwischen 8 und 11 Monaten, je nach Spezialausbildung, am Ende derer alle Wehrpflichtigen zu Reservisten werden.

Es gibt eine enge Zusammenarbeit mit den Streitkräften der anderen baltischen Länder und mit denen anderer europäischen Nationen. Eine Zusammenarbeit, die konkreten Ausdruck findet in der aktiven Teilnahme von Spezialeinheiten zu den friedensunterstützenden Maßnahmen in Bosnien und im Kosovo.

Das rumänische Verteidigungskolleg, von Giovanni Sulis (S. 96).

Das Institut wurde 1992 im Rahmen der Accademia Alti Studi Militari (Akademie Höherer Militärstudien) gegründet. Es hat sehr schnell Beziehungen zu italienischen und ausländischen Institutionen von Regierung, Kultur und Wissenschaft geknüpft und es war die erste Schule dieser Art, die in Osteuropa nach dem Fall des Sowjetsystems geschaffen wurde. Das Studienprogramm geht politische, wirtschaftliche, rechtliche und soziologische Problemstellungen an. Es sieht auch begleitende Aktivitäten vor, wie Treffen mit örtlichen Autoritäten, Exkursionen zu Industriekomplexen und Militärbasen und die Organisation vielfacher Kulturinitiativen, die Verteidigung und Sicherheit betreffen. Das Kolleg hat sich bereits ein großes internationales Prestige erworben, vor allem aufgrund seiner universitären Berufung, die darauf hinarbeitet, in einer interdisziplinären Sichtweise die Führungskader in jedwedem Sektor des öffentlichen Lebens Italiens auszubilden.

Die Ergänzungskräfte (2. Teil), von Francesco Diella und Giuseppe Bongiovanni (S. 103).

Der zweite Teil der Arbeit beschreibt die Grundlinien, die das Verhältnis des Einsatzes zwischen Heer und Reservisten regelt. Insbesondere werden untersucht: der rechtliche Status der einberufenen Offiziere, Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften. Die Karriere, Bezahlung und Rechte der Reservisten. Die neuen Vorschriften, die den Übergang vom alten Mobilmachungssystem zu einer Freiwilligenorganisation sanktionieren, werden selbstverständlich einige Veränderungen nötig haben, was

die Prozeduren, die Einsatzkriterien und die Anreize zur Rekrutierung betrifft.

Aufblasbare Schwimmkörper, von Flavio Russo (S. 110).

Der Ziegenauter war die gewählte Methode zur schnellen Überquerung eines Wasserlaufs, wie Xenophon in der Anabasis aus dem 4. Jh. v. Chr. erzählt, doch der Einsatz dieses Mittels verliert sich im Dunkel der Geschichte: Die ersten Flöße, die zum Transport von Soldaten und Karren benutzt wurden, bestanden aus Schafshäuten, die durch eine Luftblase zum Schwimmen gebracht wurden.




La necesidad de «tener conocimiento» en el nuevo escenario operativo, por Salvatore Farina y Pietro Serino (p. 6).
El conjunto de capacidades RISTA-EW tiene por objeto crear nuevas estructuras capaces de satisfacer, en ámbito tanto conceptual como organizativo, las exigencias de un Cuerpo de Ejército a la hora de llevar a cabo, a nivel táctico-operativo, operaciones tradicionales y de gestión de las crisis. El proyecto entra en el marco más amplio del proceso de reorganización de la componente operativa del Ejército.

El Arte del Mando, por Maurizio Coccia (p. 16).

El Mando no es tan solo una función sino también y sobre todo una energía natural generada por la voluntad que tiene uno de dirigir o guiar a sus propios semejantes. No es una ciencia sino un arte que se manifiesta a través de un don natural, educado correctamente. Plutarco, Maquiavelo, Clausewitz, Mao y hasta el contemporáneo Alberoni nos ofrecen exaltadores ejemplos de Comandantes geniales, cuyas prodigiosas virtudes siguen siendo hoy día un modelo de comportamiento para todos aquellos que tengan que dirigir y gobernar a hombres y estructuras complejas, tanto en ámbito militar como civil.

Reflexiones de un Comandante, por Antony C. Zinni (p. 28).

El artículo es un valiente análisis del mundo militar en los Estados Unidos, rea-



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lizado, a lo largo de cuarenta años de milicia, por un General (de origen italiano), ex Comandante en Jefe de los Marines.

El relato autobiográfico, escrito en sutil estilo periodístico, facilita, sin reserva alguna, innumerables informaciones sobre las mayores operaciones llevadas a cabo por las Fuerzas armadas estadounidenses durante la Segunda guerra mundial, la guerra de Vietnam, la Guerra fría, la «Desert Storm» y en la era posbipolar. El relato se concluye con una serie de reflexiones cuyo contenido altamente formativo constituye una especie de testamento moral de un Comandante de alto rango a la hora de retirarse del servicio activo.

Un ejército europeo?, por Pier Paolo Lunelli (p. 38).

La constitución de un ejército europeo, perfectamente integrado y autónomo desde el punto de vista operativo, concertada en las cumbres de Helsinki y St. Malo, resulta ser un proyecto muy complejo que sigue presentado numerosos interrogantes. El examen de las estructuras decisionales y del ordenamiento de las fuerzas en el marco del ampliación hacia el Este de la OTAN y de la UEO plantea importantes cuestiones políticas, financieras y organizativas.

Unión europea, política extranjera y de seguridad común. Entrevista con el Profesor Javier Solana Madariaga, representante de la UE para la política extranjera y de seguridad común, por Ornella Rota (p. 56).

Para tener una capacidad efectiva de disuasión, Europa tiene que disponer de una fuerza militar basada en una real competitividad industrial y tecnológica. Las guerras ya no las desencadenarán los Gobiernos sino los individuos o grupos de individuos. De ahí la necesidad de adoptar nuevas estrategias para hacer frente a las amenazas no tradicionales. En esta situación internacional caracterizada por la inestabilidad, se evidencia la necesidad de consolidar el proceso de cooperación e integración del Viejo Continente. En semejante contexto la aportación de Italia en su calidad de país fronterizo entre Europa y el Mediterráneo cobra una importancia creciente.

La Europa de la seguridad. Entrevista con el Diputado Luigi Ramponi, por Giovanni Cerbo (p. 62).

La Unión europea está poniendo a punto una herramienta militar integrada por 60 000 hombres. Es éste el primer paso hacia la implementación de una concreta política de seguridad común, cuya aplicación debería desembocar en la creación de un ejército europeo en el marco

general de la Alianza Atlántica que todavía representa una defensa segura de la civilización occidental contra las amenazas asimétricas.

La entrevista da importantes ocasiones de reflexión sobre: la adhesión a la OTAN de los países de Europa del Sureste; la lucha contra el terrorismo internacional; el papel del Ejército italiano en la cooperación y el desarrollo de las relaciones internacionales.

El Cuerpo de Ejército italiano para la OTAN (parte segunda), por Vincenzo Maugeri y Vincenzo Pitagora (p. 68).

En el marco de la constitución del Cuerpo de Ejército italiano para la OTAN se prevé la introducción del nivel de división para garantizar un Mando efectivo de planificación. La reorganización de los Mandos Combat Support (CS) y Combat Service Support (CSS) de FOTER transforma los Mandos Operativos Intermedios en Mandos de Brigada de Maniobra con funciones operativas completas y, por consiguiente, con capacidad para desempeñar la función C2 sobre las Unidades dependientes y de hacerse cargo de su preparación en la misma sede. A nivel de división, se prevé asimismo la creación de una Sección «Planes», que además de asegurar los refuerzos para el nivel superior, constituirá una reserva de recursos de los que podrá disponer la Fuerza armada en su conjunto.

Los soldados italianos en Kabul, por Giorgio Battisti (p. 82).

Según lo dispuesto en los acuerdos de Bonn, se lanzó en enero la misión ISAF. Es una misión tanto más compleja cuanto que los soldados tienen que enfrentarse con una situación difícil caracterizada por los conflictos endémicos de las distintas etnias afganas, la falta de infraestructuras portuarias y aeroportuarias, condiciones meteorológicas desfavorables, y carreteras en muy mal estado. El artículo facilita datos puntuales sobre la finalidad de la misión, el ámbito de responsabilidad, las tareas y la composición del Contingente italiano.

Estonia: las nuevas Fuerzas armadas. Entrevista con el Vicealmirante Tarmo Kõuts, Comandante de las Fuerzas de Defensa, por Enrico Magnani (p. 90).

Las Fuerzas de Defensa de Estonia se formaron a partir de la preexistente Liga de Defensa, constituida antes de la liberación del país de la ocupación soviética. Según la «política paso a paso», la herramienta militar está cobrando eficiencia a través de la constitución de unidades móviles especializadas y capaces de

actuar en contextos multinacionales. El reclutamiento se hace a través del alistamiento obligatorio para todos los jóvenes entre 18 y 27 años. Al finalizar el servicio, que dura de 8 a 11 meses dependiendo de la especialización, todos los reclutas pasan a las fuerzas de reserva. Las Fuerzas armadas de los países bálticos y las de otras Naciones europeas entablaron estrechas relaciones de cooperación que se concretizan con la participación activa de unidades especializadas en las operaciones de paz en Bosnia y Kosovo.

El Colegio de Defensa rumano, por Giovanni Sulis (p. 96).



El Instituto, fundado en 1992 en el marco de la Academia de Altos Estudios Militares, entabló rápidamente relaciones con instituciones gubernamentales, culturales y científicas nacionales e internacionales. Fue la primera escuela de ese tipo creada en Europa oriental después de la caída del comunismo. El programa de estudios prevé disciplinas políticas, económicas, jurídicas y sociológicas, y actividades tales como encuentros con autoridades locales, visitas a instalaciones industriales y bases militares y la organización de iniciativas culturales en materia de defensa y seguridad. El Instituto ya se hizo digno de prestigio internacional, debido en particular a su vocación universitaria encaminada a preparar, con enfoque interdisciplinario, a los cuadros directivos en todos los sectores de la vida pública nacional.

La Fuerzas de Complemento (parte segunda), por Francesco Diella y Giuseppe Bongiovanni (p. 103).






La segunda parte del trabajo describe las directrices fundamentales que reglamentan la relación de empleo entre el Ejército y las reservas. En particular se examina: el estado jurídico de los oficiales, suboficiales y militares de la tropa llamados; el ascenso, el sueldo y los derechos de los mismos. Por supuesto, la nueva normativa, que sanciona el paso del viejo sistema de movilización a una organización del tipo voluntario, será sujeta a enmiendas, en particular por lo que se refiere a los procedimientos, los criterios de empleo y los incentivos para el reclutamiento.

El flotador neumático, por Flavio Russo (p. 110).

Jenofonte (s.IV a. J.C.), en su relato Anábasis, ya habla del odre de cabra como medio expeditivo para cruzar los cursos de agua. Pero su utilización se pierde en la noche de los tiempos: las primeras balsas usadas para el transporte de soldados y carros consistía precisamente en odres de piel de cabra inflados para que flotar.



THE EDITORIAL STYLE OF RIVISTA MILITARE



RIVISTA MILITARE

JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856





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RIVISTA MILITARE

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
**MARKETING,
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QUALITY OF LIFE
ORGANIZATIONAL
CORNERSTONES OF
A HIGH-QUALITY
ARMY**

**WHO WE
REALLY ARE**


**NATO CIMIC
GROUP SOUTH**

**EL ALAMEIN
WHEN THE DESERT
TURNED INTO HELL**

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ENGLISH EDITION



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RIVISTA MILITARE**



Dear Readers,

on undertaking the office of Editor-in-Chief of "Rivista Militare" I express my gratitude to the Army Chief of Staff, who with his choice – and even more with his words – showed me his confidence and consideration, entrusting me with this prestigious publication, one of the oldest in our national history.

"Rivista Militare" is a magazine deep-rooted and stably present in our Country; in fact, it comes from far off: founded in distant 1856, at the height of the "Risorgimento", it accompanied, and often preceded, the evolutions of our culture, carrying out a

great informative action resulting from the intellectual clarity and skill of hundreds of contributors who, in the past 146 years, have constituted the force of our periodical.

Their technical and journalistic capability, together with their value and far-sightedness, have greatly contributed to its prestige.

Their efforts have remarkably favoured the progress of military studies and social ideas, often providing the right spur and keystone for the solution of significant problems.

Today, in this fascinating historical moment, our Service is engaged in a deep and highly commendable renewal; our magazine never ceased to accompany the Army's evolution and aspirations, its turning points and its changes, great and small.

The articles of our "Rivista" have always been dealing with the most diverse subjects: art of war, science, technology, military events, culture and customs. The aim of the Army and that of its periodical is, and will continue to be, that of understanding society and, at the same time, to be understood by it, in order to create a common ground for dialogue, welcoming all different expressions. Today's Army is an Institution made up of aware and participant Italian citizens, an Institution capable of realistically looking inside itself, freely and without reservations, as is necessary in the interest of the Country.

The challenges of the third millenium oblige the media to have a very widespread presence in society, and each paper is an irreplaceable reference of the civil evolution of our Nation, where present and future are increasingly near to each other.

Thanks to the abnegation and the often obscure hard work of its members, the Army is the institutional reference for the safeguard of internal and international security and for the defence of peace, democracy and freedom of all peoples. But not only that.

The Army is also a great human capital, an immense reservoir of individual, cul-

tural, technical and scientific resources in the service of our Nation.

At the present time a capable information, besides telling facts, must also catalyze thoughts, give exhaustive analyses and cause the right sensations, bringing together Institution and Country. It must also be able to prepare the future, by sensing and anticipating – and even stimulating – all possible changes, in a context which goes beyond the borders of our Peninsula.

I pledge, with God's help, to continue this activity, well aware of the great responsibility entailed by this commitment.

Our publication has always been open, both outwards and inwards, almost as a bridge or a link, underlining the typical close symbiosis that our "Rivista" will favour with simple and clear words, in order to clarify the new ideas, giving its contribution as a witness to the anticipating function of military culture along the road of man's history.

But "Rivista Militare" does not consist merely of the magazine bearing this well-known name.

We should not forget the English-language edition, the Army Review and the score of non-periodical works published every year with its mark.

We are present throughout the whole Nation – in newsstands and with a large net of subscribers – and, outside our borders, we reach steadfast and keen readers, in many Countries, with different languages and cultures.

Those who have the honour of belonging to the Army, as well as the numerous sympathizers not in uniform, are welcome to continue enriching our magazine with their ideas and their precious intellectual and professional vitality. This can make the "Rivista" like a real home for all of us, I would even say like one's own village, dear to one's heart, wherein one was born or dreams of going to live.

This is because, as Cesare Pavese said *"everyone must have his own village, if only to leave it. A native village means not to be alone, to know that in the people, in the trees, in the soil something belongs to you and waits for you when you are not there"*

Like a loyal friend who will never forsake you.

To Brigadier General Giovanni Cerbo, transferred from the "Rivista" and called to take on another prestigious assignment, goes my cordial and well-wishing farewell. During the "stirrup-to-stirrup" period, in which he passed on to me the indispensable "working tools," he was an attentive and scrupulous guide. Gen. Cerbo is a real master of journalism and an important reference of culture and information. To him go my deepest thanks and my gratitude.

Dear Readers, to you I express my warmest greetings, together with the invitation to go on with this fascinating and stimulating editorial adventure, so that we may continue together in the search for the good fragments which are an integral part of the reality and of the great mystery of life.

Good reading to you all.

Col. Giuseppe Maria Giovanni Tricarico



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

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Christmas is an important moment of reflection for the military community, ready, as always, to safeguard the needs and security of all peoples. "Rivista Militare" wishes everybody a prosperous and peaceful future.

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MARKETING, COMMUNICATION, QUALITY OF LIFE. ORGANIZATIONAL CORNERSTONES OF A HIGH-QUALITY ARMY

**Lecture by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army at the
Institute for High Defence Studies
(Rome, October 16, 2002)**

Within the Armed Forces, promotional, public information and public relations activities have always been conducted with unquestionable effectiveness. Our colleagues engaged in these sectors worked with enthusiasm, endeavouring to offset the lack of specific skills in a field so far from our essential training and service experiences.

In these sectors, the operational management is made even more difficult by the unavoidable turnover of jobs, typical of our employment but very unpractical in terms of organizational learning, which is the necessary *humus* for the development and growth of a culture essential for working out a strategy functional to the conception of a policy.

I believe that these are precisely the reasons of the limited attention given by our system to a joint communication policy.

As a matter of fact, there have been ups and downs – more ups in recent years – but we cannot say that at present there is a real culture in relation to these activities, which are recognized as highly strategic by all.

This is confirmed by the examination of the presentations made by the senior representatives of the Armed Forces at the various military training institutions. The internal organization has always been discussed with reference to the operational and logistical-technological components, to training, Service models, commitment in missions and also, partially, to the quality of life. But I believe that the subject that I am going to illustrate has been discussed very rarely.

All large and complex organizations, from schools to firms, from financial concerns to institutions and, recently, even ecclesiastical structures, continuously expand the strategic

branches of marketing, communications and quality of life. The pursued and achieved objectives in this latter sphere, in particular, are certainly the touchstone for determining the real levels of internal quality.

Acknowledged social status, motivation, self-gratification, degree of participation in a common mission, quality of life – both in the strict sense of the word and in relation to family and free time – are in fact quality indicators within an organization and, if transparently perceived on the outside, become consent-producing factors.

The Army had to tackle these very complex problems, with particular attention and urgency – I should say, almost in a state of emergency – in the mid-nineties.

The Bosnian emergency (1995) can be considered the *a quo* point. In that year it became suddenly necessary to project a whole mechanized Brigade – a heavy unit – made up exclusively of volunteers, to the Sarajevo area.

From the political and social viewpoint it was considered not appropriate to send conscripts to risky missions abroad, while they were still the framework of the Armed Forces and numbered about 200,000 men.

The Army was not quite unprepared: the “Garibaldi” Brigade, manned by professionals, had already been constituted. These volunteers soon earned international praise as a result of their good work in a multinational context.

This experience prompted the media to spread a positive image of the Italian soldier, his skill and his particular capability in peacekeeping missions. By the way, I would like to point out that many concurrent causes are indicated for this unimaginable success but, in my opinion, the fundamental factor is being overlooked: i.e. the experience gained by all Cadres from the “Vespri Siciliani” operation.

I had the honour of starting this operation in 1992, as Commander of the “Aosta” Brigade. “Vespri Siciliani” drew the attention of public opinion to the particular ability of the Italian servicemen to interact with local populations and to operate in multinational environments. Their particular gifts of empathy, easy dialogue, communicativeness, mediation in solving problems, as well as the capability of creating understanding and cooperation with the other forces engaged in the fight against the Mafia (Police, “Carabinieri”, “Guardia di Finanza”) emerged for the first time precisely in this context.

All Army Cadres took turns at the command of the “Vespri Siciliani” units, acquiring a remarkable experience.

The same Officers and NCOs led the all-volunteer “Garibaldi” Brigade.

The operation in Bosnia started well and was successful ; nevertheless, we did not rest on our laurels.

The Service Staffs were qualified for assessing the scenarios and had already all the necessary elements to understand that a serious problem was arising: that of having rapidly on hand an adequate number of volunteers, both for the “Garibaldi” and for meeting the possible future requirements that were beginning to take shape, albeit in terms of planned assumptions.

There were three kinds of reasons for the urgency of this need:

- the Italian society, although beginning to think highly of the Armed Forces and expressing its solidarity during the missions in the Balkans, continued to be intransigent about the employment of conscripts in risky operations and, what was more, the demands – also political – for a reduction of conscription were growing;
- the missions involved had to be carried out in joint and combined multinational contexts; this implied the employment of professionals with linguistic and data-processing skills, as well as a thorough knowledge of NATO procedures;
- the need to have projectable support and logistic units, made up of personnel skilled in

the employment and maintenance of technologically advanced equipment, under conditions of rapid wear (highest intensity).

The problem of recruitment, therefore, had to be solved.

The first idea was spontaneous and intuitive: to entrust the "recruitment" to the operational units, promoting, within their conscripts, extensions of 3, 6 or 12 months. But this solution turned out to be ineffective.

The main reason for this failure was the lack of promotional aptitude of the units, owing to a physiological want of organization and preparation in the specific field. If our units had possessed this capability, the Army, which along the years had been "host" to a lot of Italian young men, could have promoted itself very efficiently, and obtained a very different response.

Some historians have defined this problem exactly, underlining that the Army, having been a "basin" of conscripts, had the preliminary and fundamental organizational prerequisite for an effective promotional activity: direct contact with the public concerned.

Obviously there were valuable exceptions resulting mostly from the personality of some Commanders. I want to mention, for example, the "Granatieri" Brigade which, in 1996, produced an entire mechanized company of conscripts on a six-month re-enlistment. The company was employed in Bosnia as the reserve mechanized minor complex of an "Alpini" Regiment. This success was the result of an ongoing internal communication activity, whose objective was the motivation and participation of conscripts rather than a direct response to the new recruitment policy.

The problem of recruiting a sufficient number of volunteers did not concern only the Army.

Our Service was just the first to tackle it and, I should add, had to do it in an emergency. The changed scenarios clearly suggested to start the rapid constitution of an Army with a strong professional component; at that time the mixed form was selected. The experiences made by the Army, therefore, represented the lessons learned that permitted to begin, without delay, a new policy for the recruitment of volunteers at joint level.

It was decided, therefore, to untie the more or less conflictual knots, which hindered the solution of the problem, by pursuing the aim of having all Services, the "Carabinieri", the "Guardia di Finanza", the Police and the other Corps, accept the so-called "snare".

In June 1998, with a single notice, the first joint enlistment for a short term of voluntary service was announced. It was open to young men aged 17 to 22 years, with a junior high-school diploma. Despite the good intentions, the lack of a common marketing organization in charge of the specific promotional activities, the first joint enlistment turned out to be a failure: out of 10,251 spaces advertised only 1,153 were filled (11,25%).

The failure had the worst effects on the Army which, therefore, started to analyse its causes and to study autonomous strategies.

The results were carefully examined by a team of experts in statistics, operational research and company marketing. The team's inferences suggested absolutely innovative actions and initiatives.

The key-point was the reorganization of the bureaucratic and selective characteristics of the enlistment context, in order to make them closer to the potential candidates' expectations. This was a crucial challenge. It was necessary to solve the problem of remoulding an organized and strongly bureaucratic system, not devoid of conservative defences. Nevertheless, this was the precondition for the successive operations, with some possibility of success, in the marketing sector proper.

The second step was to conceive and start a net aimed at developing promotional activities towards the exterior, entrusting its terminals to expert professionals.

This task was taken away from the operational units and assigned to “agencies” of the territorial Commands, which employed specifically trained teams from the units, available on-call.

The third step was to introduce an efficient communication system in this circuit and to build a solid platform of external relations.

Luckily, there was an element of strength, i.e. the new positive consideration of the new Army by public opinion. This was a very precious resource which had never been used before. In terms of marketing, we could speak of an “expanding market”.

The campaign was therefore hinged on four directional lines of development:

- creation of a territorial model for recruitment and external relations;
- collaboration with experts from the academic and business communities, in order to acquire the organizational culture necessary for moving on to the professional model;
- dismantlement of all negative stereotypes, disastrous to any promotional campaign (ill-treatment of recruits by older soldiers (“nonnismo”), boredom of military life, etc);
- synergies, in terms of cooperation, with the general directorates concerned, in order to get rid of the red tape regarding the enlistments and facilitate contacts with the applicants.

All these initiatives and innovations were used – and optimized – in the extraordinary recruitments for the Army, which had the purpose of taking young men from the outside, albeit without offering any guarantee of a steady job. The results were good. In fact, thanks to these recruitments, that I would consider “bridges” towards the greatly-desired joint recruitment (which would ensure a regular job), the Army succeeded in recruiting an adequate number of short-term volunteers. Therefore we could sustain the Balkan theatre and, immediately after, in 1997, we made the remarkable effort of operation “Alba”, the first Italian-led multinational mission.

This new organizational and propulsive marketing capability, although experimental, was used to support the second joint recruitment endeavour carried out in 1999, in which the Army, despite its being a *pars pro toto*, obtained no less than 43,835 applications for 10,545 available spaces. On this point, I want to point out that all Services and Institutions have benefited, and still do, from this activity carried out by the Army.

In fact, according to the norms governing the promotional activities, the Service that announces the recruitment must inform the public about all possibilities of enlistment.

To meet this requirement, we had recourse to the “Recruitment and Promotion Activities” branch (*Rap*) as well as to the “interactive game”.

The latter, which represents a kind of symbol of the second joint recruitment, was diffused through the Internet and permitted the candidates to estimate their probabilities of joining the selected Service.

By now, the Army’s *Rap*, a keystone of the recruitment, has become a real institution, highly considered by the whole Country.

This is, more or less, the history of our organization and also that of a happy process which marked the transition from simple public information to a real communication policy; from promotional activity to a new marketing strategy; from public relations to an effective system of external relations, at both central and peripheral level.

These “dimensions” are interconnected by the said relation.

In substance, if one strengthens one denominator he should simultaneously strengthen all the others, in order to keep a constant ratio.

In short, today we can count on a very efficient organizational model.

THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

As regards the first development line, i.e. the creation of a territorial model, our organization has produced three different configurations:

- the first, called RFC, was devised in order to promote the peripheral activity and aims at building a system of external relations well rooted in the territory, in order to permit, when needed (meaning both recruitment activity and management of possible communication crises), the active support of the mass media and local opinion leaders (politicians, headmasters, teachers, public representatives, journalists, etc). The personnel engaged in RFC followed training courses, through which they acquired action tools based on scientific methodology. The system works through the conception of standardized tactical actions divided, according to their typology, into three kinds of events: type A (involvement of an entire city), type B (involvement of a school) and type C (activity involving a single class), depending on the recipient target. All activities are carried out in synergy with the other Services. To support and complete the territorial activity, all external activities carried out on the territory have been mapped in a special operations room.
- The second, known as "Brigade model", entrusts the person in charge of Public Information of each Major Unit (selected for his professional skill and on a part-time basis) with the development of external relations for image-promotion and divulgence of the work done by the subordinate Regiments (mostly, training activities and missions abroad). In fact, the main task of the Brigade PI staffs consists in mapping and updating the media system of external relations in their respective areas. The purpose is to acquire the information necessary to effect "active" communications, through the publication in the newspapers of articles written by servicemen (news-making) and the formulation of *ad hoc* communication plans on the occasion of important events such as, for example, the departure of units for missions abroad, ceremonies and training activities. It is important to add that these personnel, like those employed in other sectors, are continuously trained and kept up to date under the direct supervision of the Army General Staff. Another achievement is the Master Degree in Communication and Public Information (Law 150/2000).
- The third configuration is realized through "protocols of understanding" with the Veterans' associations. I'd like to mention here a particular successful example: the collaboration with the National "Alpini" Association (ANA). In order to proceed to the recruitment of one-year volunteers for the "Alpini" Regiments, the Army undertook a profitable cooperation with ANA, which is characterized by its particularly close relationship with the local communities and its widespread presence on the territory. Thus, the Army can recruit one-year volunteers who are the real "compensation chamber" of recruitment. The "Alpini", in their turn, ensure their own survival by basing their association on personnel who have ended their military service, mostly conscripts. Each "Alpini" Regiment is assigned an "area of responsibility" coinciding with its territory, and an "area of interest" which includes regions or provinces determined by ANA, used as further "feeding basins". ANA, therefore, was entrusted with local-level communication and promotion activities. The ANA representatives to the "Alpini" Regiments work in synergy with their "colleagues" engaged in the territories considered "associated recruitment basins", availing themselves of the Rap teams of the "Alpini" Regiment concerned. Furthermore, on the territory, ANA undertakes to encourage the enlistment of young volunteers from the South through various initiatives. This form of synergy aims at producing a one-year military "voluntary service" at the end of the conscription duty, in competition with the civilian voluntary service.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

As regards the second development-line, I must say that, in synergy with the creation of the territorial models, the collaboration with external advisers has been encouraged and strengthened through a mutual exchange of services at practically no cost.

These collaborations produce analysis and marketing studies which suggest the subsequent communication and marketing steps to be taken. However, although highly qualified, they do not experience the reality of the organization and its technical-operational aspects. Therefore, they have difficulties in translating their theories into practical solutions.

The lesson learned was that it was necessary to constitute a new and very qualified military body; the first problem was to recruit this new expertise.

The right opportunity came with the admission of women within the military. We appealed to the strong motivation and good preparation of the women who requested to join the Service. This was supported by a study, carried out by expert sociologists, of the numerous letters – about 10,000 – received by the Army Staff, and by the results of the experiment conducted in 1992 at the “Lancieri di Montebello” barracks. Thus the Army, by applying the “direct commission” procedure, was able to recruit young Officers with the necessary professionalism and experience.

All these initiatives and innovative projects resulted in the constitution of an office for Organizational Resources and Communication (ROC), which works within the Army Staff's General Affairs Division and, being in close contact with the Organization and Communication leadership, gives a qualified support to the decision-making process.

It is not without pride and satisfaction that I remember some results of the “new course” of the Army's communication policy, aimed at promoting the image of our Service.

The inventive promotional campaigns, our presence in the media, the collaboration with public and private academic institutions, our participation in exhibitions of particular interest for the Army, are under everybody's eyes and do not need further explanations. A typical example is the First Prize for the “right to information” awarded to the Army during the exhibition on “Public Communication” in Bologna last September, where our Service competed with almost 300 other institutions.

THE ANALYSIS OF NEEDS AND QUALITY OF LIFE

As regards the third development line aimed at getting rid of the stereotypes concerning the military organization – first of all the already mentioned “nonnismo” – the Army carried out a complex campaign of contrast and removal, together with an effective marketing activity.

First of all the Service established a study Committee, made up of experts, university professors, sociologists, psychologists and psychiatrists, with the objective of analysing and putting an end to the phenomenon. The Committee acted by opening the military world to the outside with complete transparency; the result of this well-known action was a reduction of the phenomenon below the physiological threshold and the Organization was allowed to concentrate not on the pathology but on its physiology and functioning.

With regard to this subject, I should stress that no action of attack and removal of stereotypes and prejudices can be completely successful unless it is flanked by an effective activity of prevention and management of communication crises, which are real hotbeds of stereotypes.

To this end, the Army long ago introduced the figure of “Army spokesman” who, in an emergency, is authorized to intervene, without hierarchical obligations, in the units and bodies involved in a crisis, in order to clarify the situation in real time, by conceiving the right communication strategy and, on authorization by the Minister's Public Information

Service and the Defence General Staff, by conducting in person the necessary communication activity. This technique permits to promptly fill the information void occurring in moments of crisis and to manage the negative events that could be exaggerated (and sometimes exploited), and often to transform them into positive cases by letting people appreciate the Army's transparent manner of communicating.

The spokesman works in connection with the Committee – which has been strengthened – as permanent adviser to the leadership, adopting the name of “Permanent Observatory of the Quality of Life”. In this capacity it conducts also research work and prevention campaigns on drugs and road accidents.

The external relations activities permitted to tackle the drug problem through a partnership with institutions that have been dealing with this question for years. Besides, the Observatory has allowed the Ministry of Social Policies to benefit from a financial support to a project regarding the drug phenomenon within the military and the relevant possible response strategies.

In connection with road accidents, a similar course has been followed, by employing communication strategies, with synergic relations with other bodies (especially non-profit) engaged in the prevention of the same phenomenon, as well as through organizational strategies deriving from the data analysis made by the Observatory.

The latter, which works in close contact with ROC, rightly realized the urgent need to shift the attention from “nonnismo” to the quality of life.

From the analysis and monitoring of the internal needs of the organization and the continuous exchange of ideas with the outside, the Observatory defined the ideal model of “Open Barracks” as an answer to the requests of improvement in the personnel's quality of life, from the infrastructural and relational viewpoint.

The model devised is centred on a military structure offering the opportunity to integrate barrack life with the social life of the surrounding territory. Practically it consists of a training area for exclusively military activities and a network of satellite spaces open to integration.

The objective is to make the military structure become a space open to the exterior, a socialization area frequented by families, whose young have various opportunities of spending their free time with persons of the same age and interact with them. Besides, the servicemen's wives can meet local people and possibly find working opportunities.

To achieve this objective, we need to:

- realize structures with functional spaces equipped according to the servicemen's and the local people's requirements; in particular, those of the young (focusing on English, computer science and internet), on the basis of surveys made by the Permanent Observatory and various Universities;
- consider the future of married volunteers, whose needs are different from those of singles;
- strengthen the bonds between Army and society;
- direct studies and initiatives, undertaken by public institutions, individuals and industry, towards the achievement of this objective;
- affirm, and have society acknowledge, the principle that it must invest in the military presence.

The model envisages the involvement of the following actors:

- the “Permanent Observatory on the Quality of Life”, which makes surveys in order to find out the requirements of the personnel and their families;
- Universities and research centres, which make surveys about needs and expectations of the civilian population vis-à-vis the new reality;

- the local political sphere (region, province, city) for the agreements on the necessary investments and financial support for housing and sports facilities;
- political representatives at central level (Government and Parliament) tasked with promoting the project;
- schools and Universities willing to cooperate in training activities;
- private firms willing to sponsor initiatives such as, for example, multi-media spaces and sports centres;
- other partners willing to support the project with agreements and contributions: i.e., transport companies, tourist offices, employment bureaus.

I am very pleased for the manner in which this project has become concrete and is progressively overcoming the resistance of the sceptics.

The case of Macomer is a good example of implementation: within the reorganization of the "Engineer" component, the Army Staff is considering to establish a Sapper Regiment in the "Bechi Luserna" Barracks at Macomer, Sardinia.

In the near future, new activities will be carried out near Sora and in the Abruzzi.

BUREAUCRATIC CONSTRAINTS

As regards the fourth line of action, which tries to overcome the obstacles that hinder the implementation of effective marketing campaigns, the Army is endeavouring to facilitate the enlistment procedures by establishing a fruitful cooperation with the General Directorates, in order to streamline the enlistment rules and to find new elements of attraction for the military profession.

CONCLUSION

The objective of this discourse was to describe the organizational and communicative response strategies devised by the Army in order to meet the requests coming from both the external world and the military structure itself.

We thought of a new organizational model, based on three configurations (RFC, Brigade and collaboration with the veterans' associations – ANA is a good example), to tackle the problem of the recruitment of military professionals.

We promoted a cooperation network with external advisers, as an instrument for spreading the organizational culture needed for the functionality of the Service in a changing world. The creation of the ROC Office was the internal response to this requirement.


The negative stereotypes were removed through the institution of the spokesman, an institutional instrument in continuous contrast with them, as well as by focusing on a transparent policy, which led to the acceptance of all requests for a better quality of life and culminated in the elaboration of the "Open Barracks" model.

The bureaucratic obstacles were overcome through the cooperation with the General Directorates, which resulted in the simplification of the enlistment procedures.

All these activities, besides meeting the needs of recruitment and quality of life, also foster the virtuous circle of consent.

As a matter of fact, the media become the resonance box of this public appreciation, and the political leadership cannot but take it into account when dealing with new laws aimed at improving the military status. In their turn, the improvements certainly have positive repercussions on the Service's image and will encourage a growing number of young people to join our organization.

Lieutenant General Roberto Speciale



WHO WE REALLY ARE

*The incisive role of the military Church
as centre of community and fulcrum of
the search for one's own course of
human and spiritual life.*



The Church represents a constant reference also in the military reality. The distinctiveness of the grey-green uniform must not prevent us from looking outside and inside ourselves, in order to give an accomplished sense to our existence and be real participants in the professional and family life. The Church pays the greatest attention to the military, because they are guardians of high human and social values.

The uniform itself is the exterior symbol of a calling which implies an inclination towards serving others. Christmas, which is approaching, and the coming New Year should give us a further subject of reflection in regard to our relation with God and the world. This is because each one of us can give an important and concrete human contribution to family and society, also by being silent. What is important is, in fact, to believe and to love.

On joining the military, one becomes a part of a particular diocese: the Military Ordinariate. What is, in fact, the Military Ordinariate?

Many believe it is the organizational centre of the Chaplains who operate within the Armed Forces, who obviously attend to the spiritual needs of the military, somehow as the hospital Chaplains assist the ill and the university Chaplains tend to the students' needs.

No, it is not like that. The Military Ordinariate is the Catholic Church present in the military world, it is all the baptized persons present in the Armed Forces. To be a military means to belong to a body, a category of people well defined and qualified, with its schools, villages, hospitals, cemeteries, its style, its traditions and its liturgies.

The Church always considered the military with particular attention and asked itself who should be the Bishop of these

men, who call sea and sky their home and are characterized by their mobility on the land. The answer was a radical one: the Bishop of the military was the Pope himself, who has jurisdiction over the whole Earth. On his turn, the Pope was helped by the Bishops, who guided the military of each nation in his name. That is why they were called "Vicari Castrensi", that is, Vicars of the Pope for the Armed Forces.

After the Second Vatican Council a new juridical configuration was given to the military: the Pope constituted as local Churches – assimilating them to the Dioceses – the "Castrensi" Vicariates of each nation. Ecclesiastic districts were thus born which were not characterized by territory, like all dioceses, but rather by the type of service performed. In short it can be said that the military as such are a particular church, with their Bishop, their priests, their Church not linked to a place but

characterized by their service.

This is very fine, because our ecclesial communities are really communities entirely in the service of our brothers. This is a binding commitment, because for the Christians the military service must be a vocation and not a profession, otherwise their living together as Christians could not distinguish them as a Church, but they could be at most an arts and crafts corporation.

Our present military Church, which as such is now sixteen years old, but behind which there are eighty years of history, has by now its own beautiful traditions, its structures and the consciousness of being useful or, even better, necessary, with its service among the men of the Armed Forces.

It has its own Curia, a pastoral organization, its own school for military Chaplains, has already held its First Synod and holds a dialogue with the sister churches of the other Countries, besides having an ecumenical activity on





the field, where our soldiers meet and cooperate in peace operations with colleagues of other worships and different religions, while the Chaplains of the various faiths share together and in harmony the spaces destined to them.

The military Church has made its choices, in ecclesiastical terms it has drafted its pastoral plan. In the next two years it will be particularly attentive to the families of the servicemen. The reason is easily explained. The family is in fact the fundamental and indispensable support of the soldier; it is fully involved in his mission and, alas, today is a subject particularly at risk. The pastoral visit that I am making to the military realities has this particular interest and its aim is to evangelize, to live the values of the family and, at the same time, to make them known and defend them.


Also the Chaplains engage in their work starting from the family, with the specific


programme of sustaining and developing it and I must say that, after one year, we have ascertained the existence of a great interest in this regard.

The family is really a man's greatest treasure. Jesus himself proclaimed it with his own life. He

wanted to be born in a grotto, without a home, without a roof, and died, naked, on a cross, he renounced everything but one thing: his family, a beautiful family.

How many children are born today poorer than he was! Those that don't even see the light





because their mothers suppress them as soon as they are conceived, those that many parents refuse to acknowledge and those who are left before the doors of a church or dumped into a rubbish bin as soon as they are born. Jesus, in denying himself everything but a family, told us

that the lack of a family is not poverty, it is destitution, and each one of us has a right to a family. Nevertheless, if there is a right there is also a duty towards the family and this is the message that the entire military Church wants to proclaim in Christ's name.


The Church says that every man

owes his wife a fine family and every wife owes a fine family to her husband. Together they owe a splendid family to their children and their children owe a beautiful family to their parents, at any age. Because nobody can do without a family, everybody has a duty to the family. Working in this sense, the military Christians strive to build man and society according to the principles of justice and honesty, which are after all the principles of the Gospel.

As Christmas approaches, before the great mystery of the Nativity we cannot avoid pausing and listening its profound message of peace.

From Bethlehem's grotto we are introduced into the fullness of Christian life and the perfection of love, which discloses to us God's will to share with man His life, His love, the sacrifice of His life for our redemption.

From the contemplation of the scene of the Sacred Family gathered in the cold hut, we must learn to live in humility, in





forgiveness and brotherhood.

I wish the young soldiers to be able to rediscover, thanks also to the testimony of their superiors, the attraction of an ideal of sanctity, of solidarity and of the values of love of one's country, accepting them with enthusiasm, generosity and spirit of sacrifice.

To the superiors at all levels, to the educators at large, my wish is that they may be able to offer the men in their charge positive life experiences, examples, charity, love for one's fellowmen, with the certainty of transforming themselves in sowers of hope and zealous guides in profession and life, sustained by the justness of the duty accomplished and by the support of their families.

To the readers of *Rivista Militare* I wish therefore a Merry Christmas and a happy and serene New Year 2003, in the grace of God.

□

**Archbishop,
Military Ordinary for Italy*

THE FUTURE IS ALREADY HERE

A photograph of an Italian soldier in camouflage uniform and a black beret, holding an assault rifle. He is standing in front of a green armored vehicle with "ISAF" and a yellow circular insignia on its side. The background shows a damaged building and a chain-link fence.

by Giovanni Cerbo *

Interview with Senator Domenico Contestabile,

The Italian soldiers engaged in peace missions on the field are winning the respect and admiration of the world. This is a sign of the profound renewal which concerns every sector of the Army. Our Service is rapidly entering the future and going towards a complete professionalization; it is ready to become part of a European Army, also thanks to a Defence budget which is progressively reaching the



Chairman of the Senate Defence Committee.

level of those of the most advanced Western Countries.

With these preconditions, Italy will be able to reliably tackle the demanding issues of the international context. Meanwhile, several important challenges are at our door.

All this, and more, is discussed in Sen. Domenico Contestabile's conversation with us.

The Italian priority objective is to build a professional Army capable of contributing to the safeguard of the Country's interests, wherever they are, of understanding the security needs of the Alliance, acting as a protagonist in the Europe of defence. What is the state of the project?

It was planned to end conscription in 2006, but the Minister of Defence has made the informal request to speed things up. We shall probably have professional Armed Forces by the end of 2004.

The European Union wants to take the necessary steps in order to break away from the logic of "peace support" and become a fully active political subject, with a wider range of possibilities in international crises and in the fight against terrorism.

This must bring forth the capability of providing the Union with a Corps-level force, capable of carrying out all the missions envisaged by the Petersberg declaration. It is a matter of creating a complex Major Unit with complete combat capabilities.

What could Italy's qualitative and quantitative contribution be?

Will it be comparable to that of the main European Countries?

It is envisaged that the "European Army" will be made up of 80,000 men.

I think that a fair Italian contribution, considering the population ratios, should be around 8%.

As regards quality, we have excellent units which are now famous all over the world. A while ago, the British Ambassador told me that in the Balkans the Italian soldiers are gaining the admiration of the world.

Every time I meet with Defence officials from other Nations they

speak very highly of the "Col Moschin" and "Tuscania" paratroopers. No doubt, Italy will participate in the construction of the European Army with these and other elite units.

It goes by itself that an Italian foreign policy aimed at realizing a European political union, with equal rights and titles, requires a greater financial effort. Italy, in percentage terms, assigns to defence much lesser resources than those invested by the British, the Germans and the French.

In your opinion, are there the conditions for coping with this situation of undercapitalization?

Italy allocates to defence one half of the budget percentage compared to France, and one third of the United Kingdom's. But, in the last Financial Law, the expenditures of all Ministries have been cut, with the only exception of Defence and Justice.

The Prime Minister assured me that he intends to assign increasing percentages to Defence, in order to reach the level of France and the United Kingdom.


The admission of the Eastern European Countries to NATO is a very topical subject, particularly after the entry of the Russian Federation, which became the 20th member.

Do you believe that the enlargement could be a strengthening factor, or could it weaken the international stability?

In view of this, what changes could take place in the relationship between the Old Continent and the other shore of the Atlantic?

First of all, one should complete the inclusion of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which we call simply Russia.

Right now, there is a partnership, not a full membership. In this



context our Country has played a very important role. For the first time after WWII, Italy asserted itself, with courageous choices in international policy.

Therefore, we must proceed quickly towards the full participation of the CIS.

Right after that, the States of the former Soviet Union must also be admitted. Italy would prefer to start with Bulgaria and Rumania.

Recently I have visited the Baltic States – Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – which wish to join NATO. I went there precisely to put out feelers on this issue.

To answer the last part of your question, I want to stress that the relations between Europe and the US will have to change. In



Above.

British and French soldiers in the outskirts of Kabul.

the first place, WEU – the Western European Union – should disappear. Up to now, it has been playing a very modest role and has become an encumbrance. The force-ratio between the US and Europe must change, because during the last fifty years most financial burdens have been sustained by America. Precisely for this reason, the US has had a predominant position within the Alliance.

If the financial burdens are more equitably shared and

Europe participates in a greater proportion (as seems to be the intention of the major European Nations), then also the responsibilities will have to be distributed with updated criteria.

Only in this way Europe can play a more incisive role in the international context.

Do you believe, then, that the prospects of enlargement could be a factor of reinforcement of the international stability?

Most certainly.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 against the United States have changed the politico-strategic international scenarios. We are now facing new threats

requiring a multidimensional defensive approach.

According to and old saying, granaries must be defended also with arsenals. This seems to be still valid, since granaries represent not only the material well-being reached by man but, above all, the values of progress and civilization labouriously pursued along the road of history.

Could you tell us your opinion on the complex problems bearing on the future of the world?

I believe that a global war, at least within the next ten years, cannot be imagined. But I also believe that the conflicts of the future will have a more and more

regional characterization.

This problem is of particular interest to Italy.

On our borders there are two regions, the Balkans and the Middle-East, which are real hotbeds of tensions and clashes. Therefore our Country, more than other European Nations, is called to undertake direct responsibilities in peacekeeping operations in both areas.



The Mideastern scenario is very complex, to the point that, if a solution is not found, the Israelis and the Palestinians are not the only ones that are going to pay, but we shall pay as well. Therefore

the Italian defence must be greatly strengthened within the next 12 years, particularly from the technological viewpoint.

Recently we approved the participation in a very ambitious American programme for the constitution of a low-cost, high-performance aircraft, which should be adopted by the Italian and American Air Forces.

As for the Navy, we started to build an aircraft-carrier twice as big as the "Garibaldi", the equivalent of the French "De Gaulle".

The Navy is planning to introduce eight frigates, which



Above.

Italian servicemen of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan on patrol in the streets of Kabul.

Left.

A "Guide" cavalryman in the Afghan desert.

will be the main core of our fleet.

Moreover, the Army needs advanced technologies, just like the other Services, and is now adapting its armaments to European standards.

We expect that within 12 years Italy will have a high-quality Army, with new structures and materials, capable of facing the threats of the future and coping with the most dangerous challenges of the present: the Balkans and the Middle East.



Are we actually confronted, then, by a strategic asymmetry, requiring an overhauling of the Armies, not only the Italian, but the other European Countries' as well?

Indeed. And then there will be a problem: the integration of the various Armies will have to take into account the balances among the different Services and also within the Services themselves, according to the tactical and strategic requirements. And this is not going to be an easy task.

In the last decade, many international peace-missions have been following one another, and the UN has come up against serious problems that still persist. Its military structure is rather weak: the contributions, assembled at the moment of need, are

inadequate, particularly as regards human resources.

What is your opinion about the possibility of relaunching the role of the UN, in order to enable it to express a new policy and an updated strategy of intervention?

I don't believe it. By now it is clear that to take specialized units and put them under the UN aegis for peace-enforcing and peace-keeping operations is a method which is going to become obsolete in a few years.

I think that the endeavours to provide the UN with its own Army are useless. It will never work, because today we need macroregion-level forces with an appropriate and permanent command structure.

□

**Brigadier General*



Sen. Domenico Contestabile was born in Teano, near Caserta, on August 11, 1937. He is a lawyer and an expert in economic penal law, and a member of the Committee appointed to draw up the new Code of Criminal Procedure.


As a lawyer, he attended the most important trials concerning financial, currency, corporate, insolvency and banking offences.

From 1970 to 1980 he has been Chairman of the Culture Committee and Town Councillor in Milan where, from 1982 to 1990, he also held the office of Managing Director of the "Piccolo Teatro".

On March 27, 1994, he was elected Senator for "Forza Italia" and called to participate in the Berlusconi Government as Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Justice.

In 1996, with the Prodi Government, he held the positions of Deputy Speaker of the Senate and Deputy President of WEU.

Reelected in 2001, Sen. Contestabile was appointed Chairman of the Senate Defence Committee, member of the WEU Defence Committee and of the Human Rights Committee of the European Council.



NATO CIMIC GROUP SOUTH

The new Italian-led multinational unit

by Mario Ruggiero * and Marco Buscemi **

The development of "out of area" operations is characterized by very diverse environmental conditions. Hence the need to revise the structure of the basic Branches and combat-support units.

It is indispensable, therefore, to provide these units with the capability of extending their tasks beyond the traditional commitments, to include activities related to the political, social, economic and cultural reality of the Countries where they operate.

In other words, it is necessary to consider also specific assets concerning forms of communication (PSYOPS), new information systems (RISTA) and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).

In particular, the awareness of this situation convinced NATO to acquire a CIMIC capability, in order to better integrate the units with the population, the civil authorities and the International Organizations and to create a favourable environment for the accomplishment of the mission.

In view of this, Italy has undertaken to develop the "CIMIC Group South" project and to be the "framework" Nation for the realization of a CIMIC Unit for Southern Europe, in conformity with the intentions of the Alliance.

In this regard, it should be noted that this is a foremost objective, not only for overcoming the shortcomings that exist in the specific sector, but also for the ensuing good international image.

It is undoubtedly a challenge, because, for the support and coordination of the activity, the capability will depend not only on the basic component of the "CIMIC Group South" but also – and mainly – on the availability of specifically qualified personnel drawn from the Selected Reserve, who will have to operate in close contact with the civilian world.

The training of these specialists and their availability for employment are absolutely innovative and decisive aspects, upon which a large part of the prospects of CIMIC are based.

*Lieutenant General Roberto Speciale,
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army*

THE REQUIREMENT AND ITS ORIGINS


The need of close relations between the civilian and the military has always been felt by the armies throughout history, making therefore necessary an "interface" for connecting these two very different realities.

This task was usually entrusted to the Commanders or to the organizations in charge with the recruitment and logistic support. These relations were extremely important, not only for controlling the occupied areas but also for the defence of the national territory. In a besieged city the war involved everybody. Those who could do it, enlisted, and the others, although remaining civilians, gave all possible help to the soldiers who were ready to sacrifice their life to save the town. But while this was normal in the small realities, as the organization grew greater and more complex it became necessary to define tasks and procedures in a more and more detailed manner.

The armies were becoming permanent structures which operated also in peacetime and were employed by the authorities not only to enforce the law but also to help the population hit by natural disasters, or to contribute to the Country's economic development by making the soldiers work in fields and factories and also, more recently, to replace workers on strike in vital sectors. On the other hand, in emergencies the civilian world had to be able to restore the damaged services or the nerve centres of the Country, as well as cooperate with the logistic support provided by the Armed Forces.

Also NATO, since its foundation, has considered as a priority the need to work in cooperation with the civilian organizations.

In the bipolar age, most European NATO Nations, having to employ their armies mainly on their territory or on that of other allied Nations, had come to



East Timor. Paratroopers patrolling a rugged area.

criterion of reciprocity is very important: according to it, the Armed Forces give their support in case of natural calamities, casual accidents or man-caused disasters, while the Civil Defence implements measures for facing emergencies brought about by national and/or international crises and conflicts.

Within NATO, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) has taken on a specific connotation through the concept of "Host Nation Support" (HNS) which, on the basis of NATO SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement), fixed the nature and level of the contribution to be given to the allied troops operating, or due to operate, on the Host Nation's territory. In short, CIMIC could be assimilated to COCIM, with reference to foreign troops rather than to national forces.

THE MOST RECENT CONTEXT

A CIMIC doctrine of this kind is no more suited to the new strategic scenario, where NATO envisages the employment of units also outside its territory for CRO-type missions (Crisis Response Operations).

The different requirement was already noticed in embryo in other non-NATO missions in support of peace. In Lebanon, Iraqi Kurdistan, Albania, Somalia and Mozambique, albeit in different forms, the necessity to cooperate with the local civil structures was always felt, and the measures applied were practically similar to those envisaged by the CIMIC doctrine. The type of cooperation was obviously very different: in Lebanon, Albania and Mozambique, even among the well-known difficulties, there was still a civilian government to

interministerial agreements permitting to support, on their territory, both their own troops and those of other NATO Countries. The situation of the armies from overseas – and especially the US Army's – was different since, having to ensure a permanent presence in Europe, by availing themselves of local civil realities, had already arranged specialistic units capable of acting as "liaison" between the "host" Country and their "guest" army. This organization derived from the one adopted during WWII in the

occupied territories and remained very similar in its essential elements.

Also Italy had realized its own procedures defining, with the publication SMD DC-2, Civil-Military Cooperation (COCIM) as "a complex of decisions, measures and activities aimed at establishing, in view of a common purpose, the forces necessary – in peacetime, in emergencies, in crises or war – for the integration and mutual compensation of the operational capabilities of the national structures". In view of this, the

which one could refer in order to decide the most appropriate forms of cooperation.

In Iraqi Kurdistan the situation was very different and the operation was carried out in a territory occupied by force, without taking into account Saddam Hussein's regime, which was "de facto" absent from the area. On the other hand, in Somalia there were only power groups legitimated exclusively by force. But, even in this case, some relations with the local notables were necessary and were indeed very effective for the bloodless retrieval of the well-known "Checkpoint Pasta". It must be noted that in all these cases there were not specific groups including also civilian specialists, but the connection between military and civilians was mainly entrusted to Officers skilled in intelligence

matters and, in some cases, to the diplomatic representatives cooperating with the units.

Nevertheless, it was especially as a consequence of IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina – the first Peace Support Operation conducted by NATO – that the problem became characterized by much more marked and complex exigencies. It was therefore necessary to analyze the suitability of the existing CIMIC doctrine to the new situation and tackle the whole issue in a systematic way. It was immediately clear that the availability of adequate CIMIC resources was necessary and important and, to this end, it was decided to adopt – with the appropriate changes – the existing doctrine referred to a traditional conflict. Each Division was to have a company of CIMIC

experts. Actually, for the reasons already mentioned and for its multidecennial experience, only the US had the adequate resources and structures. The CIMIC companies in support of the Divisions of other Countries, on the contrary, were still wanting in human resources, as regards quantity and specialization and, therefore, their activity was limited to some particular tasks proportionate to their actual capability.

THE NEW CIMIC POLICY

At a later time it became necessary to entrust CIMIC with completely new tasks. The main

Regular Afghan soldiers being trained by Italian ISAF personnel.





An Italian unit on surveillance duty near a Kosovo township.

mission of a peace force, “to achieve stability in the area”, but also security and freedom of movement of the personnel, can be achieved only with the contribution of an adequate cooperation between the local civil society and the peace force. The soldiers often find themselves operating in territories where anti-NATO propaganda may have been disseminated or where a man in uniform is seen as a bearer of death, massacres and destruction. It is therefore necessary to change the possible hostile attitude of the population, for instance through the integration of CIMIC’s activities with an appropriate propaganda carried out by PSYOPS groups, in order to present soldiers as performers of “positive” activities, e.g. reconstructors of communication

lines or instructors in the defence against mines and other dangerous explosives left behind by the war.

These new functions have raised CIMIC from the status of simple complementary-integrative activity to the rank of combat support. Besides, it must be added that in the new areas of crisis there are many other civilian protagonists, not only local but also – and mainly – international, such as U.N. representatives, international police, foreign private firms for reconstruction, humanitarian organizations. Hence the need to give CIMIC a new dimension.

Therefore, not only cooperation between the Army and the local Authorities, but also between the Army and the international Organizations.

These are the lessons that, in 1997, convinced NATO Commanders to give their armies a new CIMIC organization,

considering the growing need of interfacing with the civilian population, the authorities and the international organizations, in order to create a favourable “environment” for performing the NATO force’s mission.

This entailed the revision of the CIMIC policy through a new doctrine (conceptual component), a new training concept (moral component) and the constitution of instruments suitable for accomplishing the tasks connected with this function (physical component), which have become a fundamental tool in the hands of the Commanders.

As regards the conceptual component, NATO drafted several updated documents at various levels, among which MC 411, AJP-9 and Chapter 20 of AJP-1.

For the moral component, meant as the acquisition of a full awareness of the new function, annual conferences are held by the strategic and regional

Commands as well as by the ARRC.

Furthermore, specific courses are held at the NATO School in Oberammergau and at the NATO Defence College in Rome, while all ACE exercises include CIMIC activities.

As for the physical component, CIMIC personnel will be assigned to NATO and national Commands, and multinational assets are going to be constituted at Regional Command (RC) level. SACEUR will have two CIMIC groups, one for the Northern Europe RC, guided by Holland and Germany and one, Italian-led, for the Southern Region RC at Bagnoli, Naples. SACLANT will have a British-led CIMIC Group.

THE CIMIC GROUP SOUTH

In particular, the NATO CIMIC Group South will have to be constituted by employing all CIMIC resources made available by the Southern Nations of NATO. The project was joined by Italy, Greece, Portugal, Turkey and Hungary.

Italy has assumed an active and propositional role in the specific sector and, following the NATO policy, has developed the new capabilities acting on two fronts: nationally, for the constitution of the new units and the training and selection of the specialist personnel and, at international level, for the drawing up of common procedures.

Furthermore Italy, as leading Nation, will have to provide the infrastructure, most staff personnel, the Headquarters Command and a CIMIC company.

In relation to the said organization, on January 1, 2002, at Motta di Livenza, Veneto, a unit was established destined to take the function of CIMIC Group South as soon as its inclusion in NATO is completed. At present the Group is only national and takes care of the

training and amalgamation of the regular personnel as well as of the recruitment, training and incorporation of specialists, to be found in non-military bodies.

The infrastructure of the installation is being improved in order to meet the requirements of a highly specialized international unit, with particular reference to the sectors of information systems, Command and Control, didactics and quartering.

The first operational assets are expected to be projectable as from January 2003.

THE SPECIALISTS

It should be pointed out that the most distinctive aspect of the CIMIC Group structure is represented by a completely new component of the Service's organization: the specialists coming from the "selected" reserve of the Volunteer Completion-Forces.

They are a fundamental and very important element for achieving the CIMIC capabilities envisaged by the specific project. This reserve can be joined not



An international Working Group – together with the representatives of all NATO southern Nations – is now drafting the common procedures concerning the operational, training, organizational and Command-and-Control aspects. The job will be completed by the end of 2003 and the unit will start receiving the international assets. Thus the Group will be fully operational in all its joint and international components, and completely projectable by the end of 2003.

Engineers teaching explosive-device precautions to Kosovar citizens.

only by discharged Officers, NCOs and enlisted men but also, or rather mainly, by civilians highly skilled in the particular fields and capable of doing a fully satisfactory job in view of the envisaged goals.

The specialists' task will be to assess the local situation in each particular sector by conducting appropriate analyses, in order to

find the relevant possible solutions and the best employment of the available resources. The same personnel will have to oversee the development of the proposed solutions, with the cooperation and in support of the local experts.

The recruitment of these personnel will take place through the Completion Forces System and – as we have seen – is the main innovative element of the CIMIC structure, since the traditional cooperation units are formed by regular soldiers. The strong point of these reservists will be their specific experience that will lead them to operate in close analogy with their customary civilian activity.

We should not omit the difficulties which, at least at the beginning, the recruitment of these qualified elements could

entail. In fact, it will be necessary to find a number of reservists far larger than the positions to be filled, a number that will be better defined through successive changes based on experience. This is due to the uncertain availability of the necessary specialists who – let's not forget it – must be volunteers, as well as to the need to rotate the personnel in operations. The creation of a data bank covering the definite capabilities of the individuals will permit a good selection of the reservists whose training, professional experience and skill are best suited to the specific context of the particular operational theatre.

The specialists will have to tackle many problems concerning public affairs, civilian infrastructure, economy and commerce, humanitarian aid and cultural affairs. For each of these activities, a particular section

with its own specialists will be established.

In particular, as regards public affairs, it will be necessary to consider the government's activity as well as the legal aspects, health, schools, security and environment. Hence the need to recruit expert managers from State or State-controlled structures, together with doctors, paramedics, ecologists and biologists.

The civilian infrastructure will have to deal with: communications, (with personnel taken from all media and experts in data processing and communication sciences); transportations (with elements drawn from railways, highways, airlines and shipping lines); energy and water resources (with personnel from Public Works, construction firms, electricity and oil companies and engineers' offices).


For the economic development, in the sector of economy and commerce it will be necessary to have financial and banking experts, etc.; for food and agriculture, personnel from food industries and farms; for industry and commerce, besides the staff of the relevant ministries, managers of industrial and commercial concerns.

Humanitarian aid will take care of refugees and the relevant essential supplies, of medical care and respect of human rights (with specific experts, sociologists, etc.).

Finally, also the cultural aspect will have to be considered, in order to promote the respect for historical monuments and local religions and idioms through the recruitment of students and experts in these fields.

Of course, it will also be necessary to have a large number of interpreters. As we have seen, all these personnel are not permanently present in the CIMIC Group; therefore, after an appropriate selection they will have to attend a training cycle

"Alpini" on training.





An A-129 "Mangusta" helicopter during the FMP operation in Albania.

including a basic military instruction (if necessary) and the general CIMIC preparation for their introduction in the data bank. However, on the occurrence of an emergency, a successive specific training will be required.

Obviously, until the importance and effectiveness of the functions of the CIMIC Group are not generally known, particularly in the civil society, the necessary experts will have to be found among government employees whose recruitment does not hinder their normal civilian tasks. On the other hand, the remarkable interests connected with the economic, industrial and commercial development of the crisis areas could also make private individuals to participate

actively. No doubt, then, that a suitable informative and promotional activity could be very determinant for the achievement of the desired results.

CONCLUSIONS

In the past, the CIMIC activity concerned only the support that the Host Country had to give to the allied troops on its own territory within the framework of traditional operations. Today, CIMIC has assumed a greater complexity and a decisive role within CROs, where it is extremely important to systematically coordinate the relations between operating troops, civil society – including both population and institutions – and international organizations. To achieve this, it is necessary to consider, besides the appropriate

conceptual and moral activities, the creation of specific units, i.e. the international CIMIC Groups. One of them falls mainly within Italy's responsibility.

The peculiarity of these units is their mixed structure, which combines a permanent support with a specialistic complex taken from the Completion Forces.

Finding the specialists, training them and having them ready for employment are completely new and decisive aspects. They are the foundations of an increasingly effective activity of CIMIC, and will have an extremely important influence on the conduct of the operations.

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
**Lieutenant Colonel,
Plans Office,
Army General Staff
**Captain,
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MILITARY PENAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The legal aspect is one of the main pillars of the Military Institution. It is necessary to know it well in order to operate profitably inside and outside the national territory.

The Army is now systematically engaged in "out of area" operations; therefore the complex legal rules are rapidly being adapted to the new circumstances. Our "Laws of War" are now being adjusted taking into account the internal and the international jurisprudence.

The purpose is very noble: to prevent, even in war, the indiscriminate use of force.




by Vito Nicolò Diana *

The subject of this article involves simultaneously a dimension, a subject matter and a scenario: international space, criminal law and the tragic scenario of war.

Three profiles and a leading actor. A shy, often mocked but obstinate protagonist, a yardstick and an unsurpassable threshold: the international penal law, in the guise of "Law of War" or, as it is called today, "Law of Armed Conflicts".

This very special juridical branch has been given many definitions: all of them very reductive and excessively disconsolate.

Some have called it "lame law", since it fixes the rule but not the





sanction; others called it an "infant law", moreover destined never to grow up; the majority irrevocably disqualified and condemned it as the "law of the winner".

For our Law I'd like to propose a different name which, without denying its obvious limitations, could summarily explain its irrenounceable reasons.

The "Law of Armed Conflicts" is a "frontier" law, in the widest meaning of this word.

Frontier, because it reaches the limits of its possibilities and is therefore highly exceptional.


Furthermore, it applies to extreme situations such as war and operates astride two "territories": the internal one and the international one.

In this regard, I'd like to start from the last consideration. The "Laws of War" put the internal legal system of each State in relation to the international rules; hence, it is necessary to examine the main normative rules existing within the two precincts, ascertain their mutual compatibility and, in case of divergence, decide which side should prevail.

THE INTERNATIONAL NORMS

In order to limit ourselves to the very essential, we can mention:

- the four "Geneva Conventions" (Aug. 12, 1949) aimed at protecting the victims of war;
- the "Convention of The Hague" (May 14, 1954), for the protection of cultural assets in case of armed conflict;
- the "Convention" of December 1976 which, condemning the indiscriminate use of defoliants in the Vietnam war, forbids the



A sapper on a mine-clearing operation in Afghanistan.

present time - the Statute of the newborn International Criminal Court, adopted in Rome on July 17, 1998.

INTERNAL NORMS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

- Articles 10, 11, 78, 87, 103 of the Constitution (Jan.1, 1948);
- Law on War and Neutrality (July 8, 1938);
- Military Criminal War Code (Feb. 20, 1941);
- Law Jan.31, 2002, no. 6;
- Law Feb. 27, 2002, no. 15.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WAR PHENOMENON

At least since WWII, the positive international law has taken a formal position vis-à-vis the war phenomenon: the traditional supreme right of every State to wage war (*ius ad bellum*) has been generally rejected, admitting war in self-defence only.

However, even if we have moved from "war as a right" – a prerogative of the Crown – to "war as a crime", it has been realistically perceived that these very solemn and very important statements of principle are not enough to ward off the possibility of armed conflicts: it was therefore necessary to establish what behaviours must be prohibited, even in the admittedly tragic and exceptional junctures of war: in other words, even if the "right to wage war" has ceased to exist, there is still a permanently valid *ius in bello*, the right within war. The Statute of the Nuremberg International Court has very incisively established that certain behaviours cannot be

application of war techniques liable to modify the natural environment;

- the two additional protocols of June 1977; the second one is particularly important since it explicitly extends the applicability of the Laws of War to non-international conflicts, as long as they reach a sizable intensity;
- the numerous conventions for the prohibition of certain weapons (explosive traps, either toy-like or concealed under protective labels, such as red crosses or white flags, or in food or religious items). They also

regulate the use of force, forbidding some forms of war conduct, either for their "wickedness" or because they are considered excessive even considering the very ample standards of "military necessity". These, and many more, contractual and positive norms must be added to the customary international laws included in the "Main legal principles recognized by the Community of Nations" or "People's Law" (i.e. the old and still valid "Martens clause"), together with the principles fixed by the Statute of the Nuremberg Court and – coming to the

justified, not even by war, and must be repressed with the extreme and severe instrument of the Criminal Code. Therefore the Court introduced the "war crimes" category (art. 6, para b - August 8, 1945). The same category was considered and confirmed by the UN Committee on International Law (July 1950 - principle no. VI, para b). It is a penally significant category, which was finally and generally sanctioned in the four Geneva Conventions and their two additional protocols.

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE "SERIOUS VIOLATIONS"

To stress the gravity and unacceptable nature of the behaviours already labelled as "war crimes", the norms contained in the four Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols define as "serious violations" those behaviours (and others as well) already labeled as "war crimes", enjoining every contracting High Party - and this is the essential innovation - *to take all the necessary legal measures to establish adequate penalties to be applied to the persons who committed - or ordered to commit - a serious violation.*

In an extreme synthesis, from this set of norms we can deduce a list of forbidden war-behaviours, defined as *serious violations* which must be penally repressed; first of all there is the "hard core", which includes willful murder of *protected* persons, torture, inhuman treatment - including biological and medical experiments - and the intentional

causing of serious damages to physical integrity and health.

Then there is a group of *serious violations* considered by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Convention, i.e. the large-scale and militarily unjustified destruction or misappropriation of goods. The 1st and the 4th Convention forbid non-impartial and irregular trials, conducted against the international provisions.

The 4th Convention defines deportation, illegal transfer, unlawful detention and hostage-taking as *serious violations*.

ADAPTATION OF THE ITALIAN LAWS TO THE INTERNATIONAL PENAL CODE

Once the "essential core" of the international war-code is clarified and fixed, we have the ensuing and very delicate problem of measuring how much our national war-laws comply with the said rules.

From a merely historical viewpoint, we must acknowledge

that our laws of 1938 on war and neutrality, and even more those of 1941 (military penal war-code) responded much more to the need of giving a "human face" to war than those adopted by other Nations.

If this is true, and must be said, it is also true that, at least up to the laws of 2002, the significant gap between the two normative systems appeared no more tolerable.

As a matter of fact, before Law no.6 and no.15 of 2002, Italy was a defaulter in the obligation to adapt the old (and never updated) war-laws of 1939-1941 to the commitments made at international conventions, showing also a basic inconsistency with our Constitution.

From a general point of view, one can notice that even when the war-code sanctioned criminal deeds against protected persons, it envisaged penalties that were utterly inadequate (for example, violence against private citizens of enemy Countries was only punished with imprisonment up to two years - War Code, art. 185, para 1).



An Italian patrol at the former "Zastava" factory, in the suburbs of Pec.

In particular, it was permitted to take hostages (War Code, art. 219) while this was clearly in contrast with art. 3 of the four Geneva Conventions; there were no provisions about the deportation of private citizens, ethnic discriminations, rape and/or offences against the morality of women and children; finally, there was no explicit incrimination for acts of *torture* and/or medicobiological experiments not justified by objective medical needs, and much more, not listed here for reasons of necessary synthesis.

The situation of incompatibility decreased remarkably after the coming into force of Law no. 6 of January 2002 which, albeit in a very summary and precarious form ("until the coming into force of a new and detailed law on the matter"), found a remedy to the worst discrepancies, so that today we can notice a difference between national and international rules only as regards *protected goods and areas*, attacks against undefended, demilitarized or *dangerous areas* (such as dams and nuclear plants): in fact, art. 185 bis of Law 6/2002, in referring to the international conventions, restricts this reference to criminal behaviours against persons, without considering the *internationally protected areas*.


FINAL REMARKS

We notice with satisfaction that our internal laws are being adapted – albeit not exhaustively – to the international penal legislation and we wish and hope that this process will be fully concluded in our Nation, as well as in the others, (at least in those which share with us the same

An American UH-60 "Black Hawk" and its crew in Afghanistan.

principles of civilization): we are actually convinced that – today and for a long time to come – the safest and operationally easiest way to guarantee the prevention and repression of international crime is and will be to reproduce, in the respective national laws, the criminal offences identified by the international jurisdiction. All this is true, but we must be careful not to turn it into a taboo and conclude that until everything is put into practice, the international criminal norms are only a *flatus vocis*, or useless proclamations. Neither can we agree with those who continue to believe that the recipients of the penal norms are only and uniquely the States.

The main arguments used – (almost) always in good faith – to *disarm* the international penal code, condemning it to the



A "Centauro" armoured car in Bosnia.



irreparable condition of "infant law", are usually the following:

- the international space, and consequently its laws, would know as "subjects", and therefore recipients, only the States and the international organizations such as the UN *et similia*, the Red Cross and other humanitarian structures, the religious confessions. Individuals and persons, isolated or in groups, would remain absent. This is not true anymore: individuals have entered the international space, albeit through the worst possible door, the criminal one. They are now internationally significant entities: the relevant rules now take them directly into consideration, making them recipients of both protective and punitive norms. Once it was said that every

soldier had in his knapsack the code of his flag: today a soldier must carry, besides his national code, also that of the territory where he operates and, above all, the international penal code: as a matter of fact, all three affect him with positive or negative consequences:

- the second argument used to *disarm* the international penal code is that it should follow strictly the same principles of the national codes: in particular, the legality and typicality of the norm. The ancient axiom "*nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali*" (no crime and no penalty unless there is a previous law) is irrenounceable and very valuable as a safeguard against possible judicial abuses but, particularly at this time of *hypertrophic*

criminal laws, cannot be transferred, with the same preclusive value, to the international environment. As a matter of fact, here the penal laws are certainly not hypertrophic but, on the contrary, rather minimal, and the few criminal conducts considered are so enormous that they are well known to any passably civilized conscience, and do not need an explicit provision by the respective national system. For instance, to say that *genocide* is not a crime if a national law does not sanction it, is a juridical and ethical absurdity. What is actually genocide if not mass murder? What is *ethnic rape* if not generalized and racially motivated rape? What is *deportation* if not large-scale kidnapping?

- the third argument is the craftiest and maintains that, after all, the war criminal code is the winner's law, the eternal Brennus' law, i.e. the law of the sword, not that of the balance. Unfortunately, in this disconsolate and discouraging conviction there is some truth; but we should not give it more weight that it deserves; for preventive deterrence purposes, first of all, because we know how conflicts start but almost never how they end and therefore it is very difficult to foresee who will be on the winning side. Secondly because, even admitting all that we have said, the fact that the winner is unlikely to be punished is not a good and sufficient reason to let the loser go unpunished. Finally we should not neglect the "*time factor*": there is no guarantee that today's protected winner will be protected also tomorrow. Justice, as we all know, is...very slow!!!

□

**President of the
Court of Appeal of Verona*

CRAZY HORSE

THE LAST STRATEGIST OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE

HISTORY

In the culture of American natives (for convenience we shall also call them "Indians") man's history was perceived as "circular", there was no beginning, there was no end, but everything followed a cyclical course, what had occurred was destined to occur again in a successive cycle, in new forms, with new people, but in the same substance...


Arriving in the territories of the American continent, the "white man" had brought with him his culture, his religion, his customs and his law. In view of this, since the beginning of the colonization, the native peoples had been constituting a "problem". Thus Great Britain first, and the United States after, started, at the end of the XVII Century, what was called the "policy of treaties", in order to force the Indians to leave their territories on the eastern coasts and move to the interior. Nevertheless, the treaties were never respected by the "whites", so that, year after year, the native populations of North America were compelled to move towards the West, to the land that Congress had defined as "Indian territories".

Those who did not want to leave their land were killed or confined in special Reservations. In order to explain and justify the permanent breach of the treaties and the interference in the "Indian territories" of the West, between 1840 and 1850 the United States

talked about "manifest destiny"; a principle according to which the "Whites" were appointed by destiny to dominate the entire continent and the Indians had to submit to the white man and disappear.

We start our story from this point, from this "linear" and Eurocentric conception of history, where everything is undergoing an evolution, and what occurs today will never again occur in the future. The white man's history is a straight line, not a circle.

In 1862 the United States Congress, with the "Homestead Act", granted the pioneers, for the sum of 10 dollars, lots of 160 acres



by *Rocco Panunzi* *
and
Michele Tomassetti **


In the long war against the new dwellers coming from Europe, Crazy Horse was the last hope, the last great Chief as well as the capable strategist of the Indian people. Under his leadership, the entire Sioux nation joined together in an extreme defence of their values.


In Crazy Horse's view, present and past were immutable and cyclical. For Colonel Custer, instead, everything underwent a constant improvement thanks to man's work and to progress. Both were the representatives of a fierce clash between extremely different cultures. Nevertheless, both, each in his own way, wanted to make great the common land where they were born. Crazy Horse won at Little Bighorn but later lost the war and was destined to live with the sense of guilt typical of all survivors. Until his tragic end.



(60 hectares) in the Indian territories west of the Mississippi, on condition that the land be cultivated for five consecutive years: the "conquest of the West" had begun.

In fact, between 1840 and 1860, an incessant migratory flow brought more than four million Europeans to the United States. These poverty-stricken emigrants came from Great Britain, Germany and Scandinavia; they were mostly abused and disheartened farmers attracted by the idea of a property and a new life. Between 1860 and 1914 about





14 million emigrants arrived in the United States.

The US Government tried to convey this migratory flow towards the West, in order to accelerate the occupation and colonization of the "Western territories", that ceased to be called "Indian".

Already before the end of the Civil War (1865) convoys of pioneers marching towards the West had gone beyond the limit of the settlements on the other side of the Mississippi, crossing the entire continent and founding new small towns on the Pacific coast. However, between these two limits, distant about 2500 km from each other, there was a very ample wild area that took up almost half of the continent, which had still to be colonized. From the geographical viewpoint, the area consisted of three very different physical environments: the Great Plains that extended from the 98th meridian to the slopes of the Rocky Mountains; the great ranges of the Rocky Mountains and the Sierras and, between them, the Great

Basin, a region of arid plateaus, salt lakes and deserts. These very extensive, barren and wild areas were the American "territories" destined to the Indians. (fig. A).

Together with the migratory flow of the settlers, the conquest of the West was spurred by the great "gold rushes", following a series of discoveries of gold and silver deposits between 1860 and 1880. The last "gold rush" started in 1874, after two expeditions financed by the Government had confirmed the presence of gold in the "Black Hills", in the "territory" of Dakota.


It was a Sioux reservation, a sacred area for these tribes, but when the news about the discovery spread, the army was unable to stop the stream of gold diggers: in a few months more than 15,000 had flowed to the site.

The last aspect to be considered is the impulse given to industry and transports. During the Civil War, started in 1860, many businessmen began to press the government in order to obtain permission to build a railway

heading towards the West Coast.

By 1861 a telegraph line linked San Francisco to Saint Louis. In 1862 the Union Pacific Railroad and the Central Pacific Railroad obtained the permission to build a line from Omaha to Sacramento through the Great Plains, the "Bozeman Track". The works started under the protection of the army, which could only employ few effectives, because of the war in the east. The importance of the mineral resources, the plots of land granted to settlers and companies and the creation of new States, such as Colorado, promoted a rapid advance of the works of the future transcontinental line. Little by little the whites unfolded the ample net of "modern civilization" on the Indian territory.

In moving towards the West, beyond the Mississippi, diggers, stockbreeders and settlers invaded the last strips of land of the American Indians and destroyed their culture. At the end of the Civil War, 240,000 Indians probably lived in the Great Plains, at the



Left.

George Armstrong Custer in a 1865 portrait.

Below.

The Indian Chief Crazy Horse in a photograph taken immediately after his surrender.



beginning of 1900 there remained only a few tens of thousands inside a few reservations.

CRAZY HORSE AND "LONG HAIR"

Paha Sapa was the Indian name of the Black Hills, one of the world's oldest mountain ranges, which rises in the northern Great Plains. They are approximately 160 km long and less than 100 km wide. The Sioux, the Shoshones, the Crows, the Cheyennes, the Minneconjeux and other tribes considered them a shelter during the periods of bad weather; but the mountain territory and its forests did not represent an ideal place for the tribes of the Plains. Thus the Black Hills became the dwelling of spirits, a sacred place that had always belonged to the Indians, until 1874, when George Armstrong Custer led an expedition that opened to "whites" and gold diggers the road of the Black Hills.

Crazy Horse was born in 1840, in the Plains close to the Black Hills,

in a Sioux-Oglala village, and was educated to respect and understand nature. He had been acquainted with war since his youth and was a perfect hunter already in his teens. At thirteen he had entered an association called *akicita*; in its tepee a member could while away time, sleep, eat, dance, sing and chat with friends. The *akicita* was private and could be entered only by invitation. Those who were guilty of cowardice, murder and adultery, or who had accumulated wealth without sharing it with the members of the tribe, were excluded.


Curly, this was the name of Crazy Horse as a boy, was shy, more quiet and reserved than the boys of his age. He never spoke at meetings and rarely participated in them, nevertheless he aspired to follow a line of life that he had already decided: he was going to be a warrior and a hunter, and would protect and help the weak members of his tribe. He passionately wanted to take heavy risks upon himself in order to

achieve his aim. He had had frequent contacts with the white man, but had only a very slight idea of his culture.

George Armstrong Custer was born in 1839, at New Rumley, Ohio. In those years, the United States was a Country that presented surprising differences in geographical aspects, economy and population. The emigrants, coming from every part of Europe and Africa, spoke a great number of languages and had as many cultural traditions; there were many religions, although they all belonged to the Christian sphere. There were two basic forms of economy: the labour of slaves, south of the Ohio river, and free and paid work in the north. Within these two worlds there was a myriad of ways to earn a living.

Also Custer, like Crazy Horse, grew in a large family, well taken care of and lovingly protected in his infancy.

Both were model sons of their respective cultures: Custer lived for the future, believed in progress and



Left.
The Indian Chief Sitting Bull.

Right.
Indian settlements in the Great Plains.

in the theory according to which things were continuously improving, especially thanks to man's work, his inventions, the new guns, the telegraph, the railway.

Crazy Horse lived for the present. History was a part of the present in which he lived, much of what he did was done in the way it had always been done.

These two men and, together with them, these two worlds, were to clash soon. Their battlefield would be the Great Plains and the Black Hills.

THE BATTLES IN THE PRAIRIES

Between 1860 and 1870 the Sioux found themselves in a position not only to stop the flow of emigrants through their territory but also to drive the whites out of the region of the Platte river, which had already been under the whites' control for ten years.

The war tactic of the Sioux consisted in hitting rapidly and fleeing immediately after the attack; their greatest limit was their inability to coordinate the forces of the various tribes.

In 1864 Crazy Horse decided to leave the Oglalas and join the Cheyennes in the south, in order to attack the whites and their outposts.

For the Indians the attacks had become a reason for vengeance, because of the massacre of Sand Creek. In November 1864, in fact, a group of Sioux had camped in a place called Sand Creek.

The Indians had no intention of fighting against the whites and this is confirmed by the fact that they had chosen Sand Creek in agreement with the "Bluecoats", who had promised that they would be protected by the army for the entire winter. Black Pot, the village Chief, had even hoisted the American flag at the centre of the camp. Nevertheless, on the 29th of


November, at daybreak, a Regiment of 600 frontier volunteers, who had enlisted for hundred days, fell upon the camp where two hundred men and five hundred women and children were sleeping: it was a massacre.

Crazy Horse was then a little over twenty-four but was already considered a warrior of proven courage and valour.

In July 1865 Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull and Red Cloud tried, for the first time, to coordinate the Indian guerrilla warfare by attacking simultaneously and on several fronts the outposts of the American army and the supply convoys that arrived from the east, isolating the detachments completely, breaking the communications and preventing any further advance of the whites on their territory.

The scarce results of the army against the "rebels" induced the Government to start a new policy to solve the problem of the Indians of the Plains.

Despite the opposition of Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull and others, many Chiefs signed a treaty at Fort Laramie, by which the Americans were allowed to build outposts and open new roads in the Powder river area. Crazy Horse and the Chiefs who had refused to deal with the Government continued with their actions. In December 1866, Crazy Horse devised a plan to lay an ambush against the soldiers stationed at Fort Kearny. He attacked a convoy of woodcutters near the fort and waited for the soldiers to come to their rescue; after a few minutes a squad of light cavalymen and forty infantrymen led by Lt. Fetterman left the



another in the Indian settlements.

Nevertheless the Government was forced to resume the negotiations with the Indians, because the conflict cost more than 150,000 dollars a day, immobilized thousands of soldiers, stopped investments and, above all, led to no concrete results.

In the spring of 1868, General Sherman was forced to negotiate a truce with the Indians, giving them the land on the Powder river and the Black Hills, and the permission to freely hunt buffalo on those territories.

As a matter of fact, owing to the unrestricted killing of these animals (Buffalo Bill was the main protagonist), from 1868 to 1889 the herds of buffalo were reduced from fifty million head to 541.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

The success of Crazy Horse had a direct influence on Custer. In 1868, for the first time, something done by Crazy Horse had impressed him. From that moment on, the two men were imperceptibly linked by an invisible thread, they influenced each other in their actions and reactions, and studied one another in depth until they met in battle at Little Bighorn, in a fine duel of

garrison. Fetterman met Crazy Horse, who directed the charge against the soldiers; all were killed except Fetterman, who preferred to kill himself.

This "massacre" greatly alarmed American public opinion, which insisted that the Government employ a harsher policy towards the "rebels". General Sherman, the hero of the Civil War, conveyed men and equipment to the plains, in order to carry out the task assigned to him: to put an end to the Indian guerrilla warfare. His idea was a "total war". That is why, in 1867, a long series of massacres of innocents, carried out by the American Army, followed one

Reservations	Tribes	Language groups
NORTHERN PLAINS	Blackfeet Plains Cree Plains Ojibwa Gros Ventre Sarcee	Algonquian. Ancient inhabitants of the region. Archaeological finds indicate the existence of close bonds between Black Feet and Crees, and many similarities in their mythologies. Athapaskan. In the 19th Century this small tribe entered an alliance with the Blackfeet, as it had done earlier with the Gros Ventre.
CENTRAL PLAINS	Sioux (Lakota, Nakota, Dakota) Crow Mandan Hidatsa Arikara	Siouan. Lakotas were the westernmost Sioux tribes. Dakotas, Mandans and Hidatsas were semisedentary. Caddoan. Sometimes called "Northern Pawnees". They were semisedentary and lived south of the Mandans on the Missouri river.
SOUTHERN PLAINS	Comanche Kiawa Wichita Pawnee Kiawa-Apache	Uto-Aztecan Kiawan Caddoan Athapaskan



daring and strategy that was going to have only one winner.

For Custer the life of his men was of no importance, what he really wanted was fame and power, his password was "promotion or death" and often, during the Civil War, he had ordered charges against adversaries overwhelming in number and strength, just to earn glory and renown.

At the beginning of 1867, Lieutenant Colonel Custer reached his new assignment at the 7th Cavalry Regiment stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas; his task was to defend the frontier from the Indians on the extreme southern sector of the Plains.

Soon he obtained small successes dashing at the head of his men, charging against isolated Indian villages and often mowing down innocent victims. Starting from April 1867, his assignment changed and his Regiment moved north to chase the Indians, without appreciable results until 1868, when he was called by General Sherman and by General Sheridan, his comrade at the Academy and Commander of the military Division of Missouri, to lead the 7th Light Cavalry to the northern Plains to fight a "total war" against the Sioux of Crazy Horse and the Cheyennes of Red Cloud. In fact Sherman wanted to employ the 7th Light Cavalry for a winter

campaign aimed at striking the Indians in the places where they lived, in the villages, regardless of women and children; on the other hand, in summer the Indians were too mobile and could not be easily reached – Custer had learned it at his own expense – and therefore it was necessary to find the winter villages and hit the Indians there.

Custer forced his men to endure exhausting marches through the Plains; some companies suffered heavy losses, due to cold and snow, but this was not important, what counted was to find the Indians and destroy them. In the winter of 1868 Custer led the men of his Regiment in a charge to a Cheyenne village on the Washita river, killing one hundred and three Indians. Only eleven were warriors.

Between 1868 and 1869 Custer led his men far and wide in the Great Plains, never clashing with the Indians again, but compelling them to flee to the "reservations" that were assigned to them in the new frontier-States.

From 1869 to 1873 there was a kind of truce, but both parties were preparing for a war that they knew was not over. During these years the Government of the United States tried to conclude new treaties with the rebel Indians of the Prairies and, in 1870, also Red Cloud signed a peace treaty in Washington with the "Great Father", the President. The Chief

pledged to take his tribe to a reservation in Nebraska. Obviously, also this time, the Indian good faith was taken advantage of, in that the peace conditions were immediately disregarded.

In 1868 the "Great Father" had assigned the Black Hills to the Indians for ever. Nevertheless, a few years later, gold was found in the Paha Sapa and thousands of gold diggers started to go up the Missouri and ventured into the Black Hills. The American Government, in the face of this situation, tried to bring into question the Indian possession of the Hills. Thus a meeting was called and all the Indian chiefs invited, in order to draw up a new- and we could say useless- treaty allowing the United States to buy a portion of the Black Hills (1875).

The meeting for drafting a new treaty failed, and the Indian chiefs residing in the reservations brought their braves again in the vicinity of the Black Hills. Thus, the Commissioner for Indian Affairs, who not accidentally was under the authority of the War Department, ordered the Indians to go back to the reservations by the 31st of January, 1876, *otherwise, he said, it will be the Army's job to force them to do it.*

In February 1876 the War Department authorized General Sheridan to start military operations against the "hostile" Sioux, carrying out "the actions he deemed appropriate in order to achieve the goal".

Thus General Crook and General Terry guided their men towards the upper courses of the Powder and Bighorn rivers.

On June 16th, 1876 Crazy Horse at the head of one thousand braves left the great encampment of Little Bighorn and started his march to attack the column of soldiers led by Crook.

Crazy Horse's initial strategy was to keep Crook's men scattered; he led the charges in person, deep into the soldiers' ranks, so as to keep the men separate. The Sioux

Left.

Officers of the 7th Cavalry in a group photograph.

Right.

A Blackfeet Indian family.

and Cheyennes knew that the soldiers had the new breech-loading rifles; that is why Crazy Horse incited his men to remain near the enemy, confronting them in a hand-to-hand struggle: the Indian tactic was once more changed in accordance with the new situation. As a matter of fact, in that circumstance Crook was saved only by the Shoshoni and Crow guides, who put up a strong resistance against the warriors "allied" with Crazy Horse.


Crook, after a few hours of combat, sent Colonel Mills, with eight Cavalry squadrons, towards the canyon to the north of the valley, because he was convinced that the Indian camp was beyond it; he wanted to hit it before the return of the braves; he wanted to make the umpteenth massacre, but the camp was at Little Bighorn and Crazy Horse had already placed a group of warriors on the sides of the canyon, ready to ambush the Bluecoats.

Crazy Horse, at that point, decided to apply the fundamental principle of the art of war which suggests to concentrate the forces on the decisive point.

Thus, while the Indians were withdrawing in order to follow Mill's forces, Crook guessed Crazy Horse's plan and sent immediately an Officer at a gallop to tell Mills to turn back.

Mills, therefore, fell back towards Crook making an ample left-wheeling manoeuvre, thus outflanking the Indians that were about to cut his way; this disoriented the Indians and they decided to retreat.

Crook later reported that he had won a victory against the Indians



because the redskins had abandoned the battlefield. To tell the truth, the Army would have been ruined if it had obtained a good number of these "victories"! First of all the greatest losses had been suffered by the soldiers (38) and not by the Indians (28), secondly, the soldiers in that battle had fired twenty-five thousand shots; counting the entire expense for the campaign, each Indian killed would have cost one million dollars!

Finally, the following day, Crook retreated towards the south.

Crazy Horse and his braves returned to the camp by the Little Bighorn river, where they mourned

their dead and danced in their honour.

General Terry had divided the troops into two columns, the first commanded by Colonel Gibbon, the second under Custer's orders. Custer's vanguards were commanded by Major Reno and Captain Benteen; behind Custer's column, the 7th Light Cavalry, there was the supply convoy.

On that morning of June 25th, 1876, Crazy Horse, thanks to his expert scouts, knew very well the number and movements of Custer's forces.

Custer's plan was to attack the Indians as soon as possible; he was in fact convinced that they



were on the run and felt hunted down.

According to the information he had acquired, Custer believed he could count on surprise and therefore sent Reno to attack from the south, while sending an order to Benteen to keep south and prevent possible escapes.

Custer, at the head of five squadrons totalling 265 men, quickly headed northwards, trying to attack the column on its northern side, outflanking it from behind the hills.

But the real surprise for the Indians was Reno's attack. He forded the Bighorn on the south of the camp and found himself in an immense open space, an ideal site for a cavalry charge, as Custer had envisaged. Major Reno, inexplicably, ordered his men to dismount as soon as the first tepees appeared within gunshot and had them start a rifle fire against the Indians.

Crazy Horse organized his men to counterattack Reno's soldiers, but his greatest worry was Custer's simultaneous advance towards the northern side of the camp.

In any case it became impossible for Crazy Horse to keep his men from counterattacking. They launched themselves against the lines of Reno's soldiers with such vehemence that they were literally

swept away. As the first men fell, Reno ordered a retreat which soon turned into a rout.

While Reno was riding towards the southern side of the camp, Custer got in sight of it and realized, at that point, that everything he had done up to then was based on a wrong assumption. The Indians were not on the run and Benteen was by now out of the game, engaged in a useless enterprise. However Custer did not lose heart and resumed his way towards the northern side of the encampment, where he wanted to conduct the attack in any case.

Crazy Horse probably glimpsed Custer and his men marching behind the hills and sensed what his plan was. He left a few braves to chase Reno and led about a thousand of his men rushing through the camp, among the shrieks of women and children. His plan was to overtake Custer, ford the Bighorn and attack the 7th Cavalry from the rear and from the right.

Meanwhile Custer, during his advance behind the hills, was faced by about 1500 Hunkpapa Indians, led by the Sioux Chief Fiele, who blocked his way. Therefore he tried a diverting manoeuvre to the right, towards the heights, but Fiele's braves were close at his heels and attacked in

force his rearguard. At this point, Custer's dreams were starting to dissolve, he realized that his was a struggle for survival. Thus, at the head of his soldiers, he rode towards the summit of the hill where he wanted to entrench himself with his men and resist, awaiting for reinforcements.

Custer's men were advancing in open order towards the top of the hill when Crazy Horse, who had forded the river and gone up from the north, appeared on the summit.

When a mass of horsemen reach a summit they usually restrain the horses before continuing in another direction. Probably this is what actually occurred that afternoon: when Crazy Horse and his thousand warriors reached the top of the hill, they held back their horses. There was a standstill, probably Custer's and Crazy Horse's eyes met; a mass of more than a thousand Indian braves were about to rush, from a dominant position, on to a little less than 225 cavalymen of the American regular Army.

The braves could already smell the scent of victory, the scent that Custer knew so well, exactly as he knew that the fighters who feel it become invincible.

The interval lasted only a few endless instants; it was broken only when Crazy Horse and his men filled the air with their battle cries and, hurtling down from the hill, swept away everything that appeared before them. Most warriors directed their pitiless blows against Custer: the scene may have recalled a buffalo hunt; Custer entered the battle to die, and his was a superb fight.

The battle of Little Bighorn was a unique moment in Sioux history. Never before had the Sioux been so united and so masterfully guided and never again they would be. In the Indian tradition the victorious battle of Little Bighorn was later known as "the beginning of the end"; from that moment, in fact, the history of the North-American natives was to

Facing page.

"Custer's last battle" by Elk Eber.

Right.

Lakota Oglala warriors on their ponies.

Below.

The movements of the Federal and Indian forces at Little Bighorn.

undergo a long decline.


Crazy Horse counted his losses, about forty, and mourned them. Not much, anyway, because that had been "a splendid day to die".

CONCLUSION

After this massacre, Congress decided to pass a law which forced the Indians out of the Powder river region and the

Black Hills, conferring to General Sherman full powers to make the "rebels" see sense. The Sioux were chased closely by the Army

and, starving and with scarce munitions, decided to submit to the "Great Father" and go live in the reservations.



Custer Hill. Monument and tombstones in memory of G.A. Custer and the Fallen of the 7th Cavalry.

Crazy Horse died on the 6th of September 1877 in an Indian reservation, murdered by an American soldier. Thus ended the war between "whites" and "redskins". Crazy Horse's death was more than a man's death. It was the end of the hope, history and culture of a people who had once been lord of America and was now banished to reservations, with no dignity and with a prospect of forced acculturation.

The whites' vision of history, their culture and their law had prevailed. But, paradoxically, history itself was to prove that Indian culture and vision of things were right. Since then, history has demonstrated that everything is cyclical and destined to repeat itself, century after century.


We wanted to end this writing on Crazy Horse, proud leader of the Indian cause, with this reflection which goes beyond the boundaries of history and touches the frontiers of morals and the law of nations

The Indians could only perform their "ghost dance" and wish to see again, one day, the buffalo galloping on the prairies of a land really free for all, where Crazy Horse, their "peculiar Chief", their Messiah (who died regretting he could not be useful to his people anymore), could ride proud, indomitable and immortal.

□

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THOSE MAGNIFICENT ROMAN LEGIONS

*A fascinating journey through time,
to discover their origin and identity*



On its constitution, every legion received an identification number and often also a name. Eventually it could earn an attribute, or appellation, which, by emphasizing its merits and military virtues, made it famous and immortal.

The legionaries were very faithful and had a deep-felt sense of belonging and esprit de corps. In fact, the Roman Empire, with 30 legions, i.e. only 360,000 men, controlled a territory delimited by a border of 6,400 km.


Names and surnames were connected with events, geographical areas, Emperors, brave leaders or also with religious motivations. The latter was the case with Julius Caesar who, belonging to the gens *Julia*, protected by Venus, allowed his faithful *X Legio* to call itself "Veneria".

THE ROMAN ARMY


The legion was the heart of the republican, and later imperial, military apparatus. This astonishing war machine was the secret of the unequalled power achieved by ancient Rome.

At the time of the Kings, the army was recruited only in times of war and consisted of a single legion. The legion, commanded by the King, was discharged at the end of the conflict. In the Republican era, there were two legions, each commanded by a Consul. In combat, the legionaries were aligned on three rows: on the first line, the *hastati*, armed with a long lance (*hasta*), on the second the *principes*, on the third the *triarii*, the veterans destined to withstand the final attack.

All were equipped with a *gladius*, a short sword, and a big rectangular shield. The combats were opened by the *velites*, a corps of young men with a light armament, consisting of a bundle of javelins. In the I Century B.C., Consul Caius Marius established a permanent army of volunteers.



Roman legionaries.



A Roman "ballista".

Thus the *velite* disappeared and became an infantryman like any other and there were no more differences in armament between *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii*, but all became legionary foot soldiers.

A legionary had a metal helmet and a cuirass that could also be made of leather, and his outfit consisted of a short sword, the *gladius*, two javelins called *pilum*, a long lance and a shield. The whole equipment weighed about 40 kg and, besides the weapons, consisted of work tools and a knapsack. The tools that he brought with him were: a big mace, a shovel and a handsaw. These were the implements that the legionary had to use for his work during the marches, in

particular for the fortification works of the encampments. The knapsack contained food supplies: there was wheat, cheese, lard, oil for condiment, a canteen for water and a small grill for cooking food over charcoal.

The shield's characteristic was that it bore spikes. During the battle, the legionaries, holding it, positioned themselves next to each other in a continuous closed rank, almost like a wall and, with lances and spikes sticking up, they marched against the enemy like a kind of tank. This was an invincible war machine, for it surely frightened the unorganized barbarian populations.

The advance of the legionary infantry was slow and cautious. Even with forced marches, it covered no more than 20/30 km each day, also because, as we said, each man carried a back-

pack of about 40 kg. The advance on enemy territory was made safe by an extraordinary number of expedients. For example, a fortified encampment was built every day (two posts for each legionary were carried by the baggage waggon) for spending even only one night. Roads were opened, bridges were built, forests were cleared. The legions' internal organization was meticulous and accurate. There were legionaries specialized in building roads, bridges and fortifications, in finding water and food, in treating the ill and wounded men, there were veterinaries for the animals and haruspices for the religious ceremonies.

The monthly ration of each soldier was about 25/30 kg of wheat, which meant one kilo of "placenta", a flat loaf, per day; onions and garlic were particularly appreciated as a side dish.

The length of the military service changed along the centuries but, in any case, the average period was more than 20 years, the best part of a man's life in those times, providing he did not die in some battle.

Each legion consisted of about 5200 infantrymen plus 120 horsemen divided into two wings, about a hundred men assigned to the war machines, and the personnel of the headquarters. In all about 6000 men. The Command included the Imperial Legate, various Tribunes and Prefects, while, among the Officers, the Centurions were those more in contact with the troops. Infantry and cavalry auxiliary troops were deployed next to each legion.

The Roman Army during the Imperial Age numbered between 25 and 30 legions, i.e. about 180,000 legionaries and 180,000 auxiliaries. The immense territory of the Empire, and its borders of 6400 km, was therefore controlled by a relatively small force: 360,000 men.

THE ROMAN LEGIONS AND THE ORIGIN OF THEIR NUMERATION AND DENOMINATION.

As we said, until 104 B.C. the legions were recruited each time according to the necessity of the moment. Starting from that date, Caius Marius transformed the army into a professional body, allowing all citizens to enlist. The legions that constituted the army therefore became permanent units and, as years went by, acquired an esprit de corps unknown to the legions prior to the reform.


Before the reform, the legions, at the moment of their constitution, received an identification number that distinguished them. As they became permanent units, the number continued to be their main distinctive element, and only later the appellations started to appear as an integral part of the denomination of each legion.

As we are going to see, both number and surname revealed the circumstances of the origin of each legionary unit and were an indispensable instrument for knowing the reasons for its constitution.

Numeration and denomination constitute the identity of a legion. There can be two or more legions with the same number or with the same appellation, but never can legions with the same name and number coexist.

THE NUMBERS OF THE LEGIONS DURING THE LATE REPUBLIC AND THE EARLY EMPIRE

A quick glance at the list of the Roman legions seems to show an evident continuity in their numeration which, nevertheless, does not correspond to a chronological method. Actually the legions were recruited in different periods and for the most disparate reasons, therefore the numbering did not need to be progressive.



Plan of the encampment of a legion.

The first series of known legions' numeration appears in the army that Julius Caesar employed to conquer Gallia between 58 and 50 B.C.. When he assumed its command it consisted of four legions: the VII "Claudia", the VIII "Augusta", the IX "Hispana" and the X "Veneria".


Following Caesar's murder in 44 B.C., his army was divided between his heirs: his nephew Octavian and his General Marc Anthony, who ended up fighting each other in the decisive civil war for the supreme power of the Empire. Some legions were split in two contingents, one for each heir, as was the case with the VI Legion, which originated Anthony's VI Legion "Ferrata" and Octavian's VI Legion "Victrix". Moreover, both recruited new legions and constituted huge armies. In Octavian's army the legions' names reached up to a XLI Legion and in Antony's up to a XXX Legion.

When Marc Anthony was definitively defeated by Octavian in the battle of Actium, in 31 B.C., the victor found he possessed an enormous army of about 70 legions, a lot more than were necessary to the Empire and could

be economically supported. Octavian, (Augustus from 27 B.C.) started to disband the legions, until there were only 28 left, generally eliminating those that had been enlisted more recently (i.e. those bearing the highest identification number) and keeping the oldest and most employed ones. Meanwhile he found no difficulty in recruiting in the Imperial army also the best legions among those defeated at Actium (the III "Gallica", the VI "Ferrata" and the XII "Fulminata").

Thus he found he had various legionary units with double, or even triple, numbers: there were two IV Legions ("Macedonica" and "Scytica"), two V ("Alaudae" and "Macedonia"), two VI ("Ferrata" and "Victrix"), two X ("Fretensis" and "Gemina") and three III ("Augusta", "Cyrenaica" and "Gallica").

No new legions were recruited until 39 A.D.. That year Emperor Caius Caligula decided to reinforce the Rhine frontier and established two new legionary units: the XV "Primigenia" and



Cordoba, Spain; a Roman bridge on the Guadalquivir.

the XXII "Primigenia".

In 67 A.D., Emperor Nero constituted a new legion, the I "Italica"; nobody knows why he gave it that name. Possibly it was simply one of his whims.

Two new legions were recruited in the tumultuous period between 68-69 A.D. In Spain, Servius Sulpicius Galba proclaimed himself Emperor and, *to safeguard his interests*, he founded a legion, the VII "Galbiana", to which he gave this number in order to give continuity to the legion that he kept under his command, the VI "Victrix". When he arrived to Rome from Spain, Galba recruited, legally, the I Legion "Adiutrix" (which had been existing for a short time in an irregular way). The legion was given this number because it was the first to be recruited among the sailors of a fleet; its quarters were at Miseno, near Naples.

In 69, with the men of a fleet (in this case that of Ravenna, on the Adriatic Sea) a new legion was recruited which, of course, received the name of II "Adiutrix". The following year,

Emperor Vespasian (69-79 A.D.) formed two more legions, the IV "Flavia" and the XVI "Flavia", whose numbers corresponded to the IV "Macedonica" and the "XVI "Gallica", which he was intentioned to disband due to a serious lack of discipline among its men.

In 83, Emperor Domitian (81-96 A.D.) recruited a new legion which he called I "Minervia", perhaps because it was the first founded by him or for a mere whim. In 98 or 99, Emperor Trajan (98-117) established the the thirtieth legion of his army, which he called XXX "Ulpia" and, even if there was an empty space in the numbering between XXII and XXX, the second legion recruited by him in 108 got number two: II "Traiana".

No more legions were constituted until 168 A.D., when Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161-180) recruited two new units. As a continuation of the numbering of the legion founded by Nero (I "Italica") they were given the numbers and names of II "Italica" and III "Italica". Almost thirty years later, in 196 A.D., Septimius Severus recruited three legions that he numbered from one to three (I "Parthica", II "Parthica" and III "Parthica").

Finally, the last legion recruited during the Early Empire was constituted by Emperor Alexander Severus (222-235) in 231, and was called IV "Italica". Here the number IV continues the series of the three "Italicae" constituted by Nero and Marcus Aurelius.

THE MAIN SURNAMES OF THE LEGIONS OF THE EARLY EMPIRE

As we said, the legions created in the last period of the Republican Age were given only a number. Surnames were assigned later or, we can say, they earned them. However, some of them did not have the time to obtain them, as was the case with the XVII, XVIII and XIX, which were annihilated by the Germans in an ambush in 9 A.D. and of which we ignore even the nickname. Starting from 39 A.D., with the two legions constituted by Caligula, all the new legionary units received, together with their number, also the corresponding appellation.

These surnames had various origins. They could derive from a part of the name (*nomen*, *praenomen* or *cognomen*) of their recruiter or reorganizer. We find the first example of this in the legions called "Augustae". They received the appellation in honour of Emperor Augustus (27 B.C. – 14 A.D.) who reformed them during his rule.

In 68, Galba, Governor of Tarraconensis Spain, when he proclaimed himself Emperor, recruited the VII Legion "Galbiana" which, evidently, received its name from the cognomen of the insurgent. The appellatives of the IV "Flavia" and XVI "Flavia" derived from the name of Emperor Titus Flavius Vespasian who had formed them.

Marcus Ulpius Trajan, an Emperor of Spanish origin, recruited two new legions, the first of which, the XXX "Ulpia", received as appellation the name

The signifer was the bearer of the legion's insignia, the lion skin marked his function.

of the Emperor while the second, the II "Trajana", derived its name from the cognomen of its founder.

Also a legion of the Republican Age had taken the name of its founder, a rather unusual thing at that time. It was the XVII Legion "Cornelia Spinteri", which took this name in honour of Cornelius Espinter, Proconsul of Cilicia from 56 to 52 B.C..

This legion did not survive Augustus' reform.

Other legions already existed when they received appellations based on the name of important persons who had relations with them. Thus the XX Legion, which took part in the repression of the Dalmatian- Pannonic revolt of 6-9 A.D., integrated within the army of future Emperor Tiberius, fell into an ambush and survived only thanks to the valour of its men and the command capabilities of its legate, Marcus Valerius Messalinus. From then on, to honour its commander, the legion was called XX "Valeria".


In 42 A.D., when the VII Legion "Macedonica" and the XI Legion camped together in the encampment of Burnum (today's Kistanje, Croatia), in Dalmatia, they were incited to rebel by the governor of the province, Furius Camillus Escribonianus. After a day of uncertainty, both legions decided to remain loyal to Emperor Claudius and therefore the Roman Senate granted to each one of them the privilege of calling itself with the "Claudia Pia Fidelis" appellation.

Another group of legionary surnames refers to geographical regions. Some recall the place of recruitment of the legion, such as, for example, the "Italicae" legions. Other geographical names reminisce of places where particular legions participated in memorable battles, or of peoples



against whom they fought, whose names deserved to be mentioned in the name of the legion. An example of this are the legions whose name refers to the province

of Macedonia where, at Filippi, in 42 B.C., the members of the second triumvirate, Octavian, Anthony and Lepidus defeated in battle the troops of Caesar's



The legionary's lances, from bottom to top: *venabulum*, light *pilum*, heavy *pilum* and *hasta*. The first was the *velite's* javelin. The *hasta* was the lance of the *triarii* (the third line, made up of veterans, tasked with resisting to the final thrust). The *pilum* was introduced during the Empire. It consisted of a wooden staff ending with a cone, on which an iron bar was inserted. The bar was fastened by two bolts, one of which had a prearranged fracture-line. Once the *pilum* was launched, the fracture bolt broke on impact, preventing the enemy from reusing the weapon. If the *pilum* penetrated a shield, it made its handling impossible at the moment of hand-to-hand combat. At the end of the battle, they were recovered, and easily repaired by the Roman smiths.

Another origin of the legionary surnames can be found in the names of the deities that were worshipped in ancient Rome. Some gods and goddesses, chosen for their bond with the founder or the reorganizer of a legion, gave their name to determined legionary units, at the same time making the image of the god become one of the emblems of the legion. The earliest case known regards Julius Caesar,


member of the *gens Iulia*, a family whose protectress was Venus. He granted to the X Legion, which he favoured so much that he made it his personal guard, an appellation intimately bound to him: that of "*Veneria*" (Legion X "*Veneria*").

The names of another group of legions refer to the most varied characteristics of each unit or its men. This is the case with the I Legion "*Adiutrix*". Its appellation, which in English means "helper",

murderers, the Roman noblemen Brutus and Cassius, forcing them to suicide. In remembrance of that battle, various legions were called "*Macedonicae*": the IV "*Macedonica*", the V "*Macedonica*", the VI "*Macedonica*" (*Victrix*), the VII "*Macedonica*" (*Claudia*) and the IX "*Macedonica*", whose appellation was later replaced by that of "*Hispana*", in honour of the valour shown in the Iberian Peninsula.

Weapons of the Roman legionary: the *gladius* (a short sword, about 50 cm long) and the *pugio* (a 24 cm-long dagger).

The *gladius* was adopted after the 2nd Punic War, in substitution of the Greek *Hoplite* sword.



THE ROMAN LEGIONS OF THE EARLY EMPIRE

(main surames in capital letters)

Legio I	ADIUTRIX Classica Pia Fidelis Constans.
Legio I	AUGUSTA.
Legio I	GERMANICA.
Legio I	ITALICA Pia Fidelis.
Legio I	MACRIANA Liberatrix.
Legio I	Flavia MINERVIA Pia Fidelis Domitiana.
Legio I	PARTHICA Nisibenica.
Legio II	ADIUTRIX Pia Fidelis Constans Pannonica.
Legio II	Gallica AUGUSTA Britannica.
Legio II	ITALICA Pia Fidelis Divitensium.
Legio II	PARTHICA Pia Fidelis Felix Aeterna.
Legio II	TRAIANA Fortis Germanica Pia Fidelis.
Legio III	AUGUSTA Liberatrix Pia Vindex Constans Perpetua Fidelis.
Legio III	CYRENAICA Claudia.
Legio III	GALLICA Felix.
Legio III	ITALICA Concors Pia Fidelis.
Legio III	PARTHICA.
Legio IV	FLAVIA Firma Felix.
Legio IV	ITALIA Victrix.
Legio IV	Sorana MACEDONICA.
Legio IV	SCYTHICA.
Legio V	ALAUDAE Gallica.
Legio V	Urbana MACEDONICA Pia Fidelis Constans.
Legio VI	FERRATA Fidelis Constans Felix.
Legio VI	Macedonica Hispana VICTRIX Pia Fidelis Domitiana.
Legio VII	Macedonica CLAUDIA Pia Fidelis.
Legio VII	GALBIANA.
Legio VII	GEMINA Felix Pia.
Legio VIII	Veterana Gallica Mutinensis AUGUSTA Pia Fidelis Constans Commoda.
Legio IX	Macedonica Triumphalis HISPANA.
Legio X	FRETENSIS.
Legio X	GEMINA Pia Fidelis Domitiana.
Legio X	VENERIA.
Legio XI	CLAUDIA Pia Fidelis.
Legio XII	Antiqua Paterna FULMINATA Victrix Certa Constans.
Legio XIII	GEMINA Pia Fidelis.
Legio XIV	GEMINA Martia Victrix.
Legio XV	APOLLINARIS Pia Fidelis.
Legio XV	PRIMIGENIA.
Legio XVI	FLAVIA Firma Pia Fidelis.
Legio XVI	GALLICA Germanica.
Legio XVII	
Legio XVIII	
Legio XIX	
Legio XX	VALERIA Victrix Britannica.
Legio XXI	RAPAX.
Legio XXII	DEIOTARIANA.
Legio XXII	PRIMIGENIA Pia Fidelis Domitiana.
Legio XXX	ULPIA Victrix Pia Fidelis.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE ROMAN



recalls the fact (without precedent) that it was formed by Nero as a support to the regular troops, in a moment when the politico-military situation was adverse to him (Vindex' insurrection in Gallia and Galba's insurrection in Spain).

When Caesar decided to wage war on Pompey, the urgent need of troops prompted him to recruit the entire legion among the transalpine Gauls; a measure totally unusual because, according to the rule, the legionaries had to

LEGIONS AT THE END OF THE 1 CENTURY A.D.



be Roman citizens and the inhabitants of Gallia, recently conquered, generally were not. This new legion started to be known by the name of "Alaudae", because its men had the habit to decorate their helmets with lark (*alauda*) feathers. The word derived from the Celtic language of the new legionaries. In 47 B.C., Caesar transformed it into *iusta legio*, i.e. a regular legion, and gave it a number. From then on, until its destruction by the Dacians in 86 A.D., it was known

by the name of V "Alaudae". As regards the origin of the name of the XII Legion "Fulminata" there is a legend that spread during the IV Century. This legion, mostly formed by Christian soldiers, was transferred by Emperor Marcus Aurelius from its encampment at Melitene (today's Malatya in Cappadocia) to the Danubian frontier, in order take part in the operations against the Quadis, the Marcomannis and the Sarmatians. In 172 or 174 A.D. it was surrounded, together with other

units, by the barbarians. The situation was made even more serious by the lack of water that the Romans were suffering at that moment. The Roman soldiers of the XII Legion then invoked the help of their God, who sent the rain in the form of a violent storm, accompanied by thunderbolts and lightnings. The storm helped the besieged and took the superstitious barbarians by surprise, causing their defeat. Marcus Aurelius, impressed by this demonstration of divine power, stopped the



Above.
Salamanca: Roman bridge.

Facing page.
In brown, the extent of the Roman Empire in the II Century A.D.

persecutions against the Christians, who were numerous among the legionaries, and in remembrance of that event, assigned that legion the appellation of "Fulminata".

Several legions have "Gemina" as main surname. It appears that this name wants to indicate "double" legions, referring to the reorganization of such legions during Augustus' reform. It seems that when that Emperor had to reduce the almost seventy legions that were under his command in 30 B.C., in many cases disbanded some as a whole, while in other cases he considered the men's experience and age, dismissing the oldest and those with lesser military capability. With the remaining men he organized some legions, merging them two by two, and this is the reason why they were called "Geminæ". We ignore what legions were merged but we know the result of the fusion: X "Gemina", XIII "Gemina" and XIV "Gemina".

There is a number of legions which, despite having been

mentioned in the preceding paragraphs as regards their surnames, must be considered separately since they have no number. These are very rare cases in the Roman army of the Republican Age and did not survive the civil wars of the I Century B.C. Excepting the "Alaudæ" Legion (already mentioned and which later took number V) there are other legions with these characteristics. It is the case of the "Gemina" Legion, which was part of Pompey's army in the battle of Pharsala. Another of these legions is the "Martia", whose name refers to Mars, the god of war. The last of these legions without a number is the "Vernacula" Legion, very closely bound to the Spanish territories because it had been recruited in 49 B.C. in the Iberian Peninsula by Pompey's legates among the clients and supporters of this Roman general in the war against Julius Caesar. The name "Vernacula" refers to the fact that it was recruited among the inhabitants of the province,

therefore certainly Roman citizens, (let's not forget that Transalpine Spain was one of the most Romanized countries in the area under Roman domination) and not among natives, like the "Alaudæ" Legion.

THE SECONDARY SURNAMES OF THE LEGIONS OF THE EARLY EMPIRE

Besides the abovesaid names, by which the legions were usually identified, each one of them could have other secondary appellations, granted to the legion by the Senate or by Emperors in various circumstances. Sometimes a principal surname could become secondary, when



the legion assumed a new name. Among these appellations, those most commonly granted were related to loyalty (to the State or to the Emperor). Two of these titles, *Pia* and *Fidelis* (virtuous and faithful) were generally granted at the same time.

The Roman Senate, for example, in 42 B.C., granted these titles, next to the name "Claudia", to the VII "Macedonica" and to the XI, because of their loyalty to the Emperor during Escribonianus' rebellion.

These two honorary titles could also be granted separately. Thus the original name of the II "Italica" was "Pia", a title which, when, in the same year of its recruitment (168 A.D.), the name of this legion was changed, remained as secondary appellation. Some years later, the II Legion "Augusta" and the VII "Gemina" were given the same title by Septimius Severus.

The surname of "Fidelis" was

given by the same Emperor to the II Legion "Italica" for having supported him in his accession to the imperial throne.

Other honorific adjectives of the legions refer to the loyalty towards this or that personality: "Costans" (immovable in its fidelity) was given by Marcus Aurelius to the VI Legion for having refused to support Avidus Cassius.

There are also secondary surnames that refer to a place or a region of the Empire, or to their inhabitants. The V Legion "Macedonica", starting from the I Century B.C., had "Urbana" as secondary appellation. Its origin is unknown, but surely it is linked to Rome, or *urbs* (the city par excellence). "Sorana" was one of the titles of the IV "Macedonica", which probably originated from one of its armed actions of 43 B.C. in the vicinity of Soranum (in the province of today's Grosseto), in the days




preceding the battle of Mutina (today's Modena), between Octavian and Marc Anthony.

After the invasion of Britannia in 43 A.D., some legions that took part in it (the II "Augusta" and the XX "Valeria") were also called "Britannica", in memory of their deeds in the island. The title of "Germanica" was conferred to the XVI Legion "Gallica", possibly for its intervention in the campaigns carried out in this region under Augustus and Tiberius (14-37).

Other characteristics that were believed to belong to a particular legion or to some of its components became surnames of legionary units: "Liberatrix" (liberator), assigned in 68 A.D. by Clodius Macrus to his Legions I "Macriana" and III "Augusta"; "Fortis" (strong, valiant), conferred by Trajan to the II Legion "Traiana", etc.

Another group of secondary surnames originate from the names of Emperors. The I "Minervia", when it was recruited was called I "Flavia Minervia" after its founder Domitian, a member of the *gens Flavia*. Some legions garrisoned in Germany, starting from 89 B.C., bore the name "Domitiana", derived from the *cognomen* of this Emperor, after the episode of Saturninus, until 96 B.C., when Domitian was assassinated by the praetorians. The Senate decreed for the dead Emperor the *damnatio memoriae* (literally, the malediction of his memory: his name was deleted from all monuments and any reference to him in the names of legions, colonies, cities, etc. was eliminated). Starting from the beginning of the III Century, the habit of giving the military units an appellation derived from the name of the Emperor of the



moment began to spread within the Roman army. So we have a "Severiana", an "Alexandriana", a "Gordiana", a "Philippiana", just to mention a few. To give an example of the above, during Alexander Severus' empire, the name of the I Legion "Italica" would have been I Legion "Italica Pia Fidelis Alexandriana". The names of gods were uncommon among the secondary surnames: the only documented one is that of "Martia" for the XIV legion

"Gemina", conferred by Nero in 63 A.D.

THE NUMBERS AND NAMES OF THE LATER EMPIRE'S LEGIONS

During the period of transition from the earlier to the later Empire, known as "Military Anarchy" (235-285 A.D.), few legions were recruited and their names followed the pattern of the

previous denominations, i.e. geographic or ethnic names. For example, the name of the VI Legion "Gallicana", where the future Emperor Aurélianus served as military Tribune, refers to Gallia. Two legions recruited in this period, the IV and the V "Marta" bore the name of Mars, the god of war.

In 277, Emperor Probus recruited three legions in Isauria, a region of present-day Turkey, and gave them the names of I "Isauria Sagittaria", I "Isauria" and II "Isauria".

In 285 Emperor Diocletian obtained total power over the Roman Empire. Aware of the importance of the army as a support of throne and state, he started to enlarge it, a task which was to be continued by one of his successors, Constantine I (306-337). The strengthening of the army implied an increase in the number of units and, probably, of the legions. The numbers of the new legions raised by Diocletian only in some cases follow a well-defined logic. What he never did was to continue the numeration starting from the highest, which was the "Ulpia". Thus Egypt, which had been garrisoned by only one legion, the II "Trajana", was reinforced by two new ones: the I "Maximiana" and the III "Diocletiana".

As regards the appellations, some of the new legions adopted the emperors' names and surnames. In 286, Diocletian appointed co-Emperor one of his old fellow-soldiers, Maximianus, and both assumed, for prestige's sake, divine names: Jupiter (Jovis, in Latin) for Diocletian and Hercules for Maximianus. Thus we have the III Legion "Diocletiana", the I Maximiana, the I and V "Joviae" and the II, III and VI "Herculiae".

Surnames referring to gods are, for instance, the I "Marta" (or "Martiorum"), while geographic ones are used in the garrisons and legions recruited in Armenia

(I and II "Armenicae"), in Pontus (I "Pontica"), in Noricum (I "Noricorum") and in Britannia (II "Britannica").

There were also compound surnames, such as Legion I "Maximiana Thebaeorum" and III "Diocletiana Thebaeorum", probably recruited on the basis of the I "Maximiana" and the III "Diocletiana", and completed with Egyptian recruits from the region of Thebes, on the banks of the Nile.

The legions enlisted by Constantine I or by his father Costantius Clorus are difficult to attribute to one or the other, because all of them had "Flavia" as part of their surname (the complete name of Constantine I being Flavius Costantinus, and that of his father Flavius Costantius Clorus). Other legions of this period bore geographical names referring to the origin of the first recruits or to the units' garrison.

Some legions completed their surnames precisely in this period, as was the case with Diocletian's three "Alpinae," which became I, II and III "Juliae Alpinae" in honour of Julius Crispus, Constantine's son, who commanded them for a year, or of Costantius (Flavius Julius Costantius). Finally, some legions raised in this period attached to their names those embodying the longings of the populations in those troubled times: Peace (Legion I "Flavia Pacis"), Virtue (Legion II "Flavia Virtutis") and Salvation (Legion III "Flavia Salutis").

THE UNNUMBERED LEGIONS OF THE LATER EMPIRE

Diocletian and Costantine I's military reforms included the moulding of a mobile and manoeuvring army, which had the task to resist the invasions of the barbarian peoples after they

had overtaken the border fortifications.

The first units of this type had been troops skilled in breakthroughs, which were called "Ioviani" and usually followed Diocletian and Maximianus in their military expeditions. Those recruited in this period, instead, were called "Lancerii", from the "lancea", a launching weapon which had replaced the "pilum" (javelin) in the III Century A.D.. At any rate, this does not mean that the "lancea" was used only by these units of "Lancerii".

The number of this type of legions grew very much in the period of Costantine I and his successors. They were given no numbers but only surnames of the most varied origins. Some of them derived from the names of the border legions which had originated the new legions of the army.

Other denominations referred to the legions' mission to protect the Roman world, i.e. "Armigeri Defensores" (literally, armed protectors) or "Propugnatores" (defenders).

Some names supply information on the mission or the armament typical of each unit, as is the case with the "Ballistarii", name of several legions of the manoeuvre units. These legions had originated under Emperor Galienus, between 260 and 268, from the regrouping and reorganization of the ancient legions of the early empire into autonomous artillery legions. One of their fundamental elements was a weapon called "ballista". Hence their name. Other surnames of this type were "Funditores" (armed with "fundae", slings), "Praeventores" (given to exploring) and "Superventores" (literally, "those who arrive suddenly and unexpectedly", probably tasked with disturbing the enemy rear guard).

Some legions' names inform us about the name of the recruiters: "Costantini Seniores",

"Costantiaci", "Felices Theodosiaci Iuniores", "Valentinianenses", but most new legions took their name after the region of their recruitment or the ethnic origin of their members, who were generally inhabitants of the border areas of the Rhine and the Danube. Without mentioning every legion, we can cite as examples the "Abricanteni", recruited in the city of Abricantum (today's Avranches, France) and its surroundings, in the province of "Gallia Lugdunensis" II; the Dacians, recruited in "Dacia Ripensis" and "Dacia Mediterranea"; the "Britones Seniores", recruited in Britannia; the "Mauri Osmisiaci" probably made up of inhabitants of the African province of Mauritania (approximately north of present-day Morocco and Algeria) and quartered in Osmis (today's Brest, France).

Several legions were also recruited among the inhabitants of areas outside the empire, such as the "Tzaanni", a Caucasian population of present-day Georgia and the "Transtigritani", recruited, as shown by their name, "beyond the Tigris". Possibly, many of these units had already existed as auxiliary formations since the III Century A.D. and Constantine I, or one of his successors, only raised their standing.

Some legions had names made up by surnames of various origin: for instance, by joining together their type of armament and their founder's name, we have the "Ballistarii Theodosiaci"; a type of armament and their ethnic origin: the "Lancearii Augustenses" (from the city of Augusta); the name of their recruiter and their ethnic origin: the "Constantini Daphnenses" (from Daphne, today's Spantzon, Bulgaria). From 364, several legions appeared with new appellations: "Seniores" or "Iuniores". The origin of these surnames was the election, in that year, of Valentinianus I.

This Emperor, realizing that he needed help in order to govern, appointed co-Emperor his brother Valens and put him at the head of the eastern territories of the empire, keeping the western part for himself.

In splitting the army units, rather than applying the "this for you, that for me" system, they decided to divide some of the main legionary and auxiliary units in two parts. Those which joined the western army assumed the new surname of "Seniores", since Valentinianus was the senior (or chief) Emperor, while those of the eastern part were called "Iuniores", considering that Valens was the designate (or junior) Emperor.

Examples of this arrangement are the "Ioviani Seniores" and the "Ioviani Iuniores", the "Herculiani Seniores" and the "Herculiani Iuniores". But there were also exceptions to the rule, as was the case with the "Martenses Seniores" and "Martenses Iuniores", where the "Seniores" were in the Eastern Empire and the "Iuniores" in the West.

CONCLUSION

The Roman legions were identified through a number, a surname or both. The numbers could be repeated, but the names derived from geographical areas, Emperors, or even from their recruiters.

From the end of the IV Century, many leaders of the imperial army, especially in the West, were barbarian mercenaries, who served in the Roman army with a contract or a pact (*foedus*) signed by the Roman State with the tribes, such as the one contracted in 382 by Theodosius I with the Visigoths. He recruited thousands of them in the army of the Eastern Empire. These new recruits wore their own garments (they did not use Roman

uniforms or, truth to tell, any uniform at all), carried their own weapons and had their own leaders, upon whom, in order to flatter them, the Romans bestowed resounding titles, such as "Magister Militum per Illyricum", awarded in 401 to Alaric, King of the Visigoths. The new units were not given names anymore and the existing ones drowned in the sea of the barbarian invasions of the beginning of the V Century, at least in the Western Empire, since in the East many legions survived, albeit only nominally, till the dissolution of this type of units, toward the end of the VI Century.

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
EL ALAMEIN

**WHEN THE DESERT
TURNED TO HELL**

The battle and the heroes.




1942 - 2002... an everlasting memory



This article was written with the collaboration of:

- *Dr. Carlo De Risio who wrote a pamphlet on El Alamein this editor published in 1992;*
- *Professor Girolamo Garonna, Chairman of the Infantrymen National Association – branch of Rome – who reported testimonies of the veterans from Northern Africa, in particular: Corporal Giovanni Pucciotti, Corporal Balilla Maurizi, Corporal Antonio Ventriglia and Sapper Giovanni Martini*
- *Professor Gabriele De Rosa, Senator of the Italian Republic, who provided the editor with his war journal.*



EL ALAMEIN

MANCO
LA FORTUNA
NON IL VALORE
- 1° 7° 1942
← ALESSANDRIA III

60th Anniversary of the Battle

by Carlo De Risio

Sixty years ago the soldiers of the most important units of the Italian Army Corps in Africa – and of the Italian Army as a whole – fought a battle at El Alamein and gave their lives for their country.

From 23 October to 4 November 1942 the “Ariete” and “Littorio” armoured Divisions, the “Trieste” wheeled Division, the “Trent”, “Bologna”, “Brescia” and “Pavia”, infantry Divisions, the “Folgore” parachutists Division, the support units at Army Corps and Division level and the German “Afrika Korps” fought against VIII British Army.

The British Army was stronger in terms of soldiers, equipment and air force support.

The Italian Army, the Navy and the Air force shared a common destiny in El Alamein and wrote one of the most heroic pages of our history. Those soldiers gave their lives for their country and left a moral heritage we and the future generations shall not forget because the future of a Nation is based on its past.

Today we can look at that battle – included in all history books – and understand what a wrong idea the British Army had of the Italian soldiers.

The Italian units were not equipped for fighting in the North of Africa and this was the major reason of their defeat. But they fought against the enemy heroically and – when there was a balance between the parties – even successfully.

On several occasions Rommel said the Italian soldiers were good fighters and also wrote that “all Italian units, in particular the wheeled ones, were doing better than the whole Italian Army had done in the previous years”. The Divisions belonging to the 10th and 12th Army Corps (the “Trento”, “Bologna”, “Brescia” and “Pavia” infantry Divisions – each composed of two poorly manned and equipped Regiments) took part in all operations in Marmarica, Sirtica, Tobruk and in the Egyptian territory and lost all their soldiers in the battle of El Alamein. The same happened to the Divisions of the 20th Wheeled Army Corps and the “Folgore” Division. The “Ariete” armoured Division fought heroically the last desperate battle on 4 November 1942.


Rommel and also the VIII British Army commanders felt great admiration for all Italian soldiers.

The silence of the Italian, British and German Cemetery in El Alamein calls for a peaceful world. Those who gave their lives for their – and our – Country must not be forgotten.

TWO FLAGS

“El Alamein” means in Arabic “two flags”. In 1942 there was only a little train station along the railway running from the Nile Delta to Tobruk. It was 180 kms. away from Marsa Matruh and 105 from Alexandria. It was only a tiny name on maps and no one could ever image that so many soldiers from different countries – more than the two (flags) recalled by the name of the place – were to fight a battle there: Italians and Germans – who wanted to get to Alexandria, Cairo and Suez – were opposed to the British, the Commonwealth Coalition and their allies.

In 1940 the Mid-East Troops British Commander, General Archibald Wavell and the Commander of the French Armée d'Orient, General Maxime Weygand explored El Alamein because they thought Italy could enter the war and have the 10th Army heading to Egypt. They thought El Alamein was an important strong position and ordered some defensive works



Right.

The building on hill 33 which was used by the Italians as a base during the rescue operation following the battle. This hill overlooks the range of hills in front of the sea and is 500 meters far from the Sacrarium.

Below.

The area of North Africa between Tobruk and the Suez Canal.

for possible future operations.

In fact, later the Italians discovered that some defensive works had been built in 1940 and the defence had been accurately planned before.





El Alamein was an important position from the geographical, tactical and strategic point of view. It was 60 kms from the coast, was surrounded and protected by the 217 meters high Qaret El Himeimat rocky mountain, the El Qattara depression, by soft ground and quicksand.

Moreover the only source of drinkable water of the West Egyptian desert was in El Alamein, as Colonel Fritz Bayerlein reported.

All history books say the El Qattara depression could not be crossed. But Desmond Young, a biographer, wrote that Randall Plunket, a Cavalry officer, started from the Siwa Oasis with his tank unit and crossed quicksand.

Moreover, Rommel writes in his notes on the North of Africa Campaign that: "on 29 October

1942, during the battle in El Alamein, I was told that the enemy was crossing the depression of El Qattara and was in the region 100 kms South of Marsa Matruh, which was an alarming news. We were concerned because there was no way to make a defence. Many rear units were sent to the threatened region but in the morning of October 30 the news from the Supreme Command turned out to be false."

So we can assume that Rommel thought crossing the quicksand region might be possible. Moreover, it seems that Rommel explored the El Qattara area several times in the Summer 1942.

But in general we can say that a manoeuvre with mechanised units through El Qattara was not possible.


In order to understand what a tragedy Italians and Germans

experienced in El Alamein we must go back to the decisions taken in the Spring 1942. In fact, on 29 and 30 April 1942 Hitler, Mussolini and their Staffs met in Klessheim and decided to win the match in the Mediterranean and in the North of Africa.

The RAF basis on the isle of Malta were bombed by Kesserlings' 2nd Fleet (he had been appointed as Chief of Southern Forces Command on 28 November 1942) and by the Italian Air Force. The Italian convoys could then go through Tripoli and Bengasi and reinforce the Italian-German armoured Army.

General (then Marshall) Ugo Cavallero, the Chief of the Italian General Staff wanted to invade Malta (the Italian nickname for the plan was C3 while the Germans called it Herkules Operation). An expedition Corps was being prepared and as many as seven Divisions were marked for the C3 operation, including special units from the "Folgore" parachutists Division, the "San Marco" Regiment, a special Regiment of Camicie Nere and many more specialists.. The Germans planned to take part in this operation with one parachutists Division, with amphibious troops and with hundreds of airplanes. In order to make the operation easier the RAF had to be turned out of the whole Cyrenaica and Marmarica area and Tobruk was to be conquered. So, when they met in Klessheim they decided to start with the Italian-German armoured Army and the operation was called "Aida". The aim was to defeat the British forces and take Tobruk. They planned to reassemble the troops along the Halfaya-Sollum line and start the operation against Malta. An operation against Egypt would have come later.

"Aida" began on 26 May at 2 p.m., which was unusual for an



attacked by the British during a withdrawal operation (ordered by Rommel to make logistic support easier) pushed back the enemy and also the British units lost many soldiers and tanks. The British thought the Italians were an easy enemy to destroy. But they were not and the British had not learned the lesson when on 19 November 1941 (at the beginning of the "Crusader" Operation) the 22nd Royal Armoured Brigade attacked the Italian "Ariete" in Bir El Gobi and lost more than 50 tanks. The same happened when the British and Indians attacked the Italian stronghold in Bir El Gobi and the "Giovani Fascisti" battalions pushed back the British tanks although they were equipped only with few 47/32 anti-tank weapons.

Going back to the June 1942 events it is worth noting that the Italian-German Army began to break through the British defence although paying a high tribute in terms of human lives and tanks. The Italian-German Army conquered the Gott El Ualeb middle position, Bir Hacheim – heroically defended by General Koenig's Brigade – and finally Ain El Ghazala. The British armoured units of the 7th and the 1st Divisions along with the autonomous Brigades were finally defeated in a place the British called "The Knights Bridge".

The British VIII Army began the battle with 843 (plus 145 reserve) tanks of which 242 "Grant" and 219 "Stuart" made in the USA, which means the United States were playing an important role also in the North African theatre. The Italian-German armoured Army began the battle with 560 tanks - of which 228 were Italian – and during the fights it was given 76 more tanks both from the Germans and the Italian "Littorio" armoured Division which will be addressed later in this article.

offensive operation. In fact it was a false start. So, after the Italian infantry Divisions belonging to the 10th and 21st Army Corps moved along the coast Rommel ordered all armoured and mechanized units (over 10,000 vehicles) to move in the night. The real operation started with the keyword "Venezia". General Ritchie's 8th Army was positioned between Ain El Gazala (on the coast) and Bir Hacheim, 64 kms southwards (in the desert) protected by wide minefields.

All battles that took place day by day until Tobruk was

conquered shall not be addressed in this article.

The quick battle Rommel had in his mind turned out to be a long lasting struggle. On 27 May 30% of the German tanks were destroyed by the British using the American tanks "Grant" equipped with a 75 mm fixed cannon and a turning 37 mm cannon in the turret. Also the Italian armoured "Ariete" and the wheeled "Trieste" Divisions (belonging to the 20th Army Corps) took part in that manoeuvre and lost a high number of soldiers and tanks. On that occasion the Italian units



M13 Tank in the desert.

Then the VIII Army was stronger than the Italian-German one, both in terms of tanks and soldiers. Also the Desert Air Force was stronger than the Italian Air Force and the Luftwaffe together, even if the latter had moved to Libya as many as 700 airplanes, which had an important part in the attack operations since the very beginning.

The Axis armoured units were manoeuvred with great skills and managed to destroy the enemy's armoured units so that after the Knight Bridge battle the VIII Army was numerically superior no more. Tobruk was then attacked by more than 30,000 troops supported by the air force and after 24 hours the battle was over. This caused a great deal of comment in the world.

Tobruk may be considered as an introduction to El Alamein. The defeat in Tobruk (Rommel had been planning since the

month of April 1941) prompted the American military industry to better support the front line in the North of Africa.

Winston Churchill was in Washington to meet President Roosevelt when he was told Tobruk had been conquered by the enemy. The British Premier wrote in his historical record: "(...) and the President was given a message. He read it silently and then gave it to me: the message reported that 25,000 soldiers had surrendered to the enemy in Tobruk. (...) President Roosevelt saw my painful feelings and said: "You can suffer a defeat but you cannot be dishonoured. How can we help you?" This was my answer: "You can send all the Sherman tanks you have to the North of Africa as soon as possible".


Finally Roosevelt did more than he had promised and from the US were shipped also 300 Sherman without engines and on a different cargo were then shipped 300 Sherman engines to the Suez Canal. The ship carrying the engines was sunk by the enemy but more engines were

shipped from the United States immediately.

The British and the Americans did their best not to lose Egypt and to protect the countries producing fuel in the Mid East (Iran and Irak) while the Axis countries were simply enjoying their victory and did not give enough support to the armoured units that had taken part in the battles. At the same time they decided they would not attack Malta any more.

It is worth noting that while Tobruk was being conquered Mussolini wrote a letter to Hitler to confirm his idea that Malta had to be conquered as they had decided in the month of April. Mussolini also pressed for fuel support to be delivered to the Italian Navy that had attacked two British convoys sailing to Malta from Gibraltar and Alexandria. 15 out of the 17 well escorted merchant ships were destroyed before arriving to the besieged island of Malta and the British lost also many war ships. The Italian Navy had no more fuel for attacking Malta.

A 1938 postcard from the 85th Infantry Regiment, Sabratha Division (XXI Army Corps) in 1942.



the Caucasus and Stalingrad.

The encryption codes the Italian Military Information Service had taken from the American Embassy in Rome were of great importance to the Italian and German Headquarters in Libya. Said codes allowed them to read the reports the American Military Attaché in Cairo, Colonel Frank Bonner Fellers, wrote and sent to the War Department. They knew how the things were going to the VIII British Army.

This was confirmed by Marshall of Italy Ettore Bastico, General Governor of Libya and High Commander of the Armed Forces in the North of Africa, when he wrote his historical records in 1958.


Bastico reports the intercepted messages: "Rommel can invade Egypt and the Axis attack Malta to have a free support channel from Italy to Greece ... The Axis flow of support to the Armies must be interrupted otherwise the Mid East will be at Rommel's mercy ..."

M40 Self-propelled 75/18 gun of the Littorio Armoured Division.

But Hitler was as euphoric as Rommel for the victory in Tobruk and wrote back to Mussolini that the troops must go on and completely destroy the British Army.

they had seized large quantities of fuel, equipment and food in Tobruk but all that was not enough to give a new life to the German and the Italian units.

But Hitler thought the great offensive in Russia was to begin on 28 June and all armoured forces had to be directed against



THE MIRAGE OF THE PYRAMIDS

Feller reports that 1009 out of 1142 British tanks were destroyed. In the Mid East there were only 133 tanks left. That's why Rommel said it was an extraordinary occasion. The VIII Army was defeated in Tobruk as it had never happened before. That was the time to attack and conquer Alexandria, Cairo and the Canal. But neither Bastico nor Kesselring or Cavallero agreed with Rommel. On 25 June the three of them met in Derna and Kesselring said: "the enemy may be capable of a massive counterattack. I feel it and I am scared of it. The enemy can still rely on 600 airplanes while we only have 60 or 70 and so have the Italians. Moreover 50% of our airplanes cannot be moved after the troops because transportation is not enough. I told the Führer our forces were enough strong to win Tobruk but we need more fuel, bombs and airplanes to go on fighting. I think I was clear and honest when I said Rommel cannot go beyond El Alamein".

On 26 June Cavallero, Bastico, Rommel and Kesselring met in Sidi El Barrani for a final meeting while the forward troops were getting near the entrenched fields of Marsa Matruh. Rommel was indifferent to Kesselring. Bastico did not completely share Rommel's opinion and Cavallero was half way between trusting Rommel or not.

Cavallero prompted Mussolini to go to Libia and Mussolini thought he would enter Alexandria triumphantly. But it was not so and after waiting until 20 July he went back to Italy.

Bastico's war journal report what they told each other.

Rommel was trusty although he knew he would not be given a real support. He asked for more support but Kesselring told him there was too much to do all around the world and he had been given only some new "Stukas".

Rommel concluded: "when our Army overcomes El Alamein – which I do believe so – we shall be in Cairo on 30 June. I shall be waiting for you there. We shall be more comfortable in Cairo. We shall talk there".

On 26 June the 20th Army Corps Headquarters was bombed and General Baldassarre, the Corps Commander, General Piacenza, Artillery Commander, and Colonel Raffaelli, Engineer Corps Commander, were killed.

Consequently General De Stefani (from "Ariete") was appointed as Army Corps commander while General Arena was appointed as commander of the armoured Division.

The Desert Air Force went on and attacked the Italian and the German troops with 200 multi-engines airplanes and 160 hunters.

At this moment the Italian units were composed of the following:

- the 20th Corps included the *Ariete* Division (10 tanks, 15 artillery guns, 600 bersaglieri from the 8th Regiment and 1500 infantrymen) and the *Littorio* armoured Division (that had given part of its equipment to "Ariete" and "Trieste" and consequently had only 30 tanks, 11 artillery guns and 1000 bersaglieri from the 12th Regiment)
- the 10th Army Corps included the "Pavia" and "Brescia" infantry Divisions with 2000

troops (infantrymen and bersaglieri) and 90 artillery guns

- A group of hunters from the 21st Army Corps which was composed of 1 Granatieri anti-tank battalion, 2 Bersaglieri battalions from the 7th Regiment, 4 battalions from the "Trento" Infantry Division and 8 artillery groups. All these units totalled 3000 troops and 100 artillery guns.


The DAK (Deutsches Afrika Korps) was exhausted. The 90th Light Division diminished to less than 20% of its original force and the same was for the 3rd, the 33rd and 580th Reconnaissance Groups.

So this was the Italian-German Army attacking on 26 May. And this is what Kesselring meant when he said that the units could not be given more missions after Tobruk. The Delta was 500 kms far from the Libia-Egypt boundary line and the RAF controlled that space. Moreover the VIII Army was getting closer its rear base while the Italian-German Army was dangerously moving away from its support base.

In conclusion we may say the Italian-German Army was given no support. The Italian tanks were weared and unprotected M13 and L6. Moreover, as General Giuseppe Mancinelli, liaison officer at the Italian-German armoured Army reports in his war journal, at the moment of the battle the German Corps only had 50 tanks because the remaining 150 were being repaired and would have been returned to the units within the next 5 to 10 days.

The Wehrmacht planned to move all armoured units to the Russian front and decided not to support the Afrika Korps.

The Italian authorities did the same. In fact the ARMIR Divisions (totally more than 16000 vehicles) left for Russia in the month of June 1942. It is



A 1938 postcard from the Tank Regiment drawn by G. Ferrari.

worth noting that the CSIR in Russia had already been given more than 800 (almost all) modern Army Corps and Division artillery guns (210/22 and 149/40 groups, 75/32 antitank weapons, 75/18 cannons, 75/46 anti-aircraft, 20mm machineguns and more support weapons).

We can assume that if the wheeled units in the North of Africa had been doubled the support load would have doubled as well. But in the Summer 1942 there was no will to do that. Moreover the Germans did not want to take Luftwaffe units away from Denmark, France and Norway although they were less important sectors.

28, 19 and 30 June were crucial days to the war in the Western Desert. General Claude Auchinleck, the Mid East British Commander, dismissed General Ritchie and substituted him on the field to lead the VIII Army.

General Auchinleck was not new to similar decisions. In fact he had already replaced General

Cunningham, Admiral Cunningham's brother, after the unsuccessful events of the Desert Army. We may say Auchinleck was a destiny maker.

On 29 June the poorly manned and equipped German and Italian Divisions conquered Marsa Matruh (bersaglieri from

the 7th Regiment entered first) and made 6000 prisoners. But the German and Italian forces were not enough to completely encircle the conquered stronghold and the British Army managed to withdraw their Infantry units.

Since the very beginning of the war in Africa the British thought that should the enemy get to Marsa Matruh the Mediterranean Fleet would leave the Egyptian base because of the possible bombing from the Italian-German air force. And that happened on the 21st of June when Admiral Harwood ordered to move the Fleet from Haifa to Suez.

Auchinleck had planned to defend the Delta (Egypt was not as important as the positions East of Suez, in particular Iran and Iraq) but he also prompted his troops to react against the enemy.


The British and the Commonwealth units that had survived the previous battles reassembled between El Alamein and El Qattara and were reinforced by fresh troops.

The Information Service of the VIII Army believed the Italian-German Army could still rely upon 100 tanks and 25000 troops, although this was not and the VIII Army was actually stronger.

The first Battle of El Alamein (1-13 July 1942)

The tanks were getting closer to El Alamein and the British Embassy was celebrating what they ironically called an Ash Wednesday. In fact all documents were being burned in the garden of the Embassy because they expected things getting worst.

During the previous three years they experienced a cycle of defeats alternating with victories. But Marsa Matruh, Maaten Bagush, Fuka, El Daba, Sidi Abd



*A 1940 postcard from the XXI
Cirenaica Army Corps drawn by
Matta.*


El Rahman had been conquered by the Italian-German Army and only El Alamein, El Hammam and Burg El Arab were left. The ships of the Mediterranean Fleet were leaving and the French were preparing to sink one of their naval squadrons that was under maintenance in the port of Alexandria. General Auchinleck was aware of the gravity of the situation but he wanted to go on because although they had not won a battle during the past 5 weeks the VIII Army was still strong enough to defend Alexandria and the Delta.

The 50th British Division and the 1st South African Division had withdrawn from Ain El Gazala and reassembled the core of their units in El Alamein. The 2nd New Zealander Division was almost intact (it had been reassembled in Syria and was commanded by General Freyberg, a veteran who had taken part in many battles in the desert and who had been also wounded during the battle in Marsa Matruh).

The 18th Indian Brigade, that had been moved from Iraq, took a position to defend Deir El Shein while the 4th Indian Brigade was to defend Abu Weiss, along the border of the El Qattara depression.

Moreover Auchinleck could still rely upon 150 tanks from the 1st armoured Division and on the 4th light armoured Brigade made up of wheeled armoured vehicles. In conclusion, the Army was strong enough and was reliably supported by the Royal Air Force.

The Italian-German Army had 55 German tanks and some light armoured tanks from the Italian Divisions "Ariete" and "Littorio". Moreover the Italian-German Infantry units were small and could not attack the enemy along the whole North-South line (later



Rommel realised that the enemy's weak point was the Southern flank but he denied he had played a game of hazard).

Rommel thought he would take advantage of the British troops' destroyed morale. In fact the British Commander in Chief felt the troops were frustrated. General Auchinleck decided to fight with his soldiers side by side against the enemy and this was a boost to their morale.

On June 30, in the afternoon, the 90th German light Division or what remained of it, that is one sixth of its strength, attacked the

British defense forces, marking the start of the first battle of El Alamein. Auchinleck had forecast an attack on the center right sector of his lines and deployed his Brigades accordingly. He was right.

On July 1st, the DAK tried to rapidly burst through the British positions at El Alamein, but was stopped by the concentric fire of the British artillery, while the RAF launched nap of the earth attacks.

Rommel's plans and the prospects of marching on Alexandria failed to be wrong at



A 1938 postcard showing Italian light armoured tanks in attack. Drawn by C. Tafuri.

Deir El Shein, between El Alamein and Bab El Qattara, west of the Ruweisat high ground. The 18th Indian Brigade resisted bravely the whole day and destroyed 18 out of the 55 German tanks, before being defeated.

In his WW2 memories, Churchill wanted to reject all accusations against the British, who reportedly made other Commonwealth peoples fight in their place to save their own lives. He wrote that the Indian divisions were made up of British and Indian soldiers, whose nationality was to be correctly indicated in official documents and in battle reports. Anyway, whether they were British-Indian or Indian only Divisions, these units served honorably both in North Africa and in Italy. It is to be stressed that, at the beginning of the first battle of El Alamein, the 18th Indian Brigade played an important role and disrupted the plans of the Italian-German Army.

In early July 1942, in terribly hot weather, Auchinleck realized

that the Italian-German Army was on the verge of collapsing. However, the Axis forces thought that they could still win and in fact the outcome of the battle was uncertain.

On July 2, Rommel wrote *"During the night, the Air Force Commander informed me that the fleet had left the port of Alexandria. I absolutely wanted to reach a decision in a few days. The British seemed to lose their confidence and apparently were about to withdraw. I was deeply convinced that if my troops were able to burst through the enemy's lines, the British would be panic-stricken. But the poorly manned Italian-German formations were progressively thinning out."*

In this respect, British documents reported that on July 3, the Italian "Ariete" Armoured Division was destroyed by the 2nd New Zealand Division, supported by tanks and artillery assets. However, only the remaining elements of the "Ariete" were destroyed, that is a dozen tanks, thirty artillery pieces and some hundreds men. On the contrary, the 2nd New Zealand Division was a large unit

based on three well armed brigades.


The collapse of the Italian armoured division shocked Rommel as well *"This news caught us totally unprepared. In fact, during the week-long fighting near Knights Bridge, the "Ariete" supported by German artillery and tanks, fought bravely against the British though suffering a high number of casualties. Now the Italians are no longer up to the situation on the ground."*

After the "Ariete", the "Sabratha" Infantry Division, reorganized after the 1940-41 campaign, but still not completely configured, was attacked by the 9th Australian Division, (evidently, the British reserves were in the meantime arriving in the field).

Then, it was the turn of the remaining troops of the "Trieste" and the Infantry Divisions.

The Italians lost the Ruweisat high ground, stretching from east to west, which they had previously occupied. It was a serious loss, being a key position like the Alam Halfa high ground.

As it has been already said, the terrain in the northern sector of



M13 Tanks preparing to attack.

the El Alamein area is flat and uniform, therefore even a very low rise in the ground assumes great tactical importance. Later on, also the Chief of the British Imperial Army Staff, Alan Brooke, was stunned by the low altitude of these grounds, Ruweisat and Alam Halfa included.

The unbiased and fair pages written by Rommel on the events which took place in early July 1942 at El Alamein are to be wholly reported, mainly because the Germans were always critical of Italian soldiers. Rommel wrote "Then, many Italian units collapsed. As comrade and Commander in Chief of the Italian units, I feel obliged to clearly state that the soldiers are not responsible for the defeats suffered in early July at El Alamein. Italian soldiers are eager, generous and good comrades and performed above average given their critical conditions.

Undoubtedly, performance levels of all Italian troops, especially of

motorized units, were higher than those reached by the Italian Army over the past decades.

Many Italian Generals and Officers gained our esteem, both from a human and military point of view.

The defeat suffered by the Italians was due to the deficiencies of their political and military systems, obsolete armaments and little interest shown for this war by military commanders and state authorities. My plans were often hindered by Italian

unpreparedness. Generally, the Italian Command was incapable of conducting war in a desert environment, where decision must be rapidly taken and implemented. Infantry forces were not sufficiently trained to conduct a modern war. Troops were so poorly equipped that they could not resist without the support of the Germans. In fact, the Italian tanks were technically obsolete (very short range cannons and low power engines), and the artillery had a very reduced mobility and range of fire. The number of anti-tank weapons was completely insufficient and food rations were of such a poor quality that the


Italians often had to rely on their German comrades' food supplies.

During the fighting which took place in early July, Rommel's HQ became suddenly "deaf", as it was no longer capable of intercepting updated information on British plans, sent to the War Department by the American military representative in Cairo, Colonel Frank Bonner Fellers.

On July 10, during an attack launched by the 9th Australian division, the DAK "intelligence" company, under Captain Alfred Seebhom, was disrupted at Tell El Eisa ("Jesus hill" in Arabic).

In fact, that unit, instead of remaining in the rear area, had been incautiously moved to the front-line by the Germans.

The Australians found among Seebhom's files some messages sent by Fellers, which our Military Intelligence Service (SIM) had intercepted and decrypted for six months, to be forwarded to Kesselring and Rommel. Captain Seebhom was seriously wounded and moved to Cairo, where he died without revealing anything to the British. A warning was immediately issued, as the "Fellers" source



became unavailable in such a critical moment

The sudden disruption of the intelligence company was one of the many disasters which took place in those days.

As a matter of fact, the Italian – German Army was reinforced by the 164th German light Division – coming from Crete – without vehicles, the “Bologna” Division – hastily reorganized in the rear area – and fourteen artillery groups. Moreover, the “Folgore” paratroop Division and the Paratroop Brigade under General Ramcke, which initially had to occupy Malta, were on their way to Africa.


The VIII British Army, reinforced by a growing number of units, was increasingly pressing on, while Auchinleck had taken initiative again. Rommel was continuously obliged to fill the gaps open on the front of El Alamein and started losing confidence in his victory, being bitterly disappointed by his failure to conquer Alexandria, Cairo and Suez.

On July 17, Rommel met Cavallero, Bastico and Kesselring at El Daba and, for the first time, openly declared his intention to withdraw. “It is better to go back on the Sollum – Halfaya line” said the Marshal.

Kesselring immediately answered “If we withdraw, we will disrupt all forward air fields and the entire air force organization”

Cavallero abruptly replied “I see no reason to withdraw. Reinforcements will soon arrive and allow us to keep our positions, at least for the time being”. The day after that meeting, three artillery groups deployed to the left of the “Trento” Division, placed in one of the most dangerous sectors, while the “Pistoia” Division, though not adequately equipped to operate in the desert, was about to arrive in Libya.

On July 19, Rommel restated, in El Daba, his intention to withdraw, while Cavallero



Spitfire hit by the Folgore anti-aircraft guns on 9 October 1942. The pilot was taken prisoner.

confirmed his will to hold the ground. At that point, political factors were prevailing, as an Axis withdrawal to the Libyan-Egyptian border would have serious psychological and propagandist repercussions on the cohesion of the internal front, not only in Italy.

Therefore, the decision was taken to hold out, also because the British were paying a high toll, due to the fierce reaction of the Italian-German units. In fact, the 23rd British Armoured Brigade, newly arrived from Great Britain after circumnavigating Africa, was completely destroyed. In late July, after another British attack, the war came to a lower level of intensity.

As things calmed down, on July 29-30, Rommel, together with Bastico, made an inspection tour of the whole Italian-German deployment. At that point, it was up to the engineer units to intervene, in order to protect the front-line with all types of mines

and explosive ordnance. Thus, the "Devil's gardens" were set up in the desert.

The second battle of El Alamein (August 31 – September 6, 1942)

In July 1942, only two Italian ships sailing to Libya were sunk, but all other convoys could safely carry troops and supplies to the theatre. In August, the number of vessels sunk suddenly rose, due to the attacks launched by British submarines, torpedoes and bombers. In fact, as Churchill said "Malta was brandishing again its blazing sword" and the British were launching devastating attacks in the Eastern Mediterranean waters from the Delta of the Nile and from Palestine.


It is worth underlining that from August to November 1942, forty-two Italian and German merchant ships were sunk, many important tankers included: in particular, 10 ships in August, 9 in September, 12 in October and 11 in November. The war in North Africa was mainly a "convoy warfare", as everything was to be shipped; therefore, the Axis

suffered heavy losses, during the same period in which the last Italian – German offensive (end of August) and the final battle of El Alamein (end of October) took place.

Moreover, the German High Command was unable to send other armoured units to North Africa, due to its growing concurrent commitment in Russia, and keep the number of tanks in service with the DAK.

The level of the Italian commitment was equally insufficient, given the difficulties encountered by our national industries and the lack of raw materials.

The basic tank of our armoured Divisions was still the M-13, equipped with a 47/32 gun. The output of tanks achieved in 1941 (1,222 numbers) was neither surpassed nor even equalled in 1942 and, for incomprehensible reasons, the decision was taken not to boost the production of the 75/18 self-propelled vehicle, the only one capable of countering British tanks and, above all, the new American tanks. New 90/53 self-propelled vehicles were being produced to



be used in Russia, where our best artillery means had already been sent.

As regards the already mentioned "convoy warfare", it is worth recalling that, in August, the British Navy made an extreme effort to send supplies to Malta (Operation Pedestal).

The warships "Nelson" and "Rodney", the carriers "Victorious", "Indomitable", "Eagle" and "Furious", together with a high number of cruisers and destroyers, entered the Mediterranean sea to protect and escort a convoy of fourteen merchant ships. The Italian Air Force, the *Luftwaffe*, submarines, motor torpedo-boats (MAS) of the Italian and German Navy launched an attack on that *Armada* during the so-called "battle of mid-August" (August 11-14, 1942).

The carrier "Eagle" was sunk, the "Indomitable" suffered severe damage, the cruisers "Cairo" and "Manchester" were sunk, the "Kenya" and "Nigeria" were torpedoed and also the destroyer "Foresight" was sunk, but, above all, nine merchant ships were sunk. It was a real disaster. Five merchant ships, though, reached

Malta and, in the end, the battle was a strategic success for the British even if at a high cost.

Major changes in the two warring Armies' top level structures were concurrently taking place.

On August 12, 1942, the High Command of the Armed Forces in North Africa changed its name into The High Command of the Armed Forces in Libya having military jurisdiction over the entire territory of that colony. On the same day, the Italian-German Army, under Marshal Rommel, was directly put under the Italian Supreme Command and a Delegation named "Delease" (Delegazione Nord Africa Egitto) was established, to liaise with that Army.

Marshal Bastico, who was also the Governor General of Libya said " *The only result was that Rommel was free to act in full autonomy. From that moment on, Italian Agencies in Africa were simple Liaison Offices to establish contact with the German Command, while Rommel only availed himself of General von Rintelen (German military attaché in Rome) to liaise with the*

Supreme Command in Rome. With the new structure, Bastico added, I formally assumed command of the Armed Force in Libya, with a territorial jurisdiction practically limited to Tripolitania and the Libyan Sahara.

The top level structure of the British Army was also changed. The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Alan Brooke, stopped in Cairo both on their way to Moscow, to meet Stalin for high level talks and on their way back.

The decision had already been taken to remove General Claude Auchinleck from his position as Commander of the Middle East and, at first, General Gott, another veteran of the war in the desert, was to assume command of the VIII Army and General Alexander of the Middle East. But Gott died when the plane he was on was shot down while flying to Egypt. Therefore, General Bernard Law Montgomery, who proposed himself as the "anti-Rommel", was appointed commander of the VIII Army.

The dismissal of Auchinleck was extremely unjust, as he had

Left.

M13 tanks near the El Qattara gorges.

Right.


Postcard (1906) of the 19th Infantry Regiment, 27th "Brescia" Division.

been the one who actually saved Egypt. The official hand-over took place on August 15, 1942, when Auchinleck had already stabilized the front line at El Alamein and established the plans to stop Rommel's expected offensive.

In August 1942, other coups de theatre were staged by the High Commands.

In fact, on August 22, Rommel unexpectedly asked to be replaced for health reasons. On that same day, Cavallero wrote in his Journal "*Von Rintelen informs me that Marshal Rommel asked to be replaced for health reasons. Difficulties arise. I ask him if there are other reasons, but Von Rintelen answers no. Will Rommel launch the offensive? If not, we will have to take a defensive position. I show him that too much power in the hands of one man is not the right solution and illustrate him the negative consequences.. (but Cavallero too had contributed to the extreme "personalization" of the Command in Africa, with the new organization he set up on August 12. Note of the Author).*"

Rommel was tired, he suffered from nasal diphtheria, gastroenteritis and had open sores on his face caused by the sun. His request to be replaced showed his lack of confidence in a positive outcome of the imminent offensive. In fact, on the eve of the attack, he came out and confessed: *this is the most difficult decision I've ever made; whether to attack or not. Either we succeed in reaching Suez and our army in Russia seizes Grozny or...*" and he concluded his confession by making a vague gesture.



Bastico added that after Rommel's request to be replaced "*The choice was made to appoint Marshall Kesselring and this was the reason why Rommel put aside his intention to leave command and decided to launch the offensive ahead of schedule. In fact, on August 28, , the "desert fox" issued the order to attack and established the first day of the battle on August 30.*" The forces on both sides of the front line were made up as follows:

- on the Italian-German side: 67

Infantry Battalions (30 Italian), 536 guns (336 Italian), 515 tanks (281 Italian), 119 armoured cars (72 Italian) and 777 aircraft, among bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft;

- on the British side: 66 Infantry Battalions (fully manned unlike the Italian -German ones), 576 guns, 450 tanks, 150 armoured cars and 200 aircraft.

The last Italian- German offensive started on August 30, in



Left.

Postcard drawn by Paolo Caccia Dominioni in 1966.

Right.

M13/40 tanks of the "Ariete" Armoured Division.

indications on the nature of the soil. We marked the impracticable area close to the positions of the 7th Armoured Division, known as the Ragil Depression, as excellent for the nature of its soil. One of the maps, torn and purposely stained with tea, was put inside a reconnaissance tank which we blew up in a nearby minefield. The following morning, we found that the tank had been searched and the map was no longer there. As a consequence, the main German connection line passed through the Ragil Depression, where the Germans almost ran short of petrol".

This *ruse de guerre* – even though other sources deny its effectiveness – reportedly hampered the delivery of support to the Italian-German Army. In fact, the lack of fuel has always been considered as the reason for the unsuccessful outcome of the battle which went down in history as the battle of Alam Halfa. But was the shortage of fuel the only reason to spoil Rommel's plans?

According to Colonel Fritz Bayerlein, acting Chief of Staff of the *Afrika Corps*, the course of events was remarkably different.


In late August 1942, the *Afrika Corps* was under General Nehring. On August 31, he was severely wounded in the field and General von Vaerst assumed command, but it was Bayerlein who actually exercised tactical command. This phase of the entire operational cycle on the front at El Alamein is known as the "six-day race", indicating the last six day effort staged by the Axis to break through the enemy's line and reach Alexandria and the delta of the Nile.

the evening, with a series of attacks staged by the Italian "Trento" Division the 164th German Division, paratroop units of the "Folgore" Division and the "Ramcke" Brigade.

Once again, the maneuver forces operated within the southern sector. Together with the entire DAK, the attack was launched by the XX Italian Motorized Corps, with its "Ariete" and "Littorio" Armoured Divisions, and the "Trieste" motorized Division on the left side of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions.

Italian and German Divisions get immediately entangled in minefields which were wider and deeper than expected, while the RAF staged powerful night attacks and the British artillery started a robust counterfire action.

According to General Freddy de Guingand, Montgomery's Chief of Staff, all difficulties met by the Axis forces at the beginning of the battle were due to a clever ploy. As stated by de Guingand *"In the desert, the soil was hard in some areas but soft and impracticable in others. Therefore, we decided to modify maps, reverting the*



It is worth recalling that at the end of August, Cavallero, Kesselring and Rommel had an important preliminary exchange of messages concerning the support required for the imminent battle. Rommel asked 6,000 tons of fuel and added *"the positive result of this battle depends on the early delivery of this quantity of fuel"*. Cavallero answered *"Open fire, fuel is being delivered"*.

Moreover, Kesselring granted Rommel that even if naval convoys were destroyed, the 2nd Fleet would deliver the required fuel.

On August, 30, at dusk, German armoured units attacked the southern sector of the front line, to get over the minefields, outflank the whole British deployment and reach the coastline at El Hamman in the VIII Army rear area.

The 15th Panzer Division attacked with 70 tanks – "III" and "IV" types – while the 21st Panzer Division with 120 tanks equipped

with guns (tanks of the "II" type were not employed due to their limited armament which made them unfit for a battle of tanks. It is to be stressed that the number of Panzer tanks at Rommel's disposal was remarkably lower than that with which he fought during the former battles at Ain El Gazala and Tobruk).

Before midnight, the spearhead of the 15th Panzer entered into contact with the British defense forces of the minefield area. But the minefields were unexpectedly deep and the defense forces were on the alert. The 1st Battalion of the 115th Grenadier armoured Regiment, under Major Busch, was stopped by the British artillery and the infantry barrage fire, which succeeded in disarraying the German forces. The arrival of the II Battalion, under Captain Weichsel, saved the situation. They staged an attack on foot, established a bridgehead and succeeded in

opening a path for the tanks of the 15th Panzer Division.


The following phase of the battle is to be described using the present tense.

General Walther Nehring, Commander of the Afrika Corps, follows the 21st Panzer Division on board his armoured car together with the Chief of Staff, Colonel Bayerlein, three radio operators and two drivers. Mines are blowing up all around them. Nehring has the first sad news: the Commander of the 21st Division, General Georg von Bismarck, an excellent officer, was killed when trying to cross the minefields with his unit. It is already past midnight, it is August 31.

The German Divisions are still fighting in the wide minefields which are fiercely defended by the enemy forces. British aircraft bomb Italian and German motorized forces and succeed in floodlighting the battlefield with a new method. An inflammable

75° GRUPPO OSSERVAZIONE AEREA

MEDAGLIA D'ARGENTO AL V.M.



“DOPO ESSERSI PRODIGATI PER LUNGI MESI IN TENACE E SUPERBA AZIONE DI GUERRA CONTRO IL NEMICO, SVOLGENDO RISCHIOSE MISSIONI NEL CIELO DEL DESERTO E SULLE MUNITE BASI AVVERSARIE, I SUOI EQUIPAGGI, DURANTE LA BATTAGLIA DELLA MARMARICA, SEMPRE PRESENTI, OVVEGGIORA ERA IL PERICOLO, SUPERANDO OGNI OSTACOLO ED AFFRONTANDO LA REAZIONE AVVERSARIA, APPORTAVANO, NON SENZA DURI E SANGUINOSI SACRIFICI IL CONTRIBUTO DELLA LORO EROICA ATTIVITA' ESPLO- RANDO, COLLEGANDO, SVEN- TANDO LE INSIDIE NEMICHE.”

CIELO DELL'EGITTO E DELLA MARMARICA - DICEMBRE 1940-41

Postcard (1940) of the 75th Air Reconnaissance Group, depicting one CR42 aircraft flying over two palm trees and three meharis in the desert.

material containing also magnesium is being dropped on the battlefield. It flares up only when it touches the ground and cannot be easily put out.

After von Bismarck, another member of the command structure of the *Afrika Corps*, General Nehring, is wounded during an air bombing. Bayerlein now commands the forward armoured units. Before dawn, the British resistance in the minefield area weakens, and the armoured spearheads of the DAK reach, in full daylight, an area 12-15 kilometres distant from the starting positions, instead of the pre-established 50 kilometres.

We have expanded on the difficulties encountered by the DAK, as the German armoured Divisions were the spearheads,

while the “Ariete”, “Folgore” and Trieste Division covered the entire left flank of the battle. However, all reports concerning the battle confirmed that the Italian units met the same difficulties as the 15th and 21st German Divisions.

Thus, Rommel's plan to deeply penetrate eastward and turn to the coastline at dawn went up in smoke.

Bayerlein said “*We carefully considered to stop the battle, as the British already knew our positions. Rommel discussed the situation with me and in the end we decided to proceed with the attack. But it was then clear that the “grand solution”, that is the outflanking manoeuvre of the VIII Army was no longer possible, as the enemy had had enough time to take his countermeasures. The British were compelling us to choose an alternative solution, which meant that we had to turn to the north before than we had planned, in order to directly reach the high ground of*

Alam Halfa, at point 132, which was to be seized by direct attack”.

This crucial phase of the battle of Alam Halfa is marked by the fact that the fuel required was not delivered. The “Sanandrea”, “Pozarica”, “Picci Fassio” and “Abruzzi” tankers were sunk or severely destroyed one after another.

In the meanwhile, what did Kesselring do? He kept his promise and took action by issuing the order that all the aircraft of the 2nd fleet carry the required fuel, but most of it was consumed during the flight.

Let's go back to the battle. On August 31, Panzer tanks attacked Alam Halfa high ground, which was garrisoned, in the central eastern sector, by the 44th British Infantry Division and, in the western sector by the 10th British Armoured Division (according to Auchinleck's directives, which were confirmed by Montgomery, who had assumed command of the VIII Army only two weeks before).

A sudden sand storm blew up, which grounded RAF aircraft. Taking advantage of this unexpected situation, the German tanks immediately launched an attack on the southern area of the high ground and were counterattacked by 92 "Grant" tanks of the 22nd British armoured Brigade, which had to delay and defeat the attackers with artillery fires and especially with their 57 mm antitank weapons.

The German action was unsuccessful and, in the evening, the tanks of the 15th and 21st Division withdrew southward to stay overnight in the Ragil Depression.

In those hours, Montgomery did not unbalance his forces, but moved a South-African Division from the main front line to the Ruweisat Ridge, while another Brigade was arriving from the Delta of the Nile to occupy the area east of the combat zone left by the 10th Armoured Division.

On September 1, the 15th Armoured Division, under Colonel Crasemann, attacked Alam Halfa high ground and, after heavy fighting, almost reached the fatal point 132.

This was the final phase of the battle. Once again, it is worth describing the events of the battle using the present tense.

Grenadiers, tank men, engineers are fighting under the RAF bombings. If German tanks succeed in crossing the barrage at point 132, they can advance to the sea line. The 8th armoured regiment has already penetrated the enemy lines and , on September 1, in the afternoon, stops with his forward units 8 kilometres from the coastline, behind the main front line at El Alamein,. But, on the left side, the 50th Armoured Regiment is incapable of crossing British defensive positions while , during the day, the RAF heavily bombs tanks and motorized infantry units.


Seven Officers of the DAK Staff die. The delivery of supplies and fuel becomes very difficult. On that same evening, Rommel decides to stop the offensive and gradually withdraw to his initial position. Three more days of combat follow and the "six day race" comes to an end. A very strange close.

The offensive at Alam Halfa is the most incomprehensible "African" offensive staged by Rommel, but it is not to be forgotten that the German Marshal was ill and no longer confident in his victory.

The lack of fuel has always been considered as the reason for the failure of this offensive. But it cannot be the only one. Fuel

Right.
Flame-thrower operator, XXXI Sapper Battalion.

Below.
Infantryman of the 20th Infantry Regiment, "Brescia" Division.



supplies were limited, but no vehicle was stalled by the lack of fuel during the withdrawal. Another reason was the depth of British minefields which deeply affected the momentum of the initial attack. Moreover , General Montgomery decided that his first priority was to defend the Alam Halfa ridge. He had repeatedly said to General Brian Horrock, Commander of the XIII Corps " *Horrocks don't get "hammered"* underlining the need to spare armoured forces.

On September 7, shots were no longer heard in the southern sector of the front line and Italian -German forces were still in control of the Himeimat position, 217 metres above sea level. This greatly distressed British commanders because, from that position, Italians and Germans could easily control the area south of El Alamein. But this was actually what General Montgomery wanted.



Alamein Sud * Alba 6 nov. 1942 * Numerose autoblindo nemiche puntano sopra i superstiti della 4^a batt.^{ia} Parac. "FOLGORE (pochi artiglieri e S.Ten. Migliavacca) che ripiegano trainando il solo pezzo con pochi colpi. Le due prime sono centrate, le altre fuggono

British forces were setting the stage and the backstage of the following grand battle. The VIII Army had planned to set up a fake oil pipeline and large depots to keep the adversaries on the alert. Montgomery said "What's the use of this mise-en-scene, if the Germans cannot see it?. Let them control Heimeimat. I want them right there."

As it has been already underlined, Rommel showed a lack of resolution mainly on September 1. Kesselring expressed a highly critical judgement. According to the Commander of the Southern Forces, Rommel had not launched a decisive attack when the DAK was about to overcome the ridge of Alam Halfa. The "fox" had lost his lustre.

Later on, Kesselring managed to discuss this problem in Hitler's presence. He said "The reason why Rommel did not move on with the offensive is still wrapped up in mystery for us" and Hitler

answered "I am deeply convinced that it is a folly to leave a man in a position of high responsibility for too long. As time goes by, he is doomed to failure".

On September 23, Rommel left the command of the Army on a sick leave in Germany and was replaced by General Georg Stumme, who had already gained experience on the Russian front.

Before this change in the German top level structure, British forces had already tried to carry out a large-scale blitz (September 13-14) against Tobruk by staging a joint attack from the land (units of the *Long Range Desert Group*) and from the sea (units of the *Royal Marines* supported by a naval group). The attack was a total defeat.

Infantry men, artillery men, sailors of the "San Marco", Carabinieri and Navy batteries reacted actively. Then Italian Air Force and *Luftwaffe* units intervened. The British forces

Postcard by Paolo Caccia Dominioni commemorating an almost unknown episode.

lost more than five hundred men of the special forces and the a/cruiser "Coventry", the "Sikh" and "Zulu" destroyers and some motor-torpedo boats.

At the end of September, the champion of the German air force, Captain Joachim Marseille, the "star of Africa", who won 158 air battles, was shot down over El Alamein.

The Italian Air Force and the German *Luftwaffe* were always heavily fighting not only in Africa. The decision was taken to stage a new air offensive against Malta, given the new threat posed by the forces on the island. The air offensive launched on October 10 was stopped few days later, given the heavy losses suffered by Italian and German

air units. The initiative was in the hand of the British force also in Malta.

Prelude to the decisive battle


"The quartermaster prelude" was the definition given by Rommel to indicate the period between the unsuccessful "six-day race" and the decisive battle of El Alamein. A prelude that inevitably saw the victory of the British forces from a logistical perspective.

The 200,000 ton convoy the allied forces were impatiently waiting for entered the Suez Gulf and discharged on the Egyptian docks tanks, pieces of artillery, vehicles, tons of munitions and millions of litres of fuel. At that point, the VIII Army was really the most powerful war instrument the British Empire had ever set up.

Meanwhile, training was going on in the Egyptian desert, with the employment of 300 "Sherman" tanks and one hundred 105 mm self-propelled artillery pieces provided by the US Army. The US *Air Force* had also made its appearance and was going to take part in many missions during the following British offensive.

Unlike the unprecedented strengthening of the VIII Army, the Italian and German commitment to reinforce their divisions on the El Alamein front line was insufficient.

The departure of Rommel – who knew how to be arrogant and proactive at the same time – worsened the situation and General Stumme did not want or was not able to assert himself at the High Commands in Berlin or Rome. Moreover, British submarines and aircraft were




always decimating the Axis "Libyan" convoys. In September, only 31,061 tons of fuel out of 40,200 reached Libya and, in October, it was even worse, because 12,308 tons of fuel out of 25,771 were lost.

As autumn approached and the Soviet resistance grew stronger, the German High Command was not able to send new armoured units to Africa. During his leave Rommel, was shown new "Tiger" main battle tanks, multiple rocket launchers and smoke agents, to let him believe that the *Panzerarmee*, which had been fighting in Africa for two years, was going to be reinforced. In effect, only few Tigers made their

appearance in the African war theatre, during the final phase of the battle to conquer Tunisia, but it was too late to change the fortunes of the war in the Mediterranean area.

It is necessary to detail the strength and positions of the "ACIT" (Italian-German Armoured Army) and of the VIII Army, as the first day of the British offensive approached.

The ACIT deployed the XXI army Corps, with the 7th Bersaglieri Regiment and the "Trento" and "Bologna" Infantry Divisions, on the northern sector of the front line. As the level of the Italian armament was insufficient, Rommel alternated



Above.
Tank Officer of the "Ariete" Armoured Division.

the 10th Italian Army Corps, with the 9th Bersaglieri Regiment, the "Brescia" and "Pavia Infantry Divisions, the "Folgore" Paratroops Division and two other paratroops Battalions of the "Ramcke" Brigade. The 21st *Panzer* Division and the "Ariete" Armoured Division were behind these units.

In the northern sector of the rear area there were the 90th German light Division and the "Trieste" Motorized Division, together with battle groups and reconnaissance units which made up the reserve forces.


On the northern front line, the VIII British Army deployed the XXX Army Corps, with the 9th Australian Division, the 51st "Highlander" Division, the 2nd

a famous unit which had fought in previous campaigns.

Behind the XXX Army Corps, there was the X Army Corps, with the 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions, while behind the XIII Army Corps there was the bulk of the 7th Armoured Division.

Other units were directly under the Army Corps Command, namely an Indian Brigade tasked with opening gaps through minefields, one armoured brigade, two a/a artillery brigades and one Indian infantry brigade.

To sum up, without taking into account small units, 12 Italian-German Divisions (4 armoured) and 10 British and Commonwealth Divisions (3 armoured) were on both sides of the front line.



Right.
Italian HQ at Point 33, Alamein,
Western Egyptian Desert.

Italian-German units, organized in groups or zones (*Raum*). In fact, in the northern sector, the strongholds were garrisoned by the Italian Battalions and the German Battalions of the 164th Division, as well as two Battalions of the "Ramcke" Paratroop Brigade, all entrenched behind the "devil's gardens", wide stretches of land filled with mines and booby traps.

Behind the front line, always in the northern sector, there were the 15th *Panzer* Division and the "Littorio" Armoured Division. The southern sector was controlled by

New Zealand Division, the 1st South African Division and the 4th Indian Division.

The XIII Army Corps deployed in the southern area, with the 50th British Division (it also included a Greek Brigade-level group and the II Brigade-level group of the "Free French" Division), the 44th British Division and, on its left side, the I Brigade-level group of the "Free French" Division. This group was under the 7th Armoured Division,

The three British Armoured Divisions and the autonomous tank units fielded: 285 "Sherman", 246 "Grant", 421 "Crusader", 167 "Stuart", 223 "Valentine" and 6 "Mathilda" tanks, as well as the first three "Churchill" infantry tanks sent to Africa.

The Axis fielded 497 tanks: 239 medium tanks and 20 Italian light tanks, which could not be compared to the American "Sherman" and "Grant" tanks, or to



Bersagliere on a motorcycle and SPA Mod.41 light armoured vehicle.

the "Crusader" tanks. For the same reason, the 30 German "Mark II" light tanks were not to be taken into account, while only few "Mark III" tanks, out of 170, equipped with a 50 mm gun (50/60), had a certain importance. From a statistical point of view, only the 38 "Mark IV" German tanks were effective and some of them were equipped with a 75 mm gun (75/43).

The few Italian 75/18 self-propelled guns assigned to the "Ariete" and "Littorio" Divisions also proved to be effective.

Italians opposed the obsolete 47/32 self-propelled guns to the numerous British 57 mm anti tank weapons, while the Germans used the equally ineffective 50/33 self propelled guns against the American tanks. The German 88/55 artillery piece still proved to be very effective; a

real trump card of World War II, given its anti-aircraft and anti-tank multi-role employment. The same applies to the Italian 90/53 artillery piece.

The superiority of the British field artillery was overwhelming, both from a qualitative and a quantitative point of view, all the more so as the Italian artillery fleet was still based on old guns and very few modern weapons systems.

The RAF was also remarkably superior with its 1,200 aircraft (800 first line aircraft), only countered by 700 Italian and German aircraft (150 fighters, 180 dive bombers and fighter-bombers and 400 aircraft of different kinds).


The third battle of El Alamein (October 23 – November 4, 1942)

On October 23, 1942, 8:45 p.m. (Italian Time), one thousand British field guns contemporarily

opened fire against Italian-German positions at El Alamein. All testimonies agree in defining that storm of fire as similar to the heavy artillery fire typical of World War I. As a matter of fact, it was an unprecedented event in the desert.

The British Commander in Chief, General Montgomery, boasted that he went to sleep on the eve of the battle just as the Prince of Condé, mentioned by Manzoni in his most famous novel, did on the eve of the battle at Rocroi. But there is room for doubt. Montgomery had left the main HQ of the VIII Army at Burg El Arab to reach a tactical HQ at El Alamein. He was therefore near to the front line, where the deafening roar of the artillery was not conducive to sleep.

General Montgomery is to be blamed – as some British authors actually did – not for what he said but, from a military and



professional point of view, for what happened in the following hours and days.

It is worth recalling that General Stumme, Rommel's substitute, prohibited the use of counter-preparation fire by Italian-German artillery units. Thus the British infantry assembly areas were not bombarded (this decision was harshly criticised by Rommel after his hasty return to Africa).

Once again, fortune favoured Montgomery, as in the early hours of October 24, General Stumme, on the front line to get a clear idea of the situation, was hit by enemy fire and died of an apoplectic fit, falling off the car he was on to rapidly leave the danger area.

Thus, Rommel was absent at the beginning of the offensive, General Stumme died, triggering a crisis within the Command of the Italian - German Army and the guns of the Axis remained silent for some hours.

This way, the possibility of opening of a breach in the Italian-German front line was envisaged, given the overwhelming superiority of the VIII Army and the RAF, also taking into account the threat posed by minefields.

Nothing happened though.

At this point, it is necessary to make a step backward. On October 24, Rommel, who was still convalescing in Austria, had a telephone call from one of his assistant, who informed him that the British offensive had been launched. Then, he received a telephone call from Hitler himself, who asked him if he wanted to assume command again, also given that General Stumme had been declared as missing.

Marshal Rommel did not hesitate and boarded the plane which had been put at his disposal. He reached Rome the following morning and was briefed on the situation by General von Rintelen.

Rommel was astonished to discover that the Army had very limited fuel stocks and that an insufficient amount of supplies had been delivered during his one month leave.

He left Rome, reached Crete and from there the front line.

On October 25, at 11:25 p.m, all units engaged at El Alamein received a same message " *I assume Command again- Rommel*"

Operation "Lightfoot" planned by Montgomery's staff and prepared employing a great amount of resources, envisaged the deployment of 4 Divisions of the XXX Army Corps and 2 Armoured Divisions of the X Army Corps in the northern sector. These Divisions had to cross the minefield area and rapidly reach open ground. The infantry had to open two corridors leading to Kidney Ridge and Miteiriya High Grounds, to allow the armoured units to enter the area.

Meanwhile in the southern

Left.

Postcard by Paolo Caccia Dominioni showing two vehicles of the Italian Delegation for the Honors to the Fallen in the desert at Point 28, at Alamein, returning from a reconnaissance mission amid the rubble of the battlefield during a sand storm.

Right.


Postcard of the 9th Bersaglieri Regiment sketched by Lieutenant Benso.

sector, the XIII Army Corps had to "fix" the enemy divisions with a diversionary attack, to deceive Italian-German Forces on the main axis of attack. The task assigned to the XIII Army Corps has been sometimes considered as less important, but this opinion is not commonly shared.

An outflanking manoeuvre of the entire line from the south was envisaged, if the Italian "Brescia" "Pavia" and "Folgore" Divisions deployed in the southern area collapsed. In fact, the British were deeply convinced, though they did not confess it, that Italian Forces could be easily defeated.

The reconstruction of historical events, mainly of military events, is always difficult, in that the protagonists tend to stretch the truth. Sometimes, written testimonies collected in the field better fulfil the need to ascertain the truth.

Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Bechi Luserna, a paratrooper, Commander of the 187th "Folgore" Regiment, who died in Sardinia on September 1943 in the accomplishment of his tasks as Chief of Staff of the "Nembo" Paratroops Division and was awarded a Gold Medal, wrote a battle report "on the spot". On October 25, he wrote "Thanks to the inflow of reinforcement, the enemy could employ a force made up of five or six battalions and two armoured brigades, to widen the breach in the central sector of the "Folgore", pushing southward to reach the 186th Italian




Regiment which controlled the Qaret El Himeimat positions. The enemy considered the collapse of this defensive structure as necessary to start the outflanking manoeuvre aimed at disrupting the entire front line at El Alamein"

If the Italian Forces had collapsed, British General Brian Horrocks, the resolute Commander of the XIII British Army Corps, would have launched his 7th Armoured Division to the attack. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that all

British and Commonwealth units were motorised, unlike Italian units.

Though the main effort made by the VIII Army took place in the northern sector, where the British finally burst through the 164th German Division, British sources never mention or minimize the importance of the possibilities offered by a breach in the southern sector.

One aspect which cannot be overlooked- now that fifty years have gone by- is that on October



Postcard (1937) of the 2nd Tank Regiment, depicting L33 light tanks advancing under enemy fire.

24, at dawn, the VIII British Army had serious difficulties in conducting the battle and this was a strange prelude to a completely different outcome. In fact, it took twelve days of harsh fighting for the British to disrupt the Axis positions one after the other and literally destroy Italian-German infantry, armoured and motorised divisions.

The second aspect to highlight is that the British diversionary attack in the southern area was fiercely countered by the "Folgore" Division (4000 men) which was supported by artillery of the "Pavia" Division, as the main armament of the paratroops was represented by 47/32 antitank weapons.

In 1960, the British historian Correlli Barnett wrote "The Desert Generals" (translated also in Italian), to properly illustrate the general political- military framework and uphold the idea

that the battle of El Alamein had been personally decided by Churchill to increase his power.

The British Premier, the British General Staff, General Montgomery, General Alexander and all other Staff members knew that Allied Forces would land on the French North African coast on November 8 and that, in the Mediterranean area, the command of the war would shift from the British to the Anglo-Americans, with the US playing an increasingly important role. Moreover, in 1942 British forces had surrendered in Singapore (more than 60,000 prisoners) and at Tobruk (33,000 prisoners), therefore a victory was absolutely necessary before the end of that year. In addition to that, after the landing of Anglo American Forces behind the line of the Italian-German Army at El Alamein, the Axis High Commands would necessarily issue the order to

evacuate the Egyptian territory, giving the "Desert Fox" the opportunity to flee.

Contrary to all expectations and notwithstanding the superiority of the British forces on the ground and in air, the last days of October 1942 went by without the expected brilliant victory by the VIII Army. The British divisions, trapped in minefields, counterattacked by enemies who were employing all their forces without hoping in the arrival of reinforcement, marked time. To make up for it, the RAF was heavily bombing the area and British Generals had to admit that the Air Force was playing a decisive role. On this matter, great credit should be

given to the 40th and 5th Air Fighter Wings, and the 500th Air Assault Wing, flying their obsolete CR 42, belonging to the Italian Air Force, for what they were able to do in those days to contain the overwhelming air superiority of the RAF (a British Officer wrote: *I see an Italian CR 42 flight formation flying above me: I do not know whether to laugh or be moved*).

In the middle of the battle, the Divisions of the X, XXI, and XX Italian Army Corps and of the DAK were engaged in a war of attrition. From October 23 to October 29, in the southern sector, the British forces facing the positions of the "Folgore" Division lost 70 tanks and a hundred men belonging to famous Regiments, while all Italian-German armoured units were engaged in the northern sector.

Rommel, who had been again in command of the Army for 24 hours and launched a counterattack employing less than 150 tanks, saw that the number of his forces was thinning out. Montgomery, however, did not succeed in crossing the lines.

On October 30, when the news that the VIII Army had temporarily withdrawn the front line Divisions to reorganize them, reached London, Churchill burst out and shouted at the Chief of the General Staff, Alan Brooke " *Is there a General who can win a battle?*"

Meanwhile, the following

Italian ships, steamers and tankers were sunk in the Mediterranean, with their precious cargoes of tanks, weapons, supplies and fuel: on October 23, the "Amsterdam", on

Right.
"Bersaglieri" Sergeant of the "Ariete" Armoured Division.

Below.
Corporal of the 47/32 a/t Company, 187th Paratroop Regiment.



October 25 the "Tergesteia" and the tanker "Proserpina", on October 29 the tanker "Luisiano", on November 2 and 10 the "Tripolino, the "Ostia" and the "Zara". When Rommel knew that the "Luisiano" had sunk he wrote " *Now we have to go on foot*".

Montgomery, who could not hear Churchill's harsh rebukes, was preparing "Operation Supercharge", a true storm of 400 main battle tanks, supported by 15 artillery Regiments and the entire Air Force..

In those days, Rommel was more inclined to appreciate the merits of the Italian Allies, who were not only fighting side by side with the *Afrika Korps* – defending the territory inch by inch against the British – but were also destined to play a key role in the battlefield.

Marshal Rommel wrote in his notes " *The tanks of the "Littorio" and "Trieste" Divisions were destroyed one after the other by the British Forces. Italian 47 mm*

	ITALIAN	GERMAN	TOTAL	VIII ARMY
Men	43 000	53 000	96 000	220 000
Inf bns	42	27	69	78
Mach gun bns	—	1	1	8
Cannons	371	200	571	939
A/T light guns	150	300	450	—
A/T heavy guns	—	72	72	1 506
A/A pieces and mach guns	750	600	1 350	812
Tanks	259	238	497	1 348
Armoured cars			few dozens	500



I SUPERSTITI DELLA 6ª COMP. PARACADUTISTI «GRIFI» (II BATT. DEL 187° REGG. «FOLGORE», MEDAGLIA D'ORO ALLA BANDIERA) E DEL 31° BATT. GUASTATORI D'AFRICA (MEDAGLIE D'ARGENTO E DI BRONZO AL LABARO) RIAFFERMANO LA LORO FRATERNITÀ TRENTATRE ANNI DOPO LA BATTAGLIA DI EL ALAMEIN OVE FURONO TRA GLI ITALIANI CHE NON MOLLARONO ★ 23 OTTOBRE - 6 NOVEMBRE 1942.



antitank guns just like our 50mm antitank guns were totally ineffective against British tanks." The end was near.

One of the last battle of tanks was fought at Tell El Aqqaqir, where Rommel proved his undisputed capabilities as Commander and obliged the tanks Montgomery had assigned to "Operations Supercharge" to mark time once again.

At this point, it was necessary to withdraw to the line of the Fuka meridian to save what remained of the Italian-German Army. Orders were therefore issued and were already being executed when Rommel was reached by a message from Hitler which sounded foolish in that contingency "No other way but the one that leads to victory or death!".

Rommel got angry but obeyed the order. This was a first political interference in the war in North Africa. Also Mussolini

issued the order to fight to the bitter end. All units stopped withdrawing and the result was a great confusion caused by the implementation of the well-known Napoleon aphorism "Order, counter-order, disorder".

In the end, Rommel disobeyed the order from the "Warlord", who wanted to interfere in the battle which was taking place thousands of kilometres away from his "lion's den" at Rastenburg in East Prussia.


This happened on November 4. That same day, the "Ariete" Armoured Division which was the Italian-German Army's last reserve, faced its destiny. Rommel left a written testimony of this true epic.

"Large clouds of dust could be seen south, south-east of the Headquarters. There the desperate fighting of the small and poor Italian tanks of the XX Army Corps was going on against about 100 British heavy tanks, which

Postcard by Paolo Caccia Dominioni for the 33rd anniversary of the battle of El Alamein.

had outflanked the Italians on their uncovered right side. I sent Major von Luck to close the breach between the Italians and the DAK and he told me later on that the Italians, who at that point were our strongest motorized forces, fought with extraordinary bravery. Italian tanks exploded or burst into flames one after the other, while enemy heavy artillery fire attacked Italian infantry and artillery positions. At 3:30 p.m. the last radio message was sent by the "Ariete": Enemy tanks burst in south of the "Ariete". "Ariete" encircled. approx 5 km north east of Bir el Abd. "Ariete" tanks are fighting".

Rommel added "In the evening, the XX Italian Army Corps was crushed after fighting bravely and



Postcard (1938) of the 16th "Pistoia" Motorized Division.

we lost our Italian senior comrades who, we must admit it, had always been asked to do much more than they could with their poor armament"

All Italian tanks fought to the bitter end. Later on, the Chief of the interpreters at the XX army Corps, Mr Monzel wrote "As there was no possibility of surviving inside one of these tanks, the bravery of Italian soldiers exceed all limits".

The Italian-German Army did not exist any longer. What remained of the DAK and a flood of vehicles withdrew westward along the coast road "with the sun behind them and their faces looking into the night".

Notwithstanding the *corps de chasse* set up by Montgomery,

the VIII British Army "followed" and not "chased" the few Italian and German motorized units which had been able to get out of the theatre. On November 7, bad weather conditions and the heavy rain transformed the desert into a quagmire and further hampered Montgomery's movements

In the southern sector, the X Italian Army Corps could not escape its destiny and the "Brescia", "Pavia" and "Folgore" Divisions were destroyed. Just like the two infantry divisions, the paratroops division counted its dead, included the brothers Ruspoli, Marescotti and Costantino, who were awarded a gold medal in the field.

Later on, Rommel was accused of abandoning the Italians to their fate, but it was not true. He was only left with the choice of saving what remained of the Army's motorized assets or sacrificing everyone. The German paratroop brigade under General

Ramcke was also abandoned. Once the game was lost, General Ramcke assembled his men, assaulted the British motorized columns and reached friendly lines with 600 paratroopers.

When winners and losers counted their own losses, the Italian-German Army reported 25,000 casualties (dead, wounded and missing soldiers included) plus 30,000 prisoners (10,724 German soldiers including the Commander of the *Afrika Korps*, General von Thorma).

The British reported 13,560 casualties (dead, wounded and missing soldiers included) and the loss of 600 tanks. It was too high a price for the VIII Army, which should have been capable of defeating enemy forces with ease, given the enormous imbalance between the two Armies' assets.

Even though the bells rang all over the United Kingdom to



Left.

Postcard (1940) by Vittorio Pisani, depicting paratroopers landing.

Right.

Sergeant Major of the XXXI Sapper Battalion throwing a hand grenade.

Below.

Second Lieutenant of the 186th Paratroop Regiment, "Folgore" Division.

soldiers are buried in a white War Memorial.

The Point 33 Tower is placed not far from this area. It was built by Paolo Caccia Dominioni, who spent long years in the charitable search of the human remains of all those who fought in arms under all flags in the desert of El Alamein sixty years ago.


celebrate that victory, the British, given the high number of their losses, were obliged to recall the words said by the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo "The greatest tragedy after loosing a battle is winning a battle".

Corelli Barnett's words are useful to sum everything up from a historical point of view "From a historical perspective, this is the last action of the British Empire, as a great united and independent power. It can be ironically

considered as the suicide of the old Europe; in fact, today, the Germans, the Italians and the British are no longer in control of the Middle East, for which they fought so hard."



The three cemeteries at El Alamein are a silent testimony to those historical events ; the bodies of the soldiers of the Commonwealth are buried under an English-style lawn, a Suevian castle was built in memory of the German soldiers and the Italian





Left.
Infantryman of the "Pavia" Division.

Below.
Postcard by Paolo Caccia Dominioni, depicting the monument to the "Desert Tankers" in the yard of the Point 33 War Memorial.






Above.
*Postcard (1938) by
 C. Tafuri, depicting
 Italian light tanks in
 action.*

Left.
*Postcard (1942) of the
 11th Medical
 Company.*

EL ALAMEIN

**60th
anniversary
of the battle**



THOUGHTS FROM THE FRONT LINE

by Girolamo Garonna

In the boundless Sahara, where our eyes get lost in scanning the line of the horizon and our thoughts roam, the image of brave soldiers of warring factions fighting in the accomplishment of their duties could be interpreted as a dream.

The undulated and rolling dunes, the low but pretentious altitudes, where hermits aspiring after perfection found shelter, in the past were only violated by raiders chasing migrant caravans but now they are the theatre of a battle which is very difficult to describe in words.

El Alamein, a site between a blue sea, white sands and a horrible depression, kingdom of snakes and legends, was the theatre of epoch-making battles fought by powerful Armies.

Those men, with their virtues and their dreams, come to life again in the following pages.

In the historical recollection of the battle of El Alamein (October 23 – November 4, 1942) which culminated in the defeat of the Forces of the Axis in Africa, the celebration of the fallen soldiers and of the heroic actions performed by the warriors of both parties expresses the sacredness of the historical memory of peoples.

The following testimonies give the idea of the troops' morale in those days.

To give importance to individual testimonies means to pay tribute to all the protagonists of a cruel battle, marked by the soldiers' sacrifice, pain and blood but also by timeless human and social values.

Let's listen to those memories which do not want to give an interpretation of the events they are describing, but only represent a warning and an incitement to remember.

TESTIMONIES OF VETERANS FROM NORTHERN AFRICA

**Corporal Giovanni
Pucciotti, 1919
contingent, from Rome,
LXVIII light tank
Battalion,
"Brescia" Division**



I leave Rome on February 6, 1940 for Salerno and then immediately for Libya. I land at Tripoli where I stay until June 9, 1940.


When the war breaks out on June 10, 1940 we immediately move to occupy Tunisia which belongs to France. We rapidly march towards the border line. We cross many cities in Tripolitania and I remember in particular Sabratha, an ancient roman city. Once beyond the border, we do not meet any resistance and rapidly reach Sfax. France surrenders and we go back to Lybia to be deployed on the Cyrenaic -Egyptian front line and fight the real war: Bengasi, Derna, Tobruk, Bardia, Sidi El Barrani. I take part in all operations carried out to defend or seize these cities.

I have a special memory of the events of November 1941 in Marmarica

The British launch their second offensive and we are obliged to withdraw. While withdrawing in orderly manner, we are pressed by the enemy and near the Libyan border we find our track occupied by some British tanks. We are between two fires; they are encircling us and we cannot follow our retreat way. We must reach Bardia at any cost. We counterattack with our light tanks and the British are obliged to evacuate. But they reappear here and there with their heavy

tanks and cause heavy losses. In this framework of harsh fighting, I take part in an action under the command of General Bergonzoni called "electric whiskers". The enemy is hindering all our movements and we are running the risk of losing contact with the bulk of our division and being blocked. At a certain point we receive the order to halt the column. A group of M/13 tanks reverse its course and rapidly advances towards the area from which the fire is coming.

At the same time, some light tanks of my Battalion with their 20mm gum ready to fire, are ordered to make a U-turn, reach a side track and follow the M/13 tanks. It is a raging inferno, a storm of shots are fired from our tanks and machine-guns for about thirty minutes. We are blinded by the flashes of lightning and smoke, stunned and excited by that hell, in which we are playing a major role. All of a sudden everything is over and we hear the moaning of the wounded. As the smoke fades





A convoy of M 13 tanks advancing in the desert.

away, we can see that General Bergonzoni, at the head of his tanks, is watching the last British tanks going away. It's dawn, the sun is shedding a dim light over all the young soldiers who were alive a few minutes earlier and now lie still on or inside their destroyed or burning vehicles. Some of our comrades are dead and many others are wounded. Many British soldiers are also dead. When we look at them our anger cools down and we shed a tear. Few days later we are engaged in another action which end with another defeat for our forces. A group of tanks is crushed by the enemy and captured. The members of our crews behave heroically but the enemy's superiority is overwhelming, as regards both men and equipment.

We are in early January and still withdrawing.

Agedabia is the last war action I take part in. We are fighting strenuously not to be encircled by the British, who come from the desert and try to surround us.

Their encircling manoeuvre ends at Agedabia, where I am taken prisoner, together with many other units. No one can imagine our discomfort .

I am a broken man, have lost all my strength and do not dare to walk with my head held high. But then we are able to listen again to reason ,react and show how proud we are for having honorably served our country.

There is an episode that I would like to describe to show that Italian combatants knew how to make themselves respected, even when they were prisoners. Once prisoners, the British take us to Alexandria, then to Cairo and lastly at Geneifa, by the Suez Channel where there are many concentration camps. A narrow gauge railway line passes near these camps and every day, in the morning and in the evening, we see a low-sided wagon train carrying Arab workers to Suez. Few days later, they start jeering at us with obscene words and gestures. They cry "Italy finish", spit at us and make obscene and threatening

gestures. We endure this situation for some days, then , through the grapevine, we reach an agreement with the prisoners in nearby camps and, resorting to subterfuge, provide ourselves with many stones. The following morning, when the train passes near the camps and the Arab workers start again to jeer at us, after a pre-established sign, we attack the train throwing our stones at them. We cause heavy damage.

On that same day, in the evening, the Commander of the camp, a Maltese Marshal, shows us a newspaper, the Egyptian "Times" reporting in the headlines the news " Italian prisoners attack a train full of workers". Strangely enough, he seem satisfied, and laughs. Then we are informed that he is married to an Italian woman, The following morning, when the train passes , we get stunned by the fact that all Egyptian workers stand up and raise their arms in the typical fascist salute. We are not disturbed any longer. We have won their respect. I want to add that the Maltese Mareshal treats us with great humanity, always protects us and does what he can to provide us with the bare necessities, mainly water. For many long years, we have been prisoners and suffer pain and humiliation but, unlike many others, are lucky.

We are touched by the memories of that time. I feel the need to thank those who give us the opportunity to express our pride for having accomplished our duty. We have not wasted the best years of our youth. Our nephews should be proud of our history, which is the only thing we want to be remembered for. We are not heroes, but just men who have accomplished a sacred duty to the best of their possibilities.

□

TESTIMONIES OF VETERANS FROM NORTHERN AFRICA


**Corporal Balilla Maurizi,
1917 contingent, from
Rome, 20mm a/a machine
gun Autonomous Company
of the "Brescia"
Division.**



I have the rank of Corporal and take part in the advance towards Alexandria with my company, but we are obliged to stop in the desert due to the lack of fuel. My division is deployed inward, in the Marsa Matruk area, 80 miles from El Alamein. Our line is made up of several posts, 8 miles distant, equipped with one 20mm machine gun and a couple of Austrian water-cooled machine guns belonging to WW1. Just imagine using these guns in the desert! Each post is under an Officer and comprises one NCO and 18 men approximately. But we are only 10 in my post, the Officer included. We are all in foxholes and our weapons are covered, to prevent them from shining in the sun, be detected by the enemy and protect them from dust. We are often attacked by British aircraft and by New Zealander and Australian patrols, always particularly cruel.

An Australian patrol attacks an Italian patrol, made up of few men under Corporal Marinucci from Cosenza. Italian soldiers are captured, undressed and left there naked.

I would like to recall what happened on August 28, 1942. In my post, I am with Domenico



Clementi, from Geraci Marina, as our Lieutenant has been ordered to report to the Headquarters at Marsa Matruk and the other soldiers are patrolling the area.

A "Spitfire", a British fighter, attacks and machine-guns us. We call them "Tommy". It attacks us furiously four times. We uncover our 20 mm machine gun, together with another machine gun, and return fire aiming our weapons through cross sights, as they were pistols. During the

fourth attack, when the fighter is low over our heads, I clench my teeth and, indifferent to what is happening around me, fire many shots just as Clementi does. We cheer when we see a flare and the aircraft crushing on the sand, 100 meters from us. We run towards the aircraft and find that

Left.

Bersaglieri equipped with Fiat 14/26 machine gun and mod. 91 rifles.

Below.

M13 tanks in action. Sand bags were added to protect the chassis from "Sherman" and "Grant" tanks' high piercing shells.



the pilot is dead. We take him out of the aircraft, cover his body and put by his side a small bottle with a note indicating the day of the crash and the name of the unit which shot down the aircraft. Then we hand the documents we found over to our Lieutenant, who writes a report and forwards it to General Rossi, the Commander at Marsa Matruk. We are promised a reward, but this episode is forgotten perhaps due to the

seriousness of our situation. What is important for us, however, is that we are certain that we have honorably served our country and our army.

In that same period, on September 16, 1942, we rescue a New Zealand patrol made up of four men lost in the desert: they have no food, no water and no strength left. I remember their horror-stricken faces, dry lips and foamy tongues sticking out.

We give them something to eat and drink and hand them over to the German Command, as ordered.

I would like to mention another episode, to prove that we have always rigorously obeyed orders, even when dealing with friendly

forces. We have received written orders according to which friendly forces, when deployed in formations, must not overcome pre-established distances. One day, we see a thick cloud of dust and hear the noise made by armoured vehicles. We are on the alert and realize that some tanks are moving towards us going beyond the pre-established distance. We immediately start firing.

At a certain point, we see a flag of truce and some Officers

moving towards us. We cease fire and realize they are German. Once they reach our positions they insult us and threaten to denounce and shoot us. We calmly show them our orders written in Italian and German which we have to comply with. Now they praise us, apologize and go back.

I shed some tears when, on November 4, 1942, we receive the order to leave the positions which have not been conquered by the British forces, and to withdraw to Tobruk. This is the beginning of our painful, hopeless and endless retreat towards Cirene, Tripoli, Tunisia up to Naubel, where we deploy near the "San Marco" battalion. On May 11, 1943, I am taken prisoner by a Scottish unit and brought to a concentration camp in Tunis. We carry air bombs from the depots to the fighters, which then drop them over Italy. Later on I am transferred to the camp at Orano. I am lucky because it is a camp for officers and, as I am a nurse, I enjoy some privileges. Life is easier also because the camp is under the responsibility of the Americans. After the armistice I am asked to collaborate and choose to do so. When I land at Marseilles with a formation of four Italian military companies, I wear the American uniform. We are tasked with preserving law and order. It is September 1944. Everything goes right until the arrival of French forces, then we have to endure difficulties again. I come back home in 1946.


I cherish the memory of my comrades who were not so lucky as me. Today, I can proudly and humbly remember those events, being aware that I have served my country to the best of my possibilities. Peace to my brothers fallen in distant lands.

It would be disgraceful to forget them.



TESTIMONIES OF VETERANS FROM NORTHERN AFRICA

Corporal Antonio Ventriglia,
1922 contingent, from Santa
Maria Capua Vetere
(Caserta), 81 mm mortars
company, 4th Battalion,
187th "Folgore"
paratroops Regiment



My battalion is under Major Alberto Bechi, who died like a hero and was awarded a Gold Medal for Military Value.

Also Captain Costantino Ruspoli, who belongs to the same battalion, was awarded a Gold Medal for Military Value. My battalion sacrifices itself almost completely during the three battles of El Alamein. My maimed body still bears the scars of those terrible days, which I will never forget. My mortars platoon is deployed in the far right sector of the El Alamein front line, in the heart of the desert, almost on the borders of the impassable El Qattara depression. The enemy is very active as it can operate in very large areas and gives us no respite. We constantly run the risk of being attacked by patrols or aircraft.


Every day we suffer heavy losses, due to raids made by tracked vehicles, the never-ending artillery fire and the

minefields around us. Death is always on the lurch but we are constantly on the alert, optimistic and enthusiast. Sufferings do not discourage us and we are happy when we can get out of our foxholes for reconnaissance actions.

I perfectly remember the night of the full moon on August 30, 1942 when we receive the order to launch an attack towards Alam el Halfa. We immediately get entangled in a minefield. Some mines explode, but we manage to advance. In the dim light of dawn, we realize that there is an obstacle in front of us. It looks like a wall made up of sand-bags.

We stop and discover that it is a small trench garrisoned by three British soldiers equipped with machine-guns.

They also know that we are there, but our movements are more rapid and we capture them. However, these three prisoners hinder us from advancing; therefore we cannot take them



die. I am severely wounded on October 17, 1942.

While on patrol with two other comrades, we strike a mine. The explosion is terrible; one of my comrades die and I am wounded; one of my feet is crushed and I have many splinters in my body. The other paratrooper is unhurt and with the typical courage of the "Folgore" members carries me to the first aid post, where I immediately undergo surgery. I

Left.

Overview of the El Alamein battle area held by the "Folgore" Division. Cars are now parked in the place formerly occupied by the mortar platoon to which Ventriglia belonged. The El Qattara depression is in the background.

Below.

Ventriglia's identification tag.

with us. If we had not been Italians, they would have been killed. Our uncertainty is a stroke of luck for them, as suddenly a tracked vehicle of the "Brescia" Division arrives and we hand the prisoners over to the crew of that vehicle. The memory of Paratrooper Salvatore Ruggieri, who also takes part in this action, still moves me. Unfortunately, the overwhelming power of the British forces does not allow us to continue the offensive and we withdraw to the starting positions at El Munassit, in the El Alamein area, almost on the border of the great El Qattara Depression.

Thus, this trench warfare goes on with its high number of dead and wounded soldiers. Here, on October 7, a few days before the beginning of the third battle of El Alamein (October 23) Captain Padella, Commander of the headquarters company, and General Ferrari Orsi, Commander of the tankers units,



feel now the need to highlight the heroic self-denial of the those surgeons: they operate under the fire of two British aircraft. I am extremely grateful to the soldier who gives me his blood under the fire of the machine-guns. The surgeon does not know my blood-group, but it is absolutely necessary to find a donor, given the seriousness of my situation. Only after the operation they

verify that the blood -group of that donor is the same as mine. This is the end of my campaign in Northern Africa.

I cannot leave out an event which is a miracle and is worth recalling. In 1985, 43 years after the battles of El Alamein, a German Egyptologist, Professor Hubert Schreiner, during a travel for archaeological research in the area between El Alamein and the Siwa oasis, 80 kilometers approximately from El Alamein, finds my identification tag which evidently fell into the sand when I was wounded. My private data can still be easily read and therefore he can hand the tag over to the Military Authorities. On October 1985, I received my identification tag from the General Committee for the honors to the soldiers fallen in war. This most precious and dearest relic of war will be entrusted, after my death, to the Historical Museum of the "Folgore" in Leghorn. The renowned Egyptologist writes in the letter to which my identification card was attached that the place where he found my tag could be easily identified as a military position, as there were remains of Italian munitions and equipment, as well as many shell splinters. *There are also many parts of electric insulators which, he adds, looks very strange.* This is clear evidence, on the contrary, that it was my very position. In fact, the telephone line to Cairo passed near there and we often cut some poles of that line to cover or hide our foxholes.

I am extremely grateful to the *Rivista Militare* which gave me the opportunity to recall an episode of my life as a combatant Paratrooper. I do not want to be at the centre of attention, but pay tribute to the sacrifices of our soldiers and to the blood shed for our country, an ever lasting heritage which must be handed down to future generations



TESTIMONIES OF VETERANS FROM NORTHERN AFRICA

**Sapper Giovanni Martini,
born in 1922 at Rocca di
Mezzo (L'Aquila), XXXI
Sapper Battalion**



I serve in the glorious XXXI Sapper Battalion. My company is split up into sapper platoons and operates over a wide area stretching from the sea deep into the desert. As a volunteer, I attended a sapper course at Civitavecchia. Upon completion of that course, I just had the time to say goodbye to my family and was immediately sent to Tripoli. I remember total chaos, as the airport is continuously shelled by the British aircraft. We have to run away and scatter over barren and desert lands where no shelter can be found. The British hammer us with heavy fire until our fighters arrive. We move in a great hurry and, after a long march, we are carried to the operation area by truck, following the coast-line road or some prepared tracks. We have to replace the sappers who have fallen in previous engagements. We are in late 1941. The British have come back to El Agheila. We join another platoon and open fire against a British patrol trying to overtake our position. It is dark already and we shoot at random in the direction of a noise. I can only see the flames of our gunshots.

I don't know whether I hit anyone, but the British have disappeared. I still remember the hissing of the first rounds; afterwards I have become accustomed to that noise and do not notice it any more. We are tasked to build or restore defensive walls in front of our positions, mark mine sites to update minefield maps, blow up some vehicles which have been damaged or have run out of fuel. We also have to mine some tracks and dynamite antitank obstacles. More often we hide in foxholes dug on neutral ground between Italian and enemy lines. We are trained to attack tanks with the employment of magnetic mines. We wait in our foxholes for the tanks to

approach and come under fire. We suddenly burst out of our places and hurl the mines into the tank, if the hatch is open, or against its sides and rear. Then we quickly return to our shelters, if they are still available. I have seen many comrades die shattered by the same mines they have launched. Very often we have to recover the corpses of the fallen, even if they are enemies. We bury them, trying to leave a mark on the ground so that they may be recovered and moved to the graveyards in the rear area.

In late January the offensive action starts off and we move forwards. We are always busy and progressively become accustomed to the dangers, the sand, the wind and the evening cold. Having learned how to cope with hardship, we have equipped our foxholes with whatever we need. We cross the border with Egypt and rejoice at the thought that the war will soon be over. On the contrary, the worst is still to come. We are to spare our munitions, our trucks are halted to save fuel, and patrols are more frequent, with increased risks of stepping on mines or traps set by enemy teams. At night, they attack us from behind, to spread panic and death. But we too are not joking: artillery fires last hours and the sky is always red. It is not a pleasant view, often coupled with fear. There are many casualties and the cries of the wounded are blood-curdling. I remember the moans of one of our comrades who was hit by a fragment of a grenade burst in front of our foxhole, when he went out to check the origin of a strange noise, perhaps the hissing of an incoming grenade. Without hesitation, we rush out to carry our friend Ivano away from that hell. Unfortunately, he is already dead. One shoulder is smashed and one arm is partially cut

away. We start crying, swearing and venting our rage by shooting at random, helplessly. This scene is permanently engraved on my mind. For some days now we have been in an area beyond the Egyptian border and have the impression that something is wrong, as there are too many orders and counter-orders and we continuously shuttle between hinterland and the coast. During one of these movements to reach some hills at an altitude of 28° and 33° we witness a dreadful artillery engagement. There is a continuous chain of explosions and the whole area is covered by a red smoke, like that of a huge fire. We are later informed that one of our cannon group has been totally destroyed.

On October 23, 1942 the El Alamein debacle takes place followed by an exhausting withdrawal. My only memory of those days is a hectic rush to destroy materials, connect with other units, rescue the wounded and recover dismounted troops stranded in the desert without vehicles, an easy prey to the enemy. We are in the rear guard. The enemy arrives from unexpected directions and we have to be constantly on the alert and defend ourselves not to be taken prisoners. In this chaos we also have to provide for our sustenance. To say the truth, we have always found some

food, even in some damaged vehicles left off the beaten tracks. At times, we first have to

bury the corpses of those who have died. We move on to Bengasi, Derna, Tripoli and then Tunisia. We make a stop-over near Medenina and prepare to defend ourselves. We think that our withdrawal has come to an end, but the British and their allies, this time together with the French, arrive. It is January 28, 1943. Some British tanks try to wedge between our position and that at our left side. A short but violent engagement follows,


where I am seriously wounded. When the British withdraw their tanks, I am rescued by my comrades and sheltered in a foxhole where a German doctor gives me first aid. He tells me in Italian that I am done for and that my life is in danger. I hear him as he is talking to another person. I suffer terrible pain, but clench my teeth to contradict the diagnosis made by the German doctor. However, he

immediately sends me to the nearest field hospital by a German motor car, where I receive emergency care and remain there for a few days, before moving to the Sfax Hospital. Luck is on my side as, given the seriousness of my wounds, I am embarked on a

Hospital Ship and sent back home. The ship docks at Naples in the early hours of the day under heavy shelling. On the same day, the Hospital Ship is hit during another bombing.


Many crew members are killed, as well as some hospitalized soldiers who are onboard awaiting to be moved to other cities. Once again, I am very lucky! Even today I

repeat this to myself, when I remember the ordeal I went through. I am eighty years old now and, thanks God, I am able to tell my story and say to myself, my family and those who want to listen to me that I tried to carry out my duty. I am also proud of my suffering for the sake of our Flag, our Nation and the Italian Army.



INTERVIEW

with the Hon. Professor Gabriele De Rosa



Former 2nd Lieutenant –
IV “Granatieri di Sardegna”
a/t battalion

by Giuseppe Maria Giovanni
Tricarico *


Professor, you fought, among other places, at El Alamein, in a battle which has become legendary. During the war, you were in the desert - where the sand is scorching-hot and there is blistering heat in the day and biting cold in the night-amid uncountable risks, privations, longings and sacrifices. In those hard times,

Right.
The front arcade of the "Honor
Courtyard" designed and built by
Paolo Caccia Dominioni.

Below.
1987 Painting by Paolo Caccia
Dominioni.

what gave you the strength to
go ahead and behave like a
man and a soldier?

I was constantly sustained by
a strong sense of duty, which
helped me overcome all
difficulties. I did not bear
resentment against anybody,
but only wanted to support my
country during that
predicament. It didn't matter



who our political leaders were,
my comrades and I fought to
defend our country, our land,
our history and culture.

Particular friendship ties are
established under dangerous
circumstances, which cannot
be easily understood from the
outside. War veterans say that
there are no words to explain
a feeling which only the heart
can understand. In what does
it differs from the bonds
which link people in a
comfortable and wealthy
environment?

I served in the "Bologna"
Division, where there was a
climate of cooperation and
friendship, i.e. true comradeship.
When we faced risks together,
everyone, in turn, supported and
was supported by the others. We
wanted to go on even under
those tragic circumstances,
survive and mutually sustain one
another; when we felt dejected
or when many of our comrades
did not come back from the
battle. As platoon leader, I saw
many of my men torn to pieces
and I was shattered by grief,
rage and helplessness. In my


position as leader, I had to do
my utmost to protect those who
survived. I shall never forget
those times, which still stir up
strong emotions in my heart.
How could it be otherwise?

You have experienced the
excitement of victory. How did
you react to the withdrawal
order after the battle of El
Alamein?

It is true, we had to withdraw,
with mixed feelings of rage and
emptiness at the same time, but
we did not have the impression
of having lost the battle. There
was great disparity between
our forces and those of the
enemy and we were not
responsible for that withdrawal.
We did what was humanly
possible, as we were not short
of bravery and courage, but only
lacked material resources.

At times, we tried to assess
the forces that the enemy could
field, and became gradually
aware that seizing the initiative
would be extremely difficult.

We had to be doubly
courageous to fight under
those circumstances, where we




Left.

Left: 18th Century Coat of Arms in the Banner of the "Guardie" Regiment of the King of Sardinia, established on April 18, 1659 which gave origin to the Granatieri di Sardegna, presently the first specialty of Infantry.

Below.

One destroyed "Mathilda" British tank, by Paolo Caccia Dominioni.



risked our lives and had to fight with a small number of obsolete equipment.

We were fully aware of our shortage of means, which were insufficient to engage an enemy equipped with a wide range of modern tanks and aircraft.

What could we do with our 47/32 artillery pieces? And yet, to my knowledge, there were no cases of desertion, insubordination or breakdown. We came from all over Italy, but were equally convinced that each of us was pivotal to the victory of our armed forces. One principle had been instilled in our minds: the importance of the individual in a community.

We tried to make up for our limited resources by being more generous, enthusiastic, and vying with one another to help and protect our friends. Thus, we could count on the

fact that everyone was at the disposal of his comrades and Unit.

Sixty years ago, what were Italy's sons like?

Today it is difficult to understand the past, as we are all involved in a huge process of technological development, affecting us both at home and outside; even our words are completely different from those used in the old days. The youth who took part in that war came from a poor and mainly peasant environment, but were rich in noble feelings. I have written hundreds of letters for them, in which the most humble and everyday aspects of life were described: family relations, the health of their cattle, the work in the fields, the condition of their elderly relatives.

Those poor families, living a life riddled with privations and worsened by the war, wanted to believe that their young sons would come back some day. Unfortunately, many of them are still there, buried in the sands of the great African continent.

What do you remember of the time between the battles?

The home-like aspect of our foxholes was a strange experience indeed. We

soldiers considered the pit dug in the burning sand as our home. It was the place where we put our belongings, cooked, ate, mutually supported one another and dreamt. At first, it looked narrow and uncomfortable, but after a few weeks it was the best we could wish for. In fact, it gave us shelter, solace and was an

Country. This word was all but abstract for us. In fact, it stood for family love and friendship, support of our culture and civilization, dignity, humility, sense of duty and moral principles. As far as I am concerned, it helped me understand the true meaning of life, religion and God.


These are highly spiritual concepts, but how are they perceived by our society?

We should enjoy life in its entirety, understand what a great gift it is, reach out to other people, but still feel linked to our predecessors. That is where the feeling of belonging to a national community comes from, which today seems almost extinguished.

But, thanks God, things are changing also in this respect.

□

***Colonel,
Editor of "Rivista Militare"**



Gabriele De Rosa was born at Castellammare di Stabia on June 24, 1917. He was a Grenadier officer during World War Two and fought at El Alamein (Africa). He taught modern history at the Universities of Padua, Salerno (where he was also university Dean) and Rome. He is the Director of the Research Institute for social and religious sciences in Vicenza, and Director of the Study Centre for Southern Italy history in Potenza. He is the editor of the magazine "Research on social and religious studies". Since 1979 he has been Deputy Director of the Rome Institute which bears the name of Luigi Sturzo, with whom he cooperated from 1954 to 1959. He was elected Senator of the Italian Republic during the X Parliament on June 15, 1987 in the Treviso constituency. He took part in the Education Committee of the Senate and was Chairman of the Control Committee of the Senate library. He was re-elected Senator in the XI Parliament on April 5-6, 1992 in the Alba-Bra- Savigliano constituency and elected MP in the constituency "Campania 2" during the XII Parliament.

He wrote "History of the catholic movement" (1966), "Bishops, people and magic in the South" (1971), "Sturzo told me" (1982), "Religious and historic time" (1987 and 1994), "Histories of Saints" (1990). He edited for the "Il Mulino" publisher the volume "Catholics, Church and Resistance" (1977); together with F. Agostini, "Religious life and culture in Lombardy and Veneto during Napoleon age" (1990) and together with A. Vauchez and T. Gregory "History of religious Italy". He is the editor of series of publications under the name "Thesaurus Ecclesiarum Italiae recentioris aevi" (XVIII-XX century). He took part in the political life during several Parliaments.

important meeting point as well.

What lessons can young people draw from those events?


It is useful to hear the story of past suffering from those who experienced it, as it is a precious teaching for life. The Italians couldn't have shown the world their courage and bravely at El Alamein, if they had not been inspired by a strong human and spiritual passion in serving their

by Gabriele De Rosa

THE Passion of El Alamein

African omen

*Pages of a war journal
from September 6, 1942
to January 1, 1943*




**Dedicated
to my Grenadiers
fallen at El Alamein**

September 17, 1942

We have landed in Africa after a five hours' flight from the Tatoi airport in Greece to Crete and now to Tobruk. We are welcomed by a dreadful wind and the sand, made up of very fine and sharp grains, seeps through the cracks of our luggage and gets into the eyes and nostrils of the men who swallow it bit by bit. Ela is a stray little dog with white and black spots which comes near me while I am trying to shelter under a sort of canopy awaiting for the arrival of the trucks. I am told that the dog has inadvertently travelled with us. Ela is an intelligent and bright pup with a little restless face which he pokes everywhere. Unfortunately, he whines too often. He is a very little, light and pocketable thing, certainly not the size of a hero!

Five days ago, the British tried to land on this area, which is still full of battle remains; war ordnance is scattered everywhere, black heaps of discarded, broken and burnt out equipment which, seen from above, looks like huge spiders smashed on the ground. The flat and barren surface of the desert, whose bleakness is heightened by the carcasses of military vehicles, is sparsely dotted with rows of small and white crosses, evoking the presence of our merciful God on this harsh ground. The IV Battalion, which we are to augment, fought bravely in this place. Second Lieutenants Valentino Tolazzi (1), Goffredo d'Antona and Francesco Saraceni (2) are among our acquaintances.



September 26-27, 1942

All of a sudden, we are ordered to leave; we pack up silently, then start the engines leaving our worries behind us. We are alone under the bright dome of an ill-boding sky, which hovers over our heads, making us feel isolated and oppressed. The sun has just set and it is dark immediately, as usual in this region. After getting off the vehicles, the men shelter under their canvases. I make a tour to check their movements and feel that they are calmly brooding over the events. We get up at wake-up call with our limbs numbed and our sweaters drenched by the fog which is still lingering. In fifteen minutes we are ready to leave. We are slightly disappointed by these hasty movements, which are contrary to our ingrained contemplative attitude. And yet we also like this hectic atmosphere; we are proud of ourselves and feel at the centre of an undertaking in which each action is in anticipation of the war ahead. Our column stops to refuel at Bardia, near a war cemetery where we spend some time in prayer. There is a row of helmets and crosses, with no flowers, but only war crosses with one black shell case. The vehicles drive along the "Balbia" road, full of carcasses

of destroyed vehicles. One grounded "Spitfire", thrusting its propeller deep into the sand, exposes its twisted, humiliated and harmless skeleton. We reach the sea at Sollum and are suddenly overcome by the brightness of its colours: the eye-catching blue, white and red are distinct blotches with no intermediate shades, like on a Venetian palette. The rows of irregular dunes, following the coastline like a spotless shroud over this incredible land, are chalk-white; the waters of this deep and inhospitable sea are dark blue and shining, as if constantly polished; the land is red, and scorching as lava, which erodes and burns out all surrounding life, threatening the inviolable purity of the environment.

September 30, 1942.


Yesterday it was our last stop. We arrive at the HQ towards evening (3) and immediately meet our senior comrades in the battalion. They teach us how to move in the desert at night following the contours of the shades. We learn by ourselves to distinguish the roar of the different air forces and artilleries. This noise goes on all night. At dawn, the last shots fade away, when the troops wake up. At this

South of El Alamein. September 1942: Italian 75/18 self-propelled guns and "Panzergranadiere" of the German 90th light Division, advancing in parallel columns.

point, we have to take a new reality into account; in fact, until now, there was no war, but only colours around us. Then, at about 10 a.m, the air defense artillery next to our positions opens fire and two fighter aircraft start a dog-fight in the air. At first, they whirl around slowly, as two air cavalymen, then suddenly face each other and make steep loops, risky nose-down and nose-up maneuvers, exchanging fast volleys of shots. The "Macchi" hits the enemy's tail twice, the English aircraft goes into a climb up in the sky, then bends to one side, starts spinning and ends by swirling out of control. It crashes to the ground aflame two km. from our foxholes. The "Macchi" overflies the area for some time to evaluate the extent of its victory.

October 3-7, 1942.


One soldier is wounded amid sand and mud; the radio plays "Lili Marlene". The British have been shooting heavily but randomly for some days now. The aviation too is



sand, laden with electricity. It overflows kilometres of front-line, uprooting everything, penetrating foxholes, cannons, crates, kitchen appliances, gun barrels and almost suffocating everyone. The storm whirls ominously howling like hell and its hot and oppressing air stuns our senses. Then, it slowly

Left.
Lieutenant of the IV Battalion, 187th Paratroop Regiment.

Below.
Below: L6/40 Light Tank of the "Ariete" Armoured Division.



restless and makes continuous raids. Tonight the news has come that one grenadier has been wounded among those who have just arrived. He jumped on a mine 15 minutes after arriving at the front-line. He was unlucky, but is still alive, with a wound in his thigh only. There is a storm, carrying along sand and mud.

It always starts from the west, with a flash of piercing light, which progressively burns out the sky until it becomes pitch-black. Then, flashes of appear from a distance, like mounting flames licking the earth from all sides, while thunderclaps are roaring louder and louder. As the storm approaches, we realize that what it carries along is not water, but a huge column of reddish and fine

subsides, leaving a smell of burning behind it and a kind of dizziness in our heads, similar to a flu. After a little while, there is a heavy downpour, which initially plays with the residual sandy wind and then overwhelms it, coming down in buckets, pelting the earth and drenching it to its core. A yellowish mud seeps through the ground and bubbles in the drains. We are disgusted by all this filth and have to prevent it from flooding our tents and soiling our belongings. A storm may last one,

two, three hours or even days. When the first sunbeams pierce the clouds, the sky and the earth have a same ashen colour, after such a fierce clash overwhelming human lives as well. It would be very dangerous to fall ill amid these filthy waters. The amoebiasis is on the lurch and there are scant possibilities of being hospitalized. The song "Lili Marlene" echoes in our ears. It mildly challenges to our feelings every evening, when we meet in the officers' foxhole to listen to the songs chosen by the soldiers and broadcasted by the Italian radio. This song is like a whisper which comes in different tones and pitches and, even today, evokes our past memories. Lale

Anderson sang "Lili Marlene" when I first heard that beautiful song at the front.

October 19, 1942

We are on the front-line and dig foxholes.

October 20, 1942

This morning, the British have fired some shots very near our foxholes. Perhaps this is their way of saying good morning.



October 21, 1942

We learned through the grapevine that the British would attack during the night, but nothing happened. This morning, our fighters appeared. Air shelling and artillery fires went on all night, until this morning (8 a.m.), within the sector of the "Trento" Division. The British air force bombed our positions. We don't know what is happening on our left flank.

October 23-24, 1942

The news spread on the front-line (through the grapevine) that the British would attack during the night of the full moon, probably on the 20th of this month. But on the night of the 20th nothing happened, nor on that of the 21st, 22nd and 23rd, except for an increased activity by the two air forces.

Every morning, the American assault wings overfly our positions, perfectly aligned as in


a flypast formation. In the evening, however, groups of black and frightful "Stukas" invade the enemy sky. Rows of tracer ammunition are fired along the British lines, to create a barrage effect. The machine guns shoot volleys of rounds whose trails stand out against the pearl-gray sky and the flaming-red sunset. There is a myriad of bright dots which go up at full speed, reach their targets and then burst with a sharp explosion, hardly perceived from our distance. The "Stukas", after reaching the desired altitude, start a series of dreadful nose-dives and drop all kinds of bombs, accompanied by the wailing of their sirens.

During the night of the 23rd, at about 10 p.m., a burst of flashes breaks out from left to right over a stretch of about 10 km, as if operated by an alternate energy switch. A few seconds later, gun shots follow. There is an interrupted chain of light effects and high flames tear up the black

M13/41 Tank with crew during a pause in the battle on the El Alamein front.

curtain of the night. The earth is shaken like a stormy sea and trembles as it had lost its balance. Shells drop everywhere making a devastating noise, burning and shattering everything, while our foxholes risk being completely wiped out. Our lines are covered by a curtain of smoke which has the same pungent and choking smell of burnt gunpowder. If we consider that there are over 250 guns shooting at a 5 minute rate of fire, about one million shells are fired (4).

At about 02 am. the enemy masses its artilleries against the sector of one of our divisions placed to the left of the deployment. At dawn, the British tanks advance to attack, still protected by a thick curtain of fog. Our strongholds hold out and open precision fires, blocking the




friends were speaking to him in a low voice, trying to keep him awake, as if he was not dying but only suffering from a minor accident. Second Lieutenant Tosoni was wounded, Second Lieutenant Feliciani was killed.

Left.

Point 33: a native leads his meharis on a track in the desert. Two signboards show the distance from Nerviano and Cairo.

Below.

Italian gunners firing their 149/40 artillery piece.



enemy vehicles. The British infantry troops do not even try to infiltrate our lines, as the tanks which had to support them have been stopped and knocked down by our artillery fires. The battle is raging in the sector of the "Trento" Division. The British are staging a series of attacks and delivering heavy preparation fires. Our troops are holding out, but there are many casualties in the firing areas and foxholes and men are left with no weapons and communication lines. I know this much, so far. We are in the sector of the "Bologna" Division under General Alessandro Gloria (after the attack on the 26th we have had only artillery engagements in this area). From our position, we can see several columns of smoke and hear the shelling of tanks coming from our left side. The division has been completely disrupted by the battle (5). On the night between the 25th and the 26th the enemy masses its assets in the sector of the battalion we have been attached to, in an effort to recover from the previous defeat and test new break-through possibilities. Enemy artillery preparation starts at 11 p.m. with a swift and pelting machine-gun fire. The 88 type howitzers fire sharp and piercing shots which disperse burning fragments

everywhere. Volleys of about 20 rounds at a time pierce the air with a hissing sound and the earth makes a grumbling noise, like a huge boiling cauldron. I snuggle in a foxhole and my heart leaps at every explosion, while a hoard of senseless thoughts is crossing my mind; then a strong but well-founded feeling of anger follows. I wish my hands were big enough to grab one of these guns and smash it completely. At last, preparation fires end and enemy infantry troops advance. At this point, one of our 75mm batteries, which is behind us, opens fire, together with 81mm mortars and 47/32 artillery pieces, machine guns and other automatic weapons. After two hours of violent fire, the British attack is repelled.

October 27, 1942

I am grieved to hear the news coming from the battalion HQ.

The first "Grenadiers" company is destroyed, Francesco Palladino is dead. My poor friend! An artillery shell shattered the top of his foxhole and a large fragment cut his legs off. He slowly bled to death, gradually losing all strength, but still made an effort to move his head with an expression of pain and bewilderment. His

October 28-29, 1942

Nothing new has happened. The battle continues on the left of the deployment. One infantryman killed by a grenade has been buried near my fire position, under a stone-encircled mound of earth. In the morning, when I got out of my foxhole, I saw two stains of his blood on the ground.

October 30, 1942


This is a new experience: to lie with my face on the sand under an enemy hail of bullets falling two meters from me, while my head is pelted with blasts. I wish I could hide somewhere. The blue flames of a machine gun are facing me, and I feel as I were observed, followed, fascinated and nailed down by its blinking eye, which is both sarcastic and cruel. I suddenly get up and run forward, to face that disgusting thing that is spitting his hatred at me, croaking ominously and

fallen fast asleep under a cliff of rock. I find my battalion commander and realize that we are both saddened by the latest events. The front of the "Trento" Division has been already broken and the tanks of the "Littorio" Division are holding the enemy back. But a large number of "Liberator" aircraft are still bombing our rear area. They arrive in waves of 18-20 vehicles flying at very high altitudes and drop their ammunition following an established pattern, on the signal of the squadron commander (green smoke). The

called "white squadrons" because the deadly bellies of the aircraft, seen from the ground when the sun is shining, looks pale white.

November 1, 1942

An air shelling started at 10 p.m. and lasted until dawn. I have just got into my foxhole with Rev. Ventura, the chaplain. We only have a canvass to cover our shelter. We hear the noise of a reconnaissance aircraft hovering over our heads. Then suddenly it drops some star shells which floodlight the whole area. After




shifting from green to yellow, to red...But when I get hold of it, I can see its exposed bowels covered in mud and blood and feel its black and hot corpse. That monster has become a useless tool in a flash.

October 31, 1942

I return to the HQ under an a constant air shelling. I have

hissing of the bombs increases as they near the ground. Their explosion makes a terrible noise and scatters hundreds of burning fragments. This morning, I saw two aircraft of that type burst in the sky, deadly hit by the fires of our air defense. They were smashed to pieces but, before crashing to the ground, they hung in the air for a while, like a red and burning blob swaying in the wind. These formations are

detecting its targets, the aircraft continues to fly high to muster fighter bombers to the area, like a decoy bird. Their arrival is heralded by a metallic noise typical of the isochronous beats of their engines. As they reach the meeting point, one or two of them come down with their engines stopped. We can hear the angry hiss of their wings then the shrill whistle of the bombs; there are three, four or five simultaneous



explosions not far from our place. There is a hell-like scenario at night, when the flames given off by the fires mingle with black fumes. It is a nerve-racking experience.

November 2, 1942

All of a sudden, we are ordered to withdraw, not to be attacked from behind. There was a heavy bombing during the night. At dawn, a few km from our position, our vehicles are on fire, hit by the British vans, which are already beyond our lines. Our men immediately deploy in close formation to protect our vehicles and load them with equipment. At last, we leave the area where the British made several breakthroughs. The incoming troops are from Australia and New Zealand and leave a mark wherever they push their way. They are fresh forces, proud of being well-trained and well-equipped. For the first time, I feel that we are no longer fighting against a live enemy, be it English, Indian, New Zealander,

but against a lethal war machine, which inexorably attacks our obsolete 47/32 tanks, only capable of grazing, and not piercing, the armour of the "Sherman" tanks (6). We suddenly discover a seashore near the El Alamein palisade, created by an indentation in the desert coast-line. It looks like a mirage or a daydream. But no, I am sure it is really sea. This well-known, beloved and even longed-for view is shocking.

November 3, 1942

We are withdrawing and are now in the middle of a tank battle. Armour-piercing grenades are whistling around us. Our column disperses, but regroups after a few hours. We sustain three air strikes. The last one hits us directly, but does not cause any damage. I am left alone awaiting news from Lt. Rossa, the pace setter, who went out to establish connection with the battalion HQ. We sleep in an area sheltered from air strikes. There are noises and movements of tanks.

November 4, 1942

We are at El Dabah, trying to establish connection with the battalion HQ. Air shelling is going on. We are still shocked and deeply saddened by the view of a burnt corpse, with an expression of prayer still stuck on his face. My words cannot express the sorrow that renders our hearts. His image is impressed in my mind, with his maimed arms stretched out, like a bridge over a useless life. His corpse is a black spot against the white sand of the beach. "Let us throw some earth over his head and that's the end of it". At night, we move on blindly, while the coast road is lit by enemy flares. We have miraculously escaped death.

Men and vehicles are on fire. Our discarded or unserviceable 47/32 light guns are heaped in a dump ground.

November 5, 1942

Two batteries of the Flak Division open interdiction fire against the RAF aircraft, near Fuka.

Left.

Postcard of the 61st Infantry Regiment assigned to the 102nd "Trento" Infantry Division.

Right.

Bersaglieri on the attack.

One vehicle is spotted by the beams of a searchlight and swerves to hide in the dark. Short moments of unrest follow, when the first resistance actions are set in place.

We reach Marsa Matruch in the morning. After covering 30 other km, I meet Romano (7) and am overwhelmed by emotion.

I hate my literary culture which hinders me from expressing my feelings and passions. I would like to break the rigid frame of my thoughts and make my words flow freely with no academic refinement, to turn over a new leaf.

November 6, 1942

During the night, two German vehicles collided and left a beheaded corpse on the road. The British aircraft are flying over our heads. On the ground, the Germans have stopped our vehicles, trying to make their way. A battle follows, where many are wounded or killed. We move on blindly, haphazardly and finally reach the Sollum ridge. We make a stop-over at the Capuzzo redoubt. The desert has become part of our souls, but we hate its vast spaces.

November 7, 1942

The grenadier convoy leaves the Capuzzo Redoubt after reorganizing its forces, like a family bewildered by such devastation but glad to meet again. It arrives at the wells of Bardia and stays for the night.

We leave early in the morning and stop at Tobruk, where some Army Corps are massing.

We don't know whether we are prisoners or free men. Today, El Alamein recalls very sad memories, while the sound of its



name might evoke feelings of love and quietness.

November 10, 1942

We leave for Ghemines and stop at Omerzan.

November 11, 1942

We are crossing the Cyrenaic Gebel.

November 12, 1942

We leave at dawn. At Barce, we meet the battalion HQ.

November 13, 1942

We are leaving again, destination Sirte. I follow the column as trail officer and have one day's delay. We stay overnight


40km from Agedabia.

November 14, 1942

We stop at 35 km from Marsa el Brega. The British have resumed shelling the Balbian road. There are new fires and new casualties. We hear gunshots close to our vehicle. Together with some other grenadiers, I reach the place where these shots come from: are they British? I grip my gun and send the men up a steep cliff where the shots come from. They are Germans who are training!

November 15, 1942

We leave for Nofelia; gunfire continues along the road. The British aircraft appear suddenly from beyond the sea and swiftly



November 16, 1942

I reach my battalion HQ which is 60- 61 km far from Sirte. I am told that my black and angry face looks like that of the Negus. But I am only sad and embittered. The disaster is approaching. My poor country, what will befall you? The surviving troops of our battalion can still regroup, showing their organizational capabilities under Captain Viganò.

November 22, 1942

We landed in Africa two months ago and I have grown old in these two months. Our General spoke to the troops to raise their morale. What did he say?

November 25, 1942

We are assigned to the 66th regiment of the "Trieste" Division. We stop at Buerat.

Left.
Corporal of the 40th Infantry regiment of the "Bologna" Division.

Right.
War remains on the battlefield (M13 and "Sherman" Tanks). Track links used as an added protection can be seen on the M13 tank.

Below.
Drawing by Paolo Caccia Dominioni depicting a camp Mass on the eve of the battle of El Alamein.



November 24, 1942

A day of rest. The order to leave for a new combat zone may arrive any moment. It is mail time for the grenadiers. They ask me to write a "beautiful" letter to their girl-friends or parents. I have to ask how the farm, the cattle and the grape harvest are going. Am I not an "intellectual" who knows how to write properly? I too receive a letter from my beloved Gabriella.



Given our small number of forces and obsolete armaments, we can only hope in our good star. But is this a star still there?

November 27-December 1, 1942

The operation cycle of the battle of El Alamein may be considered as closed. Now it is time to draw conclusions.

Whatever the luck of our

attack our columns shooting volleys of shells. Our men scatter over the desert but many of them burst into flame aboard their vehicles, suddenly immobilized by death. However, once the air raid is over, we resume our positions as nothing had happened, with a weak smile on our faces, trying to hide or dispel our inner tensions. But these are useless words or empty rhetoric which does not explain the meaning of our deeds. In fact, in those moments, we acted without thinking and our minds were empty. The things we are telling now have happened a moment before or afterwards. The "present", instead, which is more real than any speech and stronger than any reasoning, rests unknown, like a distant and inscrutable truth belonging to an unreal world. What is the "present" and what power have we over our lives? The answer are those who died and are still there soaked in blood with their heads cut off.



troops, I am sure of one thing: we Italians have suffered on this land and fought this battle with all our hearts and minds, and have racked our souls over it. Everyday we unconditionally devoted ourselves to the war, playing no tricks, but being fair to the bitter end, especially because we felt that the enemy engaged this battle as it were a walk in the woods. Some grenadiers told me that one day, while they were on the shore

bordering the Balbian road, one "Spitfire" crossed the sky and its pilot waived them hello.

December 6, 1942

Yesterday morning at 7 a.m., near Buerat, the battalion reached the roadman's house which is 12 km from Sirte and 12 km inland. We are at the far left of the "Trieste" divisional deployment, which has to protect the withdrawal of our troops west of Buerat. We set up a stronghold.

December 7, 1942

Engineer soldiers detonate mines to build weapon emplacements. In the evening, a number of firing positions are completed and the weapons are in place. Some mechanized vehicles, still unidentified, placed at a distance on our left side, may be a threat, as the night approaches. There is a wide and deep field of fire in front of us and therefore the possibilities of being identified by the enemy are few.

I read the speech of the Duce and wonder whether he can be defined as an "ill-minded man". I

interpreted his speech as a comment of psychological insight rather than a reassuring picture of military and political history. The meaning of his allegations clashes against a different and more terrible truth. The policy of embellishing the news with statistic data does not work: we are confronted with a dreadful scenario and a huge tragedy (8).

December 9, 1942

Yesterday at 10 I devoutly read St. Bernard's prayer to the Virgin (9). The memories of the past and the sorrow of the present have rekindled familiar feelings which I thought were long gone.

We are alone in this desert and the sky is too far to perceive our suffering. For two days now we have been sharing memories with our friends and the names of our women make us feel homesick and restless. We get back 20 km from Buerat and are awaiting for new orders.

December 11, 1942

My friends (10) Magnani,

Bavaresco, Berlincioni and Piglia had the courage of eating the macaroni pie I had cooked following my mother's recipe. At the end of that "lavish" meal, we ate one orange whose exquisite fragrance pervaded our tent.

In Africa, certain objects and household goods exert a hidden fascination on us. For instance, the presence of a can or a tin in a foxhole gives a familiar look to the place and revives friendship feelings which reconcile us with life itself. In fact, these objects are a constant reference point, linking us to everyday life, both mentally and verbally. When we leave a foxhole and carry all our things away, it becomes an anonymous pit, as its comfort depends on the presence of our inseparable belongings.

We all are in a state of uncertainty, and especially Vittorio P, who turns pale when he imagines his future life. I am sure

that tomorrow Captain Magnani will still walk with his empty haversack. He will thrust his hand into it and find his forgotten youth buried there. Tony B. is a boy again when he lists the human and civil experiences he never had

December, 14-16, 1942

We have lost the notion of time; the immense surface of the desert evens out both time and space in our minds. The word "Arab" indicates an inborn attitude of internal stillness and a contemplative apathy. We fight an unseen enemy and materialize his presence through our anxiety and concern for his supposed moves. Perhaps our imagination makes us fight a war full of tensions and expectations as well. After all, this is in line with the harshness of the desert.

December 17, 1942

We are 100 km from Misurata and deploy in stronghold formation. Our battalion is augmented by a paratroop company.

December 18, 1942

Tonight troops are on alert at the stronghold, as a British van has opened fire on the road. The dampness of the night numbs our bodies and soak our canvases.

December 21, 1942


One grenadier patrol which was reconnoitring our surrounding area captured a New Zealand NCO who went astray in the desert having lost his van.

Above.

A drawing by Paolo Caccia Dominioni.

Left.

Sergeant of the VIII paratrooper-sapper battalion.




December 23, 1942


Since yesterday morning we have moved to a high ground to seal up the deployment of the battalion on the Zern-Zem wadi. The company is completely isolated and self-sufficient (11).

December 25, 1942

"Now the birth of Jesus Christ was on this wise: When his mother Mary had been betrothed to Joseph, before they came together she was found with child of the Holy Spirit..". (Gospel of St. Mathew, verse 18 and sqq). These simple words highlight the magnitude of that miracle, whose story rekindles our devotion and faith.

Yesterday night at midnight, there was a pale and trembling





moonlight crossed by a trail of pale clouds which caught our attention. We felt the need to share our sorrows and loneliness, perhaps it was juvenile gloom.

January 7, 1943

In the Cathedral of Tripoli on the left side of the nave, at the level of the high altar, there is a Crucifix, with the following inscription:

*"Venite ad me omnes
qui laboratis et onerati estis"*
(St. Matthew)

NOTES

(1) Valentino Tolazzi was one of the most popular figures among the grenadiers of the IV battalion: He fought in Africa, at Tobruk, El Alamein and Takrouna in Tunisia, where he


was taken prisoner. He was awarded a silver medal. Vicenza was his place of origin; I met him there many times and we used to recall our African memories. Since 1975 I have often gone to Vicenza where I am at the head of the Research Institute for social and religious sciences. He was extremely reliable and humane. Tolazzi distinguished himself during the attack that Rommel conducted successfully in July 1942 to reach El Alamein, chasing the British units which were hastily withdrawing. The then Commander of the IV "Grenadiers" antitank battalion, arriving at El Dabah with the first echelon of forces (we belonged to the second echelon), ordered Tolazzi to advance for 40 km. Paolo Caccia Dominioni described the operation as follows:

Remember that there is no one in front of you – said Major Burraggine to Tolazzi. After 20 km the Ursus (the name of the truck) is definitively abandoned. The small column moves on, under the light of the moon and flares, until it reaches its destination.

The grenadiers leave their Lancia 3 RO truck and walk the last stretch of the road, towing their 6 artillery pieces, before quartering in stronghold formation (Paolo Caccia Dominioni "Alamein 1933", Mursia, Milano, 1962, 1992, pp.57-58).

The illusion lasted 3 months. Mussolini believed that our troops, together with the Germans of the *Wermacht*, would reach El Alamein and, from there, immediately arrive at Suez. On the contrary, after waiting about twenty days and being ignored by Rommel, he returned to Italy with his white horse and the sword of Islam which he wanted to brandish.

Tolazzi wrote a war journal from December 22 1941, when he left Italy, to March 13 1943, the date of the surrender following the hard battle of Takrouna, where the survivors of the "Folgore" Division and the rest of our battalion fought for the last time. Also my friend Lt. Delfo Diletti, who was awarded a gold medal, served with the grenadiers. Takrouna was an important high ground, a barrier preventing the British armoured



vehicles from reaching Tunis and Cape Bon. Diletti distinguished himself in that battle during the counterattack against the British infantry troops. The British media defined that battle as one of the toughest engagements sustained by the VIII Army against the Italian soldiers: *who fought man to man as no one did before*. Diletti was seriously wounded and suffered the consequences of that wound for the rest of his life. I met Diletti more often in Rome in 1972, when our two families settled down in two attached houses in the Prima Porta area. I was next to him when he passed away. Valentino Tozzi recounted this battle in "The last battle in Africa", "Il Giornale di Vicenza", February 22, 1990. He also wrote *Montgomery did not keep his word at Takrouna* in "Il Lunedì" Udine, April 18, 1949.

Tolazzi asked me to present his book at Cividale del Friuli, where he served as Chief Clerk of the Civil Court for 27

years. Tolazzi wrote his journal when he was imprisoned in Tunis, together with Captain Attilio Viganò. It is a valuable document, as it is a diary of an eye-witness and a man who took part in those battles. Francesco Saraceni, another grenadier, gathered Tolazzi's memories. He followed the course of military operations from El Alamein up to the battle of Enfidaville, Tunisia.

Tolazzi died at Vicenza in November 2000, assisted by his wife Angelina Gennari, whom he loved tenderly.

(2) Francesco Saraceni was a grenadier with the rank of corporal and a scholar. He fought in Tunisia, where he was taken prisoner by the Americans and transferred to the US. He gathered many testimonies on the war in Africa and on the life in prison.

(3) We belonged to the "Bologna" Division, placed at the center of the deployment, between the "Trento" and the "Brescia" Divisions. Our battalion operated in a decentralized way, on platoon and company basis, to support the "Ariete", "Bologna", "Trento" and "Trieste" Divisions. The "Folgore" and "Pavia" Divisions were near to the El Qattara depression. As regards the battle of El Alamein, Massimo Zamorani gives us a detailed description of the British and Italian-German troops in the field, in his *El Alamein, the beginning of the end for the*

This journal is not aimed at describing the whole strategic framework of the battle of El Alamein.

I used to write with a pencil on a small note-book when I had some rest, in my foxhole during my stay at the front-line, or where I would find a place to write.

I did not see the battle and the withdrawal from the air, nor from a high HQ, but while it was going on in front of me. We had to move quickly, extricate ourselves from the fog of war under enemy fires, lead and instil confidence in men, as far as it was possible.

The following notes explain those details necessary to understand some biographical reference.

This journal describes my feelings, impressions, sorrows and fears, which are the most true-to-life part of it. My wife, Carla Sabine Kowohl, who, as a child, was a Silesian refugee in 1944-45 during the advance of the Soviet troops, assisted me in reviewing and editing the pages of this journal, before sending it to the press.

I thank Mariolina De Luca who helped me in the proof-reading phase.

Left.

Captain, flame-thower operator and sapper of the XXXI Sapper Battalion.

Below.

The 47/32 alt gun was often ineffective against the thick armour of the "Mathilda", "Sherman" and "Grant" tanks. It was employed by the Italian Army on all fronts during WW2.

Axis, "Il giornale", October 23, 1992.

(4) The VIII British Army (New Zealanders, Australians, Indians, South-Africans and Poles) attacked the Italian-German deployment. The British had 200,000 men, 1,500 tanks - against about 500 tanks owned by the German and Italian troops, which were much lighter than those of the VIII Army - 4,000 cannons, 13,000 trucks, 1,600 aircraft - against a total of 500 assets owned by the German and Italian troops. Marshall Edwin Rommel led that battle from beginning to end. He was on leave and returned immediately to replace General Hans Stumme, killed by British artillery fire. Force levels were greatly unbalanced.

(5) The British burst through the centre of our ranks, near El Alamein. The I and X British Armies crossed the gaps opened along our lines. The Italian divisions held out to the utmost and staged heroic actions. The "Folgore" lost 2/3 of its men and the "Trento", "Brescia" and "Bologna" bravely sacrificed themselves.

(6) On the occasion of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the battle of El Alamein, I praised the courage of the men belonging to the

Per i Caduti del Deserto del Cielo ~ del Mare

~ Quota 33 di Alamein ~

Benedici, Signore, nel canto del Deserto e dell'Onda
~ gli Italiani riuniti sopra la Quota lontana ~
Essi conobbero, prima del supremo mortale spasimo
~ tormento insoune di attesa, sete, sozzura, fatica ~
Seppero vicende disperate di battaglia e talora, indifesi
~ al facile insulto straniero, squallore di libertà perduta ~
Perch  condotti non da vanit  o bramosia di ventura ~
~ ma da obbedienza alla Patria, benedici, Signore,
Con tutti i Caduti d'Africa e del Mondo ~ fratelli
~ Soldati d'ogni Bandiera, purificati nell'ultima fiammata ~

"Folgore" (about 380 survivors out of 5,000 men), as well as that of the troops of the "Trento", "Ariete" and "Bologna" Divisions, who fought to the utmost in that "bloody" battle, as Tolazzi defined it.

G.De Rosa, *El Alamein our debacle*, "Il Giornale", October 24, 1992.


(7) Second Lieutenant Fulvio Romano from Asti, one of my dearest friends, came from Italy to join our battalion on that tragic day and moment. He brought the memories of our past glories with him. Now the remains of that generous youth are buried at Takrouna.

(8) Mussolini delivered his speech, which I mentioned in my journal, on December 2 1942, during the plenary session of the legislative Committee of the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations. The text of that speech was published by the "Corriere della

sera" on December 3, with the following title: *Historic report of the Duce to Italy*. Today, reading it after 60 years, I can confirm the impression I had at that time: It was a comment of psychological insight, rather than a political-military report. In fact, the Duce opened his speech as follows: *I am convinced that in time of war, when the cannon speaks with its powerful voice, the less we speak, the better. In any case, one should speak of past accounts and rarely of future expectations.*

On the contrary, he did not draw a final balance in describing the following three main events of the war: the war in Russia, where the Italian Army was fighting desperately; the "supremacy" of Japan and the African war after the landing of the British-American troops in North Africa, which he did not consider as *glorious*, as it took place with the complicity of the invaded, i.e. the Algerian populations. In sum, it was a tragic comedy. When I read that speech in my foxhole, I noticed that he never used the words defeat, withdrawal, retreat. Mussolini did not pronounce them, as he was convinced that the war has now assumed proportions that could be called *cosmic*, so universal are they - a war which goes beyond the power of words, a war that having spread enormously in space has, as a natural consequence, also been prolonged in time proportionately.

From a psychological point of view, I think that Mussolini did not want to acknowledge facts that he could not accept, or else his convictions would be thoroughly contradicted: *I am deeply convinced that in this huge game,*



played to create a new Europe and draw the boundaries between Europe and Africa, a decisive and final victory will be only obtained thanks to the intervention of the Italian Army.

Therefore he decided that his speech would not be centred on politics, but on "data, facts and figures; in other words, it will be a balance-sheet of the first 30 months of war". Notwithstanding the number of casualties, the towns destroyed by air strikes and all the pain suffered, that conflict was considered as "a legitimate war and an unavoidable duty".


(9) I carried with me a pocket edition of the "La Divina Commedia", Hoepli Edition, 1911.

(10) Captain Giovanni Magnani was Executive Officer to Colonel Tullio Gervasoni, a very strict commander, who applied discipline in a rational, and not only formal or mechanical way. Gervasoni had a wide war

the end of my Officer career, during which I fought in Africa, serving in the volunteer university students' company, attached to the 3rd "Grenadiers" regiment. We were trained at Viterbo and Civitacastellana, and then attended the Officer Cadet Course at Arezzo. After September 8, 1943, being wanted by the Nazis (my name and address were in the list of the 1st "Grenadiers" regiment Officers) I became a clandestine and joined Badoglio's forces. During the final phase of that never-ending war, the Ministry of freed lands seconded me to the V Army HQ as field officer of the Pescia partisans, who were withdrawing from the Modena area behind the Gothic line. I had a lot of trouble trying to calm down those resistance-fighters who were chasing local fascist officials. I returned to the civilian life when Milan was freed. The university students' "Grenadiers"

transferred to Germany. My journal reports the names of some university officers, such as Ugo Aprile, who was wounded at El Alamein, Franco Romano, Enzo Rossini, Antonio Bavaresco and Luciano Berlincioni. I would like to close these notes by citing the words of Paolo Caccia Dominioni. He concluded his book on El Alamein, a reference document of that historical event, with a list of those, both friends and enemies, who took part in that battle:

the "Granatieri di Sardegna" of the IV Battalion; the infantrymen of the I/19 "Brescia", I/40 "Bologna", III/61 "Trento" and III/65 "Trieste" Battalions; the Bersaglieri of the VIII Armoured Battalion; the paratroopers of the II, IV and VII "Littorio" Battalions; the lancers of the III "Novara" armoured group; the gunners of the "Eugenio di Savoia" and "Duca d'Aosta" motorized regiments, as well as those of the 132th "Ariete", 46th "Trento", 205th "Bologna" regiments and of the 52nd cannon group; the sappers of the 31st and 32nd Africa Battalions; the engineers of the 51st "Trento", 17th and 27th "Brescia" Battalions; the pioneers of the 15th company; the drivers of the 37th motor pool; the HQ of the Royal Navy at Marsa Matruh and the crew of the MZ 715 landing craft; the pilots of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th fighter wings and 50th assault wing; the armoured grenadiers of the 115th "Landgravi d'Assia" regiment; the paratroopers of the "von der Heydte" Battalion, "Ramcke" Brigade and the Scotsmen of the "Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders" battalions.




experience, ranging from World War One to the campaign in Eastern Africa, where he served as Commander of the 1st "Grenadiers" regiment, gaining the esteem of his subordinates.



Magnani knew him well, but was a more flexible and friendly commander; he too had a wide war experience.

(11) When serving in Tripoli, I had a 15-day leave, and flew to Italy on board a German plane, which was spotted by the British air defence near Malta, but was not hit. After landing at the Lecce airport, I underwent a medical examination and was diagnosed a histolytic-vegetative amoebiasis. When I was dismissed from the quarantine station (behind the San Camillo Hospital) to spend a period of convalescence and undergo a series of check-ups, Africa had already been conquered and Montgomery prepared to land in Sicily. That was

company was celebrated by a speech made by one of them, Lt. Luigi Deserti, on March 10, 1995, in the Great Hall of the Bologna University. L. Deserti wrote the story of that company *The young volunteer university students during the 1940-45 war*, on the "Rivista di storia contemporanea" February 1, 1966. He also wrote "*The history of the volunteer university students company, a unit which won the highest number of awards*" on the "Il Granatiere", July-August 1986. It should be recalled that university grenadier Officers served in Africa, and also in Montenegro, Greece, Russia, Albania, where my dear friend Galdo Galderisi was killed. When we both attended the war college at Civitacastellana, we used to discuss Benedetto Croce's aesthetics and Marxist theories. Another friend of mine, Stenio Contiglozzi, was taken prisoner by the Germans and



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Qui sommes nous en fait?, par Giuseppe Mani (p. 10).

L'Eglise représente l'un des repères stables de la société militaire. Le caractère atypique de l'armée ne doit pas nous empêcher de regarder au-delà et à l'intérieur de nous mêmes pour donner un sens à notre existence et participer pleinement à la vie professionnelle et familiale. L'Eglise se penche avec un grand intérêt sur les militaires car ceux-ci sont les dépositaires de hautes valeurs humaines et sociales.

De fait, l'uniforme est le symbole extérieur d'une vocation qui sous-tend la disposition à rendre service aux autres. La Noël et le nouvel an qui approchent seront une occasion de réfléchir sur le rapport avec Dieu et avec le monde, car chacun peut apporter une contribution humaine et concrète à la famille et à la société, et ce même dans le silence. Croire et aimer, voilà ce qui importe!

Le futur est déjà là. Interview du Sénateur Domenico Contestabile, Président de la Commission à la Défense du Sénat, par Giovanni Cerbo (p. 16).

L'Italie occupe de plus en plus le devant de la scène mondiale, d'autant que c'est à elle, à ses hommes et à ses femmes que revient le mérite d'avoir démystifié certains préjugés, pas toujours mérités. Dans un tel contexte, l'Armée a, elle aussi, son rôle à jouer. C'est là un exemple probant du profond processus de renouvellement qui caractérise désormais tous les secteurs. Dans les missions de paix, les soldats italiens sont cités en exemple par leurs collègues étrangers et par les habitants des différentes zones d'intervention. La Force armée italienne est déjà prête à prendre part active à l'Armée européenne, tandis que son processus de professionnalisation est déjà en cours d'achèvement. Des signes positifs proviennent également du secteur financier: le budget de la Défense italienne sera porté progressivement au même niveau que celui de la France et de la Grande Bretagne.

Mais ce n'est pas tout: sur le plan de la politique internationale, l'Italie est de plus en plus active. A une époque où les guerres planétaires sont suivies d'intenses crises locales, les démocraties sont appelées à intervenir avec une fréquence croissante. Toutefois, l'Europe doit encore montrer toutes ses potentialités effectives, si elle veut que son rôle de pilier continental de l'OTAN devienne encore plus visible. Ce sont là quelques-uns des thèmes abordés par le sénateur Domenico Contestabile, Président de la Commission à la Défense du Sénat, lors d'une interview aussi passionnée que modérée. Voilà une occasion pour réfléchir sur des thèmes de base qui caractérisent la Politique de la Défense et sur l'importance du rôle qu'est appelée à jouer la Force armée italienne, laquelle a déjà relevé de stimulants défis, et est prête à en relever d'autres tout aussi intéressants.

OTAN CIMIC Group South. La nouvelle unité multinationale sous la direction italienne, par Mario Ruggiero et Marco Buscemi (p. 22).

Le 1er janvier 2002, à Motta di Livenza, il a été procédé à la création de l'Unité qui remplira la fonction de «CIMIC Group South» (avec une compétence pour toute l'Europe méridionale) aussitôt que sera parachevée son inclusion à l'OTAN. Ce qui aura lieu d'ici la fin de 2003. Le Groupe, formé pour le moment au niveau national, s'emploie actuellement à la formation et à l'amalgamation des Cadres permanents et à l'identification du personnel spécialisé qui sera choisi dans la réserve sélectionnée des Forces de réserve volontaires. L'initiative a vu la participation de l'Italie - qui est chargée de la direction du projet, ayant adhéré aux intentions de l'Alliance Atlantique - de la Hongrie, de la Grèce, du Portugal et de la Turquie. L'Italie fournira les infrastructures, la plupart du Commandement, la compagnie commandement et services et une compagnie CIMIC avec les spécialistes y relatifs. Le «CIMIC Group South» appuiera les opérations en prenant en charge les facteurs de situation du théâtre et en facilitant la création d'un milieu favorable aux missions de paix. Le choix opéré par l'OTAN confirme le haut niveau d'efficacité et de fiabilité dont a fait preuve l'Armée italienne. L'article est précédé d'une synthèse du Sous-chef de l'Etat Major de l'Armée

de Terre.


Le Droit pénal militaire dans les affaires internationales, par Vito Nicolò Diana (p. 30).

L'Armée étant sans cesse engagée dans des opérations «Hors Zone», le Droit en matière de conflits armés est devenu un sujet à l'ordre du jour. Cet article intéressant analyse la «genèse normative» et les changements en cours dont le Droit en question fait actuellement l'objet. Il s'agit d'un droit de frontière en ce sens qu'il est destiné à revêtir une importance croissante dans le cadre des systèmes juridiques nationaux et internationaux.

Cette étude est issue du besoin de jeter la lumière sur les compétences et les limites liées au recours à la force lors des interventions visant au rétablissement de la paix et de la légalité internationale. Le tout sans perdre de vue, bien entendu, la noblesse de la finalité: prévenir et réprimer les actes de barbarie et protéger les êtres désarmés.

Crazy Horse. Le dernier stratège du peuple indien, par Rocco Panunzi et Romeo Michele Tomassetti (p. 36).

S'il est aisé de consulter une encyclopédie quelconque pour connaître l'habile chef sioux Crazy Horse, le dernier héros de l'épopée indienne, il est plutôt difficile de pénétrer la psychologie du personnage et de comprendre sa vision du monde ainsi que de distinguer la mythe de la réalité. Pourtant, l'article apparaît plutôt convaincant. Le vainqueur de Little Big Horn (25 juin 1876) ne fut pas seulement l'adversaire orgueilleux et loyal du Colonel Custer. Il fut le dernier espoir d'un peuple tout entier, le peuple des grandes prairies qui choisit Crazy Horse pour rassembler toutes les tribus Sioux et défendre les sacrées Black Hills contre l'assaut des immigrants européens venus à la recherche de l'or. Crazy Horse et le Colonel Custer sont bien plus que les simples protagonistes d'un conflit devenu désormais légendaire. Ils ont incarné la guerre entre deux mondes totalement différents, où l'un devait vaincre et l'autre succomber. L'article ne fait aucune distinction entre bons et méchants, vainqueurs et vaincus. Il illustre au contraire le déclin d'une époque et la naissance d'une autre. Mais surtout il met en évi-



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dence une dualité existentielle dans laquelle Crazy Horse et Custer voulaient, chacun à sa façon, accroître la grandeur du pays où ils vivaient.

Les prodigieuses Légions romaines. Un étonnant voyage dans le temps à la redécouverte de leurs origines et de leur identité, par Gerardo Restaino (p. 45).

L'article illustre l'organisation militaire de la Rome des césars, en analysant de façon détaillée l'un des piliers sur lesquels Roma fonda sa civilisation et sa grandeur: les célèbres Légions. L'auteur met en évidence des faits et des épisodes qui racontent avec une précision et une clarté étonnantes mille ans de civilisation. Peu nombreuses sont les études menées jusqu'à présent sur ce sujet et la poussière du temps a recouvert des épisodes importants liés à nos ancêtres qui furent, grâce à leur dévouement, parmi les principaux artisans du plus grand empire de l'histoire.

Spécial El Alamein. Lorsque le désert devint l'enfer. Les moments de la bataille et les témoignages captivants des héros qui en sortirent vivants (p. 59).

Ce reportage spécial consacré à la bataille de El Alamein à l'occasion de la commémoration de son soixantième anniversaire, se propose de rendre hommage aux héros, connus et inconnus, d'une grande bataille qui appartient désormais à l'Histoire et à la légende. Mais ce n'est pas tout. Il vise également à évoquer des valeurs telles que le dévouement, l'esprit de sacrifice, la loyauté, la fidélité, le sens de l'honneur et du devoir, la solidarité et l'amitié, des valeurs qui puissent servir d'exemple à la société et aux générations les plus jeunes.

Le reportage commence avec la présentation de la bataille de la part de M. Carlo De Risio et se poursuit avec les réflexions d'un ancien combattant, le Professeur Girolamo Garonna qui a recueilli, non sans difficultés, les témoignages de quatre rescapés. Dans la conclusion sont reportés le mémoire que le Sénateur Gabriele De Rosa a écrit de sa propre main sur le terrain (une grande première) et l'interview que celui-ci a accordée au directeur de la Revue Militaire.



Wer sind wir wirklich?, von Giuseppe Mani (S. 10).

Die Kirche ist ein konstanter Bezugspunkt auch des militärischen Lebens. Die Atypizität der graugrünen (olivgrünen) Welt darf uns nicht daran hindern, außerhalb und innerhalb uns selbst zu sehen, um unserer Existenz einen vollständigen Sinn zu geben und ernsthaft am beruflichen und familiären Leben teilzuhaben. Die Kirche ist dem Militär gegenüber sehr aufmerksam, da dieses hohe menschliche und gesellschaftliche Werte inkorporiert. Die Uniform selbst ist äußeres Symbol einer Berufung, die einen weiteren Punkt der Reflexion im Verhältnis zum Verhältnis zu Gott und der Welt zu geben. Dies rührt daher, dass ein jeder einen wichtigen, konkreten menschlichen Beitrag zur Familie und zur Gesellschaft leisten kann - auch in Stille. Das Wichtige ist aber - zu glauben und zu lieben.

Die Zukunft hat bereits begonnen.

Interview mit Domenico Contestabile, Vorsitzendem des Verteidigungsausschusses des Senats, von Giovanni Cerbo (S. 16).


Italien drängt sich immer mehr in den Vordergrund der Weltöffentlichkeit und diesem Umstand ist es zu verdanken, dass italienische Männer und Frauen lang gehegte Mystifizierungen und Vorurteile, die nicht immer verdient waren, entkräften haben können. In diesem Zusammenhang leisten die Streitkräfte ihren Beitrag, was auch ein Zeichen der tiefen Erneuerung ist, die sich über alle Sektoren erstreckt. Bei den Friedensmissionen werden unsere Soldaten seit geraumer Zeit als Vorbilder zitiert - sowohl von den Fachkollegen anderer Länder als auch von der jeweiligen Zivilbevölkerung. Die Armee ist jetzt schon bereit, einen aktiven Part im Europäischen Heer zu spielen, während die vollständige Professionalisierung (Umstellung auf Zeit- und Berufssoldaten) noch im Gange ist. Positive Zeichen sind auch von finan-

zieller Seite zu verzeichnen: Der Verteidigungsetat wirt sukzessive auf das gleichen Niveau von Frankreich und Großbritannien gebracht werden, wobei die Finanzierung dieser wie weiterer Maßnahmen ein großes Rätsel ist, so dass man wohl ausschließlich auf die von Brüssel bereits monierte Kreativität des italienischen Finanz- und Wirtschaftsministers vertrauen muss. Das internationale Parkett nimmt ein Italien war, dass immer aktiver geworden ist. In einer Epoche wie der unseren, in der den Weltkriegen intensive lokale Krisen folgen, sind die Demokratien oft zur Intervention aufgerufen. Europa muss jedoch erst noch alle seine tatsächlichen Potentiale beweisen, um eine noch einschneidendere und sichtbare Rolle als kontinentaler Stützpfiler der NATO zu bekommen. Diese und andere sind die Themen, die Senator Domenico Contestabile, Vorsitzender des Verteidigungsausschusses des Senats in einem leidenschaftlichen, doch gleichzeitig auch moderatem Interview anschnieidet. Die Gelegenheit ist günstig, die Grundthemen unserer Verteidigungspolitik zu untersuchen und auch, um die Relevanz unserer Streitkräfte festzustellen, die nach dem Überstehen vieler stimulierender Prüfungen weiter bereit ist, noch viele andere zu bestehen.

NATO CIMIC-Gruppe Süd: Die neue multinationale Truppe unter italienischer Führung, von Mario Ruggiero und Marco Buscemi (S. 22).

Am 1. Januar des Jahres ist in Motta di Livenza, die Einheit gegründet worden, die demnächst die Funktion «CIMIC Group South» (zuständig für ganz Südeuropa) übernehmen wird, sobald ihre Eingliederung in die NATO abgeschlossen sein wird. Dies wird bis Ende 2003 der Fall sein. Derzeit ist die Gruppe noch eine nationale Gliederung und ist mit Ausbildung und Amalgamierung des festen Führungspersonals und der Auswahl von Fachpersonal beschäftigt, das aus einer erlesenen Reserve Freiwilliger Ergänzungskräfte besteht. Neben Italien, das auf ausdrücklichen Wunsch der Allianz die Projektleitung übernommen hat, gehören der Gruppe Ungarn, Griechenland, Portugal und die Türkei an. Italien wird die Infrastrukturen, ein

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Großteil des Kommandos, die Chef- und Dienstkompagnie und eine CIMIC-Kompagnie mit den entsprechenden Spezialisten liefern.

Die «CIMIC Group South» wird die Operationen unterstützen, indem sie die Lagefaktoren am Schauplatz untersuchen wird und wird dadurch eine Friedensmissionen gegenüber freundlich eingestellte Umgebung schaffen. Die durch die Nato getroffene Wahl bestätigt das hohe Niveau an Effizienz und Zuverlässigkeit, welches die italienischen Streitkräfte derzeit auszeichnet. Dem Artikel steht eine Zusammenfassung eines Mitarbeiters vor.

Das Militärstrafrecht in den internationalen Beziehungen, von Vito Nicolò Diana (S. 30).

Das Kriegerecht ist ein Thema, das bei andauerndem «out of area»-Einsatz der Streitkräfte sehr aktuell ist. In diesem Artikel werden die Entstehung des entsprechenden Rechts und die Verwandlungen beschrieben, die derzeit im Kriegerecht im Gange sind. Dieses Recht wird als ein «Grenzrecht» angesehen, da es dazu ausersehen ist, eine wachsende Bedeutung zwischen den inneren Regelungen der Staaten und dem internationalen Recht zu werden. Jene Studie findet ihren Ursprung in der Notwendigkeit, deutlich die Grenzen und Zuständigkeitsbereiche des Waffengebrauchs anlässlich der Operationen zum Peacemaking und zur Wiederherstellung des internationalen Rechts zu ziehen. Alles ohne natürlich das edle Ziel aus den Augen zu verlieren: Vorbeugung und Rückschlag der Barbarei und Schutz der Schutzlosen.

Crazy Horse. Der letzte Strategie des indianischen Volks, von Rocco Panunzi und Romeo Michele Tomassetti (S. 36).

Wenn es denn so einfach ist, eine jegliche Enzyklopädie zu wälzen, um den schlaun Sioux-Häuptling Crazy Horse kennenzulernen, den letzten Helden des Indianerepos, ist es recht schwierig, in die Psyche dieses Menschen und in seine Weltanschauung Einblick zu gewinnen, wie auch, Realität und Mythos zu unterscheiden. Dem vorliegenden Aufsatz gelingt es hingegen, all dies in ein Gesamtbild zu gießen. Der Sieger vom Little Big Horn am 25. Juni 1876 war nicht nur der stolze und gerechte Gegner von Colonel

Custer, sondern auch die letzte Hoffnung eines ganzen Volkes, das der großen weiten Prairie, das Crazy Horse auswählte, um alle Siouxstämme zu vereinen und ihre heiligen «Schwarzen Berge» von der Goldsuche zu verteidigen, welche die eingewanderten Europäer fieberhaft unternahmen. Crazy Horse und Colonel Custer sind mehr als lediglich die Vertreter eines Kulturzusammenpralls, der in die Legende eingegangen ist. Sie haben den Krieg zwischen zwei sehr unterschiedlichen Welten inkarniert, in dem einer zum Sieg, der andere zur Niederlage bestimmt war. Im Text findet man keine «Guten und Bösen», Sieger und Besiegte, vielmehr das Abendrot einer Epoche und das Morgengrauen einer anderen. Doch vor allem wird ein existentieller Dualismus hervorgehoben, innerhalb dessen Crazy Horse und Custer, jeder auf seine Weise, das Land, auf dem sie lebten, groß machen wollten.

Die phänomenalen Römischen Legionen. Eine faszinierende Zeitreise auf den Spuren ihrer Ursprünge und ihrer Identität, von Gerardo Restaino (S. 45).

Der Aufsatz begibt sich in die Einzelheiten der militärischen Organisation des Roms der Cäsaren, indem er einen der Schwerpunkte analysiert, auf dem die Urbs ihre Kultur und ihre Strahlkraft aufbaute: die berühmten Legionen. Der Autor dieser messerscharfen Analyse erzählt Fakten und Begebnisse, die uns präzise und detailgetreu 1 000 Jahre Kultur schildern. Bislang ist dazu nur wenig geforscht worden, während mehr und mehr der Staub der Zeit diese Heldentaten unserer entfernten Urahren bedeckt hat, die mit ihrer Hingabe das größte Imperium der Geschichte aufgebaut haben.

Sonderbericht El Alamein. Als die Wüste zur Hölle wurde. Die Momente der Schlacht und die eindrucklichen Augenzeugenberichte der Helden, die zurückkamen (S. 59).

Dieser Sonderbericht, der dem Kriegereignis von El Alamein an seinem 60. Jahrestag gewidmet ist, will den bekannten und weniger bekannten Helden Respekt erweisen, und an eine große Schlacht erinnern, die inzwischen sowohl Geschichte als auch Legende ist. Doch ist dies nicht alles. Es will auch ein zusammen von Werten sein, dass man

der heutigen Gesellschaft anbieten möchte, auf dass sie daraus Beispiele an Entsagung, Opfergeist, Zuverlässigkeit, Treue, Ehrensinn, Solidarität, Freundschaft, Pflichtbewusstsein entnehmen möge.

Jener Sonderbericht beginnt mit der Vorstellung der Schlacht durch Dr. Carlo De Risio.


Es folgen die Überlegungen eines alten Kämpfers, Prof. Girolamo Garonna, der mit viel Mühe die Augenzeugenberichte von vier Augenzeugen aufgenommen hat. Schließlich wird das Memorial von Senator Gabriele De Rosa vorgestellt, der mit eigener Hand im Gebiet der Operationen handschriftlich Kriegstagebuch geschrieben hat. Dies ist die absolut erste Vorstellung dieses Werks - und das Interview stammt vom Chefredakteur der Rivista Militare.



¿Quiénes somos en realidad?, por Giuseppe Mani (pág. 10).

La Iglesia representa un punto de referencia estable para los militares. El carácter atípico del mundo militar no ha de impedir que miremos para nuestros adentros y para afuera con el fin de darle un sentido a nuestra existencia y participar plenamente en la vida profesional y familiar. La Iglesia no desatiende a los militares, siendo éstos los depositarios de altos valores humanos y sociales. El mismo uniforme es el símbolo exterior de una vocación que implica la disposición a atender al prójimo. La Navidad y el año nuevo que se aproximan serán una oportunidad para reflexionar sobre la relación con Dios y el mundo. Cada cual puede dar una valiosa aportación humana y concreta a la familia y a la sociedad, incluso en el silencio. Lo importante es creer y amar.

El futuro ya se asoma. Entrevista con el Sen. Domenico Contestabile, Presidente de la Comisión Defensa



SUMMARY SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN

del Senado, por Giovanni Cerbo (p. 16).

Italia está reteniendo cada vez más la atención del mundo y sus hombres y mujeres tienen el mérito de haber desmitificado algunos prejuicios que no siempre eran merecidos. En este contexto, el Ejército está haciendo su parte, y esto es la señal de esa profunda renovación que está arrollando los demás sectores. En las misiones de paz, los colegas de otros países y las poblaciones de las distintas áreas de intervención apuntan a los soldados italianos como a un ejemplo. La Fuerza Armada ya está lista para formar parte activamente del Ejército europeo, mientras se procede rápidamente a su completa profesionalización. Asimismo, señales positivas también llegan del sector financiero: el presupuesto de la Defensa italiana alcanzará progresivamente los de Francia y Gran Bretaña. Pero eso no es todo: la política internacional tiene en perspectiva para Italia un papel cada vez más activo. De hecho, las guerras planetarias y las intensas crisis locales que caracterizan esta época requieren a menudo una intervención por parte de las democracias. Sin embargo, Europa aún debe demostrar sus efectivas potencialidades, para poder desempeñar un papel todavía más incisivo y visible como pilar continental de la OTAN. Fueron éstos, y otros más, los temas tocados por el Senador Domenico Contestabile, Presidente de la Comisión Defensa del Senado, durante una entrevista tan apasionada como moderada. Una oportunidad para examinar los conceptos básicos sobre los que se fundan la Política de Defensa de Italia y el papel desempeñado por su Fuerza Armada, que tras haber aceptado exitosamente retos estimulantes está lista para los nuevos desafíos que le reserva el futuro.

OTAN CIMIC Group South. La nueva unidad multinacional bajo dirección italiana, por Mario Ruggiero y Marco Buscemi (p. 22).

El día 1 de enero de 2002 se creó en Motta di Livenza la unidad que asumirá, tan pronto como se perfeccione su inserción en la OTAN, la función «CIMIC Group South» (con competencia para toda Europa meridional). Ello habrá de llevarse a cabo para finales de 2003. El Grupo, cuya base es nacional, está procediendo a la formación y amalgama de los Cuadros permanentes y a la identificación del personal especializado, escogido de entre la reserva seleccionada de las Fuerzas de complemento voluntarias. A esta iniciativa se adhirió Italia - que dirige el proyecto tras haber adoptado los

propósitos fijados por la Alianza Atlántica - Hungría, Grecia, Portugal y Turquía. Italia proporcionará las infraestructuras, la mayoría del Mando, la compañía de mando y servicios y una compañía CIMIC con los especialistas correspondientes. El «CIMIC Group South» apoyará las operaciones haciéndose cargo de los factores de situación del Teatro y sentando las bases para el desarrollo de un medio ambiente favorable para las misiones de paz. La decisión de la OTAN confirma el alto nivel de eficiencia y fiabilidad del que puede dar prueba hoy día el Ejército italiano. Precede el artículo una síntesis del Subjefe de Estado Mayor del Ejército.

La normativa penal militar en las relaciones internacionales, por Vito Nicolò Diana (p. 30).

Con un Ejército constantemente comprometido en operaciones «Fuera de área», el Derecho de los conflictos armados se ha vuelto un tema de apremiante actualidad. En este interesante artículo se analizan la génesis de la normativa específica y los cambios que se están aportando al Derecho bélico, un derecho de frontera puesto que está destinado a cobrar una importancia creciente en los Ordenamientos tanto nacionales como internacionales. Dicho estudio se basa en la necesidad de definir claramente los límites y las competencias a la hora de utilizar la fuerza en el marco de aquellas intervenciones destinadas a restablecer la paz y la legalidad internacional. Sin por ello descuidar la nobleza del objetivo: prevenir y reprimir la barbarie y tutelar a los seres indefensos.

Crazy Horse. El último estratega del pueblo indio, por Rocco Panunzi y Romeo Michele Tomassetti (p. 36).

Si bien resulta fácil consultar cualquier enciclopedia para conocer al hábil jefe sioux Crazy Horse, el último héroe de la epopeya india, más arduo es penetrar la psicología del personaje y su visión del mundo y discernir entre mito y realidad. Sin embargo, el presente artículo lo logra en forma convincente. El vencedor de Little Big Horn (25 de junio de 1876) no fue únicamente el valiente y leal adversario del Coronel Custer sino también la última esperanza de todo un pueblo, el pueblo de las Grandes Praderas que escogió a Crazy Horse para reunir a todas las tribus sioux y defender las sagradas Black Hills de la riada de los inmigrantes europeos hacia el oro. Crazy Horse y el Coronel Custer no son solamente los protagonistas de un enfrentamiento que se

ha convertido en leyenda. Ellos han encarnado la guerra entre dos mundos muy distintos, una guerra de la que, forzadamente, uno habría de salir derrotado. En el texto no se identifican a buenos y malos, vencedores y vencidos, sino que se retrata el ocaso de una época y el nacimiento de otra, poniendo de relieve esa dualidad existencial a través de la cual Crazy Horse y el Coronel Custer quisieron, cada uno a su manera, volver grande la tierra en la que vivían.



Las fenomenales legiones de la Roma imperial. Un viaje encantador a través del tiempo para descubrir sus origen e identidad, por Gerardo Restaino (p. 45).

El artículo describe con prolijidad de detalle la organización militar de la Roma cesárea, poniendo de relieve uno de los pilares sobre los que se fundamentaba la civilización y el esplendor de Roma: las famosas legiones. Los hechos y episodios narrados con precisión y claridad por el autor en este análisis profundizado nos recuerdan mil años de civilización. Pocos estudios se han hecho al respecto, mientras el polvo del tiempo recubría lentamente los episodios de valentía de estos lejanos antepasados que con su total dedicación fueron los artifices del mayor imperio de la historia.


Reportaje especial sobre El Alamein. Cuando el desierto se convirtió en infierno. Los momentos de la batalla y los cautivantes testimonios de los que sobrevivieron (pág. 59).

Este reportaje especial, dedicado a la batalla de El Alamein para conmemorar su 60 aniversario, pretende honrar a los héroes, conocidos y desconocidos, que protagonizaron una batalla que ya pertenece tanto a la leyenda como a la Historia. Es más. El reportaje se propone evocar una serie de valores tales como la dedicación, el espíritu de sacrificio, la lealtad, la fidelidad, el sentido del honor y del deber, la solidaridad y la amistad; valores que sirvan de ejemplo para la sociedad y las nuevas generaciones.

El reportaje empieza con la presentación de la batalla por el Lic. Carlo De Risio y se prosigue con las reflexiones de un ex combatiente, el Profesor Girolamo Garonna, quien con su empeño logró juntar los testimonios de cuatro supervivientes. En la conclusión se presenta el memorial escrito en el terreno mismo por el senador Gabriele De Rosa - siendo ésta una primicia - y la entrevista que éste concedió al Director de la Revista militar.



THE EDITORIAL STYLE OF RIVISTA MILITARE



RIVISTA MILITARE

JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856

